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This thesis addresses the question what cryptography can do for one personally, i.e., it looks at
security and privacy challenges of individuals in today’s world. In particular, this thesis solves a
number of real-world problems, including secure handling of passwords used for authentication
and how to extend digital signature schemes to allow for additional features. The presented
protocols are provably secure under realistic assumptions, while providing state-of-the-art security
and privacy guarantees. All proposed protocols are highly efficient, useful, yet deployable on
a large scale, i.e., they are truly practical, thus bridging the gap between theory and practice.
This is demonstrated by providing performance evaluations and estimates of selected protocols.
In more detail, this thesis is split up into two main parts. The first part of this thesis
deals with protocols which allow a user to authenticate securely with a, potentially low-entropy,
password which must be considered a valuable asset not to be made public. The second part
applies several of the ideas given in the first part of this thesis to digital signatures. In particular,
the ideas introduced add new possibilities and privacy features to this already very versatile
primitive.
The first part of this thesis on protocols is split up into three sub-parts. The first sub-
part addresses single sign-on (SSO) protocols. In existing work, ticket-granting server(s) can,
e.g., impersonate users towards service providers or oﬄine attack their passwords. To tackle
this situation, two distributed password-based single sign-on (SSO) functionalities and their
realizing protocols are presented, where the password check and token generation is distributed
among multiple entities. Both functionalities are formulated in the universal-composition (UC)
framework. This guarantees security in arbitrary contexts, while also absorbing unavoidable
practical limitations such as typos, correlated password attempts by users and the case of guessed
passwords into the definition. The first protocol offers the basic functionality one expects from
such a distributed password-based SSO protocol, while the second protocol provides even more
privacy guarantees. For example, the service providers no longer learn which other access
rights an entity has, how long a token is valid and allows to establish different identities, i.e.,
pseudonyms, with each service provider.
The second sub-part introduces password-authenticated signatures, realizing virtual smart-
cards, as real smart-cards have a number of serious drawbacks. For example, special smart-card
readers are needed for usage and are not always available, while assuming that users always
carry such readers with them is unrealistic. Virtual smart-cards circumvent these limitations
by letting a user enter a password on a personal device, such as a smart-phone, to generate
signatures on arbitrary messages with the help of an additional server. This approach prevents
an adversary from using the signing key, if a user loses a device without also entering the correct
password. The server only contributes to signature generation, if the password entered was
correct. Neither the server nor the device alone can mount attacks on the password or on the
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password attempts, while the server does not learn the messages signed. As for SSO, security is
defined by providing an ideal functionality in the UC-framework, implying the same advantages.
The realizing protocol is secure against adaptive adversaries, i.e., an adversary can adaptively
corrupt any protocol participants. To account for the main use-case of lost devices, a new
corruption model is introduced. Namely, the simulator does not receive all prior input and output
upon corruption, which is necessary to model the case of lost devices such that the adversary
does not receive the prior password attempts. This is accompanied by a new non-committing
encryption scheme for the receiver which requires secure erasures. The implementation of the
given protocol shows that it even outperforms state-of-the-art smart-cards.
In the third sub-part, a fully simulatable non-committing encryption scheme is introduced.
In particular, the encryption scheme introduced for the virtual smart-cards requires secure
erasures. However, this is not always a reasonable assumption. To tackle this situation, this part
presents an extended definition and protocol which allows simulating non-interactive ciphertexts
even without secure erasures in a fully adaptive way. Hence, the simulator can give away the
randomness for secret key generation and the randomness used for ciphertext generation to
an adaptive adversary simultaneously. Such a non-interactive definition is in particular useful,
if ciphertexts are further processed. This is demonstrated by providing the first definition of
UC-secure signcryption in a setting with adaptive corruptions without secure erasures, which
was not possible before. However, this part also comes with an impossibility result: it is proven
that neither such an encryption scheme nor signcryption can be realized in non-idealized models.
The second part of this thesis deals with digital signature schemes with additional features.
Here, two main contributions are presented. The first contribution of this part is about
sanitizable signature schemes. In already existing definitions of sanitizable signature schemes, a
semi-trusted third party, named the sanitizer, can alter signer-chosen blocks of signed messages,
but a third party can derive which parts are actually admissible. The newly introduced notion
of invisible sanitizable signature schemes improves on this situation by also hiding which parts
of a given message are sanitizable, adding an additional layer of privacy. To build this new
primitive, the new notion of chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors is introduced. These
chameleon-hashes allow one to find arbitrary collisions of a hash, if two trapdoors at the same
time are known. One trapdoor is a long-term secret, while the second one is generated at hash
generation.
Finally, this thesis address the case of signing-right revocation. Nowadays, a certificate needs
to be checked whether it is revoked at every signature verification. As verification naturally
occurs more often, this negatively impacts on practicality, as thus network connectivity at
verification is required. The protocols presented solve this by letting the signature itself vouch
for the fact that the certificate was not revoked at signature generation time. This is achieved
by letting a revocation authority contribute to signature generation. To account for privacy
concerns, the authority does not learn the messages signed, while an extension also prohibits
that the authority can link a signing protocol to the final signature.
Summarized, this thesis presents provably secure protocols which are geared to be highly
efficient and are of direct practical relevance for personal usage, meaning that the primitives
can directly be deployed and used, even in today’s infrastructure.
Kurzfassung
Diese Dissertation geht der Frage nach, wie Kryptographie allta¨gliche Probleme lo¨sen kann.
Genauer werden eine Reihe von Herausforderungen gelo¨st, die in der heutigen vernetzten Welt fu¨r
dessen Benutzer von Bedeutung sind. Insbesondere wird in dieser Arbeit die sichere Handhabung
von Benutzerpasswo¨rtern und das Erweitern von digitalen Signaturen um zusa¨tzliche Funktionen
und Mo¨glichkeiten diskutiert. Alle vorgestellten Protokolle sind unter Standardannahmen
beweisbar sicher, geben Benutzern weitgehende Privatheit- und Sicherheitsgarantien, wa¨hrend
sie gleichzeitig sehr effizient und direkt benutzbar sind. Dies wird dadurch demonstriert, dass
einige ausgewa¨hlte Protokolle implementiert bzw. Laufzeitabscha¨tzungen pra¨sentiert werden.
Genauer ist diese Dissertation in zwei Hauptteile gegliedert. Der erste Teil dieser Arbeit
zeigt wie sich ein Benutzer sicher mit einem Passwort authentifizieren kann, ohne dass dieses Be-
nutzergeheimnis unno¨tigen Risiken ausgesetzt wird. Der zweite Teil erweitert digitale Signaturen
um einige der Ideen, die im ersten Teil vorgestellt wurden.
Der erste Teil ist in drei Unterteile aufgespalten. Der erste Unterteil adressiert “Single
Sign-On”-Protokolle (SSO), da existierende Protokolle einige gravierende Nachteile besitzen.
Beispielsweise kann ein korrupter Server in Kerberos sich gegenu¨ber Services als ein beliebiger
Benutzer ausgeben und Benutzerpasswo¨rter mit Wo¨rterbuchattacken angreifen. Um diese
Situation zu verbessern, werden zwei verteile SSO-Protokolle vorgestellt, in denen die Token-
erzeugung und die Passwortu¨berpru¨fung auf mehrere Server verteilt werden. Die dazugeho¨rigen
Funktionalita¨ten werden im UC-Framework definiert, welche zahlreiche handfeste Vorteile bietet.
Beispielsweise wird die Sicherheit der realisierenden Protokolle in arbitra¨ren Kontexten garantiert,
wa¨hrend gleichzeitig einige praktische Limitierungen wie, zum Beispiel, Typos, korrelierende
Passwortversuche und zufa¨llig von einem Angreifer geratene Passwo¨rtern direkt in der Definition
verankert sind. Das erste realisierende Protokoll implementiert die Basisfunktionalita¨t, wa¨hrend
das zweite Protokoll erweitere Privatheitseigenschaften offeriert. Insbesondere lernen die Services
im zweiten Protokoll nicht, welche anderen Zugriffberechtigungen ein Token hat, wie lange ein
Token valide ist und Benutzer ko¨nnen ihre Identita¨t hinter Pseudonymen verstecken.
Der zweite Unterteil stellt passwort-authentifizierte Signaturen vor, die virtuelle Smart-Cards
realisieren, da reale Smart-Cards einige gravierende Nachteile besitzen. Beispielsweise sind
immer spezielle Lesegera¨te vonno¨ten, welche nicht immer zur Verfu¨gung stehen, wa¨hrend es
unrealistisch erscheint einem Benutzer zuzumuten diese immer bei sich fu¨hren. Virtuelle Smart-
Cards umgehen diese Probleme indem ein perso¨nliches Gera¨t, wie zum Beispiel ein Smart-Phone
oder Tablet, benutzt werden kann um, nach einer zusa¨tzlichen Passworteingabe, Signaturen
auf beliebigen Nachrichten zu erzeugen. Diese Signaturen werden mit Hilfe einer zusa¨tzlichen
Servers generiert, um zu verhindern, dass im Falle einer Korruption des perso¨nlichen Gera¨tes der
private Signaturschlu¨ssel dem Angreifer in die Ha¨nde fa¨llt. Dieser Server hilft allerdings nur bei
der Signaturerstellung, wenn das eingegebene Passwort korrekt war. Das vewendete Passwort
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(und die Passwortversuche) sind nur angreifbar, wenn beide Entita¨ten korrumpiert wurden,
wa¨hrend der Server die zu signierenden Nachrichten nicht lernt. Die dazugeho¨rige Funktionalita¨t
ist, wie schon bereits fu¨r SSO, im UC-Framework definiert, also die gleichen Vorteile offeriert.
Daru¨ber hinaus ist das realisierende Protokoll sicher gegen adaptive Angreifer in einem neuen
Korruptionsmodell. In diesem lernt der Simulator nicht alle vorherigen Ein- und Ausgaben
der korrumpierten Partei. Dies modelliert, dass ein verlorenes Gera¨t dem Angreifer nicht alle
verwendeten Passwo¨rter ausha¨ndigt. Um das Protokoll beweisbar sicher zu machen, wird in
diesem Unterteil ein neues Verschlu¨sselungsschema vorgestellt, welche es erlaubt Chiffrate fu¨r
den Empfa¨nger zu simulieren, allerdings sicheres Lo¨schen voraussetzt. Die Implementierung
zeigt, dass das Protokoll sogar schneller als moderne reale Smart-Cards ist.
Der dritte Unterteil stellt ein vollsta¨ndig simulierbares Veschlu¨sselungsschema vor. Das
im vorherigen Unterteil eingefu¨hrte Verschlu¨sselungsschema beno¨tigt sicheres Lo¨schen, was
allerdings nicht immer zuverl¨ssig realisiert werden kann. Um dieses Problem zu lo¨sen, stellt
dieser Unterteil eine erweiterte, und nicht-interaktive, Verschlu¨sselungsdefinition vor, welche es
einem Angreifer erlaubt adaptiv Chiffrate erstellen zu lassen und, gleichzeitig, den verwendeten
Zufall fu¨r die Schlu¨sselerzeugung und Chiffraterzeugung zu bekommen. Eine nicht-interaktive
Definition ist insbesondere dann vonno¨ten, wenn Chriffrate weiterverwendet werden. Das
wird dadurch demonstriert, indem die erste UC-Definition von adaptiv-sicherer Signcryption
vorgestellt wird. Daru¨ber hinaus wird auch gezeigt, dass weder solch ein Veschlu¨sselungsschema
noch Signcryption in nicht-idealisierten Modellen realisierbar ist.
Der zweite Hauptteil dieser Arbeit behandelt digitale Signaturen und wie diese um zusa¨tzliche
Mo¨glichkeiten erweitert werden ko¨nnen. Der erste Teil diskutiert schwa¨rzbare Signaturen. In
existierenden Definitionen von schwa¨rzbaren Signaturen kann eine, teilweise vertrauenswu¨rdige,
dritte Partei (der “Sanitizer”) Teile von signierten Nachrichten aba¨ndern. Allerdings ist fu¨r
jeden ersichtlich welche Teile einer signierten Nachricht a¨nderbar sind. Die neue Definition von
unsichtbar schwa¨rzbaren Signaturen fu¨gt die Privatheitseigenschaft hinzu, dass nicht ersichtlich
ist, welche Teile schwa¨rzbar sind. Um diese Signaturen zu realisieren, werden Chameleon-
Hashfunktionen mit flu¨chtigen Falltu¨ren eingefu¨hrt. Diese Art von Hashfunktion erlaubt es
beliebe Kollisionen zu finden, wenn zwei Geheimnisse zur gleichen Zeit bekannt sind. Eines dieser
Geheimnisse ist ein geheimer Langzeitschlu¨ssel, wa¨hrend der Zweite erst bei der Hashgenerierung
erzeugt wird.
Der letzte Teil dieser Arbeit diskutiert das Problem wie Signaturerzeugungsrechte effizient
entzogen werden ko¨nnen. Heutzutage muss bei jeder Signaturverifikation der Status des
dazugeho¨rigen o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨ssels u¨berpru¨ft werden. Dies beno¨tigt im Regelfall Netzwerkzu-
griff und wirkt sich negativ auf die Effizienz aus. Die in diesem Unterteil vorgestellten Protokolle
umgehen dies, indem sie die Zertifizierungsstelle schon bei Signaturerstellung beweisen la¨sst,
dass der Schlu¨ssel gu¨ltig ist. Um den gestiegenen Privatheitsanforderungen gerecht zu werden,
lernt diese Entita¨t nicht, welche Nachrichten signiert werden, wa¨hrend eine Erweiterung es sogar
verhindert, dass Signaturen mit einem vorherigen Signaturerstellungsprotokoll verknu¨pft werden
ko¨nnen.
Zusammengefasst stellt diese Dissertation beweisbar sichere, und effiziente, Protokolle vor,
welche Alltagsprobleme lo¨sen.
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Cryptography has penetrated the every-day life of virtually every person. For example, digital
signatures, MACs, but also symmetric and asymmetric encryption are used on a regular basis
on the Internet, e.g., every time a website is requested. Additional applications of cryptography
include securing emails (e.g., PGP [Gar95]), attribute-based credentials (e.g., Idemix [CH02]),
but also secure communication with governments (e.g., tax statements via the German ID-
card [Dag13]). However, there are still a plethora of open real-world use-cases where cryptography
can reduce the amount of work users have to perform, can improve a user’s privacy or add
additional possibilities, but have not yet been solved.
This thesis identifies a number of these challenges and provides solutions for them. Namely,
the proposed constructions and primitives are of direct practical relevance, are geared to be highly
efficient (way beyond “being in PPT” [End16]), are based on widely believed assumptions which
stood the “test-of-time”, while also providing state-of-the-art security and privacy. Moreover, this
thesis takes care that the proposed primitives can easily be integrated into existing infrastructures
to allow for an easier transition, i.e., for an easier deployment in today’s environment. Thus,
users directly benefit from the proposed ideas and do not require to change their way of thinking
significantly, i.e., the primitives are useable as presented. Last, but not least, the introduced
underlying primitives (see the next section) are designed to be easily re-useable in other contexts
as new building blocks.
Roadmap. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. An overview of how the author
intends the reader to follow this thesis is given Section 1.1. Section 1.2 lists the concrete
contributions of this thesis. The broader context of this thesis is defined in Section 1.3, followed
by an introduction into the methodology used in Section 1.4.
1.1 How to Read This Thesis
This thesis consists of multiple chapters, which partially build on each other. Figure 1.1 depicts a
flowchart depicting how the author intends the reader to follow the chapters. Namely, Chapter 1
(this chapter) is meant as the starting point for the reader, whereas Chapter 2 contains the
preliminaries required to understand the definitions and primitives introduced in this thesis.
Then, the thesis splits in two major parts. Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 form the first part, while
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Personal and Password-Based Cryptography
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Preliminaries





Chapter 4: Virtual Smart-Cards:
Signing with a
Password and a Server
Chapter 7: Practical
Signing-Right Revocation
Chapter 5: UC-Secure Non-Interactive
Public-Key Encryption
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Figure 1.1: A flowchart describing how the ideas of the chapters are connected and are meant to
be read. Boxes with a blue background do not contain any new major insights, while the ones
with a green background do. The chapters on the left-hand side form the first part of thesis,
while the right-hand side from the second part.
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 shape the second part.
In the first part (Chapters 3-5), this thesis deals with the question of how users can use
passwords to authenticate securely, i.e., how passwords can be used in a responsible way. Namely,
passwords still are one of the most used and convenient means of user authentication, but
usually do not contain enough entropy to be considered secure in all contexts. This also includes
new building blocks, new corruption models and new insides how to model certain protocols.
The second part of this thesis (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) deals with authentication of
messages using signatures, also introducing new building blocks which can be used in other
contexts as well, based on the ideas given in the first part of this thesis.
In more detail, Chapter 3 introduces password-based distributed UC-secure single sign-on,
where a user has to authenticate with a password and its username and can later access a
plethora of services without the need to authenticate again. Chapter 4 introduces the idea of
password-authenticated server-assisted signing, including a new definition of non-committing
encryption for the receiver. The underlying construction of that encryption scheme is then
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shown to achieve UC-security even without secure erasures in Chapter 5. The second part of
this thesis starts with the definition of chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors in Chapter 6,
with the application of invisible sanitizable signatures. Then, Chapter 7 shows how to revoke
signing rights without having the verifier query the revocation authority at each verification.
Finally, this thesis is concluded in Chapter 8.
1.2 Contributions
As already outlined, the goal of this thesis is to propose practical (in the practitioner’s sense)
protocols and primitives, which are easily deployable in different contexts, while solving real-life
problems, focusing on cases where authentication is a necessity.
In more detail, this thesis contains the following contributions, split into several chapters,
partially building on each other.
Chapter 3 (UC-Secure Distributed Password-Based Single Sign-On). This chapter
introduces distributed password-based UC-secure single sign-on (SSO). The idea of SSO is
that a user only has to enter a password and can then use a plethora of services without
re-entering the password every single time a service is accessed. However, in existing work
a corrupt ticket-granting server can either impersonate users at services, can oﬄine attack a
user passwords and attempts as, e.g., possible in Kerberos, or does not model the case where
an adversary was able to guess a password. To tackle this situation, this chapter introduces
two provably secure protocols where the password check and token generation is distributed
among multiple ticket-granting servers. Distributing the password check and token generation
enforces that the adversary, as long as not a certain threshold of the servers granting the
authentication tokens are corrupt, does not learn the password used for registration and, under
no circumstances, anything about mistyped password attempts. The definition of SSO is given
in the universal-composition (UC) framework. This guarantees security in arbitrary contexts,
while also accounting for unavoidable practical implications such as typos, re-used passwords
and the like into the definition by letting the environment choose these values. The environment
also decides which services, and how long, a given participant can access for each generated
token. Two protocols realizing SSO are presented. The first protocol, modeled as F1sso, offers
the basic functionality of SSO, while the second extended protocol, given as F2sso, provides even
more privacy guarantees. For example, in F2sso, the services do not learn which other access
rights an entity has, how long a token is valid and allows to establish different identities with
each service provider. Both protocols have been implemented. The corresponding evaluation
shows that both protocols must be considered efficient enough for use in practice, especially
considering their merits.
Chapter 4 (Virtual Smart-Cards). This chapter proposes the idea of virtual smart-cards,
mitigating some problems of real smart-cards. For example, to use real smart-cards, specialized
hardware readers are needed, but not always available, while carrying additional hardware is not
very convenient for users. Moreover, attacks on hardware only become more and more powerful
and puts the secret signing-key stored on the smart-card at high risk. Virtual smart-cards
circumvent these problems by letting a user enter a, potentially low entropy, password on an
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almost always available personal device, such as a smart-phone or tablet, to generate signatures
on arbitrary messages with the help of an additional server. The main advantage of this approach
is that the adversary needs to corrupt both the server and the personal device before gaining
access to the signing-key, while the adversary also needs to correctly needs to guess a password
before generating signatures becomes possible, even though the personal device was corrupted.
The protocol is modeled as a UC-functionality FPass2Sign, incorporating the same advantages
as for the SSO protocols. The corresponding protocol is secure against adaptive corruptions
in a new corruption model if the RSA assumption holds, assuming secure erasures. In more
detail, in the new corruption model, the simulator no longer receives all prior input or output
of the functionality at corruption. This models the case that the adversary does not learn the
passwords entered on the device even if the personal device was corrupted at a later point in time.
Thus, the adversary neither learns the password used at registration nor the password attempts,
if at least either the device or the server remain honest. The chapter also introduces a new
non-committing encryption definition, where the receiver can be corrupted at any time, while
the adversary does neither receive the randomness used for ciphertext generation nor for secret
key generation. The protocol has been implemented and even outperforms real smart-cards,
demonstrated by the corresponding evaluation.
Chapter 5 (UC-Secure Non-Interactive Public-Key Encryption). The encryption
scheme presented in the prior chapter inherently requires secure erasures. However, there are
many situations where one does not want to, or cannot, assume secure erasures. This is, for
example, the case with SSDs, where blocks are not really deleted, even if marked so. To tackle
this, this chapter introduces a new non-committing encryption definition, where the adversary is
allowed to receive all randomness used for secret key generation and encryption in a completely
adaptive manner. This new definition is proven to be either stronger than, or incomparable to,
widely used definitions which model security against adversaries which receive randomness. It is
also proven to be equivalent to a completely local, i.e., non-interactive, definition of UC-secure
encryption, coined FLNCE, where the environment explicitly gains access to ciphertexts for further
processing. The corresponding construction is derived from the encryption scheme introduced
in Chapter 4. It is secure if trapdoor permutations exist in the programmable, and observable,
random-oracle model. This definition is in particular useful if ciphertexts are processed further,
e.g., for signing. This is shown by providing the first UC-secure signcryption definition FLSignCrypt
and construction secure against adaptive corruptions without secure erasures. This chapter
also comes with an impossibility result: it is proven that any construction achieving this strong
security notion cannot be realized in the standard model, i.e., not even a CRS helps. This
impossibility result also extends to the signcryption functionality FLSignCrypt.
Chapter 6 (Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors). This chapter introduces
the idea of chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors and their application to invisible
sanitizable signature schemes. In existing definitions of sanitizable signature schemes, a semi-
trusted third party, i.e., the sanitizer, can alter signer-chosen blocks of signed messages. However,
a third party can derive which parts are actually admissible, which lessens the privacy guarantees
given. The new notion of invisible sanitizable signature schemes prohibits this leakage by
additionally hiding the information which parts of a signed message are actually admissible,
thus closing this gap. To build invisible sanitizable signature schemes, the new primitive of
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chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors is introduced. Standard chameleon-hashes allow
to find arbitrary collisions in the domain of a hash, if a trapdoor is known. This is sometimes
too limiting, e.g., if finding collisions need to be prohibited. The new notion allows that the
entity hashing towards a particular public key can prohibit finding collisions, as long as no
second, i.e., an ephemeral, trapdoor is provided, which is generated during hash generation. Four
constructions are given, based on RSA and the discrete-logarithm assumption in known-order
groups. The first one is bootstrapped from a new “standard” chameleon-hash, while the second
one is based on RSA-like assumptions in the random-oracle model. The last two constructions
are based on the discrete-logarithm problem in known-order groups.
Chapter 7 (Practical Signing-Right Revocation). This chapter introduces a method to
easily revoke signing rights. Existing solutions either require that a given certificate is checked
whether it is revoked at every signature verification, requiring network access, or deploy other
highly specialized, and mostly interactive, methods. This negatively impacts on the usefulness
of this mechanism. This can be avoided, if the revocation status is already checked at signature
generation by the signer, i.e., if the signature itself vouches for the fact that the corresponding
public key was not revoked at signature generation time. Namely, the protocols proposed
solve most of these problems by requiring that a semi-trusted third entity helps generating the
signature if, and only if, the public key in question is not revoked. This semi-trusted third
party does this without learning the message and, with an extension, cannot link signatures
to protocols runs. The constructions are based on standard signatures, commitments and
partially-blind signatures. This chapter also proposes some extensions which provide even more
privacy, such as signer-anonymity, while also adding timestamps.
Chapter 8 (Concluding Remarks). This chapter summarizes this thesis and contains some
concluding remarks concerning the contributions. This also includes possible future research
directions which build upon the work presented.
1.3 Context of the Thesis
Here, the broad context of this thesis is defined, i.e., where this thesis is placed within the huge
body of work already done in similar, and related, areas. In particular, as this thesis mostly
deals with the authentication of humans and messages, there are two main contexts the thesis is
embedded in. These are presented next.
1.3.1 Human Authentication
Clearly, authenticating humans is one of the most basic tasks carried out. Therefore, there are
many general approaches. This distinction is mostly relevant for the first part of this thesis.
In a nutshell, one can distinguish between the following ideas [BJR+06], which summarize
the currently most deployed solutions:
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1.3.1.1 What you are
This is normally related to biometrics, e.g., someone’s voice [KAKP06], DNA [JRP04], blood
vessel patterns [FRH+12] and so on. One of the advantages of this method is that one normally
cannot lose, or forget, what and who someone is, ignoring accidents and the like. However, most
of the hardware used to check these biometric characteristics are expensive, cumbersome to use,
are not available everywhere, while the data collected needs to be checked against the data in
the database, which is clearly privacy invading, if one does not take extra precautions [RCB01].
1.3.1.2 What you have
What you have is defined as hardware and the stored information which the person wanting to
authenticate owns. This may be smart-cards [CJT02], certain tokens [SS96], but also everyday
hardware such as car keys [dKGHG08], passports [KR00a] and the like. Even though hardware
can store cryptographically secure keys, they have some serious drawbacks. In particular, they
can be lost and with a bit of effort, such keys may even be extracted, cloned or otherwise
be manipulated [KK99, VWG07]. Same of these drawbacks can be tackled by “physically
uncloneable functions” (PUF), but here a loss, or defect, implies a complete loss of the data
stored [BFSK11,SBP16,XSA+16]. This is clearly not acceptable in all cases.
1.3.1.3 What you know
What you know is data one remembers, e.g., a password, pass-phrase, memories [NP97]
and so on. Normally, this data does not contain very much entropy, can be forgotten and
easily be guessed [Gos12]. On the upside, designing a system around this paradigm is way
easier than using the other ones, as, e.g., for passwords only a standard keyboard is required.
However, it is well-known that relying on knowledge is rather dangerous, e.g., due to social
engineering [WD95,Wor08] or malware on devices [RAB14]. Moreover, as passwords and the
like normally follow some non-quantifiable distribution, i.e., if the distribution is not explicitly
pre-defined [HSBB16,MKV+13,MUS+16,USB+15], it is very dangerous to argue about security,
if the passwords are used as proper cryptographic material. For example, some work related to
password-based authentication comes without UC-security [Kie16], where security is defined
over some dictionary. However, it is not exactly clear what security guarantees are given in
this case, as the success probability may not be negligible or the passwords are drawn from
artificial distributions [CHK+05b]. Moreover, passwords are normally used in a way which is
plainly irresponsible, e.g., simple salting [FH07], which is essentially useless considering modern
computing power [Gos12].
The case “somebody you know”, introduced by Brainard et al. [BJR+06], is ignored here,
as it seems to be more of relevance in the context of social networks. However, it may lead to
additional insights. Clearly, the above examples are far away from being exhaustive. However,
they allow a first distinction of the methods used.
1.3.1.4 Relevance for the Methodology
It is very easy to combine two or more methods to counter some of the problems discussed
before [Sch05]. This is called “multi-factor authentication”. The first part of this thesis is
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located within the cases “what you know” and “what you own”. Namely, proper cryptographic
keys are defined to be related to the case “what you own”, while passwords are part of “what
you know”. The first part of this thesis bridges the gap between “what you own” and “what
you know”, while also presenting some additional new primitives which can be used in this and
others contexts as well.
Summarized, the idea is to provide secure password-based primitives in an environment
where normally proper cryptographic keys, i.e., high-entropy values, are required, but cannot be
stored or handled and thus are not available.
1.3.2 Message Authentication
The second part (and partially Chapter 4 in the first part of this thesis), deals with signatures,
which authenticate messages. In a traditional sense, signatures allow a holder of secret key to sign
a message, while the resulting signature can be verified by every party holding the corresponding
public key pk [DH76, Gam84, GMR88, Mer87, RSA78]. Clearly, only the holder of the secret
key should be able to sign messages. However, it became clear very quickly that this may not
be enough and therefore a lot of extensions have been proposed. For example, some signature
schemes allow for efficient zero-knowledge proofs [AFG+10,CL02b,LMPY16], which can, e.g.,
be used in the context of anonymous digital credentials [CH02]. Related to this approach is
the idea of having a set of participants collaborating, e.g., threshold signatures [Boy89], proxy
signatures [BPW12b,MUO96], group signatures [BCK+14,BCN+10,CvH91] and attribute-based
credentials [MPR11]. Here, it is still clear that the entity (or a set of entities) creating the
signature is still in charge of the message itself. However, these signatures still prevent that a
third party can generate new signatures on derived data, still validating under the original public
keys. Obviously, such a feature has its merits as well. For example, it may be useful to derive
means from a set of signed data, disclose only a certain subset of signed data to third party
(which is actually a feature in most anonymous credential systems [CH02]) or change certain
parts of signed messages, e.g., as an additional solution to the long-standing DNS enumeration
problem [GNP+15].
1.3.2.1 Computing on Authenticated Data
Following this line of ideas, it was only a matter of time till schemes were proposed which
allow to alter messages in a controlled way. Here, “altering” means that a second entity,
perhaps not being the original signer, can compute certain functions on signed data to derive a
signature which verifies under the original signer’s public key. What functions can be computed
depends on the scheme in question. For example, redactable signature schemes [JMSW02,KB13,
PS14,SR10,SBZ01] allow to remove parts of signed data, while append-only signatures only
allow to add new messages to a signature [KMPR05]. Somewhere in between are sanitizable
signatures [ACdMT05,BFF+09], which allow to change signer-chosen parts of a message to be
altered to arbitrary bit-strings. These approaches have then been generalized [ABC+15,ALP12,
BMS16]. Another line of work proposes that someone can calculate functions on signed data,
such as means, standard derivations and so on [BF11b,BGI14,LPJY15].
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1.3.2.2 Revocation of Signatures and Signing-Rights
One problem of signatures, which is very often overlooked, is how to handle the case where
a secret key is lost, i.e., given to the adversary [BS01b]. In particular, what happens to the
still honestly generated signatures? Can the adversary still generate validating signatures? In
the context of anonymous credentials, this is easily solved by revoking the right to generate
authentication tokens (which are essentially zero-knowledge proofs [QQQ+89] on signatures),
which only have a limited life-span anyway [CDR16,CKL+15,CKS09,CKS10]. In the context of
standard, i.e., “long-term” signatures, however, the problem is far more severe. In particular, if
one wants to revoke a public key, all signatures become invalid, even the ones generated by the
legitimate holder of the secret key. This may not always be wanted.
1.3.2.3 Relevance for the Methodology
The second part of this thesis deals with signatures in the general sense. It introduces a new type
of sanitizable signature scheme with strengthened privacy definitions, whereas the underlying
new building block can be re-used in different contexts as well. The last chapter introduces
an efficient protocol which partially solves the problem how to revoke signing rights without
revoking all signatures at once, while also circumventing the problem that verification needs
up-to-date revocation lists.
Additional related work is presented in the respective chapters, as state-of-the-art is better
understood in context with the respective contributions.
1.4 Provable Security in a Nutshell
This thesis exclusively deals with the topic of provable security.1 This means that the security
of the primitives presented is mostly based on problems from complexity theory which are
believed to be hard, dating back to the ideas by Diffie and Hellman [DH76].2 This is in contrast
to “old” approaches, where one simply assumes the security of a primitive. Simply assuming
security normally leads to broken schemes, e.g., the ciphers used during the second world
war or Caesar’s cipher. Thus, the paradigm shift to base security on, e.g., complexity-based
problems became a necessity. Even though this seems to be a very limiting constraint, there are
a plethora of assumptions which can be used, e.g., computing eth roots in a group of unknown
order [RSA78], discrete logarithms (and variants thereof) [DH76], learning parity with noise
(LPN) [BKW03, Pie12], learning with errors (LWE) [Reg09], but also some more “esoteric”
assumptions such as the “Uber-Assumption” [Boy08]. Some of them are even assumed to be
hard to solve using (currently highly hypothetical) quantum-computers [Reg04]. In more detail,
provable security means that if there is a successful attacker A on a cryptographic scheme S,
then this attacker A can be used to break a certain problem P (sometimes there is a set of
problems). In turn, this means that the hardness of the problem P implies the security of the
cryptographic scheme S. In other words, the security of S can be reduced to the hardness of
P. To transform such an adversary A, a PPT reduction R (sometimes called the adversary
B) is constructed which, together with A, breaks P with a probability polynomially related to
1Not to be confused with “probably secure”.
2Mostly, in this context, means that one can also resort to, e.g., statistical arguments.
1.4. PROVABLE SECURITY IN A NUTSHELL 9
the probability that A breaks S. To be meaningful, the reduction B is also required to run in
polynomial time. Thus, an ideal reduction B has roughly the same probability and running time
as the adversary A, i.e., it is “tight”. A “low-quality” reduction requires much more computation,
i.e., time, or is very unlikely to break the problem P , even though the adversary A is successful.
This gap is also referred to as “loss”. Bader et al. provide a very good overview [BJLS16]. In this
thesis, two different methods to define provably secure schemes are used, which are introduced
in a more formal manner next.
1.4.1 Game-Based Security
A game-based definition consists of two entities [BR06,Sho04]. Namely, there is a challenger
C and the corresponding adversary A. The underlying idea is that the adversary A “plays
a game” with the challenger C. In particular, the challenger defines the environment of the
adversary such as oracles, but also some precisely defined winning conditions and the inputs
to the adversary. These winning conditions can, e.g., be outputting a signature σ∗ on some
message m∗ verifying for some honestly generated (thus generated by the challenger C) public
key pk for which the adversary A has never seen a signature. Thus, the adversary A is said to
“win the game”, if it breaks the scheme S in question.
Normally, game-based definitions are used for more basic primitives such as signature schemes,
encryption schemes and so forth. However, game-based definitions are very delicate, are hard
to write for more complex primitives, and also do not define correctness of the scheme in
question. This becomes even harder, if one wants to define protocols. To tackle this, one can
use simulation-based security definitions, introduced next.
1.4.2 Simulation-Based Security
Simulation-based security dates back to the ideas given by Goldreich et al. [GMW87]. Sometimes,
this is also called “ideal/real world paradigm”. In a nutshell, the adversary is no longer required
to break a primitive, but only to distinguish between an “ideal world”, which may not even
contain any cryptographic details, yet defines the input-output behavior in form of an ideal
functionality which is perfectly correct (thus, defining correctness on-the-fly) and perfectly
secure by definition, with the “real world”, where the cryptographic protocol is executed [Can00].
The idea is that if there exists a simulator SIM, which only receives the information explicitly
leaked from the ideal functionality, yet can produce a view which is indistinguishable from the
real protocol execution, an adversary can run this simulator SIM itself and thus does not learn
any additional information from the real execution. This paradigm is in particular suitable for
more complex protocols, as the ideal functionality encapsulates “the essence” of the protocol,
including what an adversary learns. This will become clearer, when some ideal functionalities,
as well as the corresponding protocols and proofs, are presented in Chapter 2. As before, the
idea is that once such a distinguisher exists, some hard problem P can be solved using this
distinguisher. Moreover, if one resorts to an even more restricted simulation-based framework
such as UC [Can01], one can even achieve security with concurrent executions in arbitrary
contexts.
For both paradigms, this thesis only deals with black-box access to the adversary, as well as
reductions and simulators which are assumed to be (non-)uniform polynomially bounded, which
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is in contrast to super-polynomial simulations [BS05].
A small introduction is presented in Chapter 2. If more details, and formal definitions, are
required, the reader is referred to the work done by Baecher et al. [BBF13], as well as Bernhard
and Warinschi [BW13], Brzuska’s thesis [Brz13] and the tutorial by Lindell [Lin17].
1.5 A Personal Note
The thesis is (hopefully) written in such a way that a reader with a decent comprehension of
cryptography is able to understand the ideas given - and with a bit of more work - even the
proofs. In other words, the thesis wants to be readable, even for non-expert readers. It was also
taken care that this thesis is complete, meaning that all preliminaries are given, or if too basic,
cited. Thus, the author’s intention is to provide a really practical thesis where everyone, with a
bit of effort, can follow the ideas and bring them into practice. The author is, and will be (at
least if possible ¨^ ), available for any questions regarding the results.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Now, the basic preliminaries used throughout this thesis are introduced. These definitions can
be read on a “as-needed-basis”, as most of them are standard. Less well-known definitions are
introduced when used in the respective chapters.
Roadmap. The roadmap of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the used notation.
The used cryptographic hardness assumptions used are presented in Section 2.2, while Section 2.3
introduces some already known cryptographic primitives such as digital signature schemes and
the like. Section 2.4 provides a short introduction of the universal composition (UC) framework,
including some standard functionalities, such as the authenticated channel functionality FAuth,
while Section 2.5 introduces the random-oracle methodology.
2.1 Notation and Conventions
With λ ∈ N the main security parameter is denoted. Likewise, 1λ is the string of λ ones. All
algorithms, and the adversary A, receive 1λ as an, often implicit, input. An adversary A with
binary output is called a distinguisher D. If a is assigned a random element chosen uniformly
from a set S, a $← S is used. If A is a PPT (efficient) algorithm y $← A(x; r) is used to denote
that y is assigned the output of A with input x and external random coins r. If r is dropped, the
random coins are freshly drawn internally. The notation (y; r) $← A(x) means that r is assigned
the value of the fresh random coins used by A. The randomness space is denoted as R and
may depend on some external parameters such as a public key. For deterministic algorithms,
y ← A(x) is used. The notation AOfunction(·,·,b) means that the adversary A has oracle access to a
function function which requires two additional parameters chosen by the adversary A, while b
is fixed. All algorithms may return a special error symbol ⊥ /∈ {0, 1}∗, denoting an exception.
This is not always made explicit for the sake of readability. A function ν : N→ [0, 1] is negligible
if ν(λ) ∈ λ−ω(1). The bit-wise exclusive OR (XOR) is denoted as ⊕ : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ.
Note, XOR is an involution. The message space of a primitive is the set MS. As for the
randomness space R, MS may implicitly depend on system parameters or a public key. For
simplicity, it is assumed thatMS = {0, 1}∗, where {0, 1}∗ is the set of all finite strings with some
length polynomial in the security parameter λ if not explicitly defined otherwise. To further
shorten notation, X˜n,m, where n ≤ m, denotes the vector (Xn, Xn+1, Xn+2, . . . , Xm−1, Xm). The
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notation [1, n] is a shorthand notation for the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. By |m|, where m is a binary
string, the binary length is denoted. The notation |S| denotes the cardinality of a set S. If
an argument is a list, an injective encoding which allows embedding it into {0, 1}∗ is required.
The function ϕ : N→ N denotes Euler’s totient function. Further, it is sometimes (implicitly)
required that a public key pk can always be uniquely derived from the corresponding secret
key sk. This can simply be achieved by appending the randomness used to create sk to sk
itself. This is not be made explicit to avoid unhelpful boilerplate notation. For certain security
properties it is required that values only have one canonical representation, e.g., a “4” is not the
same as a “04”, even if seen as an element of N. The notation G× for G \ {1G} is used, where G
is some multiplicatively written group and 1G the corresponding trivial normal subgroup.1 All
mathematical symbols, such as Z, ∨, ∪ etc., have their usual meaning, if not explicitly defined
otherwise. Sets of parties are denoted as S, while single parties are denoted as S.
2.2 Cryptographic Hardness Assumptions
As this thesis deals with the topic of provable security, some assumptions are needed on which the
security of the proposed schemes are based on. Throughout this thesis, only assumptions which
“stood the test-of-time” are used to avoid less-studied ones, which have not been thoroughly
analyzed. If existing assumptions are used only once, they are introduced when needed. This is
done to keep this chapter short.
2.2.1 Computational Indistinguishability of Distributions
At certain locations it is required that certain distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
More formally, consider the following definition taken from Katz and Lindell [KL07, p 232].
Definition 2.1 (Computational Indistinguishability). Two probability ensembles X = {Xλ}λ∈N
and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted as X ≈c Y , if for every (non-
uniform) PPT distinguisher D there exists a negligible function ν such that:
|Pr[D(Xλ) = 1]− Pr[D(Yλ) = 1]| ≤ ν(λ)
In other words, the distinguisher D cannot decide, except with negligible probability in λ,
whether it sees a sample from the first or the second distribution, depending on λ. Sometimes,
“indistinguishable” instead of “computationally indistinguishable” is used.
2.2.2 The Discrete-Logarithm Assumption
Let (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ) be a group generator for a prime-order, and multiplicatively written,
group G2, along with a generator g of order q of that group, such that 〈g〉 = G. The discrete-
logarithm (DL) problem associated to DLGen is defined as follows. Given G, g, q, and gx, where
x
$← Zq, to find this x [KL07, p 278].
1Note, this is different from G∗.
2Clearly, DLGen only returns a description of G.
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Definition 2.2 (Discrete-Logarithm Assumption). The discrete-logarithm assumption holds, if
for every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[(G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ), x $← Zq, x′ $← A(G, g, q, gx) : x = x′] ≤ ν(λ)
Sometimes samples from Z∗q are drawn instead of Zq. This changes the view of the adversary
only negligibly and is thus not made explicit.
2.2.3 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ) be a group generator for a prime-order, and multiplicatively written,
group G3, along with a generator g of order q of that group, such that 〈g〉 = G. The decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem associated to DLGen is defined as follows. Given G, g, q, gx, gy,
gz, decide whether z = xy or z $← Zq [KL07, p 279].
Definition 2.3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption). The decisional Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion holds, if for every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
 (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ), b $← {0, 1},
(x, y, z) $← Z3q, a $← A(G, g, q, gx, gygb(xy)+(1−b)z) : a = b
− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
Again, sometimes samples from Z∗q are drawn instead of Zq. This changes the view of the
adversary only negligibly and is thus not made explicit.
2.2.4 Bilinear Maps
For some constructions, bilinear maps are used. These are introduced next. In particular, let
G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic multiplicative groups with prime order q, generated by gi, i.e.
Gi = 〈gi〉 for i ∈ {1, 2, T}. Let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be a bilinear map such that:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u ∈ G1,∀v ∈ G2 : ∀a, b ∈ Zq : e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃u ∈ G1,∃v ∈ G2 : e(u, v) 6= 1, i.e., e(g1, g2) = gT .
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm that calculates the mapping e.
Let (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) $← BLGen(1λ) be a group generator for three prime-order, and
multiplicatively written, groups G1, G2, and GT 4, along with the corresponding generators g1,
g2, gT of order q of each group, such that 〈g1〉 = G1, 〈g2〉 = G2, and 〈gT 〉 = GT = 〈e(g1, g2)〉,
where e is the bilinear map. The discrete-logarithm (DL) problem associated to BLGen is defined
as follows. Given G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, gT , q, e, and gx2 , where x
$← Zq, to find this x.
Definition 2.4 (Discrete-Logarithm Assumption for Gi). The discrete-logarithm assumption
for Gi now states that for every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr
 (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) $← BLGen(1λ),
x← Zq, x′ $← A(G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, gxi ) : x = x′
 ≤ ν(λ)
3Clearly, DLGen only returns a description of G.
4Clearly, BLGen only returns a description of the groups.
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This clearly also implies that DL is hard in GT .
Sometimes samples from Z∗q are drawn instead of Zq. This changes the view of the adversary
only negligibly and is thus not made explicit. Moreover, it is also required that the pairing
is of type III, i.e., there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between G1 and G2 in any
direction [GPS08].
2.2.5 The RSA Assumption
Let (N, e, d, p, q) $← RSAGen(1λ) be an RSA-key generator returning an RSA modulus N = pq,
where p and q are random distinct primes, e > 1 an integer co-prime to ϕ(N) and d ≡
e−1 mod ϕ(N). The RSA one-wayness problem associated to RSAGen is, given N , e and
y
$← Z∗N , to find x such that xe ≡ y mod N [RSA78].
Definition 2.5 (RSA Assumption). The RSA (one-wayness) assumption associated to RSAGen
holds, if for every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[(N, e, d, p, q) $← RSAGen(1λ), y $← Z∗N , x $← A(N, e, y) : xe ≡ y mod N ] ≤ ν(λ)
2.2.6 The One-More RSA-Assumption
The one-more RSA assumption associated to RSAGen is provided an inversion oracle I which
inverts any element x ∈ Z∗N w.r.t. e and a challenge oracle C, which, at each call, returns a
random element yi ∈ Z∗N , to, given N and e, invert more elements received by the challenge
oracle than calls to the inversion oracle.
Definition 2.6 (One-More RSA Assumption). The one-more RSA assumption holds, if for
every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[(N, p, q, e, d)← RSAGen(1λ), X ← A(N, e)C(n),I(d,n,·) :
more values returned by C are inverted than queries to I] ≤ ν(λ)
Here, X is the set of inverted challenges [BNPS03].
For all the RSA assumptions, it is sometimes required that e is larger than any possible
n w.r.t. λ (or even for e > n3) and that it is prime. Re-stating the assumptions with these
conditions is straightforward. In this case, it is also required that e is drawn independently
from p, q, or n (and d is then calculated from e and not vice versa). This can, e.g., be achieved
by requiring that e is drawn uniformly from [n + 1, . . . , 2n] ∩ {p | p is prime}, where n is the
largest RSA modulus possible w.r.t. to λ. This is left to the concrete instantiation of RSAGen.
2.3 Cryptographic Primitives
Now some basic cryptographic primitives are introduced, which are used throughout this thesis.




if b = 0, let v′ $← {0, 1}2λ
else, let v $← {0, 1}λ and v′ ← EvalPRG(v)
a← A(v′)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 2.1: PRG Pseudo-Randomness
2.3.1 Collision-Resistant Hash-Functions
In a nutshell, a family {HkR}k∈K of hash-functions Hk : {0, 1}∗ → R indexed by key k ∈ K is
collision-resistant, if an adversary cannot find any non-trivial collisions [Rog06].
Definition 2.7 (Collision-Resistant). A family {HkR}k∈K of hash-functions Hk : {0, 1}∗ → R
indexed by key k ∈ K is collision-resistant, if for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible
function ν such that:
Pr[k $← K, (v, v′) $← A(k) : HkR(v) = HkR(v′) ∧ v 6= v′] ≤ ν(λ)
2.3.2 Pseudo-Random Generators
PRGs allow to generate randomness from a short seed which is indistinguishable from a purely
random string. For this thesis, a constant stretching factor of 2 is assumed, as this is enough to
prove security. However, different stretching factors are also possible [App12].
Definition 2.8 (Pseudo-Random Generators). A pseudo-random generator PRG has one algo-
rithm {EvalPRG} such that:
EvalPRG. The deterministic algorithm EvalPRG gets as input a point p ∈ {0, 1}λ to evaluate. It
outputs a new point p′ ∈ {0, 1}2λ:
p′ ← EvalPRG(p)
Security. For security, it is required that PRG is actually pseudo-random [KL07, p 86].
Definition 2.9 (PRG Pseudo-Randomness). A pseudo-random generator PRG is called pseudo-
random, if for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣Pr[PRPRGA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Note, only one sample is provided to A. Security for multiple samples follows from a simple
hybrid-argument, i.e., a sequence of games [KL07, p 214].
Definition 2.10 (Secure PRGs). A pseudo-random generator PRG is secure, if it is pseudo-
random.












where oracle Eval′PRF on input κ and p:
return ⊥, if p /∈ {0, 1}λ
if b = 0, return EvalPRF(κ, p)
return f(p)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 2.2: PRF Pseudo-Randomness
2.3.3 Pseudo-Random Functions
PRFs allow the holder of a, potentially secret, key κ to evaluate a function on an additional
input point p.
Definition 2.11 (Pseudo-Random Functions). A standard pseudo-random function PRF consists
of two algorithms {KeyGenPRF,EvalPRF} such that:




EvalPRF. The deterministic algorithm EvalPRF gets as input the secret key κ and a point p ∈ {0, 1}λ
to evaluate. It outputs a new point p′ ∈ {0, 1}λ:
p′ ← EvalPRF(κ, p)
Sometimes, the input is not an element from {0, 1}λ, but some group-element g ∈ G. The
definitions in this case are similar.
Security. For security, it is required that PRF is actually pseudo-random [KL07, p 86].
Definition 2.12 (PRF-Pseudo-Random). A pseudo-random function PRF is pseudo-random, if
for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣Pr[PRPRFA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 2.2, where Fλ = {f : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ} is
the set of all functions f mapping a value v ∈ {0, 1}λ to another value v′ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Definition 2.13 (Secure PRFs). A pseudo-random function PRF is secure, if it is pseudo-
random.
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2.3.4 One-Way Trapdoor Permutations
In a nutshell, the idea of TDPs is that a permutation can only be evaluated in one direction.
The other direction can only be calculated if an additional secret, i.e., the trapdoor, is known.
Definition 2.14 (One-Way Trapdoor Permutations). A one-way trapdoor permutation TDP
consists of four algorithms {KeyGenTDP,EvalTDP, InvTDP, SampleTDP} such that:
KeyGenTDP. The algorithm KeyGenTDP is an instance generator, generating a description Σ of
some alphabet, a public key f and a private key f−1, such that:
(f, f−1,Σ) $← KeyGenTDP(1λ)
From now on, Σ is treated as implicitly contained in f . Moreover, it is required that
|Σ| ≥ 22λ.
EvalTDP. The deterministic algorithm EvalTDP gets as input a value s ∈ Σ, and the public key f .
It outputs a new point s′ ∈ Σ:
s′ ← EvalTDP(f, s)
The notation s′ ← f(s) is used to abbreviate s′ ← EvalTDP(f, s) from now on.
InvTDP. The deterministic algorithm InvTDP gets as input a value s ∈ Σ, and the private key
f−1. It outputs a new point s′ ∈ Σ:
s′ ← InvTDP(s)
The notation s′ ← f−1(s) is used to abbreviate s′ ← InvTDP(f−1, s) from now on.
SampleTDP. The algorithm SampleTDP returns a uniformly distributed value s ∈ Σ:
s
$← SampleTDP(Σ)
For simplicity, the convention that the randomness space of SampleTDP has the same size
as Σ is used.
Note, the randomness for sampling is explicitly modeled, as they are some cases where a
distinction is of paramount importance [GR13].
Correctness. It is required that for all λ ∈ N, all (f, f−1,Σ) $← KeyGenTDP(1λ), f and f−1
both define a permutation over Σ. Thus, for all s ∈ Σ it must hold that s = f−1(f(s)) and
s = f(f−1(s)).
Security. For security, it is required that a TDP is actually one-way without knowing the
trapdoor [KL07, p 93]. More formally, for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible
function ν such that:
Pr[(f, f−1,Σ) $← KeyGenTDP(1λ), x $← Σ : x = A(f, f(x),Σ)] ≤ ν(λ)
As an example, an RSA-key generator RSAGen yields a trapdoor one-way permutation under
the RSA assumption with Σ = Z∗N , f(x) := xe mod N and f−1(y) := yd mod N [GM84].
Definition 2.15 (Secure TDPs). A one-way trapdoor permutation TDP is secure, if it is correct
and one-way.
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2.3.5 Digital Signature Schemes
Digital signatures allow the holder of a secret key skSig to sign a message m ∈MS, while with
knowledge of the corresponding public key pkSig everyone can verify whether a given signature
was actually endorsed by the signer, i.e., the holder of pkSig [RSA78].
Definition 2.16 (Digital Signatures). A standard digital signature scheme DSIG consists of
three algorithms {KeyGenSig, SignSig,VerifySig} such that:




SignSig. The algorithm SignSig gets as input the secret key skSig and the message m ∈ MS to
sign. It outputs a signature:
σ
$← SignSig(skSig,m)
VerifySig. The deterministic algorithm VerifySig outputs a decision bit d ∈ {false, true}, indicating
if the signature σ is valid, w.r.t. pkSig and m:
d← VerifySig(pkSig,m, σ)
Correctness. For each DSIG it is required that the correctness properties hold. In particular,
it is required that for all λ ∈ N, for all (skSig, pkSig) $← KeyGenSig(1λ), for all m ∈ MS,
VerifySig(pkSig,m, SignSig(skSig,m)) = true is true. This definition captures perfect correctness.
Security. Two different security notions are used throughout this thesis. These are presented
next.
Unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (UNF-CMA). Now, (weak) un-
forgeability of digital signature schemes [GMR88] is defined. In a nutshell, it is required that
an adversary A cannot (except with negligible probability) come up with a signature σ∗ for a
new message m∗, i.e., for a message it has never seen a signature for. The adversary A can
adaptively query for signatures on messages of its own choice.
Definition 2.17 (Unforgeability). A signature scheme DSIG is unforgeable, if for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that
Pr[UNF-CMADSIGA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 2.3.





(m∗, σ∗) $← AOSign
′
Sig(skSig,·)(pkSig)
where oracle Sign′Sig on input skSig and m:
set Q ← Q∪ {m}
return σ $← SignSig(skSig,m)
return 1, if VerifySig(pkSig,m∗, σ∗) = true ∧ m∗ /∈ Q
return 0





(m∗, σ∗) $← AOSign
′
Sig(skSig,·)(pkSig)
where oracle Sign′Sig on input skSig and m:
let σ $← SignSig(skSig,m)
set Q ← Q∪ {(m,σ)}
return σ
return 1, if VerifySig(pkSig,m∗, σ∗) = true ∧ (m∗, σ∗) /∈ Q
return 0
Figure 2.4: DSIG Strong Unforgeability
Strong Unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (sUNF-CMA). For some
occasions, normal unforgeability of digital signature schemes is not enough, as the definition
does not rule out that the adversary A can come up with new signatures for messages it knows
signatures for [ADR02]. In a nutshell, strong unforgeability requires that an adversary A cannot
(except with negligible probability) come up with any new message/signature pair (m∗, σ∗)
which it has not seen before. As for (weak) unforgeability, the adversary A can adaptively query
for signatures on messages of its own choice.
Definition 2.18 (Strong Unforgeability). A signature scheme DSIG is strongly unforgeable, if
for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that
Pr[sUNF-CMADSIGA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 2.4.
Depending on the concrete use-case, different security properties are required. Thus, it is
made explicit at the specific locations what security guarantees are needed from the used DSIG.
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Examples. An example for a strongly unforgeable DSIG is RSA Full-Domain Hash (RSA-
FDH) [BR96], introduced next, which is secure in the random-oracle model, if the RSA-
Assumption holds [Cor00,KK12].
RSA-FDH Signatures. The RSA-FDH signature scheme DSIGRSA = (KeyGenSig, SignSig,
VerifySig) associated to RSA-key generator RSAGen is defined as follows:
Construction 2.19 (DSIGRSA). It requires a hash function HRSA : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N , modeled as a
random oracle.
KeyGenSig. The algorithm KeyGenSig generates the key pair in the following way:
1. Run (N, e, d, p, q) $← RSAGen(1λ).
2. Output ((d, p, q), (N, e)), where N = pq.
SignSig. The algorithm SignSig generates a signature on m ∈ {0, 1}∗ in the following way:
1. Return σ, where σ ← (HRSA(m))d mod N .
VerifySig. The algorithm VerifySig verifies a signature in the following way:
1. Return true, if HRSA(m) = σe mod N .
2. Return false.
Sometimes, a signature scheme also requires an additional parameter generation algorithm.
If this is required, it is made explicit.
2.3.6 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
Public-key encryption allows to encrypt a message m using a given public key pkENC. In a
nutshell, the given ciphertext leaks no information of the contained message, except its length,
if the corresponding secret key skENC is not known.
Definition 2.20 (Labeled Public-Key Encryption Schemes). A labeled public-key encryption
scheme ENC consists of four algorithms {PPGenENC,KeyGenENC,EncENC,DecENC}, such that:
PPGenENC. The algorithm PPGenENC outputs the public parameters of the scheme:
ppENC
$← PPGenENC(1λ)
It is assumed that ppENC is implicit input to all other algorithms. Also, this algorithm may
be omitted, if it is clear from the context.
KeyGenENC. The algorithm KeyGenENC outputs the public and private key, on input ppENC:
(skENC, pkENC)
$← KeyGenENC(ppENC)
















return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 2.5: ENC IND-CPA Security
EncENC. The algorithm EncENC gets as input the public key pkENC, the message m ∈ MS to
encrypt, and also some label ` ∈ {0, 1}∗. It outputs a ciphertext:
c
$← EncENC(pkENC,m, `)
DecENC. The deterministic algorithm DecENC outputs a message m (or ⊥, if the ciphertext is
invalid) on input skENC, label ` and a ciphertext c:
m← DecENC(skENC, c, `)
This defines labeled public-key encryption schemes. For a definition without labels, one can
simply fix ` to the empty string , also for the security definitions. Sometimes, PPGenENC is
omitted, if clear from the context.
Correctness. For each ENC, the usual correctness properties must hold. In particular,
it is required that for all λ ∈ N, for all ppENC $← PPGenENC(1λ), for all (skENC, pkENC) $←
KeyGenENC(ppENC), for all m ∈MS, and for all ` ∈ {0, 1}∗, DecENC(skENC,EncENC(pkENC,m, `),
`) = m is true. Again, this definition captures perfect correctness.
Security. For encryption schemes, a plethora of different notions appeared in the literature.
For now, only two definitions are required. Additional notions are introduced in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.
Chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The following definition is derived from the
ideas given by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84]. Note, this definition has no label `.










where oracle DecENC on input skENC, c and `:
return m′ ← DecENC(skENC, c, `)
where OH(·) on input s:
return H(s)
If |m∗0| 6= |m∗1| ∨m∗0 /∈MS ∨m∗1 /∈MS:
c∗ ← ⊥
Else:





where oracle Dec′ENC behaves as ODecENC(skENC,·,·),
but returns ⊥ if (c∗, `∗) is queried.
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 2.6: ENC Labeled IND-CCA2 Security
Definition 2.21 (IND-CPA-Security). An encryption scheme ENC is IND-CPA-secure, if for
any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[IND-CPAENCA (λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 2.5.
Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). The following definition is derived
from Camenisch and Shoup, as well as from Naor and Yung [CS03,NY90].
Definition 2.22 (Labeled IND-CCA2-Security). A labeled encryption scheme ENC is IND-
CCA2-secure, if for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[IND-CCA2ENCA (λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 2.6.
Note, both security definitions already have explicit access to a random oracle. If this is
not wanted, one can set H = ⊥. Why this is made explicit in this definition is discussed in
Chapter 4.
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2.3.7 Non-Interactive Commitment Schemes
Non-interactive commitment schemes allow one party to commit itself to a value without
revealing it [Blu81]. Later, the committing party can give some opening information to the
receiver, which can then “open” the commitment. This corresponds to a safe containing a letter,
where the key can be given to the receiver of the safe at some later point.
Definition 2.23 (Non-Interactive Commitments). A non-interactive commitment scheme CC
consists of three PPT algorithms {ParGenCC,CommitCC,OpenCC}, such that:




CommitCC. This algorithm takes as input a message m and outputs a commitment C together
with corresponding opening information O:
(C,O) $← CommitCC(ppCC,m)
OpenCC. This deterministic algorithm takes as input a commitment C with corresponding opening
information O and outputs message m ∈MS:
m← OpenCC(ppCC, C,O)
Correctness. A commitment scheme CC is said to be correct, if for all λ ∈ N, all ppCC $←
ParGenCC(1λ), for all messages m ∈ MS, for all (C,O) $← CommitCC(ppCC,m), it holds that
OpenCC(ppCC, C,O) = m. This captures perfect correctness.
Security. Two different security notions are required. These are presented next.
Binding. Binding means that a commitment cannot be opened to two different messages.
Definition 2.24 (Binding). A non-interactive commitment scheme is binding, if for all PPT
adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr
 ppCC
$← ParGenCC(1λ), (C∗, O∗, O′∗) $← A(ppCC),
m← OpenCC(ppCC, C∗, O∗),m′ ← OpenCC(ppCC, C∗, O′∗) :
m 6= m′ ∧ m 6= ⊥ ∧ m′ 6= ⊥
 ≤ ν(λ)
If ν(λ) = 0, even for unbounded adversaries, a commitment scheme is said to be perfectly
binding.
24 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
Hiding. Hiding means that a commitment does not leak which message it contains, as
long as the corresponding opening information is not known.
Definition 2.25 (Hiding). A non-interactive commitment scheme is hiding, if for all PPT
adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
 (ppCC,m0,m1, state)
$← A(1λ), b $← {0, 1},




If ν(λ) = 0, even for unbounded adversaries, the commitment scheme is said to be perfectly
hiding. Note, the adversary can even generate the parameters for the CC.
Definition 2.26 (Secure CCs). A commitment scheme CC is secure, if it is correct, binding
and hiding.
Note, a commitment scheme CC cannot be perfectly hiding and perfectly binding at the
same time [FF11]. An example for perfectly-hiding commitment-schemes are Pedersen com-
mitments [Ped91], which are binding under the DL-Assumption. An example for perfectly-
binding commitment-schemes are perfectly correct CPA-secure encryption schemes, e.g., El
Gamal [Gam84], which is hiding under DDH.
2.4 Universal Composition – In a Nutshell
As already discussed in Chapter 1, game-based security definitions are easier to understand
for simple primitives. However, they have also some serious drawbacks. Namely, they become
pretty hard to understand for more complex systems far beyond digital signatures. Moreover,
they do not guarantee that they interact well with other primitives in a composed system, or in
some other higher-level protocol, if not defined very carefully. As a prominent example, one can
consider interactive zero-knowledge proofs [GMR85], which may be trivially insecure, if run in
parallel [GK96].
It is therefore no surprise that one wants to have a framework which guarantees that
once security of a certain primitive is proven, it remains secure in arbitrary contexts and can
then be used as a given building block in other protocols, without the need to re-prove the
whole system. This is known as universal composition (UC). The best-known framework is
Canetti’s UC-framework [Can01], even though related frameworks with similar goals have been
published [HS15,Ku¨s06,PW01,Wik16]. In this thesis, the UC framework by Canetti is used, as
it seems to be the current standard, even though it has some serious flaws, e.g., the runtime
definition [HUM13]. However, from a purely practical perspective, they seem to be of almost no
real-life relevance [End16].
In more detail, the UC-framework [Can01] enables the modular design of cryptographic
protocols by analyzing the security of composed protocols in a so-called “hybrid” model, where
subprotocols are replaced by their “ideal functionalities”, thereby eliminating the need for
explicit reductions from the security of the building blocks in the overall security proof. In a
nutshell, an ideal functionality F describes what input and output interfaces a protocol offers
to the parties, but also which power the adversary has and which information the adversary
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receives. Thus, an ideal functionality F can be seen as a trusted third party which receives input
from all parties and also calculates and hands back the results in a perfectly secure manner.
Therefore, an ideal functionality F specifies the security and correctness of a protocol at the
same time. This idea dates back to Goldwasser et al. [GMW87]. The input for the participating
parties are provided by an abstract entity called the environment Z, which is modeled as an
interactive Turing machine. The environment Z can also freely communicate with the real-world
adversary A, which is also modeled as an interactive Turing machine. The adversary A interacts
with the protocol in question directly, incorporating the network, but also any corrupted parties.
To distinguish between different instances of the protocol, UC requires that a globally unique
session identifier sid is assigned. All honest parties participating in an instance with a given
sid execute the same protocol, while neither the adversary’s nor the environment’s code are
specified. Each party also receives a unique party identifier pid to distinguish between the
different entities participating in the protocol. It is also important to note that in UC at most
one party has control, i.e., neither computation nor network traffic is concurrent.
Faithful to its name, the UC framework guarantees that any secure instantiation of the
(sub)protocols yields a secure instantiation in the composed protocol, even though the composed
protocol may be insecure. To prove that a given protocol realizes an ideal functionality, one
constructs an ideal world adversary SIM (the “simulator”) which interacts with the ideal
functionality and the real adversary such that, informally speaking, for any environment Z and
any (arbitrary but fixed) adversary A the view of real execution is indistinguishable from the
view the same environment receives in the ideal world run with the simulator SIM. In other
words, UC requires that for every attack by the adversary A in the real world, SIM can translate
the attack into the ideal world. Hence, a protocol is said to emulate a given functionality F , as
the real adversary cannot do any more harm as defined and is thus already incorporated into
the definition. More formally, there is the following definition.
Definition 2.27. A protocol pi UC-emulates a protocol φ, if for all (non-uniform) PPT ad-
versaries A there exists a (non-uniform) PPT simulator SIM such that for all (non-uniform)
environments Z the following holds:
Exec(pi,A,Z)(1λ, z) ≈c Exec(φ, SIM,Z)(1λ, z)
Exec(pi,A,Z)(1λ, z) is defined as the distribution ensemble {Exec(pi,A,Z)(1λ, z)}λ∈N, while
Exec(φ, SIM,Z)(z) is defined as the distribution ensemble {Exec(φ, SIM,Z)(1λ, z)}λ∈N. The
variable z ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a polynomial-size advice for the non-uniform model of computation.
Note, if a proof is given in the uniform model of computation, it is also valid in the non-
uniform setting, i.e., if the advice (here z) is ignored, the proofs are still correct. The converse
is not true in general [CLMP13,KM13].
Universal composition now allows to derive the following theorem, which is the whole point
of defining and using UC-like models:
Theorem 2.28. Let pi, φ, ρ be some protocols such that pi UC-emulates φ, while ρ uses pi as a
subprotocol. Then ρφ→pi emulates ρ.
Here, ρφ→pi means that the calls by ρ to the subprotocol pi are replaced with calls to the
protocol φ. In other words, if pi UC-realizes an ideal functionality F , while a protocol makes
use of F , it is save to replace F with pi, which is exactly the hybrid-model of computation.
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2.4.1 Corruption Models
Canetti defined three corruption models [Can01]. Namely, these are static corruptions, dynamic
corruptions and transient corruptions (which is a subset of dynamic corruptions). These have
later been refined to account for a more fine-grained model. Next, a quick overview over the
different corruption models is given, as this thesis deals with different ones.
2.4.1.1 Static Corruptions
If a protocol is proven secure assuming static corruptions, the adversary has to corrupt the
parties it wants to control before the protocol starts. Clearly, this corruption model only gives
feeble security guarantees. However, depending on the use-case, it may still be strong enough and
sometimes statically secure protocols can be lifted to support adaptive corruptions [BFSK11].
2.4.1.2 Dynamic Corruptions
Dynamic corruptions allow the adversary to corrupt a party after the protocol has started and
has already run for an adversarially chosen amount of time. Upon corruption, the adversary
wants to see a convincing state of the corrupted party, e.g., randomness, an execution history,
secret keys and the like. Note, the environment knows which parties are corrupted, thus
prohibiting the simulator corrupting all parties and to achieve its task in a trivial way [Can01].
Depending what assumptions are reasonable, this corruption model must further be divided.
With Erasures. If one assumes secure erasures, parties can erase parts of the state. For
example, if a party deletes the randomness used to generate a key pair, the adversary is “satisfied”
if it only sees the secret key and not the randomness used to create it. Refer to Chapter 4 for
additional examples. Similar arguments apply, e.g., for zero-knowledge proofs [CKS11]. This
may allow to prove certain instantiations secure, which may not provably secure otherwise.
However, assuming secure erasures may not always be acceptable, as it may be very hard
to achieve [CCGS10]. Moreover, depending on what security guarantees one requires, this
corruption model has two subtypes.
Receiving Prior Input/Output. This is the normal definition. Here, the simulator
SIM receives the prior input/output of the corrupted party and can construct the state of the
corrupted party based on the now learned information.
Not Receiving Prior Input/Output. This is the opposite. Here, the simulator does
not receive the prior input/output of that party. Clearly, this corruption model implies secure
erasures, as otherwise the adversary expects all input and output somewhere in the execution
history. This corruption model is introduced in Chapter 4.
Clearly, one could also define “intermediate” stages, where the simulator only needs to
simulate fractions (say, the last five algorithms run) of the execution history, or only 50% of the
execution history. These intermediate definitions are not used in this thesis, but may lead to
interesting new insights, much like non-perfectly erasable memory [CEM16].
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Without Erasures. Security without secure erasures is the strongest corruption model
considered in this thesis. Here, the adversary expects, upon corruption, the complete state
and a convincing execution history. Thus, it is obvious the simulator SIM receives all prior
input/output of the now corrupted party.
Each of the four aforementioned corruption models can also support transient corruptions.
Here, corrupt entities can recover from corruption after a special input from the environment.
However, only a handful of protocols actually achieving this notion have been presented so
far [CEN15,CLN15]. This thesis does not deal with this kind of corruption.
2.4.2 General Conventions
When writing ideal functionalities and protocols, the following conventions are used. If additional
conventions are necessary, this is made explicit at the specific locations.
• If a party receives a network message which does correspond to a message format expected, it
is ignored, while the environment receives an implicit error message.
• If a functionality receives input for which it does not have a corresponding interface, it outputs
an implicit error message directly to the environment, i.e., it also gives up control. The same
is true for all protocol machines.
• For some protocols, responsive environments and adversaries are required [CEK+16]. In a
nutshell, this means that an adversary or environment needs to directly answer a request for
a given interface. This is necessary, if certain “meta-information” is required. In more detail,
the notation “send x to A and wait for y from A” is used as a shorthand notation for requests
to responsive environments/adversaries as defined by Camenisch et al. [CEK+16], such that
the functionality “stalls” until A provides a response y through a dedicated interface. While
the functionality waits for a message from A, the adversary/environment cannot invoke any
other interfaces of the ideal functionality, generate any network traffic or activate/corrupt any
other parties.
• An output is “delayed”, if the simulator can decide when the party actually outputs a message.
The output can either be private, where the adversary does not learn its content, or public,
where the adversary leans the message. “Hybrid” definitions, i.e., where some parts are public
and some are not, are not used in this thesis.
2.5 The Random-Oracle Methodology
In a nutshell, a random oracle (RO) is a purely random function which can be called by all
participants, including the adversary [BR93]. Random oracles are normally used to abstract
from, and idealize, real hash-functions (which are not random) such as SHA-3 [BDPA14]. Thus,
a random oracle can be seen as a black-box where no participant can look “into”. This is
necessary, as a purely random function requires an exponential amount of space to be stored,
which is clearly impossible in a PPT setting [Mit16]. These random oracles help, e.g., in
security proofs, when the challenger takes over control of the random oracle, simulating it for
the adversary. This possibility can be used to embed certain challenges into the random-oracle
responses, and to “see” the queries made by the adversary, i.e., to extract pre-images, which
thus is a very strong model [AB13, BF11a, FLR+10]. In particular, there are impossibility
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1. Query. Upon input (QUERY, sid,m), m ∈ D, from a party P do:
• If there is a tuple (m, hˆ) ∈ L for some hˆ, let h← hˆ.
• Else, draw hˆ $← R, add (m, hˆ) to L, and set h← hˆ.
• Output (RESPONSE, sid,m, h) to P.
Figure 2.7: Ideal random-oracle functionality FD→RRO , where L is an initially empty list
results that state that random oracles cannot be instantiated [CGH04]. Namely, there are
constructions which are secure in the random-oracle model, while any instantiation without
random oracles make the construction trivially insecure. On the upside, however, there is not a
single, not on purpose broken, cryptographic scheme which has been succesfully attacked in
the real world [KM15]. Moreover, the random-oracle methodology [BR93] has proven useful
in many scenarios, including, but not limited to, NIZKs [FS86], digital signatures [Cor00] and
identity-based encryption [BF01]. Thus, the random-oracle methodology needs to be treated as
a heuristic, but has its merits.
Unfortunately, there are results that prove that certain primitives cannot be instantiated in
the computational model, e.g., non-interactive secure message transfer [Nie02]. Thus, recently
published results, including UCEs and indistinguishability obfuscation, cannot be used in all
constructions [BHK13,BFM14,HSW14]. This is also true for some of the constructions given in
this thesis.
However, there is the additional benefit that primitives which make use of the random-oracle
methodology tend to be more efficient than schemes in the standard, i.e., computational model
of computation. The random-oracle methodology is used in several occasions presented in this
thesis to side-step certain impossibility results, but also to realize efficient and practical schemes
beyond the PPT-barrier.
Mittelbach’s PhD thesis provides a deeper and more formal insight into the random oracle
methodology, its possibilities, its shortcomings, but also how to circumvent certain restric-
tions [Mit16].
2.6 Some Standard Ideal Functionalities
Some of the protocols introduced in this thesis make use of some already defined functionalities.
To avoid duplicate work, but to be complete, these functionalities are given here. These include
the random-oracle functionality FD→RRO , the ideal certificate authority FCA, and the authenticated
channel functionality FAuth.
2.6.1 Ideal Random-Oracle Functionality FD→RRO
Figure 2.7 shows the random-oracle functionality FD→RRO , derived from Hofheinz and Mu¨ller-
Quade [HM04]. In a nutshell, every party queries the functionality, which then returns a
completely random value, if not already assigned. The functionality is parametrized with a
domain D and a range R. Note, this is a single instance functionality. If multiple instances are
required, different session identifiers can be used.
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1. Registration. Upon input (REGISTER, sid, v) from a party P:
• Send (REGISTER, sid, v) to A. Upon receiving ok from A, and if sid = (P, sid ′), and
this is the first request from P, record (pki-rec, sid, v).
2. Retrieve. Upon receiving a message (RETRIEVE, sid) from a party P ′:
• Send (RETRIEVE, sid,P ′) to A. Upon receiving ok from A:
– If a record (pki-rec, sid, v) exists, output (pki-rec, sid, v) to P ′.
– Else, output (pki-rec, sid,⊥) to P ′.
Figure 2.8: Ideal certificate authority functionality FCA
1. Send. Upon input (SEND, sid,m) from party S:
• Check that sid = (S,R, sid ′).
• Send public delayed output (SEND, sid,S,m) to R, if R has not received any output
yet.
2. Corrupt. Upon receiving a message (CORRUPT, sid,m′) from A:
• Check that sid = (S,R, sid ′).
• If S is not corrupt, ignore.
• Output (SEND, sid,S,m′) to R, if R has not received any output yet.
Figure 2.9: Ideal authenticated-channel functionality FAuth
2.6.2 Ideal Certificate Authority FCA
The ideal certificate authority functionality FCA, depicted in Figure 2.8, is the UC-pedant of a
PKI, i.e., as some kind of “authenticated bulletin-board” [Can04]. This functionality is used to
register public keys in an authenticated fashion.
2.6.3 Ideal Authenticated Channel FAuth
Next, the authenticated channel functionality FAuth is presented, derived from Canetti [Can04].
In a nutshell, this functionality allows to send a single public message m from the sender S to
the receiver R. Multiple messages can be sent using multiple instances of this functionality. The
same is true for bi-directional transfers, i.e., R and S change roles. Also note, that the receiver
and the sender are encoded into the sid, while the adversary can only overwrite messages which
have not yet been delivered.
2.6.4 Ideal Signatures FSig
Depicted in Figure 2.10 is the definition given by Canetti [Can04], but adjusted for the used
notation, already incorporating the observations by Backes and Hofheinz [BH04]. Namely,
the key generation is modeled more explicitly, while the functionality also imposes strong
unforgeability. Also, the adversary does not learn which party verifies a signature, which is not
the case in already proposed functionalities.
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1. Key Generation. Upon input (KEYGEN, sid) of party P:
• Check that sid = (P, sid ′). If not, ignore.
• If there is a record (key-rec, sid, ·), ignore.
• Send (KEYGEN, sid) to A, and wait for input (KEYCONF, sid, pkSig) from A.
• If pkSig = ⊥, ignore.
• Create record (key-rec, sid, pkSig).
• Output (KEYCONF, sid, pkSig) to P.
2. Signature Generation Request. Upon input (SIGN, sid,m) from P:
• Check that sid = (P, sid ′). If not, ignore.
• If there is no record (key-rec, sid, pkSig), ignore.
• Send (SIGN, sid,m) to A, and wait for input (SIGNATURE, sid,m, σ) from A.
• If there is a record (sig-rec, sid,m, σ, pkSig, false), ignore.
• Create record (sig-rec, sid,m, σ, pkSig, true).
• Output (SIGNATURE, sid,m, σ) to P.
3. Verification. Upon input (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig) from party P ′:
• If σ = ⊥, output (VERIFY, sid,m,⊥, pk′Sig, false) to P ′.
• If there is a record (sig-rec, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, v), output (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, v) to P ′.
• If P is honest, and there is a record (key-rec, sid, pk′Sig), with sid = (P, sid ′), create
record (sig-rec, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, false), and output (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, false) to P ′.
• Send (SIGVERF, sid,m, pk′Sig, σ) to A, and wait for input (SIGVERF, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, φ)
from A.
• If φ /∈ {true, false}, ignore.
• If pk′Sig = pkSig, pkSig taken from (key-rec, sid, pkSig), and P is honest, where sid =
(P, sid ′), and there is no record (sig-rec, sid,m, ·, pkSig, true), set φ← false.
• Create record (sig-rec, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, φ), and output (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, φ) to P ′.
Figure 2.10: Ideal signature functionality FSig
2.6.4.1 Explanation
Now, a description what each interface actually does is given, as this functionality has been
altered.
1. The KEYGEN interface allows P to generate a key pair. This duty is left to the adversary
which needs to provide a public key. This interface only passes the key generation request on
the first call.
2. The SIGN interface allows a party to request a signature on a message m. This duty is given
to the adversary.
3. The VERIFY interface allows a party to verify the validity of a given signature. It is required
that the party also specifies the public key. As long as the generating party is honest, the
functionality can directly determine the validity of the signature under the stored pkSig, as
it imposes strong unforgeability. The functionality also imposes consistency, i.e., a valid
signature remains valid, while a signature once marked as non-valid will never become valid.
If the functionality cannot determine the validity of the signature itself, it asks the adversary
to do so.
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2.6.4.2 Construction
The construction is a wrapper around any strongly unforgeable signature scheme to match the
input and output behavior of the ideal functionality FSig. Note, the sid is added to the message
to be signed to bind a signature to a session sid.
Construction 2.29 (UC-Secure Digital Signatures). The participants react on certain inputs
received from the environment. In particular, a signature scheme which is UC-secure can be
constructed as follows, assuming DSIG is a strongly unforgeable signature scheme.
Key Generation: On input of (KEYGEN, sid), check that sid = (P , sid ′). If this is not the
case, ignore. If a record (key-rec, sid, pkSig, skSig) exists, ignore. Generate (pkSig, skSig)
$←
KeyGenSig(1λ). Store (key-rec, sid, pkSig, skSig). Output (KEYCONF, sid, pkSig).
Signature Generation: On input of (SIGN, sid,m), ignore, if no record (key-rec, sid, pkSig,
skSig) exists. Generate σ $← SignSig(skSig, (sid,m)). Output (SIGNATURE, sid,m, σ).
Verification: On input of (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig), let d← VerifySig(pk′Sig, (sid,m), σ). Output
(VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk′Sig, d).
Theorem 2.30. The protocol given above is a secure realization of the ideal functionality FSig
given in Figure 2.10 without secure erasures and adaptive corruptions.
Proof. To prove security, a simulator SIM which acts in the ideal world and translates between
the real adversary and FSig must be provided. Clearly, an environment only sees a difference
between the real world and the ideal world, if the adversary was able to generate a signature
σ∗ which verifies under pkSig which was never created by the honest party, ignoring adaptive
corruptions. A standard reduction yields an adversary which breaks the strong unforgeability of
the used signature scheme.
2.6.4.3 Simulator
Subsequently the simulator SIM is described. Note, SIM is never “exposed” to A directly, as the
“network traffic” is part of the environment, while corrupted parties are incorporated into A.
Of course, A may still corrupt parties. SIM also does not know the party identities requesting
verifications and thus also does not know what party to simulate. Thus, each request is treated
independently, while the connection to the corresponding party is only made at corruption.
Key Generation. The simulator SIM gets activated on input (KEYGEN, sid). It simulates
“P”completely honestly. If “P”outputs (KEYCONF, sid, pkSig), SIM also sends (KEYCONF, sid,
pkSig) to F .
Signature Generation. Here, the simulator SIM receives input (SIGN, sid,m). It simulates
“P”completely honestly. If “P”outputs (SIGNATURE, sid,m, σ), SIM sends (SIGNATURE, sid,m,
σ) to FSig.
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Signature Verification. Here, the simulator SIM receives input (SIGVERF, sid,m, pk′Sig, σ).
The simulator simply calculates d ← VerifySig(pk′Sig, (sid,m), σ). It then sends (SIGVERF, sid,
m, σ, pk′Sig, d) to FSig. Note, SIM does not learn which party wants to verify a signature, and
can thus not assign this execution to any party yet.
Corruption. Now is described how corruptions are handled. Once more, the standard
corruption definition given by Canetti [Can01] is used. In particular, upon corruption of a
party, the simulator receives all inputs and outputs of that party and then needs to provide a
consistent view. Two different cases need to be considered. Note, the indices are omitted to
have an easier to read representation.
Corruption of the Holder of the Secret Key (P). If the holder of the secret key becomes
corrupted, SIM receives six lists corresponding to the inputs and outputs of FLNCE. SIM ignores
all of them but the ones of the form (VERIFY, sid, σ,m, pk′Sig). As signature generation was done
honestly, “P”is already in the correct state, including randomness. For signature verification,
however, SIM only learns now which signatures “P” was verifying. As verification is deterministic,
SIM can simply run VerifySig(pk′Sig, (sid,m), σ) for each signature and make that execution part
of “P”.
Corruption of any Other Party Q. Again, SIM receives six lists corresponding to the
inputs and outputs of FSig. SIM ignores all of them but the ones of the form (VERIFY, sid,
σ,m, pk′Sig) (Bogus key and signature generation requests do not matter, as they are simply
ignored. Thus, the execution history is implicit). For signature verification SIM only learns now
which signature “Q” was verifying. As verification is deterministic, SIM can now simply run
VerifySig(pk′Sig, (sid,m), σ) for each signature and make that execution part of “Q”.
This is a new proof, as no secure erasures are assumed, and thus also the execution history
needs to be simulated, while the simulator does not learn which party verifies a signature.
2.6.5 Common Reference Functionality FDCRS
Here, the common reference functionality FDCRS, depicted in Figure 2.11, derived from Canetti
and Fischlin [CF01], is introduced. Here, D is some distribution used to parametrize the
functionality. In a nutshell, this functionality draws a common reference string CRS according
to the distribution D on the first call. All other invocations then return the drawn element.
1. Query. Upon input (RETRIEVE, sid), from a party P:
• If there is no record (sid, crs-rec,CRS), draw crs-rec $← D, and create record (sid, crs-rec,CRS).
• Output (GETCRSR, sid,CRS), where CRS is taken from record (sid, crs-rec,CRS).




The results of this chapter are currently under submission.
Abstract. Single Sign-On (SSO) allows a user to conveniently authenticate to multiple service
providers with only a single login credential, typically being a username and a password.
Current solutions rely on a single ticket-granting server to verify the users’ password and issue
authentication tickets to the individual service provider. This approach crucially relies on the
ticket-granting server being fully trusted: if corrupt, it can impersonate the users towards all
service providers and oﬄine attack the users’ passwords. In fact, even if the ticket-granting
server is honest but suffers from a data breach that exposes the password verification information,
the attacker can brute-force the passwords and gain access to the users’ accounts on all service
providers. To avoid such a single point of failure while preserving the convenience of SSO, this
chapter proposes the concept of password-based distributed single sign-on. Therein, still only a
single user login is needed, but password verification and ticket-issuance are distributed over
multiple ticket-granting servers. Distributed SSO prevents impersonation and oﬄine attack
against users’ passwords as long as not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. This is modeled
and proven secure in the Universal Composability (UC) framework, which naturally captures
password-specific issues such as password-typos and guessing passwords by an adversary. Two
efficient and provably secure protocols are presented: the first follows the standard SSO concept
where users are known under a single identity towards all service providers and all their actions
can be linked. The second protocol (and security model) then also improves the users’ privacy
by hiding almost all information and also allows to establish different unlinkable identities, i.e.,
pseudonyms, with each service provider.
Roadmap. Section 3.1 contains the problem statement and additional preliminaries. The
first ideal functionality F1sso and the realizing protocol are presented in Section 3.2. The privacy-
enhanced functionality F2sso and the corresponding protocol are presented in Section 3.3. The
required concrete zero-knowledge proofs for both protocols are given in Section 3.4, while the
performance evaluations are presented in Section 3.5. Additional extensions are discussed in
Section 3.6. This chapter is concluded in Section 3.7.
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3.1 Introduction
Authenticating users is one of most important tasks in networking infrastructures. A widely
deployed solution for this task is password-based single sign-on (SSO). Here, a user authenticates
with a username and password towards a ticket-granting server that controls access for a certain
trust domain. Upon successful password verification, a token (or “ticket”) is issued to the user.
The token then allows a user to authenticate towards service providers within that trust domain
and a given time-frame. The main advantage of this approach is convenience for the users: they
only need to remember a single username and password to login to numerous services. The
most prominent and ubiquitous implementation of SSO is probably Kerberos [NT94].
However, virtually all currently deployed solutions in the real world have the same weakness –
their entire security relies on the trustworthiness of the single ticket-granting server. If the ticket-
granting server gets corrupted, it can impersonate the users towards all service providers and
oﬄine attack their passwords. In fact, given the low entropy of human-memorizable passwords,
already a passive security breach that exposes the ticket-granting server’s information to verify
the passwords jeopardizes all user accounts [Gos12]. Typically, login passwords are verified
against salted password hashes. Any compromise of these hashes and salt allows an adversary
to brute-force the underlying passwords. In the context of SSO such a breach has a devastating
impact, as the adversary immediately gains access to all of the users’ accounts.
One possible mitigation strategy against these oﬄine attacks is to rely on stronger user
credentials, such as cryptographic keys or incorporating hardware tokens, but both comes with a
significant loss in convenience for the users. Another approach is to avoid the single point of failure
by distributing the user authentication and token generation across multiple ticket-granting
servers. A number of solutions for that approach exist [CL12,CZLC05,JSS04,WYX13,ZLZL09].
However, they either focus on distributing only the token generation, but not the password
check, or – for enhanced password security – require additional strong secrets on the user side.
Thus, so far no solution exists that solely relies on passwords for the user authentication and is
secure against oﬄine attacks after a single ticket-granting server compromise.
3.1.1 Contribution
The question investigated in this chapter is whether password-based SSO can provide strong
security and privacy guarantees. This is answered to the affirmative by formalizing and
efficiently realizing UC-secure password-based distributed SSO. Therein, users are only required
to remember a single password and username, and their passwords cannot be oﬄine attacked
unless all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. The same holds for impersonation attacks which
an adversary can only perform when it corrupts all ticket-granting servers, or correctly guesses
a user’s password. Note, the latter, which is also known as online attack, is unavoidable as
the authentication only relies on a password. To limit the power of such online attacks, the
honest ticket-granting servers can – and should – refuse to participate in any further password
checks for a user account when too many failed attempts have occurred. After all ticket-granting
servers agree that a user has correctly authenticated itself, they issue the user a jointly computed
authentication token. This token enables the user to access a plethora of services in the network,
as long as the granted authentication token is valid.
To model SSO, the Universal Composition (UC) framework [Can01] is used, which has
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many advantages when dealing with passwords [CLN15,CLNS16,CLN12,CHK+05b] (See also
Chapter 4). For example, users often choose related or similar passwords in different contexts,
and can make typos in their password attempts, e.g., trying to login with a slightly misspelled
setup password. Moreover, the adversary may also be able to correctly guess passwords, e.g., if
a user’s password is too short, or if he was simply lucky. Using UC, all these inherent issues are
naturally modeled. Further, strong security guarantees such as composability with arbitrary
other protocols are given.
This chapter introduces two UC-functionalities F1sso and F2sso. The functionality F1sso is the
basic version of the protocol, protecting the users’ passwords and preventing impersonation
attacks unless all ticket-granting servers are corrupted. It does not provide any additional
privacy guarantees though, i.e., just as normal SSO it reveals the unique username towards
service providers and all authentication sessions are fully linkable. The second functionality F2sso
then improves also the users’ privacy by enabling them to be known under different identities,
i.e., pseudonyms, towards different services. Both definitions allow to limit the validity of the
generated authentication token by including time-stamps of the system. This required modeling
the concept of time in the UC framework, which might be of independent interest.
Finally, the realizations for both functionalities are based on standard primitives, and are
efficient enough for use in practice.
3.1.2 Related Work
The most prominent example of SSO is the already mentioned Kerberos [NT94,SNS88]. Because
of its popularity, it was subject of formal treatment of the underlying primitives [BK11], yet
also some stand-alone analysis of (variants of) the protocol [BCJ+11,BCJ+06,Wu99], and some
attacks on related protocols were presented [BM91,Gro03,PW03]. This also includes an analysis
of hardware-assisted, i.e., augmented versions of Kerberos [MPP14].
Another line of work focuses on symbolic analysis of SSO protocols [BJST08,CC08]. Clearly,
there are a lot of other related functionalities, and their analysis, such as OpenID [RR06],
SAML [ACC+08], or Shibboleth [MCC+04]. Moreover, there were also attempts to generalize
certain concepts widely used in SSO protocols [PM03].
Distributing the token-generation across multiple ticket-granting servers is also not a new
idea [CL12,CZLC05,JSS04,WYX13,ZLZL09]. However, they focus on distributing the token-
generation, but not on distributing the password-check.
Also (but more remotely) related primitives are password-authenticated secret-sharing (PASS)
schemes [BJSL11, CEN15, CLN12, CLLN14], password-authenticated key-exchange protocols
(PAKE) [BPR00, BBC+13, CHK+05b, KMTG12, KM14] and credential-based key exchange
schemes (CAKE) [CCGS10]. In particular, in a PASS scheme, a user can store a single value
among multiple servers, protected by a password. This value can later be retrieved by a user,
if the password entered was the same as used at registration. For SSO, however, this is not
suitable, as the value stored does not change, and thus neither access rights nor token validity
can be changed. Likewise, PAKE allows to establish a secure channel between two entities, if
the password entered was correct. However, the password has to be entered each time, and thus
orthogonal to SSO. Moreover, in CAKE a user needs to store its credential and therefore not
stateless, which is exactly what is to be avoided in SSO.
36 CHAPTER 3. UC-SECURE DISTRIBUTED PASSWORD-BASED SINGLE SIGN-ON
3.1.3 Additional Preliminaries
For this chapter, some additional building blocks are required. These are presented next.
3.1.3.1 Semantically Secure (t, n)-Threshold Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
A (t, n)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme TEnc is required. In a nutshell, a TEnc
behaves as a standard encryption, with the exception that it supports a homomorphic property,
and one needs t + 1 out of n partial secret keys to decrypt a ciphertext. In more detail, one
can use the TEnc introduced by Camenisch et al. [CLLN14], as it perfectly fits the needs of the
protocols. However, it is altered for the used notation. In particular, a label ` is added for the
verifiable decryption shares. The construction is restated in Appendix A.
Definition 3.1 (Semantically Secure (t, n)-Threshold Homomorphic Public-Key Encryption
Schemes). A semantically-secure (t, n)-threshold homomorphic public-key encryption scheme
TEnc consists of the algorithms {PPGenTEnc,KeyGenTEnc,EncTEnc,PDecTEnc,VfDecTEnc,DecTEnc,
HomTEnc}, such that:




It is assumed that ppTEnc is implicit input to all other algorithms.
KeyGenTEnc. The algorithm KeyGenTEnc outputs the public key of the scheme and also a pair of
partial secret and public keys:
(pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)1≤i≤n)
$← KeyGenTEnc(ppTEnc, n, t)
EncTEnc. The algorithm EncTEnc gets as input the public key pkTEnc and the message m ∈MS to
encrypt. Note, the MS is required to be some cyclic multiplicatively written prime-order
group G. It outputs a ciphertext c:
c
$← EncTEnc(pkTEnc,m)
PDecTEnc. The algorithm PDecTEnc outputs a partial decryption share di, along with a proof pii
that the decryption was done correctly w.r.t. to pkiPTEnc, (or ⊥, if the ciphertext is invalid)
on input skiPTEnc, label ` and a ciphertext c:
(di, pii) $← PDecTEnc(skiPTEnc, c, `)
VfDecTEnc. The algorithm VfDecTEnc outputs a decision bit d ∈ {false, true}, verifying that a
partial decryption share di of c is valid w.r.t. pkiPTEnc, ` and pii:
d






$← KeyGenTEnc(ppTEnc, n, t)
b
$← {0, 1}
(stateA,1, I) $← A(pkTEnc, (pkiPTEnc)1≤i≤n)
If |I| > t, return a $← {0, 1}
((m∗0,m∗1), stateA,2)
$← A(stateA,1, pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc)i∈I)






return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 3.1: TEnc Indistinguishability
DecTEnc. The algorithm DecTEnc outputs the message m, on input of t+ 1 valid (and different)
decryption shares di, pkTEnc and c:
m
$← DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (di)i∈[1,t+1], c)
HomTEnc. The deterministic algorithm HomTEnc outputs a ciphertext c′, on input of two cipher-
texts c1, c2, and the public key pkTEnc:
c′ ← HomTEnc(pkTEnc, c1, c2)
Correctness. For each TEnc, the usual correctness properties must hold. In particular, it is
required that for all λ ∈ N, for all ppTEnc $← PPGenTEnc(1λ), for all n ∈ N+, for all t ∈ {s | s <
n, s ∈ N0}, for all (pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)i∈[1,n]) $← KeyGenTEnc(ppTEnc, n, t), for all m ∈ MS,
for all ` ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all c $← EncTEnc(pkENC,m), for all (di, pii) $← PDecTEnc(skiPTEnc, c, `), it
holds that VfDecTEnc(pkiPTEnc, di, pii, c, `) = true and for all subsets S ⊆ {di}i∈[1,n] of cardinality
t+ 1, it holds that m = DecTEnc(pkTEnc, S, c), yet also for all c1, c2, with c′ ← c1  c2, it holds
that the decryption of c′ yields the product of the plaintexts of c1 and c2. Once more, this
definition captures perfect correctness.
Also some security guarantees are required, introduced next.
Indistinguishability. Roughly, this property guarantees that an adversary holding only t
partial secret keys does not learn anything about a plaintext contained in a ciphertext, even if
it can choose the corresponding plaintexts.
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Definition 3.2 (Indistinguishability). An encryption scheme TEnc is indistinguishable, if
for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν such that for all polynomial
t < n ∈ N+: ∣∣∣Pr[IndistinguishabilityTEncA,n,t(λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 3.1.
3.1.3.2 Zero-Knowledge Non-Interactive Proof of Knowledge Systems
Let L be an NP-language with associated witness relation R, i.e., such that L = {x | ∃w :
R(x,w) = true}. In a nutshell, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge allows
to verify that the generator of such a proof knows a witness w for some statement x without
revealing that witness. More formally, such a system is defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. A zero-knowledge non-interactive proof of knowledge system NIZKPoK consists
of three algorithms {PPGenNIZKPoK,ProveNIZKPoK,VerifyNIZKPoK}, such that:
PPGenNIZKPoK. The algorithm crsNIZKPoK outputs public parameters of the scheme, where λ is
the security parameter:
crsNIZKPoK $← PPGenNIZKPoK(1λ, L)
For simplicity, it assumed that crsNIZKPoK is an implicit input to all other algorithms, while
the language L is clear from the context.
ProveNIZKPoK. The algorithm ProveNIZKPoK outputs the proof pi, on input of the statement x to be
proven, and the corresponding witness w:
pi
$← ProveNIZKPoK(x,w)
VerifyNIZKPoK. The deterministic algorithm VerifyNIZKPoK verifies the proof pi, w.r.t. to some
statement x, where d ∈ {false, true}:
d← VerifyNIZKPoK(x, pi)
For the sake of readability, a somewhat informal CS-notation is used, derived from Camenisch
and Stadler [CS97]. For example, the notation pi $← ProveNIZKPoK{(g1) : C = EncTEnc(g1)}(`)
denotes the computation of a non-interactive, simulation-sound extractable, zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of the plaintext g1 contained in C (which is assumed to be public), with
an attached label `. Sometimes only “verify pi” is used for verification of a proof pi. It is
assumed that the public parameters and the statement to be proven, are also input to the proof
system and public. This is not make explicit to increase readability. The detailed and formal,





(crsNIZKPoK, τ) $← SIM1(1λ, L)
a
$← AOPb(·,·)(crsNIZKPoK)
where oracle P0 on input x and w:
return pi $← ProveNIZKPoK(x,w), if R(x,w) = true
return ⊥
and oracle P1 on input (x,w):
return pi $← SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, x), if R(x,w) = true
return ⊥
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 3.2: NIZKPoK Zero-Knowledge
Correctness. In the context of (zero-knowledge) proof-systems, correctness is sometimes also
referred to as completeness. More precisely, it is required that for all λ ∈ N, for all “suitable”
L, for all crsNIZKPoK $← PPGenNIZKPoK(1λ, L), for all x ∈ L, for all w such that R(x,w) = true,
for all pi $← ProveNIZKPoK(x,w), it must hold that VerifyNIZKPoK(crsNIZKPoK, x, pi) = true. As usual,
some correctness and security notions are required, which are introduced next. These are mainly
taken from Groth [Gro06].
Two different security notions are required, i.e., zero-knowledge and simulation-sound
extractability.
Zero-Knowledge. In a nutshell, zero-knowledge says that the receiver of the proof pi does
not learn anything except the validity of the statement. It is assumed that the distribution of
crsNIZKPoK output by SIM1 is distributed identically to PPGenNIZKPoK.
Definition 3.4 (Zero-Knowledge). A non-interactive proof system NIZKPoK is zero-knowledge,
if for a fixed language L, for any PPT adversary A, there exists an PPT simulator SIM =
(SIM1, SIM2) such that there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣Pr[Zero-KnowledgeProveNIZKPoKA,SIM,L (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 3.2. Here, τ is the trapdoor for the simulation.
Simulation-Sound Extractability. This security notion says that an adversary cannot
generate a proof pi∗ for a statement it does not know a witness for, while the proof-system is
also of knowledge, i.e., the witness w can be extracted from any non-simulated proof pi. Clearly,
this also implies that the proof-system is non-malleable. Note, the simulation trapdoor τ is
given to the adversary, i.e., the adversary can simulate proofs itself.
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Experiment SimSoundExtNIZKPoKA,E,L (λ)
(crsNIZKPoK, τ, ξ) $← E1(1λ, L)
(x∗, pi∗) $← AOSIM(·)(crsNIZKPoK, τ)
Q ← ∅
where oracle SIM on input x:
obtain pi $← E2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, x)
Q ← Q∪ {(x, pi)}
return pi
w∗ $← E3(crsNIZKPoK, ξ, x, pi)
return 1, if VerifyNIZKPoK(x∗, pi∗) = true ∧ R(x∗, w∗) = false ∧ (x∗, pi∗) /∈ Q
return 0
Figure 3.3: NIZKPoK Simulation Sound Extractability
Definition 3.5 (Simulation-Sound Extractability). A zero-knowledge non-interactive proof
system NIZKPoK is said to be simulation-sound extractable, if for a fixed language L, for any
PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT extractor/simulator E = (E1, E2, E3), such that there
exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[SimSoundExtNIZKPoKA,E,L (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 3.3.
Note, E1, E2 are required to behave exactly as (SIM1, SIM2) from the zero-knowledge
definition [Gro06], while ξ is the extraction trapdoor.
Definition 3.6. A ProveNIZKPoK is said to be secure, if it is complete, simulation-sound ex-
tractable and zero-knowledge, as defined by Groth [Gro06].
The language L will no longer be made explicit, as it can be derived from the construction
what L is exactly. It is also required that an arbitrary label ` ∈ {0, 1} can be attached to the
proof, which also contains the public parameters and the statement to be proven, i.e., can be
transformed into a “signature of knowledge” [CL06,FO11]. This is essentially used to avoid some
potential problems, depending on the used proof system, discovered by Bernard et al. [BPW12a].
See Section 3.4 for an additional discussion.
Note, as the proofs are non-malleable and non-interactive, it is already implied that they
are secure in a concurrent setting [SCO+01], while simulation-sound extractability implies non-
malleability [SCO+01]. Prohibiting re-usage in different contexts can be achieved by appending
context-information [CLLN14], e.g., the sid.
To improve performance, it is shown in Section 3.4 how to use more efficient primitives.
Moreover, in the proposed instantiation, not all witnesses need to be extractable by the simulator,
but only some, which improves performance [CKS11]. To also account for this, the witnesses
which need to be extractable are denoted as m. In fact, this optimization is directly used in the
concrete proofs presented in Section 3.4.
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3.1.3.3 Secret Sharing Schemes
The second protocol requires a perfectly secure (n, n+ 1)-secret-sharing scheme, e.g., the one
presented by Shamir [Sha79]. Here, a party can share a value across n participants, while all n
shares are required to re-construct the secret.
Definition 3.7 (Secret Sharing Scheme). A secret-sharing scheme SS consists of the algorithms
{PPGenSS, ShareSS,CombineSS} such that:
PPGenSS. This algorithm outputs parameters:
ppSS
$← PPGenSS(1λ, n)
The public parameters are assumed to be input to all following algorithms.
ShareSS. To share a secret m, do:
{s1, s2, . . . , sn} $← ShareSS(m)
CombineSS. To (deterministically) reconstruct a secret, do:
m← CombineSS({s1, s2, . . . , sn})
Correctness. For each SS, the usual correctness properties must hold. In particular, it is
required that for all λ ∈ N, for all n ∈ N, for all ppSS $← PPGenSS(1λ, n), for all m ∈ MS, for
all {s1, s2, . . . , sn} $← ShareSS(m), it holds that m = CombineSS({s1, s2, . . . , sn}).
Perfect Privacy. It is required that n − 1 shares do leak nothing (in the information-
theoretical) sense. The following definition is derived from Beimel [Bei11]. Note, the definition
captures perfect privacy, as the probability is also taken over all random coins used by the
challenger.
Definition 3.8 (Perfect Privacy). A secret-sharing scheme SS is perfectly private, if for all
n ∈ N , and for all unbounded A, the following holds:
Pr[PerfectPrivacySSA,n(1λ) = 1]− 12 = 0
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 3.4.
Definition 3.9. A secret-sharing scheme SS is said to be secure, if it is correct, and perfectly
private.












{sm11 , sm12 , . . . , sm1n } $← ShareSS(m1)
{sm21 , sm22 , . . . , sm2n } $← ShareSS(m2)
If b = 0, let T ← {sm11 , sm12 , . . . , sm1n } \ {sm1r }
If b = 1, let T ← {sm21 , sm22 , . . . , sm2n } \ {sm2r }
a
$← A(ppSS,m1,m2, T )
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 3.4: SS Perfect Privacy
3.1.3.4 Signatures with Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs
The second protocol also requires that one can easily prove knowledge of a signature σ w.r.t. to
some public key and a message value m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn), where even some blocks mi may
be hidden from the verifier. In terms of the (more or less informal) Camenisch-Stadler (CS)
notation [CS97], this is expressed as:
pi
$← ProveNIZKPoK{(σ,m1) : VerifySig(pkSig,m, σ) = 1}
In more detail, in this example, m1 is hidden, while m2 to mn are public. A suitable instantiation
of such a signature scheme are CL-signatures [CL02b], the scheme by Abe et al. [AGHO11] or
the scheme by Groth [Gro15]. See Section 3.4 for the formal proofs with the signature scheme
instantiated with the scheme by Groth [Gro15]. Note, however, that this signature scheme
requires additional public parameters. See Appendix B for a discussion.
3.1.3.5 Timestamps and Univeral Composition
As the authentication tokens must only be valid for a certain amount of time, the functionalities
need to incorporate some concept of “time”. This is, in both functionalities, modeled in such
a way that any party can advance the clock, while all other parties can receive the current
time time. The time is, moreover, modeled as an abstract unit, which only property is that
it continues forward. This models synchronized clocks in the network, without the need to
explicitly define what “time” really is.
To circumvent the requirement of synchronized clocks, one can alter the ideal functionalities
in such a way that each party Pi has its own clock timei, i.e., it is local, which can be advanced
by the environment. All the computations and checks are then performed w.r.t. to the local
timei, and not the global time. However, to make the functionalities, proofs, and protocols more
readable, it was chosen to use the “simpler” definition.
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Canetti et al. also define a global functionality, which can be used in this context [CHMV17].
3.2 Basic Distributed UC-Secure Single Sign-On
In this section, the functionality F1sso is presented. It offers the basic functionality one expects
from a distributed SSO protocol. A user sets up an account and can later obtain an authentication
token with which it can access service providers. The ticket-granting servers do not learn
anything about mistyped password attempts at token generation (which is also true for the
service providers which are not involved at all), while all ticket-granting servers need to be
corrupt to learn the password used at registration, as this is clearly the most basic intention
behind a distributed SSO functionality.
An extended functionality F2sso is presented in Section 3.3, which offers additional privacy
features, while the realizing protocol is slightly less efficient.
In more detail, both F1sso and F2sso, have the following participants: a set of ticket-granting
servers T, and a set of service providers S, which accept authentication tokens by the users. For
brevity, it is assumed that there is a canonical ordering of each set of ticket-granting servers T
and service providers S, e.g., using IP-addresses or DNS-entries.
At the very beginning of the protocol, all servers, i.e., the ticket-granting servers T and
the service providers S, need to setup their public keys, while also registering them at a PKI,
modeled as FCA, i.e., they are authenticated. Then, a non-authenticated user U can register an
account on the ticket-granting servers T with its password pwd and some username uid.
To generate a token (which does not exist as a cryptographic value in the ideal world),
another party enters a password attempt pwd′, while the ticket-granting servers start a distributed
protocol to check whether the password attempt matches the password used at registration.
The ticket-granting servers can then decide if they want to continue the request, i.e., at this
point the throttling mechanism kicks in. If they continue and if the password attempt was
correct, they also input the set of service providers a user can access and how long the token
remains valid. It is important to notice that the user initiating the token generation may not be
the same as the user which has registered the account. This models the case where a user either
mistypes its username uid, or simply uses a different terminal, e.g., a PC or laptop within a
huge company, while users do not need to store any state between protocol runs.
After successful token generation, a user can access a service provider using the obtained
token. In the given functionalities, only a user can send a message to the service provider. The
step to obtain a bi-directional channel is easy: the channel can be boot-strapped by sending
a symmetric key k which is then used in some upper layer protocol to communicate in an
authenticated and private way using, e.g., AES and MACs.
3.2.1 The Ideal Functionality F1sso
For simplicity, it is required that sid = (T, S, sid ′), where the users are not part of the sid to
avoid implying some sort of authenticated channels, as the user U should only need to remember
its username uid, the sid, and its password pwd. Thus, only the service providers S, and the
ticket-granting servers T, have authenticated public keys, which is a reasonable assumption. It
is also assumed that the query identifiers qid are globally unique, and thus omit checking for
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1. Update Timestamp. On input (UPDATETIME, sid, time′) from any party P:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time′ /∈ N, ignore.
• If time′ > time, set time ← time′.
• Output (UPDATETIME, sid, time) to P.
2. Request Timestamp. On input (REQUESTTIME, sid) from party P:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), ignore.
• Output (TIME, sid, time) to P.
3. Setup Service Provider. On input (SETUPSERVICE, sid) from service provider S:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), time = −1, or S /∈ S, ignore.
• If there is a record (sid, ssetup-rec,S), ignore.
• Create record (sid, ssetup-rec,S).
• Send (SETUPSERVICE, sid,S) to adversary A.
4. Setup Ticket-Granting Server. On input (SETUPSERVER, sid) from ticket server T :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), time = −1, or T /∈ T, ignore.
• If there is a record (sid, tsetup-rec, T ), ignore.
• Create record (sid, tsetup-rec, T ).
• Send (SETUPSERVER, sid, T ) to adversary A.
Figure 3.5: Initialization and clock interfaces for F1sso. The variable time is set to −1 at the
beginning.
duplicates in the functionality. This can, e.g., be achieved by exchanging nonces between all
parties beforehand, and then concatenating them [BLR04]. If this method is used, it is assumed
that the parties ignore all input for which they did not contribute randomness.
The functionality is split into several parts to increase readability. Namely, there are the
setup interfaces (Figure 3.5), the registration interfaces (Figure 3.6), the authentication token
generation interfaces (Figure 3.7 and 3.8) and the communication interfaces for accessing the
service providers (Figure 3.9).
Note, in the description of the functionality “ignore” means that it gives control back to the
caller with an implicit error message. Moreover, if the functionality outputs a value to some
party, control is given to that party. Hence, the functionality directly gives up control.
The Setup Interfaces. The setup interfaces, depicted in Figure 3.5, allow parties to setup
their state. This may, e.g., be key pairs. As already mentioned, these interfaces are meant for
the ticket-granting servers and the service providers, as they are authenticated. This group also
contains the interfaces to advance the clock by the environment and an interface to receive the
current time. In more detail, there are the following interfaces:
1. The UPDATETIME interface allows a party P to advance the current time time. Note, the
clock can only be advanced, as time “obviously” only has one direction in the real world,
ignoring some physical thoughts [Vel12].
2. The REQUESTTIME interface allows any party to obtain the current time. As this models a
local interaction, the current time is directly returned, without the adversary intervening.
3. The SETUPSERVICE interface allows a service provider to initialize itself, i.e., to generate
the public keys, and to register them with some PKI.
3.2. BASIC DISTRIBUTED UC-SECURE SINGLE SIGN-ON 45
5. Create Account Request. On input (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd) from party U :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′) or time = −1, or a record (user-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, ·, ·) exists, ignore.
• Create record (user-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd, false).
• If all Ti ∈ T are corrupt, send (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd) to A.
• Send (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid,U , uid) to A.
6. Account Created. On input (ACCCREATED, sid, qid,U , uid) from adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• If a record (user-rec, sid, ·, ·, uid, ·, true) exists and not all Ti ∈ T are corrupt, ignore.
• If a record (user-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd, false) exists for some pwd, update it to (user-rec, sid,
qid,U , uid, pwd, true), otherwise ignore.
• Output (ACCCREATED, sid, qid, uid) to U (delayed).
Figure 3.6: Registration interfaces for F1sso
4. The SETUPSERVER interface allows a ticket-granting server to initialize itself. As for the
SETUPSERVICE interface, this means that the ticket-granting server can generate its key
pairs, and register them with a PKI.
The Registration Interfaces. The registration interfaces, depicted in Figure 3.6, allow users
to register an account with the given ticket-granting servers T.
5. The CREATEACCREQ interface allows a user U to register a new account in the system with
user id uid. The user U also needs to provide a password pwd, which it can later use to
authenticate towards the ticket-granting servers. The password pwd used is only learned, if
all ticket-granting servers are corrupt at the same time. In the case where the adversary
“overwrites” such a setup request, the adversary provides the password, while in the case of
all corrupt servers more than one account per uid may be registered, as the users do not
communicate directly, and thus cannot know whether there are other accounts with the same
uid.
6. The ACCCREATED interface allows the adversary to activate an account. Note, the account
may already be created on the servers, while the user never received an output, e.g., if the
adversary holds back the acknowledgments from the ticket-granting servers.
Thus, the output to the user is delayed. Moreover, all honest servers need to agree on the
same login data, if at least one ticket-granting server is honest, i.e., only a single account can
be activated in this case.
The Token Generation Interfaces. The token generation interfaces, depicted in Figure 3.7,
allow users to obtain an authentication token, which authenticates users to the service providers.
The password attempt pwd′ provided has to be the same as used during the registration, as long
as at least one ticket-granting server remains honest.
7. The RECVTOKENREQ interface allows a user U to try to obtain an authentication token. It
needs to provide a password attempt pwd′ and some username uid. Note, the adversary may
still overrule token-generation requests with its own password attempt, as the users are not
authenticated. However, any further requests with the qid overwritten are then ignored.
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7. Create Token Generation Request. On input (RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd′) from
party U :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• Create record (tokenreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd′).
• Send (RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid,U , uid) to A.
8. Get Token Generation Permission. On input (TKNRECVPRM, sid, qid,U , uid, T ) from ad-
versary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), T /∈ T, or time = −1, ignore.
• If there is record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,A, ·, T , ·, ·), ignore.
• If there is no record (user-rec, sid, ·, ·, uid, ·, true), ignore.
• If there is no record (sid, tsetup-rec, T ), ignore.
• If there is a record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , ·, ·), ignore.
• Create record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T ,⊥time,⊥S).
• Output (TKNRECVPRM, sid, qid, uid) to T .
9. Token Generation Request Granted. On input (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, time′,S′)
from party T :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), T /∈ T, S′ * S, time = −1, or time′ /∈ N, ignore.
• If there is no record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid, ·, uid, T ,⊥time,⊥S), ignore.
• Update the record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , ·, ·) to (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T ,
time′,S′).
• Send (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, T ) to A.
10. Test Password. On input (TESTPW, sid, qid, pwd′) from adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• If there is a record (testpw-rec, sid, qid), ignore.
• Create record (testpw-rec, sid, qid).
• If not all Ti ∈ T are corrupt, ignore, if not for all honest Ti ∈ T there exists a record
(srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , time′, S′).
• If not all Ti ∈ T are corrupt, let b← true, if there exists a record (user-rec, sid, ·, ·, uid, pwd′′,
true), pwd′′ taken from record (tokenreq-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, pwd′′), and b← false otherwise. Send
(TESTPW, sid, qid, b) to A.
• Ignore, if not all Ti ∈ T are corrupt.
• Send (TESTPW, sid, qid, true) to A, if there is a record (tokenreq-rec, sid, qid,U , ·, pwd′), and
(TESTPW, sid, qid, false) otherwise.
Figure 3.7: First set of token generation interfaces for F1sso
8. The TKNRECVPRM interface allows the adversary to trigger a specific ticket-granting server
T to ask for permission to proceed checking a password, i.e., this is the hook to the external
throttling mechanism. This interface can only be called, if there is actually an ongoing
request, while the account with uid must be activated and the ticket-granting must have been
set up.
9. The TOKENGENGRANT interface allows the environment to decide whether the ticket-
granting server T is allowed to proceed with checking the password. Note, this interface only
allows whether a ticket-granting server is allowed to continue the password check, i.e., it does
not yet learn whether the password attempt was correct or not.
Moreover, a ticket-granting server also decides which service providers a given user uid can
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11. Notify Server. On input (NOTIFY, sid, qid,U , uid, T ) from adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), T /∈ T, or time = −1, ignore.
• If not for all honest Ti ∈ T there exists a record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , time′,S ′),
where time′ 6= ⊥time, and S ′ 6= ⊥S, ignore.
• Ignore, if there is a record (srvcont-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , ·).
• Let b ← true, if there is a record (tokenreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd, true), and a record
(user-rec, sid, ·, ·, uid, pwd, true). Set b← false otherwise.
• Create record (srvcont-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , b).
• Output (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, b) to T .
12. Continue Notify. On input (CONTNOTIFY, sid, qid, uid) from party T :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), T /∈ T, or time = −1, ignore.
• If there is no record (srvcont-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , true), ignore.
• If there is a record (srvnot-rec, sid, qid), ignore.
• Create record (srvnot-rec, sid, qid).
• Send (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, T , time′,S) to A, where time′, and S, are taken from record
(srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , time′,S ′).
13. Token Generation Complete. On input (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid,U , uid, time′′,S′′) from
adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• If all Ti ∈ T are honest, let S′′ ← S and time′′ ←∞.
• If there is a record of the form (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ignore.
• If not for all honest Ti ∈ T there exists a record (srvcont-rec, sid, qid, uid, Ti, true), ignore.
• For all existing records of the form (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, Ti, timei,Si), let time′ ←
min({timei} ∪ time′′), and S′ ← ⋂ Si ∩ S′′.
• Create record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, time′, S′, (timei, Si)i∈[1,n]).
• Output (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid, uid, time′,S′) to U .
Figure 3.8: Second set of token generation interfaces for F1sso
access and how long the token is valid once the password check was successful.
10. The TESTPW interface allows the adversary to learn whether the password attempt was
correct, but only if all honest ticket-granting servers agree that they participate. In the case
that all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, the adversary moreover receives a free guess on
the used password.
This is not avoidable, as users do not store any state, and thus a user has to trust the values
obtained from the ticket-granting servers. Note, however, that this interface has no real-world
pendant, as its only purpose is to give the adversary enough information for the simulation.
11. The NOTIFY interface allows the adversary to decide whether a ticket-granting server T
learns if the used password was correct. This interface can only be called, if all honest servers
agree to continue the password check.
12. The CONTNOTIFY interface allows a ticket-granting server to continue the token generation
request. This interface is necessary, as due to the prior interface the environment has control,
i.e., the throttling mechanism needs to acknowledge that it has received the information
whether the passwords matched.
13. The TKNRECVCOMPL interface allows the adversary to decide when the user U obtains the
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14. Send Message. On input (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m,S,∆) from party U :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), S /∈ S, time = −1, or ∆ /∈ N, ignore.
• If there is a record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), U 6= A, ignore.
• If there is no record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid ′,U , uid, time′,S′, time′′,S′′), where S ∈ S′,
and time + ∆ ≤ time′, ignore, if not all Ti ∈ T and U are corrupt.
• If all Ti ∈ T and U are corrupt, set time′′ ←∞, and S′′ ← S.
• Create record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , uid,m,S, time′′, S′′, time + ∆, false).
• If S is corrupt, send (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,U ,S,S′, time′′,S′′,m,∆) to A.
• Send (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,U ,S, S′, time′′, S′′,∆) to A.
15. Receive Message. On input (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid) from adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• If there is a record (msg-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, true), ignore.
• If there is no record (msg-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, false), ignore.
• Update the record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, false) to (msg-rec, sid, qid,
A, uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, true), where U 6= A, if it exists.
• If time > time′, ignore, if there does not exist a record (msg-rec, sid, qid,A, uid,m,S, n, S′′, ·,
false), where n ≥ time.
• Update record (msg-rec, sid, qid,A, uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, false) to (msg-rec, sid, qid,A,
uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, true), if it exists.
• Output (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m) to S, where uid and m are taken from record
(msg-rec, sid, qid,A, uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, true) if such a record and exists and from
(msg-rec, sid, qid,U , uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, true), where U 6= A, otherwise.
Figure 3.9: Communication interfaces for F1sso
token. This interface enforces that every ticket-granting server agrees to continue the request,
but also that each honest ticket-granting server has learned whether the password attempt
was correct.
Clearly, the honest ticket-granting servers only proceed, if the password entered was correct.
Moreover, the adversary now has the possibility to overwrite the access rights of a user in
the name of any corrupt server. Still, the adversary can only “downgrade” a user’s access
rights, as long as at least one ticket-granting server remains honest, i.e., the adversary cannot
interfere in this case.
Next the communication interfaces, depicted in Figure 3.9, are explained in greater detail.
These interfaces allow a user U to send a message to a service.
14. The SENDMESSAGE interface allows a user U to send a message m to some service provider
S. Here, a user U also specifies a ∆, specifying how long a message should be accepted by
the service provider. Moreover, this interface only continues, if actually a valid token was
generated.
15. The RECVMESSAGE interface allows the adversary to decide that a specific message is
received by a service provider. The output is only triggered, if a valid token for the user U
exists, and the current time is not greater than what the user specified, and a user actually
sent the message in question. Note, however, that a corrupt user may also have a valid token
which it can use to overwrite the message send. As old tokens remain valid by definition, this
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cannot be avoided. Thus, an adversarially generated message always “overrules” a genuine
message, as only one message per qid is accepted.
Finally, for all protocols presented, it is assumed that the message encrypted has a maximum
length to avoid additional leakage.
3.2.2 Realizing Protocol for F1sso
As for the ideal functionality, the protocol presented is also split into four parts. Namely, setup,
registration, token generation, and access to the service provider.
At setup, all servers set up their public keys for an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme
ENC, as well as for a signature scheme DSIG, and register them at some PKI, modeled by FCA.
To register, a user generates a key-pair for a threshold encryption scheme TEnc, encrypts
its password under the generated public key, and distributes the encrypted password, the
(partial) secret key of the threshold encryption scheme, and some context information to each
ticket-granting server. The ticket-granting servers store this information and reply with a
signature send to the user, which then distributes all signatures to all ticket-granting servers,
which, in turn, acknowledge account creation. Only then, the user receives an account creation
confirmation. Note, however, that the ticket-granting servers may already have activated the
account, even though the user which started the registration has not yet received the final
acknowledgment.
A graphical overview of the registration is presented in Figure 3.10, while token generation
is depicted in Figure 3.11. The presentation protocol is presented in Figure 3.12. Note, however,
that the figures are dramatically simplified, as they are only meant as an overview to visualize
the basic idea of the protocol.
In more detail, for token generation, the user requests the context information for the uid in
question from the ticket-granting servers, including the public key of the threshold encryption
scheme, and the encrypted password. The user then calculates the inverse of the password
attempt pwd′, and uses the homomorphic property of the threshold encryption scheme to
mangle the ciphertext received from the ticket-granting servers and the ciphertext containing
the password attempt. It is then randomized to “blind” the password attempt. The servers
then re-randomize the blinded encrypted password quotient, and ask some external mechanism
if the protocol should continue or throttle the request. If the protocols then continues, the
ticket-granting servers jointly start a protocol to prove that the decryption of the blinded
encrypted password quotient is equal to 1G. This part of the protocol is inspired by the protocol
given by Camenisch et al. [CLLN14], which, in turn, is based on Bagherzandi et al. [BJSL11]. If
the password attempt was correct, the ticket-granting servers also learn this fact, and input
a set of service providers S which the user is allowed to access. In the given protocol, this is
realized by signatures, generated by each ticket-granting server on a bit-string. This string
also contains a time-stamp which states how long the token is valid, yet also authenticates an
ephemeral signature public key generated by the user.
In comparison to Camenisch et al. [CLLN14], there are some subtle differences in the
password check. In particular, no secret is reconstructed. Moreover, the protocol is restricted to
the case that all servers participate and are known beforehand, which is a reasonable assumption
for SSO. Thus, the protocol is simpler. However, how to sidestep some of these restrictions is
discussed in Section 3.6.
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User Server 1 Server 2
pk1Sig, pk2Sig, pk1ENC, pk2ENC sk1Sig, pk2Sig, sk1ENC, pk2ENC pk1Sig, sk2Sig, pk1ENC, sk2ENC
On input (CREATEACCREQ, uid, pwd):
(pkTEnc, {(skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)})







uid, pkTEnc, cs1, cs2, Cp−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Ignore, if uid was seen before
σ10
$←
SignSig(sk1Sig, (cs1, cs2, Cp, uid, pkTEnc))σ10←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
uid, pkTEnc, cs1, cs2, Cp−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Ignore, if uid was seen before
σ20
$←
SignSig(sk2Sig, (cs1, cs2, Cp, uid, pkTEnc))σ20←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−




Check σ10 and σ20
σ11
$← SignSig(sk1Sig, (σ10 , σ20))
Decrypt cs1 to sk1PTEnc







Check σ10 and σ20
σ21
$← SignSig(sk2Sig, (σ10 , σ20))
Decrypt cs2 to sk2PTEnc




Figure 3.10: Main steps of the registration protocol for Fsso
For gaining access to a service provider, the user encrypts the message m to be sent to the
service provider and the signatures generated by the ticket-granting servers. The user also uses
the ephemeral signature private key to sign each signature and the ciphertext containing m.
Furthermore, the user also states how long the generated message should be accepted by a
service provider. This mechanism prohibits that an adversary “holds back” a message m for too
long. The service provider simply checks the signatures and validity, decrypts the ciphertext,
and then outputs the resulting message m. Thus, only if a user has received all signatures, a
service will output the message, as all signatures needs to be valid. However, as the service
needs to verify all signatures, it learns the messages signed.
3.2.2.1 Making the Protocol UC-Secure
To make the above sketch of the protocol UC-secure, some additional technicalities need to be
deployed, e.g., there are a few more signatures generated, while each signature also needs to
contain the sid, qid, and uid, to bind everything to the session and query in question. Moreover,
some of the communication is encrypted to achieve the security guarantees required.
Besides from this technicalities, the main differences are two additional steps. First, all
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User Server 1 Server 2
pk1ENC, pk2ENC sk1ENC, pk2ENC pk1ENC, sk2ENC
(UACC, uid, pkTEnc, Cp, sk1PTEnc) (UACC, uid, pkTEnc, Cp, sk2PTEnc)




Ignore, if uid is not activatedCp, pkTEnc, pkSig←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
uid, pkSig−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Ignore, if uid is not activatedCp, pkTEnc, pkSig←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Cp′
$← EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd′−1)
Let Cq ← (Cp′  Cp)rq , rq $← Z∗|G|
Cq−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Output (TKNRECVPRM, sid, uid)
On input (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, uid, time′1, S′1)
Randomize Cq to C1q,iC1q,i←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C1q,i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Output (TKNRECVPRM, sid, uid)
On input (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, uid,
time′2, S′2)
Randomize C1q,i to C2q,iC2q,i←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C2q,i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Let C′q ← C2q,i and d1
$← PDecTEnc(sk1PTEnc, C′q)
Let cs1,1
$← EncENC(pk1ENC, d1) and cs1,2
$← EncENC(pk2ENC, d1)cs1,1, cs1,2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C2q,i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→














Decrypt cs1,1 and cs2,1
d← DecTEnc(pkTEnc, {d1, d2})
Output (NOTIFY, sid, uid, d = 1G)
On input (CONTNOTIFY, sid, uid) and if d = 1G, generate the
signature σf1








Decrypt cs1,2 and cs2,2
d← DecTEnc(pkTEnc, {d1, d2})
Output (NOTIFY, sid, uid, d = 1G)
On input (CONTNOTIFY, sid, uid) and
if d = 1G, generate the signature σf2
$←
SignSig(skSig, time′2, S′2, pkSig)σf2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify the signatures
Let time′ ← min({time′1, time′2})
Store record (tokenreqgranted-rec, uid, σf1 , σ
f
2 , time′)
Output (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, uid, , time′S′1 ∩ S′2, skSig).
Figure 3.11: Main steps of the token generation protocol for Fsso




2 , pk1Sig, pk2Sig, pkENC pk
1
Sig, pk2Sig, skENC
(tokenreqgranted-rec, uid, σf1 , σ
f
2 , time′)
On input (SENDMESSAGE, sid, uid,m,S,∆):
If there are not valid signatures for S with validity
time + ∆, ignore
Choose σf1 and σ
f




$← SignSig(skSig, (σf1 , σf2 , c, time + ∆, pkSig))




2 , S1, S2, time,∆−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If current time′ > time′ + ∆, ignore
If m1,S 6= 1 or m2,S 6= 1, ignore.
Verify all signatures
Decrypt c to m
Output (RECVMESSAGE, sid,m)
Figure 3.12: Main steps of the presentation protocol for Fsso
participants need to prove that they followed the steps honestly, i.e., non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge enforce correct behavior, while they also prove knowledge of the
values the simulator needs to extract, namely the password (attempts) used. This is required to
reflect the adversary’s behavior in the ideal world. Second, to make the simulation possible, the
ticket-granting servers need to handle the decryption shares of the threshold encryption scheme
TEnc in a daisy-chain before handing the decryption to U — in a nutshell, this step is necessary
to simulate the decryption shares without knowing the actual passwords used.
Jumping ahead, in the simulation of an honest user during setup the password is not used.
However, if a corrupt user later successfully performs the token generation protocol, it expects
that the decryption of the randomized password quotient is 1G. Thus, the simulator needs to
cheat here, as it does not know the passwords involved by definition.
3.2.2.2 FCRS
The ideal functionality FCRS returns the public parameters of TEnc and crsNIZKPoK of a NIZKPoK.
In more detail, on the first call, the ideal functionality FCRS draws ppTEnc $← PPGenTEnc(1λ)
and crsNIZKPoK $← PPGenNIZKPoK(1λ, L).1 It returns (ppTEnc, crsNIZKPoK). It is stressed that the
threshold encryption scheme needs to be compatible with the zero-knowledge proofs system.
This can, e.g., by achieved using the instantiation given in Appendix A.
3.2.2.3 Protocol Description
In the following protocol, obvious checks, such as checking if the input (e.g., that time ∈ N,
the correct structuring of the sid, and the values returned by FCA) is formed correctly, are
omitted. This also includes that calls to FCRS and FCA are only carried out once to increase
readability, while all servers ignore duplicate setup requests. Storing, however, is not possible
for users, as they are assumed not to have state between protocols runs, and thus this is made
explicit. Moreover, it is implicitly required that each sent message on the network is prefixed
with a string corresponding to the protocol step to avoid ambiguities, e.g., (token-gen, 2,m),
1Actually, one CRS per language L is needed.
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where m is the original message sent in step two of the token-generation sub-protocol. How
to construct the zero-knowledge proofs used with the instantiations proposed for the building
blocks is discussed in Section 3.4.
All steps in the actual protocol are pre-fixed with a number which corresponds to the ideal
functionality for easier mapping.
Initialization Protocol. This step initializes the service provider S, and the ticket-granting
servers T. In particular, this interface allows the environment to say that each server sets up its
state, including registering public keys with FCA. Note, due to UC-conventions, making this
step explicit is necessary.
In more detail, each ticket-granting server is set up in the following way (which also includes
authenticating public keys):
Step 3. Initialize Party (Ti):
a) Upon input (SETUPSERVER, sid), generate an encryption key pair: (skENC, pkENC)
$←
KeyGenENC(1λ).
b) Generate a key pair for a signature scheme: (skSig, pkSig)
$← KeyGenSig(1λ). Note, the
signature is not required to support efficient zero-knowledge proofs. Hence, any standard
signature scheme such as RSA-FDH is sufficient.
c) Create record (KEYPAIRSSOTICKET, (skENC, pkENC), (skSig, pkSig)).
d) Send (REGISTER, (T , (sid,FCA)), (pkENC, pkSig)) to FCA, registering the public keys.
Step 4. Initialize Party (Si):
a) Upon input (SETUPSERVER, sid), generate (skENC, pkENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ).
b) Create record (KEYPAIRSSOSERVICE, (skENC, pkENC)).
c) Send (REGISTER, (S, (sid,FCA)), pkENC) to FCA.
Registration Protocol. This step allows a user U to create an account with the ticket-
granting servers T. The user requires to enter a password pwd, which it later needs to enter
again to obtain a token. For simplicity, it is assumed that the password pwd is a group element
of a group defined by FCRS via ppTEnc.
This can be enforced by using a collision-resistant hash-function for arbitrary bit-strings.
Step 5a. User U prepares messages:
a) Upon input (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd), obtain CRS (ppTEnc, crsNIZKPoK) by send-
ing (GETCRS, sid) to FCRS.
b) Also obtain (pkiENC, pkiSig) for each ticket-granting server Ti ∈ T by sending (RETRIEVE,
(Ti, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
c) Let (pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)i∈[1,|T|])
$← KeyGenTEnc(ppTEnc, |T|, |T| − 1).
d) Encrypt the password pwd, i.e., let (Cp; rp) $← EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd).
e) Generate a proof pi0 to prove that the content of Cp is known, bound to n = (sid, qid, uid,
pkTEnc, pkPTEnc, Cp), where pkPTEnc = (pkiPTEnc)i∈[1,|T|], i.e., pi0
$← ProveNIZKPoK{(pwd, rp) :
Cp = EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd; rp)}(n).
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f) For all i ∈ [1, |T|] compute csi $← EncENC(pkiENC, skiPTEnc, (n, pi0)).
g) Send (sid, qid, (csi )i∈[1,|T|], n, pi0) to T1.
Step 5b. Server Ti generates account:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0), ignore, if record (KEYPAIRSSOTICKET, (skENC,
pkENC), (skSig, pkSig)) does not exist.
b) If there is a record (UACC, sid, uid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ignore.
c) Verify pi0. If the proof is not valid, ignore.
d) Let skiPTEnc ← DecENC(skENC, csi , (n, pi0)). If skiPTEnc = ⊥ or pkiPTEnc 6= gskiPTEnc , ignore.
e) Create record (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0, skiPTEnc, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], Cp, false).
f) Sign ((csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0, Cp), i.e., σi0
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0)).
g) Send (sid, qid, uid, σi0) to U .
Step 5c. User U receives signature from Ti:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, uid, σi0) from Ti, ignore, if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n,
pi0), σi0) = false.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 5d. User U receives signature from T|T|:
a) After receiving the last signature, send (sid, qid, (σ0i )i∈[1,|T|]) to T1.
Step 5e. Server Ti receives all signatures from U :
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|]), obtain (pkjENC, pkjSig) for each server Tj ∈ T by sending
(RETRIEVE, (Tj, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
b) If for any i ∈ [1, |T|], VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n), σi0) = false, ignore.
c) Generate σi1
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|])).
d) Update the record (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0, skiPTEnc, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], false) to (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0,
skiPTEnc, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], true).
e) Send (sid, qid, σi1) to U .
Step 5f. User U receives signature from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi1), ignore, if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|], n), σi1) = false,
or if such a message for qid was received before from Si.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σ0i )i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 6. User U receives acknowledgment:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σ|T|1 ), ignore, if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|]), σ
|T|
1 ) = false,
or not all all signatures have been received yet.
b) Output (ACCCREATED, sid, qid, uid), where uid, and qid, are taken from n. Note, it is
required, by definition, that the user U has also contributed to qid, so no additional record
is needed, as it is implicit.
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Token Generation. This step is for the token generation. In a nutshell, a user U enters
its uid and some password attempt pwd′. Then, if all ticket-granting servers Ti ∈ T agree to
proceed, i.e., do not throttle and pwd′ matches the password pwd used at registration, user U
receives a token with which is can access the service providers for a given time-frame. Which
service providers U can access and how long a token remains valid, is input by each Ti ∈ T.
Step 7a. User U prepares messages:
a) Upon input (RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd), obtain the parameters, i.e., (ppTEnc,
crsNIZKPoK) by sending (GETCRS, sid) to FCRS.
b) Also obtain (pkiENC, pkiSig) for each ticket-granting server Ti ∈ T by sending (RETRIEVE,
(Ti, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
c) Generate a key pair for a signature scheme: (skUSig, pkUSig)
$← KeyGenSig(1λ).
d) Send (sid, qid, uid, pkUSig) to T1.
Step 7b. Server Ti sends information to U :
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, uid, pkUSig), ignore, if there is no record (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0,
skiPTEnc, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], Cp, true).
b) Compute σi2
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, uid, n, pkUSig, pi0, Cp)).
c) Send (sid, qid, σi2, n, pi0, Cp) to U .
Step 7c. User U receives information from Ti:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, σi2, n, pi0) from Ti, ignore if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, uid, n, pkUSig,
pi0)) = false.
b) Also ignore, if a different n, Cp or pi0 was received before.
This step essentially takes care that all ticket-granting servers have agreed on the same
login information, i.e., each server sent the same set of information to the user. Thus, the
user can be sure that each ticket-granting server uses the same information.
c) If i = |T|, continue with the next step.
d) Send (sid, qid, uid, pkUSig) to Ti+1.
Step 7d. User U receives information from T|T|:
a) Verify pi0, and ignore if it is not valid.
b) Send (sid, qid, (σ2i )i∈[1,|T|]) to T1.
Step 8. Server Ti asks throttling mechanism:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σ2j )j∈[1,|T|], n), obtain (pkjENC, pkjSig) for each server Tj ∈ T by
sending (RETRIEVE, (Tj, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
b) If for any j ∈ [1, |T|], VerifySig(pkjSig, (sid, qid, uid, n, pkUSig, pi0), σ2j ) = false (n and pi0 taken
from the local record), ignore.
c) Output (TKNRECVPRM, sid, qid, uid).
Step 9a. Server Ti proceeds:
a) On input (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, time′, S′), create record (PERMISSIONS, sid,
qid, uid, time′, S′).
b) Generate σi3
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, (σ2j )j∈[1,|T|])).
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c) Send (sid, qid, σi3) to U .
Step 9b. User U receives signature from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi3), ignore, if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (σ2j )j∈[1,|T|], n), σi3) = false.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σ2i )i∈[1,|T|], n) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 9c. User U receives signature from T|T|:
a) Encrypt pwd′, i.e., (Cp′ ; r′pwd′)
$← EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd′−1).
b) Choose a random rq $← Z∗|G|, and calculate Cq ← (Cp′  Cp)rq .
c) Generate a proof pi1 that Cq has been properly re-randomized, i.e., pi1 $← ProveNIZKPoK{(Cp′ ,
pwd′, r′pwd′ , rq) : Cq = (CpCp′)rq ∧Cp′ ∈ EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd′−1)}(n′), where n′ = (n, qid,
Cq, pkUSig). Note, that Cp′ is not given away in clear, i.e., it remains hidden.
d) Send (sid, qid, (σ3i )i∈[1,|T|], Cq, n′, pi1,⊥,⊥,⊥) to T1.
Step 9d. Server Ti randomizes share:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σ3i )i∈[1,|T|], Cq, n′, pi1, (σ4i )i∈[1,i−1], (Cq,i)i∈[1,i−1], (pi2,i)i∈[1,i−1] from
U , ignore, if any signature σ3i or σ4i is not valid.
b) Ignore, if pi1 or any pi2,i is not valid.
c) Ignore, if there is no record (PERMISSIONS, sid, qid, uid, time′, S′).
d) Ignore, if any Cq = (1G, ·). This step is necessary to avoid that the adversary uses an
additively shared group exponent to make password check succeed, even though is should
not.
e) If i = 1, let (c1, c2)← Cq. Otherwise, set (c1, c2)← Cq,i−1.
f) Choose r1i














2 )}(n′), where y is the
public key from the threshold encryption scheme for user uid contained in n.
h) Sign Cq,i, i.e., let σj4
$← SignSig(skSig, (pi1, pi2,i, n′, (σ4i )i∈[1,i−1], (Cq,i)i∈[1,i], (pi2,i)i∈[1,i−1])).
i) Send (sid, qid, σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i) to U .
Step 9e. User U receives encryption from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i), ignore, if the signature σi4 or pi2,i is not valid.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σ3i )i∈[1,|T|], Cq, n′, pi1, (σ4i )i∈[1,i], (Cq,i)i∈[1,i], (pi2,i)i∈[1,i]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 9f. User U receives encryption from T|T|:
a) Send (sid, qid, (σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i)i∈[1,|T|]) to T1.
Step 9g. Ti receives all randomized shares from U :
a) After receiving (sid, qid, pi1, (σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i)i∈[1,|T|]), verify all signatures and proofs. If not
all are valid, ignore.
b) Let C ′q,i ← Cq,|T|.
c) Ignore, if C ′q,i = (1G, ·). This is necessary to avoid that the adversary uses a shared group
exponent to make the password verification go through.
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d) Compute the partial decryption share (di, pid,i) $← PDecTEnc(skiPTEnc, C ′q, (sid, qid)). Note,
this share is bound to context (sid, qid).
e) Let csi,j
$← EncENC(pkjENC, (di, pid,i), (sid, qid, pkUSig, pkiSig)) for all j ∈ [1, |T|].
f) Sign the shares, i.e., compute σi5
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, C ′q, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])).
g) Send (sid, qid, σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|]) to U .
Step 9h. User U receives decryption shares from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|]) from Ti, ignore if σi5 is invalid. C ′q is as before.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i)i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 9i. User U receives decryption shares from T|T|:
a) After receiving all signatures σi5 and shares csi,j, send (sid, qid, (σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])i∈[1,|T|]) to
T1.
Step 11. Server Tk checks password attempt:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])i∈[1,|T|]), check that all signatures are valid. If not,
ignore.
b) Decrypt each csk,j, i.e., (dj, pid,j)← DecENC(skENC, csk,j, (sid, qid, pkUSig, pkjSig)). If decryption
outputs ⊥, ignore.
c) If VfDecTEnc(pkiPTEnc, dj, pid,j, C ′q, (sid, qid)) = false for any (dj, pid,j), ignore.
d) If DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (dj)1≤j≤|T|, C ′q) is equal to 1G, output (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, true). Out-
put (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, false) otherwise.
Step 12a. Server Ti continues:
a) On input (CONTNOTIFY, sid, qid, uid), let the message mTi ← (sid, qid, uid, bTi,1, bTi,2, . . . ,
bTi,|S|, time′Ti , pk
U
Sig), where bTi,j ← 1, if Sj ∈ S′, and bTi,j ← 0 otherwise. The values are
stored in the record (PERMISSIONS, sid, qid, uid, time′i, S′i).
b) If 1G 6= DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (di)i∈[1,n], C ′q), ignore.





$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, σfi ,mTi , (di, pid,i)i∈[1,|T|], time′i, S′i)).
e) Send (sid, qid, σfi ,mi, (di, pid,i)i∈[1,|T|], time′i, S′i, σi6) to U .
Step 12b. User U receives token from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σfi ,mi, (di, pid,i)i∈[1,|T|], time′i, S′i, σi6), check that the signatures σfi
and σi6 are valid, and ignore if this is not the case.
b) If a different (dj, pid,j)j∈[1,|T|] was received before, ignore.
c) If VfDecTEnc(pkjPTEnc, dj, pid,j, C ′q, (sid, qid)) = false for any (dj, pid,j), ignore.
d) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, (σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
e) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 13. User U receives token from T|T|:
a) If any pid,i is invalid, ignore.
b) If 1G 6= DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (di)1≤i≤|T|, C ′q), ignore.
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c) After receiving the last token, create record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, (mTi ,
σfi )i∈[1,|T|], time′, S′, skSig, pkUSig), where time′ = min(
⋃
i∈[1,|T|] time′i), and S′ = {Sj | ∀mTi :
bTi,j = 1}.
d) Output (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, time′, S′).
Gain Access to Service Provider. This step is to actually gain access to a service provider.
Step 14. User U sends message to Sk:
a) On input (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m,Sk,∆), get the current time time.
b) If there exists a record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid ′,U , uid, (mTi , σfi )i∈[1,|T|], (time′i)i∈[1,|T|],
time′, S′, skSig, pkUSig) with Sk ∈ S′ , and time′ > time + ∆, proceed. Otherwise, ignore.
c) Obtain pkSkENC for Sk by sending (RETRIEVE, (S, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
d) Encrypt m, i.e., let c $← EncENC(pkSkENC,m, (sid, qid, uid, time + ∆))
e) Generate σfs
$← SignSig(skUSig, (sid, qid, uid, (σfi ,mTi)i∈[1,|T|], pkUSig, c,S, time,∆)).
f) Send (sid, qid, uid, σfs , (σfi ,mTi)i∈[1,|T|], c, time,∆, pkUSig) to S.
Step 15. Service Sk received message from U :
a) On input (sid, qid, uid, σfs , (σfi ,mTi)i∈[1,|T|], c, time′,∆′, pkUSig), obtain (ppTEnc, crsNIZKPoK) by
sending (GETCRS, sid) to FCRS.
b) If there is no record (KEYPAIRSSOSERVICE, (skSkENC, pkSkENC)), ignore.
c) Obtain (pkiENC, pkiSig) for each server Ti ∈ T by sending (RETRIEVE, (Ti, (sid,FCA))) to
FCA.
d) Get the current time time. If time′ + ∆′ < time, ignore.
e) Verify each σfi w.r.t. pkUSig and pkiSig. If not all are valid, ignore.
f) Verify σfs w.r.t. pkUSig. If it is not valid, ignore.
g) If not for all mTi , bTi,j = 1, where j is the index of S ∈ S, ignore.
h) If not for all mTi , timei ≥ time, ignore.
i) If not all all qids in the mTi are the same, ignore.
j) Decrypt c, i.e., let m← DecENC(skSkENC, c, (sid, qid, uid, time′)). If decryption fails, ignore.
k) Output (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m).
The proof of the following Theorem is given in Section 3.2.3.
Theorem 3.10. The protocol described above securely implements the ideal functionality F1sso
in the (FCA,FCRS)-hybrid model, if DSIG, ENC, TEnc and NIZKPoK are secure, assuming static
corruptions.
The ticket-granting servers may decide to allow for access to different service providers and
a different token validity. This is reflected in the protocol by using a set of signatures presented
to the service providers. However, one may ask the question if there is way to reduce this
overhead. A solution is simple: if all ticket-granting servers share a key of a threshold signature
scheme [DF89], agree on the same time, and set of service providers S′ ⊆ S the user U can
access, one signature is enough. The sharing of the secret key can be done at the initialization
of the ticket-granting servers using, e.g., UC-secure multi-party computation [Lin09]. Even
though this may seem expensive at first glance, this initial step only has to be performed once,
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and thus amortizes over time. Another possibility are aggregate signatures [BGLS03], where all
signatures generated are aggregated into a single shorter one. However, with a realistic amount
of ticket-granting servers, say two or three, the presented approach is still efficient enough from
a practical perspective, and keeps the description of the protocol short. Thus, it depends on the
concrete scenario whether one wants to deploy the altered schemes — altering the protocol and
ideal functionality is straightforward.
Likewise, some additional improvements can be integrated. For example, an already seen
zero-knowledge proof does not need to be verified again. Moreover, in the defined protocol the
user U servers as the central hub, distributing the messages sent across the network. Clearly, the
servers itself can form a “daisy-chain”, skipping the user to decrease network delays. However,
in this case an honest server needs to verify signatures and proofs, which is, in the above
protocol, is “out-sourced” to the user. Thus, it depends on the concrete scenario which version
is preferable.
needs to verify signatures and proofs, which is, in the above protocol, is out-source
How to further change the protocol to account for additional use-cases is discussed in
Section 3.6.
3.2.3 Security of Protocol 1
High-Level Idea. The proof of Theorem 3.10 is done by providing a simulator and a sequence
of games. The initial game is the real experiment and the final game (Game 12) runs the
simulator given only the information that is also available to the adversary when interacting
with the ideal functionality.
In a nutshell, the proof idea is as follows. In the first game, the real-world is executed, where
a challenger still receives all inputs and outputs from the honest parties. With each game-hop,
the protocol is gradually made less depended on the input received for the honest party and
prove why this does not change the view of the adversary in a non-negligible way. Eventually,
in the final hop, the protocol can be simulated with the given simulator, barely based on the
information it receives from the ideal functionality which, in turn, proves security.
Next, a rough sketch of the sequence of games is given. The detailed description, as well as
the description of the simulator, is given afterwards.
Overview over Hops. The proof consist of a sequence of games that a challenger runs with
the real-world adversary. In the final game the transition, the challenger internally runs the
ideal functionality Fsso, and simulates all messages based merely on the information it can
obtain from Fsso. First, the hops are sketched to ease understanding of the full proof.
Game 1 allows the challenger to abort, if the adversary was able to forge a signature. Game 2
and Game 3 allows the adversary to simulate proofs. Game 4 allows the challenger to extract
from proofs and forces the adversary to generate the proofs correctly. Game 5 to Game 7 change
the way how encryptions of the password are done, while Game 8 and Game 9 exchange the
encryptions sent by honest parties to honest parties by dummy values, while Game 10 shows that
even with a simulated setup the adversary receives valid decryption shares. Finally, Game 11
proves that an adversary cannot generate tokens without the help of the ticket-granting servers.
In Game 12, the transition to the ideal world is done, where a simulator can run only interacting
with the ideal functionality and the real adversary.
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Detailed Sequence of Games. Now, each Game i is described in more detail, while it is
also argued why the view of the environment does not significantly change.
Game 0: In the first game, the challenger executes the real protocol for all honest players,
obtaining their inputs from, and passing the respective outputs to, the environment. It is already
assumed that the challenger keeps all values generated for the honest parties, and input from
(and output to) each honest participant. Clearly, this is only an internal change and does not
change the view of the adversary at all.
Game 1: Here, the challenger aborts, if there it sees a signature valid under a pkiSig of an
honest ticket-granting server for a message m∗ which has never been signed. In particular, these
are the signatures σi0, σi1, σi2, σi3, σi4, σi5 and σi6, for each honest ticket-granting server Ti ∈ T.
Clearly, the hop behaves differently to the prior game, if the abort happens. However,
an adversary distinguishing between the two games was able to generate a forged signature
σ∗, which breaks the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. Thus, by a standard
hybrid argument, this hop is indistinguishable. In particular, the reduction receives pkSig, and
sequentially embeds it as one of the (honest) server’s public keys pkiSig. The signatures to be
generated are provided by the signing oracle. This embedding does not change the view of the
adversary so far. Then, if the adversary was able to generate a forged signature, the reduction
can simply return it.
Game 2: The challenger now replaces crsNIZKPoK with the one generated by the ZK-
simulator. An adversary distinguishing this hop can trivially be turned into an adversary
against the proof system. The reduction is simple: if the adversary can distinguish this hop, the
reduction receives crsNIZKPoK from its own challenger and embeds it into the values returned by
FCRS. Whatever the adversary outputs, is also output by the reduction.
Game 3: The challenger now uses the ZK-simulator to fake, i.e., simulate, all proofs done
by the honest parties. Clearly, a distinguisher can be turned against an adversary against the
proof system. In particular, the reduction receives the challenge crsNIZKPoK, embeds into the
values returned by FCRS and uses the proof oracle to generate all proofs. The value output by
the environment is also output by the reduction. Note, crsNIZKPoK is distributed as in the prior
hops by definition, and thus no additional argument is needed.
Game 4: The challenger now extracts the values knowledge is proven about from the
proofs given by the adversary. If this is not possible, the challenger aborts. All extracted values
are kept internally. So far, this hop is indistinguishable by the soundness of the proof system.
The reduction is simple: the challenger embeds crsNIZKPoK provided by its own challenger as
crsNIZKPoK. That is, if the adversary was able to generate a proof which cannot be extracted,
it simply outputs this proofs as its own forgery. The challenger also aborts, if there are any
inconsistencies; the challenger can simply recalculate the steps done in the protocol, and check
if the adversary performed the steps honestly. If, however, there are inconsistencies, the proof
can simply be returned to its own challenger; no further steps are necessary.
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This hop is valid, if the NIZKPoK is used as a black-box with the definitions. If, however, the
proof-system is instantiated with the more efficient Fiat-Shamir-transform, with the alterations
presented in Section 3.4, one has to resort to a different argument. Namely, assume that the
adversary A was able to fake a proof and thus the protocol behaves differently to what is
expected, e.g., passwords verify while they should not or the challenger cannot extract the values
encrypted to the sky. In this case, the reduction can simply embed crsNIZKPoK received from its
own challenger, and return a randomly chosen proof pi∗ (along with the statement proven, which
can be derived from the protocol). Note, this random choice is necessary, as there protocol steps
where the reduction cannot decide whether the proof was generated correctly, e.g., the proofs
pi2,i if the passwords in question, as this implies a DDH-solver. See Step 8 and Step 9. Due to
this random choice, however, the reduction succeeds only with probability 1/qpi, where qpi is
the number of proofs the adversary sends. However, this is still non-negligible. This especially
means, that the values required to be extracted by the simulator are actually extractable, as
required for the simulator given in next section.
Game 5: The next change is how the retrieval is performed by an honest user. In particular,
the challenger knows whether a retrieval attempt is done with the correct pwd′, as pwd can be
extracted from Cp in the case of a corrupt user during setup, and is known for an honest user
anyway. In particular, if the passwords match, i.e., if pwd = pwd′, Cq is a new encryption of
1G, as well as Cq,i. As the proofs are already simulated, this does not change the view of the
adversary at all, as the distributions are equal due to the randomness added. However, if the
password does not match, Cq and Cq,i are replaced with fresh encryptions of random values not
equal to 1G. As the distributions are perfectly equal, the adversary does not see any difference.
Game 6: Now is changed how the retrieval is performed by a corrupt user if not all
ticket-granting servers are corrupt. In particular, the challenger knows whether a retrieval
attempt is done with the correct pwd′, as pwd can be extracted from Cp in the case of a corrupt
user during setup, and is known for an honest user, and pwd′ can be extracted from pi1. In
particular, if the passwords match, i.e., if pwd = pwd′, then replace Cq,i with a fresh encryption
of 1G.
So far, the distributions are equal. If, however, pwd 6= pwd′, then replace Cq,i with an
encryption of a random element (but 1G). Again, as the distributions are perfectly equal, while
the proofs are already simulated, the adversary cannot see any difference.
Game 7: The challenger aborts, if the “last” ticket-granting server, i.e., T|T| is honest, but
the protocol does not output a token, but pwd = pwd′ was the case. As this means that the group
exponent was hit, as the only case that the protocol aborts prematurely and artificially, even if
the adversary played honestly, while the last ticket-granting server re-randomizes completely.
This only happens by chance, i.e., 1/|G|.
Note, the case that the adversary makes the protocol can be ignored, as the adversary can
make the protocol fail anyway.
Game 8: In this hop, the challenger replaces the csi send from an honest user to an honest
server by encryptions of 1 (for each server). As usual, a standard hybrid argument shows, that
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this hop is (so far) indistinguishable due to the IND-CCA2 security of the encryption scheme.
However, there are two additional cases which have to be considered. First, the adversary may
replace (some) csi with an invalid partial decryption key. In this case, the ticket-granting server
aborts (as in the real protocol). In the case that csi decrypts to a correct partial secret key, one
can use this adversary to break the semantic security of the TEnc.
In particular, the reduction knows t secret shares, and the adversary (with a non-negligible
chance), provides an additional key. Then, the reduction can simply decrypt csi to gain an
additional (with non-negligible probability) partial secret key, and decrypting the challenge
c∗ from the semantic security challenger. Note, however, that the embedding of the challenge
public keys pkTEnc, and pkiPTEnc is random, and can only be used in one setup session. This,
however, still only implies a polynomial loss overall. In particular, only one challenge is given
for multiple registration attempts, and thus all but one are honestly generated.
Note, any ciphertext csi provided by the adversary can simply be decrypted using the
decryption oracle provided. Moreover, the corresponding partial public keys are bound to the
context n, and can thus not be re-used in a different contexts. Now, the only option left is that
n was changed as well. In this case, the ticket-granting servers simply follow the protocol. Note,
the case where an account was already created, the servers ignore the message anyway, and can
thus be ignored.
Game 9: In this hop, the challenger replaces the csi,j from an honest ticket-granting server
encrypted for a honest ticket-granting server by encryptions of 1. As usual, a standard hybrid
argument shows, that this hop is (so far) indistinguishable due to the IND-CCA2 security of the
encryption scheme.
Note, the adversary cannot replace ciphertexts, as the shares are signed, and signature
forgeries are already excluded. Thus, they cannot be re-used in different contexts, due to the
attached label, as the qids are unique. Moreover, also due to the attached label, any ciphertexts
provided by the adversary can simply be decrypted using the decryption oracle provided.
Game 10: The challenger now changes the way how the threshold encryption (and
decryption) work, if not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. In particular, in the case of
an honest user during setup, the challenger replaces Cp with an encryption of 1G. Clearly,
as the adversary knows (at most) |T| − 1 partial secret keys, an adversary distinguishing the
replacement trivially can be turned against an adversary against the semantic security of the
TEnc used using a series of hybrids, i.e., by embedding the challenge keys into one of the setup
sessions (and sending the known partial secret keys to the corrupt ticket-granting servers) one
by one.
Now, if a honest user tries to get a token for an account created by an honest user, the
challenger proceeds as before.
In the case of a corrupt user which tries to get a token for an account created by a honest
user, however, the challenger needs to make the decryption shares look correct, if not all
ticket-granting servers are corrupt. The challenger knows whether pwd = pwd′ (pwd′ can be
extracted from pi1), and proceeds as follows.
Each honest ticket-granting server no longer randomizes the share Cq,i honestly, but returns
are fresh encryption of 1G is the passwords match and of a random group element otherwise. As
the distributions are now correct again, the adversary cannot notice any difference.
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Game 11: The challenger now aborts, if a service outputs a message from a corrupt user,
even though the user in question never received a (valid) token from the ticket-granting servers,
if at least one ticket-granting server is honest. As this implies that there is at least one σfj (or
σfs ) for some message for which the ticket-granting servers or user have never issued a signature,
this tuple breaks the unforgeability of the signature scheme (note, honest users do not receive
any signatures, as the encryptions are already simulated, and the qids are unique).
A reduction in the first case is simple: pkSig is embedded as one of the ticket-granting servers’
one. Then, each signature is generated using the the signature-generation oracle provided. This
does not change the view of the adversary so far. Thus, unforgeability of the signature scheme
is broken, as σfi and the corresponding message are always given to the service provider in any
case. In the second case, i.e., where the adversary was able to generate a signature σfs in the
name of a user as the only possibility left, the reduction is the same. The challenge public key
is embedded as one of the users in the system. Then, whenever the adversary generates a new
σfs under the challenge public key, this forgery can simply be returned.
Note, the messages can be extracted in all case, as the decryption keys are known.
Game 12: Now, the challenger switches to the ideal world, and simply simulates the
protocol with the information provided by the ideal functionality Fsso alone. The simulator is
provided in the following. This is only an internal change, and does not change the view of the
adversary.
3.2.3.1 Simulator
Now, the simulator SIM is presented. The simulator is split up into four parts to ease readability.
Note, the phrase “the protocol is followed honestly” means according to the presented game-hops.
3.2.3.2 Initialization Protocol
The initialization simulation simply follows the protocol, including FCA in all cases.
3.2.3.3 Registration Protocol
The simulation of the registration part is split into different cases, depending which parties are
corrupt, and if there already is an ongoing registration.
Honest User U . Firstly, the case of an honest user is described.
There is at least one honest ticket-granting server Ti ∈ T. Here, the simulator SIM receives
the input (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid,U , uid). It follows the protocol honestly, with the
exception that is simulates the proofs and encrypts 0s as the ciphertexts csi send to the
simulated honest parties (Game 11), while the threshold encryption contains 1G (Game 13).
Note, the honest servers no longer decrypt the ciphertexts. If, however, the adversary
chose to alter sent values received to one of the honest servers, there are two cases. Firstly,
the values received by the honest server(s) are changed completely, i.e., the adversary
has overruled the setup request for qid. In this case, the simulator can extract pwd′ from
pi0, and can send (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd′) to F1sso, and can then continue
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simulating according to the protocol (See below for the case of a corrupt user). Note,
simply exchanging ciphertexts is not possible, due to Game 10. The second case, i.e., the
case where the values are not consistent (n or csi have changed for only some of the honest
servers) the account on the servers is “blocked”, as there is now no way to successfully
register an account, i.e., the simulated servers will never continue the request (not even a
new one due to the same uid; same qids are dropped anyway), while simulated users never
continue due to the changed values, as the servers never generate the required signatures
(See Game 2).
When the last honest server Ti sends (sid, σi1, n), the account is created, which is acknowl-
edged towards F1sso by sending (ACCCREATED, sid, qid,U , uid). Note, this means that the
account is created on the servers, and can be used, while the user with uid did not receive
any output yet.
Finally, after the honest user receives all correct values, the simulator allows U to output
(ACCCREATED, sid, qid, uid) in the ideal world.
All ticket-granting servers Ti ∈ T are corrupt. In this case, the simulator SIM receives the input
(CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd), and follows the normal protocol. Whenever the
simulated user U would output (ACCCREATED, sid, qid, uid), the simulator SIM triggers
the output in the ideal world as well.
Corrupt User U . Now, the case of a corrupt user is described.
There is at least one honest ticket-granting server Ti. In this case, a honest server receives (sid,
(csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0), and follows the protocol, but sends (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd)
to Fsso on the first reception of the sent message at the first honest ticket-granting server.
Note, pwd can be extracted from pi0. The simulator directly receives back control, and
follows the protocol once more. If the “last” simulated server Ti receives (sid, (σ0i )i∈[1,|T|],
n), and is willing to continue (i.e., the protocol was followed correctly and there is no
other registration with the same uid ongoing), then the simulator sends (ACCCREATED,
sid, qid,A, uid) to Fsso, and sends the last message to the corrupt user.
All ticket-granting servers Ti ∈ T are corrupt. This case is internal to the adversary A and
thus does not need to be simulated.
3.2.3.4 Simulation of the Token-Generation Protocol
Next, the simulation of the token-generation protocol is presented. As before, it is split into
several parts, depending on which parties are corrupt, and which party initiated the protocol.
Honest User U . Firstly, the case of an honest user is described.
There is at least one honest ticket-granting server Ti. Here, the simulator SIM is activated
upon receiving (RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid,U , uid). SIM starts the protocol, simulating
the (honest) ticket-granting servers and the user U as described in the protocol. The
simulation is done honestly up to the point where the first honest server Ti outputs
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(TKNRECVPRM, sid, qid, uid). This can happen if either all messages sent where received
honestly, or the adversary interfered. The case of non-interference is described first. In
the case the adversary overruled the messages, SIM continues as in the case with a corrupt
user U , described below.
The simulation proceeds as in the protocol, till all honest servers agreed to participate
(i.e., if SIM received (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, T ) for all ticket-granting servers).
Then, SIM sends (TESTPW, sid, qid,⊥) to Fsso, receiving (TESTPW, sid, qid, b), where
b = true or b = false. It then continues simulation according to the protocol till the user
must generate Cq — the simulator encrypts 1G if b = true and a random value if b = false
(Game 8). It then proceeds as in the protocol, but replaces Cq,i with encryptions of random
group elements if b = false (Game 8). If b = true, it replaces each Cq,i with encryptions
of 1G (Game 8), and replaces the encryptions csi,j with 0 (Game 12). It then follows the
protocol honestly, including the case when a simulated ticket-granting server Ti outputs
(NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, b). The simulator SIM then mimics this behavior in the ideal world
by sending (NOTIFY, sid, qid,U , uid, Ti) to Fsso, and then follows the protocol honestly
again. Finally, when the simulated user U outputs (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid, uid, time′,
S′), SIM also mimics the behavior in the ideal world by sending (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid,
qid,U , uid, time′, S′) to Fsso. Note, time′ and S′ may depend on the input from the corrupt
servers, but can be derived in the same manner as in the protocol.
All ticket-granting servers Ti ∈ T are corrupt. Here, the simulator SIM is activated on input
(RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid,U , uid). The simulator first simply follows the protocol, till
it receives n from all servers. It then obtains pwd′, extractable due to pi0. It then sends
(TESTPW, sid, qid, pwd′) to Fsso to directly retrieve (TESTPW, sid, qid, b). If b = false,
it follows the protocol with a different pwd (i.e., a random ciphertext), and in the case
b = true with the decrypted password. If, at some later point in time, the simulated user
would output (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid, uid, time′, S′), the simulator mimics the same
output in the ideal world by sending (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid,U , uid, time′, S′) to Fsso,
where time′ and S′ are derived as in the protocol.
Corrupt User U . Now, the case of a corrupt user is described.
There is at least one honest ticket-granting server Ti. Here, the simulator follows the protocol
honestly, till the (first) simulated Ti outputs (TKNRECVPRM, sid, qid, uid). It then follows
the protocol honestly (including the case where the simulated ticket-granting servers agree
to participate, as described above), till the first simulated ticket-granting server Tj receives
Cq. It then extracts pwd from pi1, and mimics the behavior in the ideal world by sending
(RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd) to Fsso, directly receiving (RECVTOKENREQ, sid,
qid,A, uid).
The simulation now branches, depending on whether the account uid was created by
corrupt user or was a simulated setup.
Account was created by a honest user. The simulator follows the protocol honestly, till it
needs to provide the opening to the commitments. Namely, SIM sends (TESTPW,
sid, qid,⊥) to Fsso, receiving (TESTPW, sid, qid, b), where b = true or b = false.
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Depending on b, the simulator generates the openings and partial decryption shares
according to Game 13, i.e., making the decryption shares look correct in the case
b = true, even though Cp contains 1G, and random elements in the case b = false.
Before the last ticket-granting server sends the last value to the network, the simulator
then grants the token in the ideal world by sending (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid,U ,
uid, time′, S′) to Fsso, directly receiving back control, where time′ and S′ are generated
as in the protocol.
Account was created by a corrupted user. In the case, the simulator already knows pwd
used at setup, and can thus follow the protocol honestly, and simply mimics the
behavior in the ideal world, i.e., once the last honest ticket-granting server sends out
its message, SIM also sends (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid, uid,∞, S) to Fsso.
All ticket-granting servers Ti ∈ T are corrupt. This step is completely internal to the adversary,
and thus does not need to be simulated.
3.2.3.5 Simulation of the Messaging Protocol
Honest User U . Firstly, the case of an honest user is described.
S is honest. Here, the simulator SIM receives the input (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,U ,S,
S′, time′′, S′′,∆). It then simply follows the protocol with the values stored from the
token-generation simulation. Note, this also means that the “most recent” token is used.
If then the simulated service receives the message sent not altered before anything else
with that qid, SIM sends (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid) to Fsso, which triggers the output
of the message in the ideal world. If, however, the adversary sends a message (sid, c′,
qid, uid, time′,∆′) which would make the simulated service output a message m′, SIM
decrypts c′ (to obtain m′), and sends (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid′,m′,S,∆′) to Fsso,
which directly returns (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,U ,S, S′, time′′, S′′,∆). The simulator
SIM then sends (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid) to Fsso to trigger the output of the new message
in the ideal world. This case can happen, if the adversary obtained a token for some uid
(which is still valid), and overrules the sent message. This is not avoidable, as the other
tokens remain valid — note, an honest user will never “overrule” such a sent message, as
it uses a new qid. Note, in the case all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, the adversary
can sent any message for uid - in the case not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt,
the adversary needs to have a token for that uid; the simulated service S would abort
otherwise.
S is corrupt. Here, the simulator receives (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,S, S′, time′′, S′′,m,∆),
and simply follows the protocol honestly.
Corrupt User U . Now, the case of a corrupt user is described.
S is honest. Here, the adversary sends a message (sid, c′, qid, uid, time′,∆′) which makes
the simulated service output a message m′, i.e., all checks pass. SIM decrypts c′ (to
obtain m′), and sends (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid′,m′,S,∆′) to Fsso, which directly
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5. Create Account Request. On input (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd) from party U :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′) or time = −1, or a record (user-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, ·, ·) exists, ignore.
• Create record (user-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd, false).
• If U = A or all Ti ∈ T are corrupt, create record (uidcorr-rec, sid, uid).
• If all Ti ∈ T are corrupt, send (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid,U , uid, pwd) to A.
• Send (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid,U , uid) to A.
Figure 3.13: Changes to the registration interfaces for F2sso
returns (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid′,S ′, S′, time′′, S′,m′,∆′). The simulator SIM then
sends (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid) to Fsso to trigger the output in the ideal world.
Note, in the case all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, the adversary can sent any message
for uid - in the case not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, the adversary needs to have
a token for that uid; the simulated service S would abort otherwise.
S is corrupt. This case is completely internal to the adversary A, and thus no simulation is
necessary.
This completes the description of the simulator SIM.
3.3 The Privacy-Enhanced Protocol
In this section, the functionality F2sso is presented. In a nutshell, F2sso behaves as F1sso, but offers
better privacy guarantees, but with slightly less efficient realization. As the functionalities are
rather similar, only their differences are discussed.
Namely, F2sso hides which other service providers a user can access, how long a token is valid
from a service provider, while the user can also resort to establish different identities with each
service provider and also hides from which token-generation run the token used in derived from.
This allows one to use the protocol in environments which require additional privacy guarantees.
3.3.1 The Differences to F1sso
Only the second, third and fourth group of the interfaces change, i.e., the setup interfaces serve
the same purpose in both protocols.
The Registration Interfaces. The registration interfaces, depicted in Figure 3.13, changes
only slightly, i.e., the first interface in that group.
5. The interface CREATEACCREQ now also keeps track whether an account was ever under
adversarial control. This is necessary to correctly model that an adversary can then link
pseudonyms, as it learns the corresponding secret key in the real world. Thus, it must be
reflected in the ideal world as well.
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12. Continue Notify. On input (CONTNOTIFY, sid, qid, uid) from party T :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), T /∈ T, or time = −1, ignore.
• If there is no record (srvcont-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , true), ignore.
• If there is a record (srvnot-rec, sid, qid), ignore.
• Create record (srvnot-rec, sid, qid).
• If U is corrupt, send (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, T , time′,S) to A, where time′, and S, are taken
from record (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, T , time′,S ′).
• Send (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, T ) to A.
13. Token Generation Complete. On input (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid,U , uid, time′′,S′′) from
adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• If all Ti ∈ T are honest, let S′′ ← S and time′′ ←∞.
• If there is a record of the form (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ignore.
• If not for all honest Ti ∈ T there exists a record (srvcont-rec, sid, qid, uid, Ti, true), ignore.
• For all existing records of the form (srvprocreq-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, Ti, timei,Si), let time′ ←
min({timei} ∪ time′′), and S′ ← ⋂ Si ∩ S′′.
• Create record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, time′, S′, (timei, Si)i∈[1,n]).
• If U = A, create record (uidcorr-rec, sid, uid).
• Output (TKNRECVCOMPL, sid, qid, uid, time′,S′) to U .
Figure 3.14: Changes to the token generation interfaces for F2sso
The Token Generation Interfaces. The token generation interfaces, depicted in Figure 3.14,
changes only slightly, i.e., only the last interface in that group.
12. The interface TKNRECVCOMPL now also keeps track whether an adversary was able to
successfully guess a password.
13. The interface CONTNOTIFY now only leaks the access rights and the information how long
the token generated is valid, if the user initiating the token generation is corrupt.
Now is explained how the communication interfaces change.
14. The SENDMESSAGE interface now also allows a user U to enter a scope string scope. Moreover,
the adversary no longer receives the uid, the time difference ∆ or the set of service providers
the user can access.
15. The RECVMESSAGE interface now also handles pseudonyms. The pseudonyms Ni are drawn
randomly by the functionality, based on the uid, the service provider S to be accessed and
the scope string scope. Note, however, that the resulting pseudonym is then fixed once and
for all (w.r.t. the service provider/uid/scope combination), as long as one ticket-granting
server Ti ∈ T remains honest.
Namely, if all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, the adversary can decide that new
pseudonyms are drawn or are re-used from another user. This is intrinsic, as the ad-
versary may hand a bogus pseudonym secret-key to a user at token generation. Moreover, the
drawn pseudonyms and the scope strings are hidden from the adversary, as long as the service
provider S to be accessed is not corrupt, i.e., those values are hidden from the adversary.
Note, however, that the pseudonyms are not scope-exclusive. The reason for this is benign;
scope-exclusive pseudonyms are deterministic and thus there cannot exist a simulator which
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14. Send Message. On input (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m,S,∆, scope) from party U :
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), S /∈ S, time = −1, or ∆ /∈ N, ignore.
• If there is a record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), where U 6= A, ignore.
• If there is no record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid ′,U , uid, time′, S′), where S ∈ S′, and time +
∆ ≤ time′, ignore, if not all Ti ∈ T and U are corrupt.
• If all Ti ∈ T and U are corrupt, set time′′ ←∞, and S′′ ← S.
• Create record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , uid,m,S, time + ∆, scope, false).
• If there is a record (uidcorr-rec, sid, uid) and S is corrupt, send (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,
U ,S,m,∆, scope) to A.
• If S is corrupt, send (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, `(uid,S, scope),U ,S,m,∆, scope) to A.
• Send (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid,U ,S) to A.
15. Receive Message. On input (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid,PRENYMA) from adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), or time = −1, ignore.
• If there is a record (msg-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, true), ignore.
• If there is no record (msg-rec, sid, qid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, false), ignore.
• Update the record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , uid,m,S, time′′, S′′, time′, scope, false) to (msg-rec, sid,
qid,A, uid,m,S, time′′, S′′, time′, scope, true), where U 6= A, if it exists.
• If time > time′, ignore, if there does not exist a record (msg-rec, sid, qid,A, uid,m,S, n, S′′, ·,
·, false), where n ≥ time.
• Update record (msg-rec, sid, qid,A, uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, scope, false) to (msg-rec, sid,
qid,A, uid,m,S, time′′, S′′, time′, scope, true), if it exists.
• If PRENYMA 6= ⊥, ignore if there is an honest Ti ∈ T, and U 6= A.
• If PRENYMA = ⊥, and a record (scope-rec, sid, uid,S, scope,NYM′,⊥) exists, let NYM ←
NYM′. Otherwise, create that record with a random (not yet chosen) NYM′ $← N .
• If PRENYMA 6= ⊥, and a record (scope-rec, sid, uid,S, scope,NYM′,PRENYMA) exists, let
NYM← NYM′. Otherwise, create that record with a random (not yet chosen) NYM′ $← N .
• Ignore, if not all ticket-granting servers Ti ∈ T are corrupt, but two records (scope-rec, sid,
uid, ·, ·, ·,PRENYMA) with different uids exist.
• If a record (msg-rec, sid, qid,A, uid,m,S, time′′,S′′, time′, scope, true) exists, take scope, m
and uid from this record. Otherwise take it from record (msg-rec, sid, qid,U , uid,m,S, time′′,
S′′, time′, scope, true).
• Output (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid,NYM,m, scope) to S.
Figure 3.15: Communication interfaces for F2sso. N denotes some pseudonym space. The leakage
function `, on input uid, S and scope, behaves as follows. It returns a list of all qids from the
msg-rec records, where there are records of the form (msg-rec, sid, qid, ·, uid, ·,S, ·, scope, ·).
produces a “succinct” usk for the adversary which “magically” makes all generated pseudonyms
match.
The Corruption Interfaces. Due to the incorporated pseudonym system, the simulator
needs some additional information once the adversary was able to successfully receive a token
for a user uid it did not create. Thus, there is an additional interface designed to capture this
behavior, depicted in Fig. 3.16.
16. The CORRSCOPES interface allows the adversary to obtain the information necessary to
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16. Corrupt. On input (CORRSCOPES, sid, uid) from adversary A:
• If sid 6= (T,S, sid ′), S /∈ S, time = −1, or ∆ /∈ N, ignore.
• If there is no record (uidcorr-rec, sid, uid), ignore.
• Send a list L to A, where L is of the form (scope-rec, sid, qid, scope), taken from all records
of the form (msg-rec, sid, qid, ·, uid, ·, ·,S, ·, scope, ·), where S is corrupt.
Figure 3.16: Corruption interfaces F2sso.
simulate the pseudonyms correctly. Namely, as soon as the adversary gains knowledge of
usk, it can recalculate pseudonyms and can thus “break” unlinkability, as it can now simply
re-calculate the used pseudonyms with the now learned secret key.
3.3.2 Realizing Protocol for F2sso
Now, the second protocol realizing F2sso is presented. Due to the better privacy guarantees, the
protocol is slightly less efficient than the one for F1sso, as it involves more zero-knowledge proofs.
3.3.2.1 Protocol Description
The protocol is derived from the first protocol. However, due to the additional possibilities,
there are some differences which are explained next. In more detail, these are the changes to
FCRS, and the protocol itself.
Changes to FCRS. The common reference string functionality FCRS now, in addition to
crsNIZKPoK and ppTEnc returns the public parameters ppNYM, where ppNYM = (gc, hc), where
gc
$← G× and hc $← G× (like Pedersen), and the public parameters ppSS $← PPGenSS(1λ, |T|) for
the secret sharing building block, i.e., the CRS now consists of (crsNIZKPoK, ppNYM, ppSS, ppTEnc).
Moreover, it is required that uid is some compatible group element.
If the signature scheme by Groth is used (See Appendix B), FCRS also needs to return the
corresponding public parameters.
Changes to the Initialization Protocol. The initialization routines remain mostly un-
changed, with the exception that the service providers create an additional key κ for a PRF,
which is used to make pseudonyms simulatable.
In more detail, a service provider is set up in the following way:
Step 3. Initialize Party (Si):
a) Upon input (SETUPSERVER, sid), generate: (skENC, pkENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ).
b) Generate a key for a PRF: κ $← KeyGenPRF(1λ).
c) Create record (KEYPAIRSSOSERVICE, (skENC, pkENC), κ).
d) Send (REGISTER, (S, (sid,FCA)), pkENC) to FCA.
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Changes to the Registration Protocol. The changes to the registration protocol are also
subtle. Namely, a user additionally generates a key pair (usk, upk) for a pseudonym-system,
and secret shares the secret key usk among the ticket-granting servers. The secret sharing is
necessary to maintain the unlinkability of the pseudonyms. At retrieval, the secret key usk is
reconstructed and is used to generate the pseudonyms for the service providers. However, notice
that the pseudonym public key upk cannot be re-used for a different account uid′ 6= uid, as the
ticket-granting servers forbid multiple accounts with same already seen upk.
Step 5a. Registration – User U prepares messages:
a) Upon input (CREATEACCREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd), obtain (crsNIZKPoK, ppNYM, ppSS, ppTEnc)
by sending (GETCRS, sid) to FCRS.
b) Also obtain (pkiENC, pkiSig) for each server Ti ∈ T by sending (RETRIEVE, (Ti, (sid,FCA)))
to FCA.
c) Let (pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)i∈[1,|T|])
$← KeyGenTEnc(ppTEnc, |T|, |T| − 1).
d) Let usk $← Z∗q and upk = guskc .
e) Encrypt the password pwd, i.e., let (Cp; rp) $← EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd).
f) Let {s1, s2, . . . , sn} $← ShareSS(m).
g) Generate a proof pi0 to prove that the content of Cp is known, bound to context n = (sid,
qid, uid, pkTEnc, pkPTEnc, Cp, upk), where pkPTEnc = (pkiPTEnc)i∈[1,|T|], i.e., let the proof pi0
generated as follows: pi0 $← ProveNIZKPoK{(pwd, rp) : Cp = EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd; rp)}(n).
h) For all i ∈ [1, |T|] compute csi $← EncENC(pkiENC, (skiPTEnc, si), (n, pi0)).
i) Send (sid, qid, (csi )i∈[1,|T|], n, pi0) to T1.
Step 5b. Registration – Server Ti generates account:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0), ignore, if record (KEYPAIRSSOTICKET, (skENC,
pkENC), (skSig, pkSig)) does not exist.
b) If there is a record (UACC, sid, uid, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ignore.
c) If there is a record (UACC, sid, ·, ·, n, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), where n contains upk, ignore.
d) Verify pi0. If the proof is not valid, ignore.
e) If pkiPTEnc 6= gskiPTEnc , ignore.
f) Let skiPTEnc ← DecENC(skENC, csi , (n, pi0)). If skiPTEnc = ⊥, ignore.
g) Create record (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0, skiPTEnc, si, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], Cp, false).
h) Sign sid, and ((csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0), i.e., σi0
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0)).
i) Send (sid, qid, uid, σi0) to U .
Step 5c. Registration – User U receives signature from Ti:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, uid, σi0), ignore, if σi0 is not valid.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], n, pi0) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 5d. Registration – User U receives signature from T|T|:
a) After receiving the last signature, send all signatures to T1, i.e., send (sid, qid, (σ0i )i∈[1,|T|])
to T1.
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Step 5e. Registration – Server Ti receives all signatures from U :
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|], n), obtain (pkjENC, pkjSig) for each server Tj ∈ T by
sending (RETRIEVE, (Tj, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
b) If for any i ∈ [1, |T|], VerifySig(pkiSig, ((csj)j∈[1,|T|], n), σi0) = false, ignore.
c) Generate σi1
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|])).
d) Update record (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0, skiPTEnc, si, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], Cp, false) to (UACC, sid, uid, n,
pi0, skiPTEnc, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], Cp, true).
e) Send (sid, qid, σi1) to U .
Step 5f. Registration – User U receives signature from Ti:
a) After receiving the message(sid, qid, σi1) from Si, ignore, if the signature does not verify,
i.e., if VerifySig(pkiSig, ((σ0j )j∈[1,|T|]), σi1) = false.
b) Also ignore, if such a message for qid was received before from Si.
c) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σ0i )i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
d) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 6. Registration – User U receives acknowledgment:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σ|T|1 ) from T|T|, ignore, if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (σ0j )j∈[1,|T|]),
σ
|T|
1 ) = false.
b) Ignore, if not all signatures have been received yet.
c) Output (ACCCREATED, sid, qid, uid), where uid, and qid, are taken from n. Note, it is
required that U also contributed to qid, so no additional record is needed, as it is implicit.
Changes to the Token Generation Protocol. This step shows how the token generation
protocol is altered. As for the first protocol, it checks the password attempt pwd′, and also
allows the ticket-granting servers to throttle ongoing token generation attempts.
However, this step now also reconstructs the secret-key usk for a pseudonym-system NYM,
which can, at token presentation, generate a pseudonym nym for a string scope. This sub-protocol
is very similar to the one presented for F1sso.
Moreover, a user no longer needs to generate a signature key pair, but an ephemeral
encryption key used to privately receive the shares of usk and the signatures σfTi,Sj from each
ticket-granting server. Thus, the ephemeral pkSig is no longer signed and thus is no longer signed,
i.e., σfi no longer protects this value.
Note, the signature scheme used for generating σfTi,Sj now needs to support efficient zero-
knowledge proofs, i.e., all other signatures can still be standard ones, i.e., one can choose the
most efficient version available.
Step 7a. User U prepares messages:
a) Upon input (RECVTOKENREQ, sid, qid, uid, pwd), ask FCRS to obtain (crsNIZKPoK, ppNYM,
ppSS, ppTEnc) by sending (GETCRS, sid) to FCRS.
b) Also obtain (pkiENC, pkiSig) for each server Ti ∈ T by sending (RETRIEVE, (Ti, (sid,FCA)))
to FCA.
c) Generate a key pair for a labeled CCA2-secure encryption scheme ENC: (skUENC, pkUENC)
$←
KeyGenENC(1λ).
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d) Send (sid, qid, uid, pkUENC) to T1.
Step 7b. Server Ti sends information U :
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, uid, pkENC), ignore, if there is no record (UACC, sid, uid, n, pi0,
skiPTEnc, (csj)j∈[1,|T|], si, Cp, true).
b) Compute σi2
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, uid, n, pkUENC, pi0, Cp)).
c) Send (sid, qid, σi2, n, pi0, Cp) to U .
Step 7c. User U receives information from Ti:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, σi2, n, pi0), ignore if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, uid, n, pkENC, pi0), σi2) =
false.
b) Also ignore, if a different n, Cp or pi0 was received before.
c) If i = |T|, continue with the next step.
d) Send (sid, qid, uid, pkUENC) to Ti+1.
Step 7d. User U receives information from T|T|:
a) Verify pi0, and ignore if it is not valid.
b) Send (sid, qid, (σ2i )i∈[1,|T|]) to T1.
Step 8. Server Ti asks throttling mechanism:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σ2j )j∈[1,|T|]), obtain (pkjENC, pkjSig) for each server Tj ∈ T by sending
(RETRIEVE, (Tj, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
b) If for any j ∈ [1, n], VerifySig(pkjSig, (sid, qid, uid, n, pkUENC, pi0), σ2j ) = false (n and pi0 taken
from the local record), ignore.
c) Output (TKNRECVPRM, sid, qid, uid).
Step 9a. Server Ti proceeds:
a) On input (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, time′, S′), create record (PERMISSIONS, sid,
qid, uid, time′, S′).
b) Generate σi3
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, (σ2j )j∈[1,|T|])).
c) Send (sid, qid, σi3) to U .
Step 9b. User U receives signature from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi3) from Ti, ignore, if VerifySig(pkiSig, (sid, qid, (σ2j )j∈[1,|T|]), σi3) =
false.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σ2i )i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 9c. User U receives signature from T|T|:
a) Encrypt pwd′, i.e., (Cp′ ; r′pwd′)
$← EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd′−1).
b) Choose a random rq $← Z∗|G|, and calculate Cq ← (Cp′  Cp)rq .
c) Generate a proof pi1 that Cq has been properly re-randomized, i.e., pi1 $← ProveNIZKPoK{(Cp′ ,
pwd′, r′pwd′ , rq) : Cq = (Cp  Cp′)rq ∧ Cp′ ∈ EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd′−1)}(n′), where n′ =
(n, qid, Cq, pkENC).
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d) Send (sid, qid, (σ3i )i∈[1,|T|], Cq, n′, pi1) to T1.
Step 9d. Server Ti randomizes share:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σ3i )i∈[1,|T|], Cq, n′, pi1, (σ4i )i∈[1,i−1], (Cq,i)i∈[1,i−1], (pi2,i)i∈[1,i−1] from
U , ignore, if any signature σ3i or σ4i is not valid.
b) Ignore, if pi1 or any pi2,i is not valid.
c) Ignore, if there is no record (PERMISSIONS, sid, qid, uid, time′, S′).
d) Ignore, if any Cq = (1G, ·). This step is necessary to avoid that the adversary uses an
additively shared group exponent to make password check succeed, even though is should
not.
e) If i = 1, let (c1, c2)← Cq. Otherwise, set (c1, c2)← Cq,i−1.
f) Choose r1i














2 )}(n′), where y is the
public key from the threshold encryption scheme for user uid contained in n.
h) Sign Cq,i and the received signatures, i.e., let σj4
$← SignSig(skSig, (pi1, pi2,i, n′, (σ4i )i∈[1,i−1],
(Cq,i)i∈[1,i], (pi2,i)i∈[1,i−1])).
i) Send (sid, qid, σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i) to U .
Step 9e. User U receives encryption from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i), ignore, if the signature σi4 or pi2,i is not valid.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σ3i )i∈[1,|T|], Cq, n′, pi1, (σ4i )i∈[1,i], (Cq,i)i∈[1,i], (pi2,i)i∈[1,i]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 9f. User U receives encryption from T|T|:
a) Send (sid, qid, (σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i)i∈[1,|T|]) to T1.
Step 9g. Ti receives all randomized shares from U :
a) After receiving (sid, qid, pi1, (σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i)i∈[1,|T|]), verify all signatures and proofs. If not
all are valid, ignore.
b) Let C ′q,i ← Cq,|T|.
c) Ignore, if C ′q,i = (1G, ·). This is necessary to avoid that the adversary uses a shared group
exponent to make the password verification go through.
d) Compute the partial decryption share (di, pid,i) $← PDecTEnc(skiPTEnc, C ′q, (sid, qid)). Note,
this share is bound to context (sid, qid).
e) Let csi,j
$← EncENC(pkjENC, (di, pid,i), (sid, qid, pkUSig, pkiSig)) for all j ∈ [1, |T|].
f) Sign the shares, i.e., compute σi5
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, C ′q, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])).
g) Send (sid, qid, σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|]) to U .
Step 9h. User U receives decryption shares from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|]) from Ti, ignore if σi5 is invalid. C ′q can be calculated
from the shares known.
b) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, qid, (σi4, Cq,i, pi2,i)i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
c) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
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Step 9i. User U receives decryption shares from T|T|:
a) After receiving all signatures σi5 and shares csi,j, send (sid, qid, (σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])i∈[1,|T|]) to
T1.
Step 11. Server Tk checks password attempt:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, (σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])i∈[1,|T|]), check that all signatures are valid. If not,
ignore.
b) Decrypt each csk,j, i.e., (dj, pid,j)← DecENC(skENC, csk,j, (sid, qid, pkUSig, pkjSig)). If decryption
outputs ⊥, ignore.
c) If VfDecTEnc(pkiPTEnc, dj, pid,j, C ′q, (sid, qid)) = false for any (dj, pid,j), ignore.
d) If DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (dj)1≤j≤|T|, C ′q) is equal to 1G, output (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, true). Out-
put (NOTIFY, sid, qid, uid, false) otherwise.
Step 12a. Server Ti continues:
a) On input (CONTNOTIFY, sid, qid, uid), let mTi,Sj ← (sid, qid,Sj, upk, time′i, uid), if Sj ∈ S′
and mTi,Sj ← ⊥ otherwise. The values are stored in the record (PERMISSIONS, sid, qid,
uid, time′i, S′i). Note, sid, qid and Sj are not group elements. However, hashing them into
G1 using a collision-resistant hash-function is sufficient, while for uid it is already assumed
that it is some group element.
b) If 1G 6= DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (dj)j∈[1,n], C ′q), ignore.
c) Sign each mTi,Sj 6= ⊥, i.e., σfTi,Sj
$← SignSig(skSig,mTi,Sj).
d) Encrypt each value σfTi,Sj , m
Ti,Sj and si, i.e., let cfi
$← EncENC(pkUENC, ((σfTi,Sj ,mTi,Sj)j∈[1,n],
si), (sid, qid, pkENC, pkiSig).
It assumed that each “missing” signature σfTi,Sj is replaced by an equally long dummy
value to account for the different resulting lengths and can be recognized as such.
This is necessary to avoid leaking information due to the different length of the encrypted
values.
e) Generate σi6
$← SignSig(skSig, (sid, qid, cfi , (dj, pid,j)j∈[1,|T|])).
f) Send (sid, qid, cfi , (dj, pid,j)j∈[1,|T|], σi6) to U .
Step 12b. User U receives token from Ti:
a) After receiving (sid, qid, cfi , (di, pid,i)i∈[1,|T|], σi6), check σi6. If it is not valid, ignore.
b) Decrypt the received ciphertexts, i.e., let ((σfTi,Sj ,m
Ti,Sj)i∈[1,n],j∈[1,|S|], si, time′i)← DecENC(
skENC, cfi , (sid, qid, pkENC, pkiSig, time′i)). If the decryption yields ⊥, ignore.
c) If a different list (di, pid,i)i∈[1,|T|] was received before, ignore.
d) Check that each signature σfTi,Sj is valid, and ignore if this is not the case.
e) If i 6= |T|, send (sid, (σi5, (csi,j)j∈[1,|T|])i∈[1,|T|]) to Ti+1.
f) Otherwise, continue with the next step.
Step 13. User U receives token:
a) If any pid,i is invalid, ignore.
b) If VfDecTEnc(pkiPTEnc, di, pid,i, C ′q, (sid, qid)) = false for any (di, pid,i), ignore.
c) If 1G 6= DecTEnc(pkTEnc, (di)1≤i≤|T|, C ′q), ignore.
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d) Let usk′ ← CombineSS({s1, s2, . . . , sn}).
e) If gusk′ 6= upk, ignore.
f) Generate the new record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid,U , uid, (mTi,Sj , σfTi,Sj)i∈[1,|T|],j∈[1,|S|],
time′, S′, usk′), where time′ is the minimum time, i.e., time′ = min(⋃i∈[1,|T|] time′i), and
S′′ = {Sj | ∀mTi,Sj : mTi,Sj 6= ⊥}.
g) Output (TOKENGENGRANT, sid, qid, uid, time′′, S′′).
Changes for the Protocol to Gain Access to a Service. Now is explained how the
protocol used to gain access to a service is altered. Namely, a user additionally uses the
reconstructed usk to generate a pseudonym on a string scope and hides the signatures σfTi,Sj
behind a zero-knowledge proof pis.
Hiding the signatures achieve unlinkability, while neither the complete list of accessible
service providers is given away nor the time how long the token used remains valid.
Step 14. Access to Service – User U sends message to Sk:
a) On input (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m,Sk,∆, scope), get the current time time.
b) If there exists a complete record (tokenreqgranted-rec, sid, qid ′,U , uid, (mTi,Sk , σfTi,Sk)i∈[1,|T|],
(time′i)i∈[1,|T|],j∈[1,|S|], time′, S′, usk) with Sk ∈ S′, and time′ > time +∆, proceed. Otherwise,
ignore. Choose a random record from them.
c) Obtain pkENC for Sk by sending (RETRIEVE, (S, (sid,FCA))) to FCA.
d) Let r′ ← G(usk, scope,Sk), where G : Zq × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → Zq is a random oracle, and
nym← guskc hr′c .
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where n′′ = (sid, qid,Sk, time).
f) Encrypt m, i.e., let c $← EncENC(pkENC, (m, time,∆, nym, scope, pis), (sid, qid)).
g) Send (sid, qid, c) to Sk.
Step 15. Access to Service – Service S received message from U :
a) On input (sid, qid, c), ask FCRS to obtain (crsNIZKPoK, ppNYM, ppSS, ppTEnc) by sending
(GETCRS, sid) to FCRS.
b) If there is no record (KEYPAIRSSOSERVICE, (skSkENC, pkSkENC)), ignore.
c) Obtain (pkiENC, pkiSig) for each server Ti ∈ T by sending (RETRIEVE, (Ti, (sid,FCA))) to
FCA.
d) Decrypt c, i.e., let (m, time,∆, nym, scope, pis)← DecENC(skSENC, c, (sid, qid)). If decryption
fails, ignore.
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e) Verify pis. If it is not valid, ignore.
f) Get the current time time′. If time′ > time + ∆, ignore.
g) Let nym′ ← EvalPRF(κ, nym), where κ is taken from record (KEYPAIRSSOSERVICE, (skENC,
pkENC), κ).
h) Output (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid, nym′,m, scope).
Note, only the signatures σfi,Sj need to support efficient zero-knowledge proofs, i.e., all other
signatures can still be realized with more a efficient standard signature scheme such as RSA-FDH.
However, to have a compact representation, this is not made explicit.
Theorem 3.11. The protocol described above securely implements the ideal functionality F2sso in
the (FCA,FCRS)-hybrid model, if DSIG, ENC, TEnc, SS, NIZKPoK and NYM are secure, assuming
static corruptions.
3.3.3 Security of Protocol 2
High-Level Idea. As for the simpler protocol, the proof of Theorem 3.11 is done by providing
a simulator and a sequence of games. The initial game is the real experiment and the final game
(Game 12) runs the simulator given only the information that is also available to the adversary
when interacting with the ideal functionality.
As for the first protocol, the proof idea is as follows. In the first game, the real-world is
executed, where a challenger still receives all inputs and outputs from the honest parties. With
each game-hop, the protocol is gradually made less depended on the input received for the
honest party and prove why this does not change the view of the adversary in a non-negligible
way. Eventually, in the final hop, the protocol can be simulated with the given simulator, barely
based on the information it receives from the ideal functionality which proves security.
However, as the hops and simulator SIM are very similar, only the differences are explained
in more detail.
Sequence of Games. The sequence of games is essentially the same as for the proof given in
Section 3.2.3 for the first protocol, with the exception of the following alterations. First, an
additional game hop is needed:
Game 10+1: In this hop, the challenger replaces the cfi from an honest ticket-granting
server encrypted for a honest user by encryptions of 1. As usual, a standard hybrid argument
shows, that this hop is (so far) indistinguishable due to the IND-CCA2 security of the encryption
scheme.
Note, replacing (by the adversary) is not possible, as the shares are signed and thus forgeries
are already excluded. Moreover, they cannot be re-used in different contexts, due to the attached
label, while, also due to the attached label, any ciphertexts provided by the adversary can
simply be decrypted using the decryption oracle provided.
Moreover, Game 11 needs to be changed as follows.
Game 11: The challenger now aborts, if a service outputs a message from a corrupt user,
even though the user in question never received a (valid) token from the ticket-granting servers,
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if at least one ticket-granting server is honest. As this implies that there is at least one σfj for a
message mj for which the ticket-granting servers have never issued a signature (note, honest
users do not receive any signatures), this tuple breaks the unforgeability of the signature scheme.
A reduction is simple, using a hybrid argument: pkSig is embedded as one of the ticket-
granting servers’ one. Then, each signature is generated using the the signature-generation
oracle provided. This does not change the view of the adversary so far. Moreover, both the
message and signature can easily be extracted from pis. Then, if the above case happens, the
challenger wins its own unforgeability game with non-negligible probability due to the random
embedding.
Finally, some additional hops are required to account for the pseudonyms incorporated into
the protocol.
Game 11+1: The challenger now takes control of G and (lazy) simulates it honestly.
Clearly, this does not change the view of the adversary.
Game 11+2: The challenger now aborts, if it draws a key pair usk of the pseudonym
system twice for honest parties. Once more, this can only happen with negligible probability
due to the exponential key-space.
Game 11+3: The challenger now aborts, if it draws 1G as a response for G. This only
happens with negligible probability due to the exponential size of G.
Game 11+4: The challenger now aborts, if the adversary makes a query (usk, ·, ·) to G
without having any successful token generation run for an honest user with uid which belongs
to that usk, or it guesses such a output correctly. Note, there is at most one secret key usk in
the pseudonym-system for each upk. This also includes the case where r is chosen randomly
(without querying G); then, the challenger randomly assigns the values as a valid pre-image to
G (if it does not exist yet).
Clearly, due to the random choice of usk and the outputs from sets with exponential size,
this can only happen with negligible probability.
Game 11+5: The challenger now aborts, if a value in the random oracle G was drawn
twice. Due to the birthday bound, this can only happen with negligible probability.
Game 11+6: Next is changed how gc and hc are calculated. In particular, the challenger
draws a random gc $← G× and a random x $← Z∗q and embeds (gc, gxc ) as the new public
parameters for ppNYM. This is only an internal change, as the real CRS looks just alike, but the
challenger now knows x.
Game 11+7: In this game hop is shown that the adversary cannot find collisions, if
different usks are involved. Assume, towards contradiction, that the adversary was able to
find a collision nym′ = nym, while usk 6= usk′ (Note, either each usk is chosen honestly, one
can be extracted from pis or even both). One can then extract a solution to a DL-challenge.
In particular, the reduction receives (G, g, q, gx), and embeds g and gx as ppNYM. Now, as,
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by assumption, it holds that guskgxr1 = gusk′gxr2 (enforced by pis and calculated honestly by
the challenger), where thus r1 6= r2 must hold. Hence, x can be extracted by calculating
usk− usk′/r2 − r1 and can then directly be returned.
Game 11+8: Now is changed how pseudonyms are calculated in case not all ticket-granting
servers are corrupt and the that uid has neither been created by the adversary nor the adversary
received usk, i.e., if it guessed a password correctly and thus received usk. Namely, instead of
computing r′ ← G(usk, scope,Sk) and nym ← guskc hr′c , choose a random r′ $← Z∗q for each new
scope and Sk combination (and abort if r′ was drawn twice. However, due to the birthday bound
this changes the view of the adversary only negligibly.) Once, however, the adversary gets to
know usk, i.e., if A (successfully) logs in into an honestly generated account, and thus expects
to receive usk, the challenger proceeds as follows. It programs G such that for all prior (unique)
(usk, scope,Sk) combinations it returns (r − usk)/x. This programming does not change the
view of the adversary. Note, usk is still distributed as before.
Game 11+9: The challenger now replaces each generated nym′ by the PRF from the
honest services with a random value and keeps the output consistent. A distinguisher can be
turned against the pseudo-randomness of the used PRF. The reduction works as follows. Using
a hybrid-argument, the challenger replaces the PRFs one service provider at a time, and uses
the provided oracle for generation of nym′. Whatever the adversary outputs, is also output by
the reduction.
Game 11+10: The challenger now aborts, if it draws a randomly drawn nym′ twice.
Clearly, this only happens with negligible probability due to the birthday bound.
Game 11+11: The challenger now aborts, if not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, but
a service receives an already seen nym′ from a different upk but the same string scope. Clearly,
this breaks the collision-resistance of the pseudonym-system. A reduction is straightforward.
Namely, usk can be extracted from pis in the case of a corrupt user, and are known for an
honest user anyway. The scopes are known in all cases, either by decryption or as input by the
environment. Note, the challenger already aborts in the case of forged proofs, and all proofs by
honest parties are simulated. Thus, all values can be extracted and can simply be returned to
the challenger, as the usk0 6= usk1 was already excluded.
Game 11+12: The challenger now aborts, if an honest service outputs a message from
a corrupt user along with nym′, even though that upk has never been issued a currently valid
token, and at least one ticket-granting server is honest. As this implies that there is at least one
σfj for a message mj for which the ticket-granting servers have never issued a signature (note,
honest users do not receive any signatures from honest servers in this hop already), this tuple
breaks the unforgeability of the signature scheme. A reduction is simple: pkSig is embedded
as one of the ticket-granting servers’ one. Then, each signature is generated using the the
signature-generation oracle provided. This does not change the view of the adversary so far.
Moreover, both values can simply be extracted from pis. Then, if the above case happens, the
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challenger wins its own unforgeability game with non-negligible probability due to the random
embedding.
These are all and additions changes needed.
3.3.3.1 Simulator
Now, the simulator for the second protocol is presented. The simulator essentially is the same
as for the first protocol, only with a few small alterations.
Namely, only the token-generation and the simulation for the messaging part have to be
altered as follows:
3.3.3.2 Simulation of the Token-Generation Protocol
The only change required is the following. As soon as the adversary was able to receive a token
for an account uid which belongs to a simulated user U , i.e., before the simulator SIM sends
the final network message to A and thus has still control, it programs the random oracle G as
described in the game hops. The required scopes are learned by sending (CORRSCOPES, sid,
uid) to the ideal functionality.
Note, this step is only necessary, if there is at least one honest ticket-granting server.
3.3.3.3 Simulation of the Messaging Protocol
Honest User U . First, the case of an honest user is described.
S is honest. Here, the simulator needs to branch, depending on whether all ticket-granting
servers are corrupt or not and whether the adversary interfered, if it holds a valid token
for the uid in question (and thus knows usk).
Not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. The simulator is woken up when it
receives (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid,U ,S). In the case that not all ticket-granting servers are
corrupt the adversary cannot tamper with the reconstruction of usk. Thus, the simulator
simply sends an empty ciphertext to the simulated service.
If the adversary did not interfere and thus the service receives the sent ciphertext, the
simulator triggers the output in the real world by sending (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid,⊥)
to the ideal functionality. Note, the ideal functionality “magically” chooses the correct
pseudonym, as it is guaranteed that usk was restored correctly, even in the case where a
corrupt user sends a message before the corresponding records are generated, as the ideal
functionality takes care of this case.
If the adversary interfered, however, i.e., if the adversary holds a valid token for uid and
S, while the simulator receives (sid, qid, c′) (which makes the simulated service S output
some message m′, i.e., the adversary overruled the request), the simulator needs to reflect
that behavior in the ideal world as well. Namely, the simulator proceeds as in the case for
a corrupt user, described below.
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All ticket-granting servers are corrupt. In this case, the simulator also receives
(SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid,U ,S). However, the adversary is now able to exchange usk at
will. Then, if the adversary did not interfere, it sends (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid, usk) to
the ideal functionality, triggering the output in the real world with the correct pseudonyms.
Note, an honest user will always calculate such pseudonyms correctly, while the adversary
may decide to give that usk to a different user as well (or even use it itself, as described
now).
If the adversary interfered, however, i.e., if the adversary holds a valid token for uid and
S, while the simulator receives (sid, qid, c′) (which makes the simulated service S output
some message m′, i.e., the adversary overruled the request), the simulator needs to reflect
that behavior in the ideal world as well. Namely, the simulator proceeds as in the case for
a corrupt user, described below.
S is corrupt. If the service provider is corrupt, the simulator also needs to branch, depending on
whether the adversary knows usk (but at least one ticket-granting server remains honest)
or if all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. Note, the adversary A knows usk if either the
registration was done by a corrupt user or the adversary was able to successfully receive
a token for an account which was created by a honest user, i.e., guessed the password
correctly.
All ticket-granting servers are corrupt. Here, the simulator is woken up upon
reception of (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,U ,S,m,∆, scope). It then simply follows the
protocol, as all values are known, while the proofs are simulated.
Note, triggering any output in the ideal world is not necessary.
Not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt, but A knows usk. This is the same
simulation as for the case that all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. However, in this case
the pseudonyms are already programmed correctly and thus the simulator can proceed
without any additional alterations.
Note, triggering any output in the ideal world is not necessary.
Not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt and A does not know usk. Here, the
simulator SIM is woken up with (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, L,U ,S,m,∆, scope), where L
is the list of all qid ′s with the same uid, S and scope combination. If that list is empty, the
simulator chooses a new random (and not yet chosen) pseudonym nym (as described in the
game-hops) and then simply continues the protocol, also storing (qid ′, nym). If, however,
the list L is not empty, the simulator uses the pseudonym nym from the record (qid ′, nym).
Note, once usk becomes known to the adversary, all pseudonyms are programmed as
described in the sequence of games and at the simulation of the token-generation protocol.
The case of an adversary holding a valid token for uid cannot happen, as otherwise usk
would be known, which is already excluded.
Note, triggering any output in the ideal world is not necessary.
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Corrupt User U . Now, the case of a corrupt user is described. In this case, the simulated
service S, i.e., the simulator SIM, receives (sid, qid, c′) on the network.
S is honest. Again, the simulator needs to branch, depending on whether all ticket-granting
servers are corrupt or not. If the simulated S would output some message m′ (and some
nym′), the simulator behaves as follows.
Not all ticket-granting servers are corrupt. In this case, the simulator mimics the
output in the ideal world by sending (SENDMESSAGE, sid, qid, uid,m′,S,∆′, scope′) to the
ideal functionality. The required values can simply be extracted from pis and by decrypting
c′. The simulator SIM directly receives back control and now behaves as follows. If the
pseudonym was generated honestly for that uid (this can simply be checked by looking
at the responses/queries by G and pis), the simulator sends (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid,⊥)
to the functionality. In the case the pseudonym NYM was not correctly calculated (as
defined in the protocol), the simulator sends (RECVMESSAGE, sid, qid,NYM) to the ideal
functionality. Note, collisions in the space of NYM is already ruled out for different usks.
All ticket-granting servers are corrupt. In this case, the adversary can exchange
the pseudonym secret key at will. This simulation proceeds as in the prior case. However,
in this case uid no longer matters (and is hidden from the service anyway), as the ideal
functionality explicitly ignores this case.
S is corrupt. This is completely internal to the adversary A, and thus no simulation is
necessary.
3.4 Concrete Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Now is presented how the zero-knowledge proofs can be constructed. For the sake of completeness,
it is assumed that the IND-CPA secure encryption scheme is ElGamal and the TEnc the one
given in Appendix A.
Assume the system parameters contain a group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q = Θ(λ) that
is also used for TEnc, i.e., let FCRS return an element y˜ ∈ G and let (G, g, q) be the input
KeyGenTEnc so that the values pkTEnc, pkPTEnc output by KeyGenTEnc are elements of G. In this
discrete-logarithm-based setting, the various proofs used in the protocols can be instantiated
using so-called generalized Schnorr-protocols [CKY09,Sch91].
When referring to such proof protocols, the following notation, similar to what was used in
the high-level description, is used [CKY09,CS97]. For instance,
SPK
[
(a, b, c) : y = gahb ∧ y˜ = gahc
]
(m)
denotes a “Signature based on a zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge of integers a, b, c such that
y = gahb and y˜ = gahc holds,” where y, g, h, and y˜ are elements of G and where m is included
into the hash that is used to make the proof of knowledge protocol non-interactive (Fiat-Shamir
transformation).
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The convention is that the letters in the parenthesis (a, b, c) denote quantities of which
knowledge is being proven, while all other values are known to the verifier.
Given a protocol in this notation, it is straightforward to derive an actual protocol imple-
menting the proof. Indeed, the computational complexities of the proof protocol can be easily
derived from this notation: basically for each term y = gahb, the prover and the verifier have to
perform an equivalent computation, and to transmit one group element and one response value
for each exponent. Refer to, e.g., Camenisch et al. [CKY09] for details on this.
The most efficient way to make these protocol concurrent zero-knowledge, simulation-sound,
and non-malleable is by the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86]. In this case, one has to resort
to the random-oracle model [BR93] for the security proof.
To make the resulting non-interactive proofs simulation-sound in the required context, it
suffices to let the prover include context information as an argument to the random oracle in
the Fiat-Shamir transformation, such as the system parameters, uid, qid, and the protocol step
in which the statement is being proven, and a collision-resistant hash of the communication
transcript that the prover and verifier have engaged in so far, so that the proof is resistant to a
man-in-the-middle attack [BPW12a,FKMV12].
In particular, notice that all the statements parties prove to each other in the concrete
proofs are only proofs of membership (i.e., that some computation was done correctly) and not
online-extractable proofs of knowledge, as the values which need to be extracted are “encrypted
to the sky”. Therefore, it is not necessary that the prover can be re-wound to extract the
required witnesses in the simulator.
Summarized, all proofs are Σ-protocols [Sch91], made non-interactive using, e.g., the Fiat-
Shamir transform [FS86], forming a proof of membership which do not require rewinding.
Moreover, these proofs are simulation-sound, as context-information is attached as a label
- which, in the case of Fiat-Shamir, corresponds to put the label into the hash-function as
well [FKMV12].
To this end, assume that an element y˜ is available as part of the CRS that is used as a public
key for ElGamal encryptions in the protocols, i.e., a public key “in the sky”. The simulator
then sets y˜ so that it knows logg y˜ and hence can, by decryption, extract group elements (the
password and the password attempts in this case) without rewinding.
The Proof pi0. The proof can be constructed as follows, where pi0 $← ProveNIZKPoK{(pwd, rp) :
Cp = EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd; rp)}(n), where n = (sid, qid, uid, pkTEnc, pkPTEnc, Cp). The ciphertext
itself is composed as Cp = (Cp,1, Cp,2) = (grp , pwd · pkrpTEnc).
The proof pi0 as now realized as follows.
First, the prover computes the value C˜p,2 = pwd · y˜rp that, together with Cp,1, forms an




(rp) : Cp,1 = grp ∧ Cp,2/C˜p,2 = (pkTEnc/y˜)rp
]
(n, C˜p,2))
The Proof pi1. The proof is given as pi1 $← ProveNIZKPoK{(Cp′ , pwd′, r′pwd′ , rq) : Cq = (Cp 
Cp′)rq ∧ Cp′ ∈ EncTEnc(pkTEnc, pwd′−1)}(n′), where n′ = (n, qid, Cq, pkCCA2ENC ).
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First, the prover computes the values C˜p′ = (C˜p′,1 ← gr′p , C˜p′,2 ← pwd′ · y˜r′p) that form
an encryption of pwd′ under y˜ (i.e., the public key contained in the CRS). Next, the prover
computes Cq = (Cp  Cp′)rq ← (Crqp,1gr¯, (Cp,2/pwd′)rqpkr¯TEnc).
Then, the proof can be realized by:
pi1
$← ((C˜p′,1, C˜p′,2), SPK
[




)rq y˜r∗pkr¯TEnc ∧ C˜p′,1 = gr
′




where r∗ = rqr′p. Why this proof works is discussed next. The last two terms establish that







rqpkr¯TEnc. Now, as C˜p′,2/y˜r
′
p equals the plaintext encrypted under y˜, say pwd′ it follows
that Cq,2 = (Cp,2pwd′ )
rqpkr¯TEnc. Assuming that Cp = (grp , pwd · y˜rp) for some rp and pwd, it holds
that Cq = (grprq+r¯, (pwd/pwd′)rqpkrprq+r¯TEnc ), i.e., that Cq is a properly randomized encryption of
the password quotient under pkTEnc.






2 )}(n′) can be
constructed as follows, where Cq = (C1, C2), and Cq,i = (C3, C4), where n′ is as in the prior














The Proof pis in F2sso. The second protocol requires a rather involved proof pis, where all
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4 ∧ nym = guskc hr
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Now is discussed how this proof can be efficiently realized. The main idea is to use
a recent signature scheme by Groth for the token-generation servers. This scheme allows
one to sign group elements and to efficiently prove knowledge of a signature and messages
where one can use the ElGamal encryption scheme to make the latter proof efficiently online-
extractable. Groth’s scheme is recalled in Appendix B. It is also explained how to prove
knowledge of a signature on messages that are encrypted under a public key given in the CRS.



















6 can simply be provided by
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encrypting qid ′j, uid, and upk, respectively, only once and then use the same ciphertext in the
proof terms when proving knowledge of a signature (cf. Appendix B). It remains to discuss
the term ∧j∈[1,|T|] time′j ≥ time + ∆. There are well known methods to implement range proofs.
However, the most efficient ones require an RSA modulus being available as part of the CRS
which is hard to achieve without a trusted party generating the CRS. In this case, a more efficient
approach is as follows, assuming that tokens are valid for a limited time (e.g., a day) and that
the granularity is not too fine (e.g., a minute). Then there are relatively few values of ∆ that are
allowed (e.g, 1′440 = 24∗60) and one can make available a Groth signature of g∆i1 for all possible




1 be signed as part of the CRS. One can then prove that time′j ≥ time + ∆ by proving
knowledge of a signature on two messages m1 and m2 s.t. gtime1 = m1 ·m2, which translates into
proving knowledge of the randomness used for encryption r¯ s.t. gtime1 /(c1 · c2) = (y˜1y˜2)r¯, where
c1 and c2 are the encryptions of m1 and m2 under y˜1 and y˜2, respectively, that are used to prove
knowledge of a signature on m1 and m2, as presented in Appendix B. Finally, usk and r′ can be
made online-extractable using, e.g., the encryption scheme by Camenisch and Shoup [CS03] or
Paillier [Pai99].
The Proofs pid,i. The concrete proofs pid,i for the threshold encrypion scheme TEnc are
presented in Appendix A.
3.5 Efficiency of the Protocols
This section contains a short summary of a prototypical implementation of both schemes. A
more detailed description is given in Appendix E.
The implementation was done using Java 9 without any optimization, while only a single
thread does the calculations. All entities were calculated on a standard PC with a 2.66GHz
processor and 8GiB RAM. To instantiate the random oracle and the PRF, SHA-512 (properly
truncated for the challenges in the NIZKs) was used. Each ticket-granting server always allows
to proceed, while it allows access to 10% of the services for ten time units. The group G used in
the first protocol was G1 of the “SNARK 2” curve, as given in the pairing library provided by the
TU Graz.2 The zero-knowledge proofs are the ones presented in Section 3.4. The exponents usk
and r′ are made online-extractable using the encryption scheme by Camenisch and Shoup [CS03]
with 2,048 Bit moduli. The ideal functionality FCA was realized using hard-coded keys, while
all signatures without ZK-property are standard ECDSA. For the range-proof in pis, 1,440
signatures are generated in the CRS, which corresponds to a maximum validity of one day, if the
granularity is one second. For secret-sharing of usk in the second protocol, Shamir’s protocol
was used [Sha79].
To have a meaningful evaluation, both protocols where measured 100 times with |T| ∈
{3, 5, 10} and |S| ∈ {100, 500, 1′000}, which even covers very large environments. Moreover,
the numbers for network delay and generating the qids are not part of the measurements, as
it depends on the concrete setting of a potential deployment. Finally, the timings for the
ticket-granting servers are accumulated for token-generation and key-generation, as this is
2https://jce.iaik.tugraz.at
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Table 3.1: Overview of the measurements for the first protocol. All values are in milliseconds.
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1000 100 500 1000 100 500 1000
ParGen Avg. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Med. 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
KGen (T ) Avg. 34 24 24 42 43 40 82 87 81Med. 24 24 24 40 42 39 82 84 80
KGen (S) Avg. 636 3
′171 6′450 656 3′310 6′245 641 3′346 6′362
Med. 628 3′134 6′364 636 3′293 6′223 640 3′336 6′344
Reg (U) Avg. 60 58 58 97 98 94 174 183 184Med. 59 57 58 95 98 93 174 182 183
Reg (T ) Avg. 144 135 140 526 542 529 3
′276 3′509 3′767
Med. 143 134 138 518 545 527 3′278 3′478 3′765
TGen (U) Avg. 107 101 103 169 173 165 288 307 315Med. 106 100 102 164 172 165 288 303 315
TGen (T ) Avg. 647 639 654 1
′716 1′758 1′663 6′168 6′550 6′369
Med. 634 634 649 1′674 1′742 1′657 6′159 6′517 6′350
Comm (U) Avg. 11 11 11 11 12 11 11 12 12Med. 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12
Comm (S) Avg. 22 20 21 29 30 29 42 45 48Med. 21 20 20 28 30 29 42 44 48
what a user (or the administrator setting up the servers resp.) sees. This was done, as UC
requires that at most one party has control. It is stressed, however, that key-generation can
be parallelized, as they the keys do not depend on any prior state. The values for each server
can thus be calculated by dividing it by |T| (or |S| resp.), as each ticket-granting server has to
perform the exact same amount of work. The only exception is the communication with a single
service, as only one service and the user is involved.
The measurements for the first protocol are in Table 3.1, while the results for the second
protocol are depicted in Table 3.2.
As expected, the parameter-generation is independent of |S| and |T|, while key-generation
obviously only depends on the number of servers involved for both protocols. The same is true
for the registration part of both protocols, which only depends on the amount of ticket-granting
servers |T|.
Things slightly change, however, for token-generation. In the first protocol, the numbers are
more or less constant, as each ticket-granting server only signs a single bit-string, regardless of
how many services are in the system. More precisely, this string’s length depends on |S|, but the
signing operation is much more costly and hides this operation. This is, however, not true for the
second protocol, where each ticket-granting server needs to generate a signature for each service
a user can access. Thus, this overhead is now very visible. Likewise, at “token-presentation”,
i.e., communication with a service, the user and service either only need to generate and verify
some signatures in the first protocol, while for the second protocol a rather expensive NIZK
needs to be generated which hides the signatures generated by each ticket-granting server.
Summarized, both protocols can be considered practical, especially taking into account that
parameter generation, registration and token-generation are rather infrequent (to some extend
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Table 3.2: Overview of the measurements for the second protocol. All values are in milliseconds.
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1000 100 500 1000 100 500 1000
ParGen Avg. 28
′705 28′066 29′630 27′433 28′965 29′854 32′719 30′057 28′727
Med. 26′958 26′234 28′131 25′552 28′001 28′593 31′683 29′085 26′718
KGen (T ) Avg. 83 83 85 140 139 140 313 280 280Med. 82 83 84 139 139 139 318 277 279
KGen (S) Avg. 622 3
′146 6′403 639 3′140 6′310 697 3′164 6′271
Med. 619 3′127 6′360 638 3′113 6′292 713 3′127 6′237
Reg (U) Avg. 57 58 61 92 92 94 195 179 180Med. 56 58 60 91 92 93 196 176 179
Reg (T ) Avg. 138 137 143 474 480 482 3
′495 3′242 3′449
Med. 135 135 140 465 476 481 3′568 3′236 3′420
TGen (U) Avg. 5
′349 26′338 53′578 8′879 44′162 88′709 19′784 89′023 177′998
Med. 5′319 26′210 53′392 8′802 43′437 88′400 20′279 87′714 176′417
TGen (T ) Avg. 1
′197 3′450 6′396 2′616 6′342 11′124 8′894 15′677 25′054
Med. 1′187 3′423 6′342 2′592 6′272 11′063 9′068 15′445 24′851
Comm (U) Avg. 786 786 799 1
′204 1′215 1′226 2′505 2′294 2′305
Med. 782 785 794 1′200 1′206 1′221 2′580 2′264 2′289
Comm (S) Avg. 1
′667 1′667 1′702 2′716 2′744 2′767 5′957 5′431 5′466
Med. 1′660 1′658 1′695 2′697 2′720 2′759 6′122 5′388 5′426
even “one-time”) operations, while communication between a user and a service offers realistic
performance in both protocols, even in the light that this implementation was not optimized
in any way. The last statement becomes even more clear considering the case that five or ten
ticket-granting servers are a rather pessimistic choice, while a bi-directional channel is then
bootstrapped. In other words, with a more realistic setting with two or three ticket-granting
servers, the run-time is entirely practical.
A more detailed description of the measurements is given in Appendix E.
3.6 Additional Extensions to the Protocols
The protocols given already offer the basic functionality of SSO, including a lot of privacy
guarantees. However, from a practical perspective, one might think of some additional features,
which one may want to have in a real deployment.
This section is devoted to discuss some of these potential additional requirements and how
to alter the functionalities (and the corresponding protocols) to address them.
3.6.1 (t, n)-Threshold Version
In the current formalizations, all service providers want a proof that all ticket-granting servers
approve that the user can access the service in question. This can be relaxed in a quite natural
way. In particular, one only requires that, say, only t < |T| ticket-granting servers need to agree
that a given user can access the service in question.
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The ideal functionality needs to be adjusted as follows: instead of granting access to the
services for which each ticket-granting servers agreed upon (for each qid), it stores the access
rights for the services for which at least t servers grant the token. In protocol, the only change
required is that not knowledge of all signatures is proven, but only t of them (with the same
constraints), and for different (service providers’) public keys. This can even be extended to
hide which servers are used to prove that the access rights are actually given, e.g., by hiding the
public keys used as well.
This can even be extended to a case where only t-out-of-n ticket-granting servers need to
participate during the password check. Altering the protocol is easy: one does not generate the
threshold encryption keys for the n-out-of-n case, but for the new t-out-of-n one. However, in
this case already t corrupt servers learn the password pwd used at registration, while all other
security guarantees still hold. Altering the functionality and protocols is straightforward. Note,
however, that in the second protocol also the secret-sharing scheme SS has to be adjusted to
the t-out-of-n case.
3.6.2 Adding Context-Information
The only information the ticket-granting servers can pass to the service providers is that a given
uid has successfully obtained a token. This, however, may not always be sufficient. For example,
it may be needed that the ticket-granting servers can pass some additional information, i.e.,
context, to the service providers.
This can easily be achieved by adding an additional parameter to the TOKENGENGRANT-
interface, which is then also signed in the token-generation protocol. This context information
is then simply made public, and attached to the sent message (or encrypted, if the context is to
be hidden from the adversary/outside world).
3.6.3 Completely Unlinkable & Scope-Exclusive Tokens
Clearly, the services learn, by definition, the party id U of the party sending requests and the
uid in the case of a corrupted service.
This may not always be wanted due to privacy concerns. However, implementing the change
is quite straightforward: in the ideal functionality, this information is no longer given to the
adversary. For the protocol, however, one has to resort to some form of onion-routing to hide
the origin of the messages, as done for anonymous credentials [CLNR14,CL05]. However, in
this case, one has to take extra care that the qid’s are also generated in an unlinkable way.
Moreover, a corrupt user can generate as many pseudonyms for a given scope as it wants
to. However, as scope-exclusive pseudonyms are deterministic, it seems to be very hard to
correctly simulate the secret key usk once it needs to be given to the adversary, especially if the
simulator does not know which token was used and thus needs to somehow “program” usk which
cannot be exponentially big. Also see Appendix C and Appendix D, where two scope-exclusive
pseudonym-systems are presented.
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3.6.4 Adding New Services
The protocol enforces that the services are fixed at setup. However, a simple alteration allows
to add additional services (note, the access rights are input by the environment anyway).
In particular, one removes S from the sid, and solely bases access to the services on the
environment’s input. Note, however, that the message signed needs to contain which service
provider is meant – in the proposed protocols, this is encoded over the position in the message,
which is then no longer possible. A solution is simple: one signs S instead of 1 in the first
protocol, while signing S mapped to group element using a collision-resistant hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 in the second protocol anyway. Note, however, that in this case the size of
the encryption may leak how many service providers a user can access in the second protocol —
this can be circumvented if there is an upper bound on the services a given user can access with
each token, while the encrypting party signs dummy values.
Clearly, all these extensions can be combined, while the proofs of security carry over with
only minor adjustments. However, it was chosen not to incorporate the changes directly to
make the protocols, proofs and definitions more readable.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the notion of password-based distributed UC-secure single sign-on,
where token generation and password-checking is split up among multiple ticket-granting servers
to protect the users’ passwords. Two ideal functionalities F1sso and F2sso, along with protocols
realizing them, were given. In both, the adversary does not learn anything about the (wrong)
password-attempts, and all ticket-granting servers need to be corrupt before the adversary learns
the password used at registration. The ideal functionality F1sso offers the basic functionality
one expects, while F2sso offers additional privacy guarantees such as unlinkable tokens and
incorporates pseudonyms, at the cost being slightly less efficient.
However, a still open problem is to find a suitable and provably secure way how to update
passwords and to make the tokens scope-exclusive.

Chapter 4
Virtual Smart-Cards: Signing With a
Password and a Server
The results of this chapter have already been published [CLNS16].
Abstract. An important shortcoming of client-side cryptography on consumer devices is the
poor protection of secret keys. Encrypting the keys under a human-memorizable password hardly
offers any protection when the device is stolen. Trusted hardware tokens such as smart-cards
can provide strong protection of keys but are cumbersome to use. This chapter considers the
case where secret keys are used for digital signatures and proposes a password-authenticated
server-aided signature Pass2Sign protocol, where signatures are collaboratively generated by a
device and a server, while the user authenticates to the server with a (low-entropy) password.
Neither the server nor the device store enough information to create a signature by itself or to
perform an oﬄine attack on the password. The signed message remains hidden from the server.
It is argued that the protocol offers comparable security to trusted hardware, but without its
inconveniences. It is also proven secure in the universal composability (UC) framework in a
new corruption model where, unlike standard UC, the adversary does not obtain past inputs
and outputs upon corrupting a party. This is crucial to hide previously entered passwords and
messages from the adversary when the device gets corrupted. The protocol itself is surprisingly
simple: it is round-optimal, efficient, and relies exclusively on standard primitives. The security
proof involves a novel random-oracle programming technique.
Roadmap. Section 4.1 contains the problem statement, while additional preliminaries are
presented in Section 4.1.3. The ideal functionality FPass2Sign is presented in Section 4.2. The
corresponding protocol is given in Section 4.3, while the protocol is proven secure in Section 4.4.
The evaluation of the implementation is contained in Section 4.5, while a few modifications of
the basic scheme are given in Section 4.6. This chapter is concluded in Section 4.7.
4.1 Introduction
Mobile devices such as smart-phones and tablets are used more and more for security-critical
tasks such as e-banking, authentication, and signing documents. However, they can be infected
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by malware and, due to their mobility, the devices are easily lost or stolen. Keeping cryptographic
keys safe in such an environment is challenging. Typically, they are simply encrypted with
a human-memorizable password. If a device is lost, stolen, or compromised by malware, the
password-encrypted keys are usually easily recovered through an oﬄine dictionary attack.
Such attacks are extremely effective on modern hardware, especially given the low entropy in
human-memorizable passwords [Gos12].
Higher-security use cases such as online banking or government-issued electronic identification
(eID) therefore often resort to tamper-proof hardware such as smart-cards, SIM cards or trusted
platform modules (TPMs) for extra protection. The hardware tokens offer interfaces to interact
with the keys, e.g., to compute digital signatures on messages provided by the host, while the
signing key never leaves the confined environment. Usually, a password or PIN code is added
as a second layer of protection. Guessing attacks on the password or PIN are infeasible as the
token blocks after too many failed attempts. In case a hardware token is compromised, it can
additionally be rendered useless by revoking its public key.
The protection is not perfect though. Without a dedicated display, malware on the host
machine may instruct the plugged-in token to sign more or different messages than the user
intended to sign. Also, side-channel attacks such as differential power analysis only become
more powerful with time. In other words, what is considered tamper-proof hardware today, may
not be so anymore tomorrow [KK99]. Additionally, trusted hardware suffers from poor usability
and high deployment and maintenance costs. Users find it inconvenient to carry a hardware
token for each security-sensitive application. Desktop and laptop computers rarely come with
built-in smart-card readers and not all consumer-grade machines have TPMs. External USB
card readers are available, but supporting drivers and browser plug-ins on several platforms
simultaneously requires a considerable effort. Using trusted hardware in combination with
mobile devices is even more problematic, as they often lack connectivity to interact with external
tokens.
So the question is, is there a way to realize similar security guarantees as hardware tokens yet
avoiding their practical inconveniences? Software obfuscation [BGI+01,BGI+12,BM14,GGH+13]
may come to mind, but does not help at all: leaking an obfuscated signing algorithm to an
adversary is just as bad as leaking the signing key itself. As network connectivity is far more
ubiquitous than trusted hardware in consumer devices, how about relying on the assistance of
an online server to create signatures? A solution must protect the keys as long as at least one of
the device or the server is not corrupted. Moreover, it is required that the user is only required
to remember at most a potentially weak password or a PIN code, while offering protection
against oﬄine password guessing attacks. Involving an online server in the signing process
enables additional control of the use of the signing key, as the server can block the account
or involve a second authentication factor. However, it is stressed that this approach therefore
requires network access and an always reachable server, which now also needs to be maintained.
Thus, it depends on the use-case which approach one prefers.
4.1.1 Contribution
This chapter introduces password-authenticated server-aided signatures (Pass2Sign), where the
signing key is distributed over the user’s device and an online server. The signing key is
never reconstructed; rather, the device and the server must engage in a distributed protocol to
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compute signatures. For added security, the user must enter a password on the device each time
a signature is generated. The server not only verifies the password, but also the identity of the
device, i.e., an adversary without access to the device cannot even perform an online guessing
attack. This prevents an adversary from blocking an honest user’s account by swamping the
server with fake login attempts: the server simply ignores signing attempts from the wrong
device. If the device falls into the wrong hands, or if the device is compromised by malware, then
the attacker must still perform an online guessing attack before it can generate signatures. When
the server detects too many failed password attempts or signing requests per time period, it
can take appropriate action such as blocking the account or requiring additional authentication.
The server neither learns the message that is being signed, nor does it learn the user’s password
(or password attempts). This not only protects the user against malicious servers, but also
protects the password in case the server is broken into by hackers.
Malware running on the device can of course capture both the device keys and the password,
enabling the adversary to sign any messages it wants, but only by interacting with the server
for each new signature. The server can therefore implement additional security measures on
top of the protocol, e.g., a logic which detects abnormal signing behavior, or a secondary
communication channel via which the server informs the user about his account activity. When
suspicious transactions are detected, the server can block the user’s account to ensure that no
further signatures can be created, and revoke the user’s public key.
The resulting security level is almost identical to the protection offered by trusted hardware
tokens, but without their inconveniences. Only few smart-card readers feature integrated trusted
keypads and displays; built-in secure elements such as SIM cards or TPMs never do. Malware
running on the host system can therefore also capture the user’s PIN code and have different
messages signed than what is shown on the screen. The main security guarantee of trusted
hardware tokens is therefore that no more signatures can be generated after unplugging the
token—which can actually be quite cumbersome or even impossible for SIM cards and TPMs.
In the same way, the protocol prevents further signatures from being generated when the user’s
account is blocked by the server. When the device is lost, the given solution even offers better
protection than hardware: while it may be possible to extract the keys from a compromised
token, the only information that an adversary can extract from a corrupted device is a “useless”
key share.
Strong Security Notion and Corruption Model. The security of the Pass2Sign scheme
is defined in the universal composability (UC) framework [Can01]. The main goal of the protocol
is to guarantee protection of the user’s password and signing key in the event of device or
server compromise. Therefore, a very strong corruption model is proposed that, unlike standard
corruptions as defined in the UC framework, does not hand all past inputs and outputs to the
adversary when a party is corrupted. In case the device gets corrupted, these inputs include
the user’s password and all previously signed messages, which obviously goes directly against
the security goals. Clearly, it is impossible to achieve such a strong corruption model without
secure erasures: if the entered passwords are not erased, then there is no way to hide it from an
adversary upon corruption.
As already discussed in Chapter 1, the UC-framework is well-known to provide superior
and more natural security guarantees for the particular case of password-based protocols than
traditional game-based notions [CHK+05b]. In particular, by letting the environment generate
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all passwords and password attempts, UC formulations correctly model arbitrary dependencies
between passwords. For example, their game-based counterparts fail to provide any security
guarantees when honest users make typos while entering their passwords, a rather frequent
occurrence in real life. Also, by absorbing password guessing attacks inside the functionality,
secure composition with other protocols is guaranteed to hold; this is much less clear for
game-based notions that tolerate a non-negligible adversarial success probability.
Efficient Protocols. One might expect that meeting such stringent security standards comes
at a considerable cost in efficiency. Indeed, similar protocols involve a factor 4–10 in performance
penalty to protect against (standard) adaptive corruptions [CEN15], while generic techniques to
obtain adaptive security at least double the number of communication rounds [Ven14]. Blindness
for signed messages is another feature that is notoriously expensive to achieve in the UC
framework [KZ08]. It is therefore even more surprising that the protocol, in the random-oracle
model, is refreshingly simple, round-optimal, and efficient. Generating a signature requires only
three modular exponentiations on the device and two on the server, plus a few hash function
evaluations, with only one protocol message from the device to the server and back. The
resulting signature is an RSA-FDH signature on a double salted hash of the message and some
technical values such as session identifiers. The protocol is also altered to two simpler variants
for the setting where message blindness is not required. The first variant exposes the message
only to the server, while the second variant does not hide the message at all.
Proof Technique. In spite of its simplicity, the security proof of the protocol is actually quite
intricate. The many cases triggered by adaptive corruptions (which are allowed even during
setup and arbitrarily interleaved signing sessions) and the mixture of passwords, encryption, and
signatures require very careful bookkeeping, especially of the random-oracle responses during
simulation. This proof also incorporates an interesting and novel technique to reconcile the
seemingly contradictory requirements that the simulator must be able to determine the value
of each signature, but without learning the message being signed. Typical blind signature
techniques and the associated “one-more”-type security assumptions [BNPS03] are avoided by
letting the device and the server both contribute to the randomness of the signature, and by
programming the random oracle “just-in-time” at the moment that the signature is verified, not
when it is created. This technique is of independent interest and may find applications in other
scenarios as well.
Implementation. The protocol was implemented on a commodity mobile device to provide a
thorough performance analysis of the prototypical implementation to demonstrate its practicality.
With signature generation for a 2048-bit key requiring about 250ms in total, the protocol is
clearly efficient enough for use in practice. The detailed results are given in Section 4.5.
4.1.2 Related Work
The idea of distributing signing keys over two separate entities dates back to Boyd [Boy89],
and was later generalized to threshold signatures [DF89,Rab98,GRJK00,BDTW01,ADN06].
Threshold signatures assume that all parties agree on the messages signed, i.e., there is no
“main entity” that can trigger a signing protocol and thus also no authentication to ensure
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that only the “main entity” can do so. Bellare and Sandhu [BS01a] present two-party RSA
signature protocols between a client and a server. However, in their protocols the server cannot
be corrupted and requires no client-authentication.
Server-assisted signatures with additional password protection have been presented in the
literature as well. Ganesan [Gan95] proposes a protocol where the client’s signing exponent is
derived from his password. This is similar to Gjøsteen and Thuen [GT11,Gjø13] who propose
password-based signature schemes where the secret signing key is shared between different
entities, but where one share only depends on the password. A server knowing the high-entropy
part of the signing key can mount oﬄine attacks by creating a signature based on a guessed
password (from which the low-entropy key-share is derived) and verifying it under the public
key. Hence, the above approaches assume that the server cannot be corrupted. The scheme
offers much weaker security guarantees than the one introduced in the chapter: the server can
mount oﬄine attacks against the user’s password and sign messages in the name of the user, as
it knows the signing key. Both is not possible in the presented protocol. Xu and Sandhu [XS03]
present two server-assisted threshold signature schemes for a closely related setting where a
user can generate the signatures with the help of his device and a threshold of multiple servers.
Their constructions do not yield single-server instantiations as a special case, however, because
in their setting a collusion of servers larger than the threshold can perform an oﬄine attack on
the user’s password, without access to the user’s device.
Another line of work are the schemes given by Mannan and van Oorschot [MvO07], as
well as the ideas presented by Damg˚ard and Mikkelsen [DM09], which assume a trusted, yet
resource-contrained device and aim at securely outsourcing parts of the device’s computation to
an untrusted entity. However, the goal is not to reduce the computational complexity for the
trusted device, but to fully remove the assumption of trusted hardware.
The S-RSA protocol due to MacKenzie and Reiter [MR03] envisages many of the goals that
are pursued here, such as requiring the adversary to compromise the device to perform even
an online attack, avoiding oﬄine attacks as long as the server and the device are not both
compromised, and “key disabling” by blocking a user’s account on the server. Their protocol is
proven secure in a non-UC notion that is weaker than the one given in this chapter. Foremost, it
does not enjoy the many advantages of UC password-based protocols discussed earlier, such as
preserving security in case of mistyped passwords and secure composition with other protocols.
Also, the server in their protocol sees the message being signed, can only be corrupted between
(and not during) signing sessions, and can perform an oﬄine dictionary attack on the password
based on the information it sees during the signing protocol (but the last problem is easy to fix).
The protocol presented here is the first to support fully adaptive corruptions of the server
as well as the device in the UC model. One could of course evaluate the signing algorithm
using generic adaptively UC-secure multiparty computation (MPC), but this comes at great
cost: evaluating even a single multiplication gate in the most efficient two-party computation
protocol secure against adaptive corruptions [CES13] incurs computation and communication
costs that are magnitudes larger than the given direct construction.
A more remotely related primitive is password-authenticated secret sharing (also called
PASS-schemes), e.g., the schemes by Bagherzandi et al. [BJSL11] and Camenisch et al. [CEN15,
CLLN14,CLN12]. A PASS-scheme allows a user to share a secret among a set of servers that
it can later recover based on a password. In a sense, one can consider storing a secret signing
key using a two-out-of-two PASS scheme, where the user’s device plays the role of one of the
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servers. This does not fulfill the given requirements, though, as the device would need to locally
reconstruct the signing key in order to compute a signature. Moreover, once the signing key
is reconstructed, the device can sign as many messages as it wants to without any additional
checks.
4.1.3 Additional Building Blocks
For this chapter, some additional building blocks are required. These are presented next.
4.1.3.1 Receiver Non-Committing Labeled Public-Key Encryption
To deal with adaptive corruptions, a non-committing encryption scheme for the receiver is
required. In the security proof, the simulator needs to be able to simulate ciphertexts without
knowing the corresponding plaintexts which would be encrypted in the real protocol. However,
when the adversary later corrupts the receiver of a simulated ciphertext, the simulator has to
provide a state of the corrupted party such that all the ciphertexts decrypt to some concrete
plaintext. This is related to the “selective de-commitment problem” [BH92].
The notion of non-committing encryption that is required is stronger than some that were
proposed in the literature [FHKW10,HPW15] and weaker than others [Nie02]. To minimize the
security assumptions for the protocol and open the possibility for more efficient instantiations,
a new definition is introduced, which is a non-interactive construction in the random-oracle
model.
A labeled non-committing encryption scheme ENC has the same interfaces as a standard
encryption scheme. However, it has some additional, non-standard, security properties which are
required for security of the protocol. Namely, the RECV-SIM security property is now introduced
that a labeled non-committing encryption scheme needs to satisfy in this context.
Definition 4.1 (RECV-SIM security). An encryption scheme ENC is RECV-SIM-secure if for
all PPT adversaries A there exists a stateful PPT simulator SIMNCE and a negligible function ν
such that:∣∣∣Pr[RECV-SIM-realENCA (λ) = 1]− Pr[RECV-SIM-idealENCA,SIMNCE(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiments are depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
This definition says an encryption scheme is RECV-SIM-secure (RECeiVer-SIMulatable), if
there exists a simulator that is given control over the random oracle such that no adversary can
distinguish between simulated ciphertexts (which do not contain any information) and honestly
generated ones.
More precisely, the adversary must not be able to tell in which of the two experiments it
is run in, even if it can adaptively query for new encryptions, decryptions, and receives the
secret key at some point. The crucial difference is that in the ideal game the adversary receives
simulated ciphertexts instead of real ones, which are computed by a simulator on input only the
length of the plaintext. Moreover, the adversary A receives the secret key of the receiver at a
later point of its own choice. In the ideal world, this secret key is provided by the simulator







where oracle EncENC on input mi and `i:
ci
$← SIMNCE(ENCRYPT, |mi|, `i)
Q ← Q∪ {(ci,mi, `i)}
return ci
where oracle DecENC on input cj and `j:
if (cj,mj, `j) ∈ Q, return mj
return mj ← SIMNCE(DECRYPT, cj, `j)
where oracle H on input qk:
return hk $← SIMNCE(ROQUERY, qk)
skENC $← SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,Q)
return AOH(·)(skENC, stateA)
Figure 4.1: Experiment RECV-SIM-ideal for the RECV-SIM definition
adversary expects that the ciphertexts indeed decrypt to the messages queried to the encryption
oracle using the given secret key.
Compared to the definition given by Fehr et al. [FHKW10], the adversary A is allowed
adaptive queries, and receives the secret key skENC (but not the randomness used to create it) at
the last step of the experiment, while the definitions given by Hazay et al. [HPW15] only consider
a single (or randomly sampled according to some distribution) message per key pair, which is
not enough for the protocol. Likewise, Nielsen [Nie02] gives a formulation of non-committing
encryption—in the sense of secure message transmission—in the UC framework. However, his
functionality is stronger than what is needed here, because it simulates all randomness, which is
not required, as the protocol relies on secure erasures anyway.
Note, in Chapter 5 is shown how to achieve an even stronger notion which does not require
secure erasures, and no interaction, i.e., does not model secure message transfer as Nielsen
does [Nie02].
Analogously to Fehr et al. [FHKW10], it is now shown that this definition implies standard
IND-CCA2 security.
Theorem 4.2. Any encryption scheme that is RECV-SIM-secure is also IND-CCA2-secure.
Proof. Intuitively, the proof formalizes the following idea: if an adversary can decide which
message a given ciphertext contains, then it can decide whether a given ciphertext contains any
information at all.
Assume an (efficient) adversary A that guesses the bit b in the IND-CCA2 game with
probability at least 12 + . Then there is a construction of an (efficient) adversary B such that the
probability that it outputs 1 in the two experiments RECV-SIM-real and RECV-SIM-ideal differs
at least by . The proof is straightforward. Essentially, the reduction feeds the ciphertexts to





where oracle EncENC on input mi and `i):
return ci $← EncENC(pkENC,mi, `i)
where oracle DecENC on input cj and `j):
return mj ← DecENC(skENC, cj, `j)
where oracle H on input qk:
return hk ← H(qk)
return AOH(·)(skENC, stateA)
Figure 4.2: Experiment RECV-SIM-real for the RECV-SIM definition
A, and if A guesses correctly, then it must be the real experiments as the ciphertexts in the
ideal experiments are unrelated to the challenge message. More precisely, the reduction is as
follows. Initially, B receives a public key pkENC of the encryption scheme, oracle access to EncENC,
DecENC, and a random oracle H. Thus, B runs A on input pkENC. Whenever A requests access
to its decryption oracle, B forwards A’s query to its own oracle, and returns the unmodified
answer to A. When eventually A outputs the challenge messages ((m0,m1), `, stateA), B checks
that |m0| = |m1|, and that both m0 ∈ MS and m1 ∈ MS. If any checks fail, B sets c ← ⊥.
Else, B picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and calls its own encryption oracle: c ← EncENC(mb, `).
B then passes (stateA, c) to A. If now (c, `) is queried to the decryption oracle, B responds
with ⊥. For every other query, B uses its own decryption oracle, and forwards the answer to A.
Eventually, A outputs its guess b∗. B outputs 1 if b∗ = b, and 0 otherwise. Let us analyze the
probability that B outputs 1 in both experiments.
1. If B is run in the experiment RECV-SIM-real, then clearly, B was playing the IND-CCA2
game with A, using the random bit b. Hence, it holds that Pr[ExpRECV-SIM-realENC,B = 1] =
Pr[ExpIND-CCA2ENC,A = b′] = 12 + .
2. If B run in experiments RECV-SIM-ideal, then the challenge ciphertext that B fed to A was
unrelated to mb, i.e., the answer b∗ of A is information-theoretically independent of b and
therefore Pr[ExpRECV-SIM-idealENC,B = 1] = 12 follows.
So, the difference between these two probabilities is at least . Note, the definition of RECV-SIM
also has access to a random oracle. This is the reason why the random oracle was made explicit
in the IND-CCA2 definition.
Instantiation. Now, a concrete instantiation for an encryption scheme that achieves RECV-
SIM security is given. Namely, the IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme introduced by Bellare
and Rogaway [BR93] is modified to include labels and handle arbitrary-length messages. Let
G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ and K : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ denote two hash functions, modeled as random
oracles. Further, an encoding scheme EC = (ec, dc) which allows to map arbitrary length messages
to a list of blocks with fixed length is required. More precisely, let ec : {0, 1}∗ → ({0, 1}λ)+ be a
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injective encoding function and dc : ({0, 1}λ)+ → {0, 1}∗ be the corresponding decoding function
that returns ⊥ if no valid pre-image exists. It is required that both functions are computable
in polynomial time and that the output length of ec only depends on the length of its input,
while dc and ec need to be perfectly correct, i.e., for all λ ∈ N, and all messages m ∈ {0, 1}∗ it
holds that m = dc(ec(m)) with probability one. Note, it is not required that these functions are
deterministic.
Construction 4.3 (RECV-SIM-secure ENC). Let ENC be constructed as follows:
KeyGenENC. Generate the key pair in the following way:
1. Generate a random TDP , i.e., (f, f−1,Σ) $← KeyGenTDP(1λ). The message space MS
is {0, 1}∗.
2. Output the public key pkENC = (f,Σ), and skENC = f−1 as the secret key.
EncENC. To encrypt a message m w.r.t. to pkENC and label ` do:
1. Let (m1,m2, . . . ,mk)← ec(m).
2. Draw x $← SampleTDP(Σ), compute c1 ← f(x), ci2 ← G(i, x) ⊕ mi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
and c3 ← K(x, k,m, `).
3. Output the ciphertext c← (c(1), (c1(2), c2(2) . . . , ck(2)), c(3)).
DecENC. To decrypt a ciphertext c w.r.t. to skENC and label ` do:
1. Parse c as (c(1), (c1(2), c2(2), . . . , ck
′
(2)), c(3)) for some k′ ≥ 1.
2. Compute x′ ← f−1(c(1)) and m′i ← G(i, x′)⊕ ci(2) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k′.
3. Let m′ ← dc(m′1, . . . ,m′k′).
4. If m′ = ⊥ or c(3) 6= K(x′, k′,m′, `), output ⊥.
5. Output m′.
The above construction is clearly perfectly correct, while the proof of the following theorem
is given in Appendix F.
Theorem 4.4. The construction above is RECV-SIM-secure, if G and K are modeled as random
oracles and KeyGenTDP(1λ) is a secure TDP generator.
It is shown in Chapter 5 that a slightly altered version of the construction above achieves
much stronger security, while also having a tighter reduction.
4.2 Ideal Functionality
Now the password-authenticated server-aided signatures (Pass2Sign) are formally defined by
describing its ideal functionality in the universal composability (UC) framework [Can01].
First, recall the high-level goal of the Pass2Sign scheme: signatures on messages are derived
collaboratively between two parties, a device D and a server S, meaning that a valid signature
can only be obtained if both parties agree to the generation. Access to the server’s signing
operation is protected by a user password pwd that is chosen at setup and needs to be provided
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for every signing request. The server then verifies whether the password is correct and also
whether the request came from the correct device, which has the additional advantage that an
attacker cannot block an honest user’s account by swamping the server with false login attempts.
The protocol must be secure against oﬄine attacks on the password used during setup and on
the password attempts during signing. That is, as long as at least one party remains honest, the
adversary does not learn anything about the used passwords. In particular, the server learns
only whether a password attempt in a signing request was correct or not, but not the actual
password attempt itself. The server also does not learn the messages being signed. If this
blindness feature is not required, Section 4.6 discusses how it can easily be removed. Security
must be guaranteed for adaptive corruptions in order to protect against the main threat, namely
the user losing his device. Note that the user of the device is subsumed into the environment to
have a more readable functionality. How this maps to real-life scenarios is discussed at the end
of this section.
1. Init Server. On input (INIT, sid) from server S:
• Create record (initeq-rec, sid).
• Send (INIT, sid) to A.
2. Setup Request Device. On input (SETUPREQ, sid, pwd) from device D:
• If there is a record (setupreq-rec, sid, pwd), ignore.
• Create a record (setupreq-rec, sid, pwd).
• Send (SETUPREQ, sid) to A.
3. Key Generation. On input (KEYGEN, sid, pwd∗, pk) from adversary A:
• If there is no record (setupreq-rec, sid, pwd), ignore.
• If there is no record (initeq-rec, sid). ignore.
• If D (taken from sid) is corrupt, then mark this instance as key-corrupt.
• If D is corrupt and pwd∗ 6= ⊥, then create a record (setup-rec, sid, pwd∗, pk). Else, create a
record (setup-rec, sid, pwd, pk).
• Output (SETUP, sid, pk) to D.
Figure 4.3: Setup interfaces of the ideal functionality FPass2Sign
The detailed description of the ideal functionality FPass2Sign for password-authenticated
server-aided signatures is given in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5. When describing the
functionality, the following conventions to reduce repetitive notation is used:
• For the INIT, SETUPREQ and KEYGEN interfaces, the ideal functionality only considers
the first input for each sid. Subsequent inputs to the same interface for the same sid are
ignored. For the SIGNREQ, DELIVER, PROCEED, SIGNATURE interfaces the functionality
only considers the first input for each combination of sid and qid.
• At each invocation, the functionality checks that sid = (S,D, sid ′) for some server identity
S, device identifier D and sid ′ ∈ {0, 1}∗. Also, whenever F receives input from or provides
output to S or D, S or D as specified in the sid, respectively, are meant.
• If the functionality “looks up a record”, it is implicitly understood that if the record is not
found, the functionality ignores the input and returns control to the environment.
• The session (sid) and query identifiers (qid) given as input to the functionality must be globally
unique. In the two-party setting that is considered, this can be achieved by exchanging random
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4. Sign Request. On input (SIGNREQ, sid, qid, pwd′,m) from device D:
• If there is no record (setup-rec, sid, pwd, pk), ignore.
• Create a record (signreq-rec, sid, qid, pwd′,m).
• Send (SIGNREQ, sid, qid) to A.
5. Sign Delivery. On input (DELIVER, sid, qid, pwd∗,m∗) from adversary A:
• If there is no record (setup-rec, sid, pwd, pk), ignore.
• If there is no record (signreq-rec, sid, qid, pwd′,m), ignore.
• If D is corrupt and pwd∗ 6= ⊥, then set pwd′ ← pwd∗ and m← m∗.
• If pwd′ = pwd then set status← pwdok, else set status← pwdwrong.
• Create a record (sign-rec, sid, qid,m, status).
• Output (SIGNREQ, sid, qid, status) to S.
6. Server Proceed. On input (PROCEED, sid, qid) from server S:
• If there is no record (sign-rec, sid, qid,m, status) with status = pwdok, ignore.
• Update the record to status← PROCEED, and send (PROCEED, sid, qid) to A.
7. Signature Generation. On input (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ) from A:
• If there is no record (sign-rec, sid, qid,m, status), ignore.
• If S is honest, only proceed if status = PROCEED.
• If there is no record (signature-rec, pk,m, σ, false), then create a record (signature-rec, pk,m,
σ, true), and output (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ) to D.
8. Verify. On input (VERIFY, sid, pk′,m, σ) from a party P or adversary A:
• Create a record (verf-rec, sid, pk′,m, σ,P) and send (VERIFY, sid, pk′,m, σ,P) to A.
9. Verified. On input (VERIFIED, sid, pk′,m, σ, φ) from A with φ ∈ {true, false}:
• If there is no record (verf-rec, sid, pk′,m, σ,P), ignore.
• Delete record (verf-rec, sid, pk′,m, σ,P).
• Record (signature-rec, pk′,m, σ, f) and output (VERIFIED, sid, pk′,m, σ, f) to P, where f is
determined as follows:
– If a record (signature-rec, pk′,m, σ, f ′) for some f ′ exists, set f ← f ′. (consistency)
– Else, if a record (setup-rec, sid, pwd, pk) exists with pk = pk′ and the instance is not marked
key-corrupt, set f ← false. (strong unforgeability)
– Else, set f ← φ.
Figure 4.4: Main interfaces of the ideal functionality FPass2Sign
nonces between both parties and including the concatenation of both in the identifiers. Also,
honest parties drop any inputs with session or query identifiers to which they did not contribute.
• An instance is “marked” a specified label is associated with the instance of the functionality
with the current sid. This does not affect other instances of the functionality with a different
sid.
Now, the behavior of all interfaces is described in a somewhat informal manner to clarify
the security properties that the functionality provides.
Setup. The setup-related interfaces allow the device D to create an account that is protected
with a password pwd and associated with the server S.
1. The INIT interface allows the server S to generate and register any key pairs it requires for
further interaction with the device D.
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10. Corruption. On input (CORRUPT, sid,P,Σ) from adversary A:
• If there is no record (setup-rec, sid, pwd, pk), ignore.
• Initialize a list L ← ∅.
• If P = S, then assemble L containing (qidi, ci) for all existing records (signreq-rec, sid, qidi,
pwd′i,mi), where ci ← pwdok if pwd = pwd′i and ci ← pwdwrong otherwise.
• If now both D and S are corrupt, then mark this instance as key-corrupt and complete the
abandoned sign requests: For all (qidi, σi) ∈ Σ, look up mi from record (signreq-rec, sid, qidi,
pwd′i,mi). If there does not exist a record (signature-rec, pk,mi, σi, false), then create a record
(signature-rec, pk,mi, σi, true).
• Send (CORRUPT, sid,P,L) to A.
11. Password Guessing. On input (PWDGUESS, sid, qid, pwd∗) from adversary A:
• If not both D and S are corrupt, then ignore this input.
• If qid = ⊥ then look up a record (setupreq-rec, sid, pwd).
• If qid 6= ⊥ then look up a record (signreq-rec, sid, qid, pwd,m).
• Set c← pwdok, if pwd∗ = pwd and c← pwdwrong otherwise.
• Send (PWDGUESS, sid, qid, c) to A.
Figure 4.5: Corruption interfaces of ideal functionality FPass2Sign
2. The SETUPREQ interface allows the device D to register with the server S, where D and S
are the identities as included in the session identifier.
3. The KEYGEN interface allows the adversary to complete the setup by determining the public
key pk under which messages in this instance are signed. If the device D is corrupt at the
time of key generation, then the instance is said to be key-corrupt, meaning that the adversary
may know the signing key and may therefore be able to sign any messages it wants. A
corrupt device D additionally has the option to “overwrite” the original password pwd from
the SETUPREQ input (that may have been provided when D was still honest) with a new
password pwd∗. This does not affect the unforgeability of signatures, as the instance is key-
corrupt anyway, but does allow the adversary to later perform signing requests with correct
passwords with S without having to guess pwd.
Signature Generation. Once setup is completed, the signature-related interfaces allow the
device D to obtain a signature σ on a message m, but only if the provided password attempt
pwd′ is correct and the server S agrees to the signature generation. Signing requests can be
done in parallel; the unique query identifier qid identifies different signing sessions.
4. The SIGNREQ interface allows the device D to submit the message m to be signed, and a
password attempt pwd′. Only the device D included in sid can perform signing requests,
so without compromising the device, the adversary cannot even perform an online attack
against the setup password pwd.
5. The DELIVER interface lets the adversary notify the server of an incoming signing request.
The notification only includes whether the submitted password is correct, but not the
password attempt itself. A corrupt device D can overwrite the original password pwd′ and
message m from the SIGNREQ input (that may have been provided when D was still honest)
with a new password pwd∗ and message m∗.
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6. The PROCEED interface allows the server to indicate whether it wants to proceed with the
signing request. This models the opportunity for an external throttling mechanism to refuse
the signing request. An honest server can only proceed if the password was correct, but
corrupt servers can proceed regardless of whether the passwords matched. If the server is
honest, then the adversary only (implicitly) learns whether the password was correct when
the server agrees to proceed.
7. The SIGNATURE interface allows the adversary to determine the value σ of the signature and
have it delivered to the requesting device. If the server is honest, then a signature can only be
established if the server previously agreed to proceed. A corrupt server can choose to ignore an
incorrect password. The functionality creates a signature record (signature-rec, pk,m, σ, true)
that will allow successful verification of the signature.
The above interfaces follow a similar approach to Canetti’s signature functionality [Can04]
where the adversary determines the signature value, with the important difference that the
adversary does not learn the message being signed. This models a weak form of blindness: it
ensures that a corrupt server does not learn the message, but it does not provide unlinkability as
blind signatures do. A full blindness notion would let the functionality generate the signatures by
running an algorithm provided by the adversary [Fis06]. Achieving such a notion is interesting,
but would almost certainly come at a considerable overhead, as is the case for standard
(UC-secure) blind signatures [Fis06,KZ08].
Signature Verification. With the verification interfaces, any party can check whether a
signature σ is valid for message m and public key pk′.
8. The VERIFY interface allows any party P to ask for the verification of a signature σ on
message m and under public key pk′.
9. The VERIFIED interface lets the adversary trigger the delivery of the verification result to P
and also allows the adversary to input the verification result φ for adversarially controlled
keys pk′. Here, adversarially controlled means that either pk′ is different from the key pk
registered in the functionality, or the instance for pk is key-corrupt. The ideal functionality
enforces that responses are consistent, meaning that verification of the same signature for
the same message and public key always returns the same result.
For a non-adversarially-controlled key pk, the functionality guarantees strong unforgeability,
meaning that even if the message m was signed before with signature σ, the adversary cannot
come up with a different valid signature σ′ 6= σ for m. For regular unforgeability, one should
add the condition that there does not exist a record (signature-rec, pk′,m, σ′, true) for σ′ 6= σ.
It was opted for strong unforgeability because it offers more application scenarios and implies
regular unforgeability [ADR02].
Corruptions. The functionality supports adaptive corruptions, i.e., the environment can,
at any time, decide to corrupt any initially honest party. It is not a standard-corruption
functionality as defined by the UC-framework [Can01] where the adversary, upon corruption
of a party, obtains all the past inputs and outputs of that party. Such a corruption model is
clearly unsuitable this setting, as it would hand the user password to the adversary as soon as
the device gets corrupted. In fact, even when both the device and server are corrupted, it is
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clearly insecure to give away the passwords immediately. Instead, the functionality then offers
an interface modeling oﬄine attacks against the passwords.
10. The CORRUPT interface allows the adversary to dynamically corrupt an initially honest
device or server. When the device is corrupted after setup was complete, the adversary
obtains the possibility to perform signing requests, but it still needs to provide the correct
password. It is stressed that the adversary does not receive any passwords attempts or
messages from past or even ongoing signing protocols.
When the server gets corrupted, the adversary is told for all past signing requests whether
or not the respective password attempts were correct. Still, the adversary is not given the
stored password, nor the past password attempts themselves. Also, the adversary is not able
to generate valid signatures.
When both the device and the server are corrupt, the instance becomes key-corrupt, meaning
that the adversary can sign any messages that it wants, and the adversary can oﬄine-attack
past passwords using the PWDGUESS interface described below. Additionally, the adversary
can finish “abandoned”/hold-back sign requests, meaning sign requests that were never
delivered to the server, that were overwritten by the adversary, that were turned down by
the server because the password was incorrect, or for which the server did not (yet) agree
to proceed. The adversary determines the signature values for abandoned requests in a
separate input Σ. This interface may seem superfluous now that the instance is key-corrupt
anyway, but the the adversary does not know the message of sign requests that were initiated
when the device was still honest, so it cannot register these signatures through the normal
VERIFIED interface. In the real world, an adversary who obtains the full state information of
the device and server can inherently complete abandoned queries, so it has to be modeled
here as well.
11. The PWDGUESS interface allows the adversary to perform oﬄine attacks on the stored
password and on previous password attempts, but only becomes available when both the
device and the server are corrupt. For the stored password, oﬄine attacks cannot be avoided,
as the device and the server together must store some information that allows them to decide
whether a password attempt was correct. For previous password attempts, this could in
principle be avoided, but would make the protocol considerably less efficient, because new
cryptographic material would have to be generated at each request and securely deleted
afterwards.
If the device is already corrupt at the time of setup, the instance is considered as key-corrupt,
even though the server might still be honest. A stronger security notion, requiring only slight
changes to the functionality, would be achievable where the instance is only considered key-
corrupt when both the device and server are corrupted. However, this would mean that in the
realization, the key generation be done distributively between the server and the device. This is
possible, but even for RSA rather inefficient [ACS02,HMRT12] and seems to offer little added
security. Hence, it was chosen not to do this. However, while the realization of the set up would
look quite differently, the functionality would not.
Discussion. Now is discussed how real-world attack scenarios map to the given ideal func-
tionality. If a user loses his device, it is assumed that the adversary is able to extract all
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non-erased the data from the device, so the device becomes corrupted. As long as the server is
not corrupted, though, the adversary controlling the device still has to make online password
guesses to be able to sign, but does not obtain the (full) signing key. To protect against online
password guessing, the server should implement some kind of throttling on top of the protocol,
such as refusing to serve further queries after too many failed password attempts.
If the device becomes infected by malware, the protocol also captures the worst case scenario:
it may get all the (non-erased) data from the device and hence the device becomes corrupted.
In contrast with the scenario above, the malware may also learn the (correct) password of the
user if it is unaware of the infection and continues to use the device. This behavior is subsumed
into the environment; this is modeled correctly by letting the environment provide the correct
password to the adversary. Some protection against this kind of attack can be implemented on
top of the protocol by adding intrusion detection logic on the server’s side, e.g., by stopping
to serve requests if they become too frequent. This situation is actually similar to that of a
smart-card inserted in an infected device: the device could intercept the PIN and sign any
messages it wants until the card is removed.
One could consider a more gradual corruption model where the device can be semi-corrupted,
e.g., if an application turns malicious, but the uncompromised operating system separates it
from other applications on the device. The model covers this as long as applications have
their own protected execution space: the device in the model represents the application, while
everything else is subsumed into the environment. More advanced models where applications
can observe other applications (e.g., their running times) are beyond the scope of this chapter.
4.3 The Pass2Sign Protocol
The core idea of the protocol is fairly simple: an RSA secret key d = dD · dS mod ϕ(N) is split
between the device and the server who then jointly perform the signing operation for each
message m. To hide the message from the server, the device “blinds” it with randomness r as
hm ← H(r,m) and lets the server sign it as σS ← hdSm . The device completes the signature as
σ ← σdDS . For each signing request, the user authenticates towards the server using a salted
password hash hp ← H(k, pwd), where the salt k is stored on the device.
The Corruption Model and the Need for Secure Erasures. The main challenge is to
maintain this simplicity while achieving the strong security properties envisaged. Most often,
security against adaptive corruptions in the UC model comes at a considerable price in terms of
computation and communication, while the presented corruption model is even substantially
stronger. In particular, recall that the protocol must protect the user’s password and previously
signed messages in case the device is lost or stolen. The “standard corruption” model in the UC
framework [Can01] (See Chapter 2) hands all previous inputs and outputs of a party to the
adversary upon corruption of that party, which in case of the device would include all previous
passwords and messages. It is quite obvious that standard corruption does not suffice here,
and also that the model cannot be achieved without secure erasures, as there would be no way
to securely erase previous inputs. Given the usual difficulty of achieving even standard UC
corruption, it is surprising that the protocol remains refreshingly simple, round-optimal, and
efficient.
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Achieving Blindness. Achieving blind signatures against adaptive corruptions in the UC
model is notoriously hard: the only scheme is due to Kiayias and Zhou [KZ08] and requires six
rounds of communication and several zero-knowledge proofs. The presented protocol therefore
strikes a reasonable compromise between security and efficiency by dropping the unlinkability
requirement, i.e., the property that the signer cannot link a signature to a previous signing
transcript, but focusing entirely on hiding the message from the signer. This also includes a new
“just-in-time” programming technique for the random oracle that inserts the correct entries into
the oracle when signatures are verified, rather than when they are created. This results in an
efficient and round-optimal construction without having to rely on one-more-type assumptions
that are typical for full-domain-hash blind signatures [BNPS03,Bol03].
In a bit more detail, to enable the simulator to open any signing transcript to any message-
signature pair, the server adds another layer of randomness, i.e., it signs h′m ← H(r′, hm) for
some randomly chosen r′. When the simulator has to provide a signature σ to the functionality
without knowing the message m, it simply signs a random value h′m
$← {0, 1}τ . The connection to
m is only established when the signature is verified, which is coined “just-in-time” programming.
Namely, whenever a random oracle query H(r′,H(r,m)) is made where r, r′ were previously
used in a simulated blind signature, the simulator verifies whether (m,σ) is valid with the help
of the ideal functionality. If so, the simulator programs the random oracle to map the message
m it just learned to the randomly chosen h′m that was signed as σ.
Non-Committing Communication and State. As UC allows corruptions during setup
and signing sessions, one must take special care that messages sent by the device and server do
not commit the simulator to values that it might not know at that time in the proof. This is
achieved by employing non-committing encryption for the passwords hashes hp ← H(k, pwd)
and each password attempt h′p ← H(qid,H(k, pwd′)) that the device sends to the server. At
a first glance that might seem unnecessary since the models already assumes secure erasures.
However, secure erasures are not sufficient as an adversary can intercept the ciphertexts and
later corrupt the server to learn the decryption key. It then expects all ciphertexts to open to the
proper password hashes (that in the security proof might be unknown when the ciphertexts are
generated). The non-committing encryption provides exactly that flexibility. To determine the
correct password hashes hp and h′p upon server corruption different random oracle programming
techniques are deployed, eventually also relying on the password guessing interfaces of the ideal
functionality (if both parties are corrupted).
Similar care must also be taken for the intermediate state records that the device keeps
during interactive protocols. After sending a signing request, the device cannot store the message
m, or even the randomness r and the message hash hm ← H(r,m), as the simulator does not
learn m upon corrupting the device. Nevertheless, the device must be able to verify whether
the server’s contribution is correct. Therefore, when sending the message hash hm, the device
also sends a value t← H(MAC, qid, k, hm) that acts as a message authentication code (MAC) for
hm. This allows the device to check that the server signed the correct message upon receiving
the signature share, but without requiring state information that depends on m.
Authentication of Participants. As already mentioned earlier, the session identifier sid
contains the identities of the device D and the server S. This means that D and S have to be
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Device Server
pkENC skENC
on input (SETUPREQ, sid, pwd):
((N, e), (d, p, q)) $← RSAGen(1τ ),
dD
$← Z∗
ϕ(N), dS ← d · d−1D mod ϕ(N)
k
$← {0, 1}τ , hp ←H(k, pw)
C
$← EncENC(pkENC, (dS , hp),
(sid, (N, e))) sid, (N, e), C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(dS , hp)← DecENC(skENC, C, (sid, (N, e)))
store (setup-rec, sid, hp, dS , (N, e))sid←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
store (setup-rec, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) and output (SETUP, sid, (N, e))
Figure 4.6: Main steps of the setup protocol for FPass2Sign
authenticated. This is achieved by employing FAuth for authenticated communication, thereby
making abstraction of how the authentication is performed. This could be through a shared
secret, through digital signatures (e.g., TLS with client authentication), or “oﬄine” by letting
the user use a trusted third party to register the device, such as a bank or a local municipal
office. The last option has the additional advantage that one could also check the name or other
credentials of the user, and also directly certify the resulting public key of the user.
4.3.1 Protocol Description
Now, the detailed protocol for the Pass2Sign scheme and a simplified presentation in Figure 4.6
and 4.7 is presented. Also, a public-key infrastructure is assumed, where devices and servers can
register their public keys, modeled by the ideal functionality FCA [Can04], and authenticated
message transmission, modeled by FAuth. In the protocol description, inputs to and outputs
from protocols are given informally to make the protocol more readable (e.g., that S sends
m to D via FAuth instead of an explicit call to FAuth with sub-session IDs etc.). Further, all
parties check the correctness of session and sub-session IDs in all inputs. Moreover, H and HRSA
denote shorthand notations for two random-oracle functionalities F{0,1}∗→{0,1}λRO and F{0,1}
∗→Z∗N
RO ,
respectively. Note that these are single-instance functionalities; one can obtain a secure multi-
instance implementation by prefixing each call to them with sid. The protocol further makes
use of an RSA-key generator RSAGen.
As discussed earlier, secure erasures are necessary to achieve the security guarantees. Thus,
it is assumed that after each protocol step all variables are deleted unless explicitly state that
a variable is stored. Finally, it is assumed that whenever a check performed by the server or
device fails, the checking party aborts the protocol, as defined in Chapter 2.
Initialization Protocol. This step initializes the server. In particular, this interface allows the
environment to say that the server generates, and registers, the key pair of the RECV-SIM-secure
encryption scheme.
Step 1. Server S generates public key:
a) Upon input (INIT, sid), generate a key pair for a RECV-SIM-secure ENC: (skENC, pkENC)
$←
KeyGenENC(1λ).
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b) Create record (keypair-rec, sid, pkENC,S , pkSig,S , skSig,S).
c) Send (REGISTER, (D, (sid,FCA)), pkENC,S) to FCA.
Setup Protocol. The setup procedure is the following protocol that a device D runs on input
(SETUPREQ, sid, pwd) with server S, where sid = (S,D, sid ′).
Step 2. Device generates account data:
a) Upon input (SETUPREQ, sid, pwd), retrieve pkENC for S from FCA. If pkENC = ⊥, ignore.
b) Generate RSA key material as (N, e, d, p, q) $← RSAGen(1τ ) and share the secret exponent
d by choosing a random dD $← Z∗ϕ(N) and setting dS ← d · d−1D mod ϕ(N). It is required
that dS is encoded as an |N |-bit string from now on.
c) Compute hp ← H(k, pwd) for a random k $← {0, 1}τ .
d) Encrypt the RSA key share dS and the authentication information hp under pkENC with
label (sid, (N, e)). That is, compute c $← EncENC(pkENC, (dS , hp), (sid, (N, e))).
e) Store the record (setup-rec-temp, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) and send the message m = (sid, (N, e),
c) to the server S using FAuth.
Step 3a. Server registers account:
a) Upon receiving m = (sid, (N, e), c) from D via FAuth, check that sid is not registered yet.
Ignore otherwise.
b) Decrypt c as (dS , hp)← DecENC(skENC, c, (sid, (N, e))). If successful, store (setup-rec, sid,
hp, dS , (N, e)).
c) Acknowledge the created account by sending (sid) to D via FAuth. At this point, the server
has registered an account.
Step 3b. Device completes registration:
a) Upon receiving a message (sid) from S via FAuth, check that a record (setup-rec-temp, sid,
k, dD, (N, e)) for sid exists.
b) Store (setup-rec, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) and end with output (SETUP, sid, (N, e)).
Signing Protocol. This protocol starts when the device D receives an input (SETUPREQ,
sid, qid,m, pwd′), where sid = (S,D, sid ′), upon which it runs the following protocol with the
server S. Recall that it is assumed that both parties have previously agreed upon a common and
globally unique query identifier qid. All messages sent between the device and server also contain
the qid as prefix, and only those messages with the corresponding qid are further processed, i.e.,
all other requests are silently ignored.
Step 4. Device sends signing request:
a) Upon input (SETUPREQ, sid, qid,m, pwd′), look up record (SETUP, sid, k, dD, (N, e)).
b) “Blind” the message by drawing r $← {0, 1}τ and computing hm ← H(r,m).
c) Compute the (re-)authentication value h′p ← H(qid,H(k, pwd′)).
d) Compute a “MAC” t of hm as t← H("MAC", qid, k, hm).
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Device Server
pkENC skENC
setup record (setup-rec, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) setup record (setup-rec, sid, hp, dS , (N, e))
on input (SIGNREQ, sid, qid,m, pwd′):
h′p ←H(qid,H(k, pwd′)), r
$← {0, 1}τ ,
hm ←H(r,m), t←H(“MAC”, qid, k, hm)
C′ $← EncENC(pkENC, (h′p, hm, t), (sid, qid))
sid, qid, C′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(h′p, hm, t)← DecENC(skENC, C′, (sid, qid))
if H(qid, hp) = h′p then c← pwdok,
else c← pwdwrong
output (SIGNREQ, sid, qid, c)
on input (PROCEED, sid, qid) and if c = pwdok:
r′ $← {0, 1}τ
σS ←HRSA(sid, qid,H(r′, hm))dS
sid, qid, hm, t, r′, σS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
abort if t 6= H(“MAC”, qid, k, hm)
σRSA ← (σS)dD , abort if (σRSA)e 6= HRSA(sid, qid,H(r′, hm))
set σ ← (σRSA, qid, r, r′) and output (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ)
Figure 4.7: Main steps of the signing protocol for FPass2Sign
e) Generate a non-committing encryption of h′p, hm, and t under the public key pkENC and
with label (sid, qid) as c′ $← EncENC(pkENC, (h′p, hm, t), (sid, qid)).
f) Store the record (sign-rec, sid, qid, r) and send (sid, qid, c′) to S via FAuth.
Step 5. Server verifies information:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, c′) from D via FAuth, retrieve (SETUP, sid, hp, dS , (N, e)) for sid.
b) Decrypt c′ to (h′p, hm, t)← DecENC(skENC, c′, (sid, qid)).
c) Check the password by verifying whether H(qid, hp) = h′p and set c← pwdok if so, and
c← pwdwrong otherwise.
d) Store the record (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) and output (SETUPREQ, sid, qid, c).
Step 6. Server creates its signature share:
a) Upon input (PROCEED, sid, qid), retrieve (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) for qid. Abort if
c 6= pwdok.
b) Compute the signature share σS ← HRSA(sid, qid,H(r′, hm))dS mod N for a random
r′ $← {0, 1}τ .
c) Send (sid, qid, hm, t, r′, σS) to D via FAuth.
Step 7. Device completes the signature:
a) Upon receiving (sid, qid, hm, t, r′, σS) from S via FAuth, retrieve (sign-rec, sid, qid, r) for
qid and setup record (setup-rec, sid, k, dD, (N, e)).
b) Verify that t = H("MAC", qid, k, hm).
c) Complete the signature by computing σRSA ← (σS)dD mod N . Verify that (σRSA)e =
HRSA(sid, qid,H(r′, hm)) mod N holds, i.e., that the server’s signature share was correct.
d) Set σ ← (σRSA, qid, r, r′). End with output (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ).
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Step 8. Signature Verification. On input (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, pk), parse pk = (N, e), σ =
(σRSA, qid, r, r′). Set M ← (sid, qid,H(r′,H(r,m))). If σRSA is a valid RSA signature on M , i.e.,
if 0 < σRSA < N and HRSA(M) = (σRSA)e mod N , output (VERIFIED, sid,m, σ, pk, true), and
(VERIFIED, sid,m, σ, pk, false) otherwise.
4.4 Security
Now it is proven that the given protocol is really secure in the UC-sense.
Theorem 4.5. The Pass2Sign scheme described in Section 4.3 securely implements the ideal
functionality FPass2Sign defined in Section 4.2 in the (FCA,FRO,FAuth)-hybrid model with secure
erasures if the RSA one-wayness assumption associated to RSAGen holds and ENC = (KeyGenENC,
EncENC,DecENC) is an RECV-SIM secure encryption scheme.
Using the RECV-SIM secure encryption scheme proposed in Section 4.1.3, which is an
extension of the Bellare-Rogaway CCA2 encryption scheme, and instantiated with the RSA
trapdoor permutation, the following corollary is obvious:
Corollary 4.6. The Pass2Sign scheme described in Section 4.3 and instantiated as proposed, se-
curely implements the ideal functionality FPass2Sign defined in Section 4.2 in the (FCA,FRO,FAuth)-
hybrid model with secure erasures if the RSA assumption associated with RSAGen holds.
High-Level Idea. The proof of Theorem 4.5 is done by providing a simulator and a sequence
of games. The initial game is the real experiment and the final game (Game 10) runs the
simulator given only the information that is also available to the adversary when interacting
with the ideal functionality. Next, a rough sketch of the game sequence is given. The detailed
description as well as the description of the simulator is given afterwards.
Game 1 and Game 2 abort when collisions occur in random-oracle outputs, or if the adversary
“predicts” random-oracle outputs. Game 3 replaces all ciphertexts sent by an honest device to
an honest server with simulated “dummy” ciphertexts. It uses the decryption simulation to
decrypt ciphertexts that were not sent by the honest device, and uses the key-leakage simulation
to obtain the secret key skENC in case the server is corrupted.
In Game 4 and Game 5, the simulator aborts when a valid signature is verified that did
not originate from the device or the server, whichever is still honest. Interestingly, the case
for an honest device can be reduced from the unforgeability of RSA-FDH, but for an honest
server it has to be reduced straight from the RSA assumption (similar as in [BS01a]). Thus, the
standard RSA assumption in the random-oracle model is enough in this case.
The subsequent games are all about making the setup and signing protocol simulations
independent of the actual values of the passwords and messages being signed. Game 6 and
Game 7 make the setup and signing protocol simulations independent of the actual value of
the password and password attempts. When the server is corrupt, instead of deriving hp and t
from the device secret k and the real passwords, the simulator uses random values. For h′p,i it
either uses H(qid, hp) or a random value, depending whether the password attempt used in a
signing request is correct or not. As long as the device is honest, this change cannot be detected
by the adversary as he does not know k. When the device gets corrupted too, and thus the
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adversary learns k, the simulator starts programming the random oracle consistently to the
previously chosen hp and h′p,i whenever the actual passwords pwd and pwd′i are queried. In the
final simulation with the ideal functionality this is done with the help of the password guessing
interface that becomes available as soon as both, the device and the server, are corrupted.
If both entities are initially honest and the device gets corrupted first, the simulation is
different though. Then, one needs to keep hp, h′p,i unassigned and only fix their values when
the server gets corrupted too. This is sufficient as the device never stores the hash values
and sends them only in encrypted form to the server (which are dummy ciphertexts since
Game 3). However, as soon as the server gets corrupted, the adversary learns the secret key of
the encryption scheme and thus all previous dummy communication between the device (sent
by the simulator when D was still honest) and the server must decrypt to the correct hash
values. Here, one cannot assign random values to hp, h′p,i, though. This stems from the fact
that the device got corrupted first, and thus the adversary knows the device secret k and could
have already computed hp or h′p,i for the correct password values pwd, pwdi. Thus, in order to
ensure consistency, check whether a previously answered random oracle query contained an
actual password pwd or pwd′i (when switching to the ideal world, this is done via the password
guessing interface). If such a query is found, simply reuse the previously given random oracle
response for hp or h′p,i and assign random values otherwise. Then, use the keyleak-simulator
of the non-committing encryption scheme to obtain a key skENC that decrypts the dummy
ciphertexts from Game 3 to the just determined hash values. In fact, this case is the reason
why one needs non-committing encryption, as in the ideal world the passwords pwd or pwd′i are
unknown to the simulator (even when the device gets corrupted), and the password guessing
interface only becomes available when both entities got corrupted.
Game 8 and Game 9 make the signing process independent of the message m, with an
interesting technique that programs the relevant random-oracle entries only when the signature
is verified, not when it is created. In Game 8, an honest device interacting with a corrupt server
chooses random values r and hm and, if the server behaves honestly, computes the signature as
σRSA = HRSA(sid, qid,H(r′, hm))dSdD mod N , which it can compute because it knows the keys
dS and dD from the time they were generated. The simulator stores the resulting signature
σ = (σRSA, qid, r, r′) as valid for m in its records; in the ideal world, the simulator would input
(SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ) to let the functionality associate σ to m. When later a random-oracle
query H(r,m) comes in, the simulator looks up whether a signature σ was recorded with
randomness r, and if so, checks whether σ has been recorded as a valid signature for m (using
its own records, or using the VERIFY interface in the ideal world). If so, then it uses the value
hm used during the corresponding signing protocol as the random-oracle response, otherwise it
returns a random value. Game 9 acts similarly when the device and server are both honest,
but by letting the server sign random h′m values, without knowing the corresponding hm. Only
when a query H(r′, hm) is made, h′m is assigned if a corresponding signature has been recorded.
4.4.1 Detailed Sequence of Games
The proof consist of a sequence of games that a challenger runs with the real-world adversary. In
the final game the transition to let the challenger run internally the ideal functionality FPass2Sign
and simulate all messages based merely on the information it can obtain from FPass2Sign is made.
Now, each Game i is described, while it is also argued why the view of the environment does
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not significantly change.
Game 0: In the first game, the challenger executes the real protocol for all honest players,
obtaining their inputs from, and passing the respective outputs to the environment.
Game 1: Let TH be the table in which the simulator stores query-response pairs (m,h)
when simulating random-oracle queries to H. Recall that all random oracle calls to H are
implicitly prefixed with sid of the current account. Similarly, In this hop, a table TH is created
per sid. The explicit handling of the sid is omitted here as well. This game aborts whenever the
adversary or the challenger cause a collision in H or HRSA, or the adversary sends a “correctly
predicted” hash value. A “correctly predicted” value is some hash hp, h′p, hm that neither resulted
from a query to the random oracle nor was previously generated by the challenger, and the
adversary makes a random-oracle query that maps to this value only after having sent the hash.
By the random choice of the response from {0, 1}λ, the adversary can distinguish this game
hop only with negligible probability.
Game 2: From now on, the challenger creates additional internal records for setup and
signing. When setup is done by an honest device, it stores (setup-rec, sid, k, hp, dS , dD, (N, e)),
i.e., it also keeps the RSA key share dS of the server. For an account created by a corrupt device
with an honest server, the challenger maintains (setup-rec, sid,⊥k, hp, dS ,⊥S , (N, e)).
Similarly, when an honest device starts a signing request, the challenger initiates a record
(sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,mi, ti, ri,⊥r′ ,⊥σ). For a signing session between a corrupt device
and honest server, the challenger creates (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,⊥m, ti,⊥r, r′,⊥σ). Both
records will be completed with the missing values as soon as they are generated or received by
an honest party.
Clearly, this is only an internal change and has no effect on the view of the environment, i.e.,
the views are equal.
Game 3: In this game, every non-committing encryption (via a series of hybrids) is replaced
that would be sent between two honest parties by a simulated ciphertext. More precisely, the
simulator SIMNCE of the NCE scheme in mode SIMNCE(PUBLICKEY, 1λ) is run to obtain the
public key pkENC that the honest server registers with FCA. Then, whenever the honest device
has to create an encryption of m with label ` under pkENC the real ciphertext is replaced by
C
$← SIMNCE(ENCRYPT, |m|, `) where |m| denotes the message length. Also, an internally
maintained list Q of tuples (C,m, `) mapping the real messages to the “dummy” ciphertexts is
deployed.
When an honest server receives such a simulated ciphertext, it does not decrypt C but looks
up the corresponding plaintext from its internal record, i.e., either setup-rec for ciphertexts
received in setup and sign-rec for ciphertexts received in the signing protocol. If the server
receives a ciphertext/label pair (C ′, `′) where (C ′, ·, `′) /∈ Q, i.e., that was not created by an
honest device, SIMNCE(DECRYPT, C ′, `′) is run instead of the decryption algorithm.
When the server eventually gets corrupted, SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,Q) is finally run to obtain
the secret decryption key skENC which has to be handed to the adversary.
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This game hop is indistinguishable by the RECV-SIM security of the encryption scheme ENC.
A reduction is straightforward and thus omitted.
Game 4: Here, it is aborted if an honest party obtains a (valid) input (VERIFY, sid,m∗,
σ∗, pk) for a public key pk of an honest device, but for a signature σ∗ that the device has never
produced. Receiving such a forged signature in the protocol allows to construct an adversary B
that breaks the strong unforgeability of RSA-FDH signatures with non-negligible probability.
For the sake of simplicity, the same reduction for the case of an honest and a corrupt server is
used.
When B receives the challenge RSA public key pk = (N, e), choose dS at random from ZN ,
leave dD unassigned, and normally compute the authentication values for the protocol. Recall
that the challenger also internally stores dS . For each signing query mi, the honest device chooses
random ri and hmi , gets hmi ← H(ri,mi) from the random oracle, and sends hmi to the server.
When it receives a response (sid, qid i, hm,i, ti, r′i, σS,i), B verifies that σS,i = HRSA(sid, qid i,
H(r′i, hmi))dS or aborts otherwise. Then B sends Mi ← (sid, qid i,H(r′i, hmi)) to its RSA-signing
oracle to obtain the signature σRSA,i. The device outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, qid i, σi), where
σi ← (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i). Each store each produced message/signature tuple (mi, σi) in a list Lσ.
When B receives input (VERIFY, sid,m∗, σ∗, pk) such that (m∗, σ∗) /∈ Lσ, it parses σ∗
as (σ∗RSA, qid∗, r∗, r′∗) and outputs (M∗, σ∗RSA) as forgery with M∗ ← (sid, qid∗,H(r′∗,H(r∗,
m∗))). The output is a valid RSA-FDH forgery if the message/signature tuple (M∗, σ∗RSA)
did not appear as an RSA signing query/response before. Suppose for contradiction that
it did appear in a signing query by B, i.e., M∗ = (sid, qid∗,H(r′∗,H(r∗,m∗))) = Mi =
(sid, qid i,H(r′i,H(ri,mi))) for some query i that led to signature σ∗RSA. That would mean
that qid∗ = qid i and H(r′∗,H(r∗,m∗)) = H(r′i,H(ri,mi)). As collisions on H were excluded in
Game 1, the latter means that r′∗ = r′i, r∗ = ri, and m∗ = mi. This contradicts the fact that
(m∗, σ∗) /∈ Lσ.
Note that the simulation deviated from how the signing key dS for the server was chosen.
In the original scheme, dS is chosen from Z∗ϕ(N), whereas dS was selected randomly from
ZN , since the challenger only learns (N, e). However, Lemma 5.1 from [BS01a] shows that
Pr[dS ∈ Z∗ϕ(N)] > 8435 ln |N | for RSA modulus N and dS
$← ZN . Hence, a “good” dS value was
chosen with non-negligible probability, in which case the simulation of the protocol was perfect.
Overall, this game hop is indistinguishable by the strong unforgeability of the signature scheme
DSIGRSA.
Game 5: This game considers the setting where the server is honest and the device is
corrupt, but was honest during setup. Then, similar to the previous game, but there is an
abort if there is a forged signature for the corresponding key pk. That is, an abort happens if
there is a valid signature (m∗, σ∗) where σ∗ = (σ∗RSA, qid∗, r∗, r′∗) but the honest server never
signed M∗ = (sid, qid∗, h′m) where h′∗m = H(r′∗,H(r∗,m∗)) in the session qid∗, or there are two
different valid message-signature pairs (m∗1, σ∗1) 6= (m∗2, σ∗2) that resulted from the same signing
protocol for M∗ = (sid, qid∗, h′m). In contrast to the previous game, this cannot be reduced to
the unforgeability of the RSA signature as underlying assumption, though, as the honest server
does not have “full” control of the final signature. However, a forgery in the scheme allows to
break the RSA problem in the random-oracle model directly.
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The latter case of two different message-signature pairs either requires the adversary to find
collisions in the random-oracle responses for H and HRSA, which were excluded in Game 1, or
to find two different values 0 < σ∗RSA,1 < σ∗RSA,2 < N such that HRSA(M∗) ≡ σ∗RSA,1e ≡ σ∗RSA,2e
mod N . If HRSA(M∗) ∈ Z∗N , then this is impossible because RSA is a permutation on Z∗N .
If HRSA(M∗) 6∈ Z∗N , then gcd(N,HRSA(M∗)) > 1, so that B can factor N and solve the RSA
problem.
For the former case of a (non-strong) forgery against the protocol, consider algorithm B that,
on input an RSA public key N, e and challenge y ∈ Z∗N , outputs x where xe ≡ y mod N with
non-negligible probability. B chooses keys dD $← ZN and k $← {0, 1}λ. When the device gets
corrupted, B hands these values to the adversary. When the adversary makes a random-oracle
query HRSA(Mi), B chooses xi $← Z∗N and responds xeiy mod N . When the honest server receives
an incoming signing request for message hash hmi , it chooses r′i
$← {0, 1}λ, σSi $← Z∗N , programs
HRSA(sid, qid i,H(r′i, hmi)) = σedDSi mod N , adds (hmi , σdDSi ) to Lσ, and sends σSi back to the
device. In case HRSA(sid, qid i,H(r′i, hmi)) had been queried before, B aborts, but by the random
choice of r′i, this happens with probability at most qsqh2λ , where qs and qh are the number of signing
and random-oracle queries made by the adversary, respectively. When B receives an input
(VERIFY, sid,m∗, (σ∗RSA, qid∗, r∗, r′∗), pk) such that (H(r∗,m∗), σ∗) /∈ Lσ, B looks in its random-
oracle responses to find x∗ such that HRSA(sid, qid∗,H(r′∗,H(r∗,m∗))) = x∗ey mod N , then by
the validity of the signature it holds that σ∗RSAe ≡ x∗ey mod N , so B returns σ∗RSA/x∗ mod N as
the RSA inversion of y. As in the previous game, Lemma 5.1 from [BS01a] is a lower bound on
the probability that dD ∈ Z∗ϕ(N).
Game 6: Now, all values that would depend on the device secret k are made independent
of k, when they are generated by an honest device and are sent to a corrupt server. More
precisely, the way the authentication values hp, h′p,i and the tags ti are computed is changed.
Namely, hp $← {0, 1}λ is chosen randomly at setup at setup, while the actual password pwd
is stored in an internal record (setup-rec, sid, pwd). For a sign request started by an honest
device h′p,i ← H(qid i, hp) is derived, if the request was initiated for a password pwd′i = pwd and
set it to a random value h′p,i
$← {0, 1}λ if the passwords did not match. The created h′p,i are
kept in the sign-rec record as before, while also another record for the password attempts as
(signreq-rec, sid, qid i, pwd′i) is created.
The computation of the tag ti ← H("MAC", qid i, k, hm,i) is replaced by ti $← {0, 1}λ, and ti is
stored in sign-rec as before. Also, the verification of the tag in Step 4 of the signing protocol is
replaced by a simple look up whether the received ti value is the same as in sign-rec.
If there is a random oracle query of the form H(k, ·) or H("MAC", ·, k, ·) for the secret key k
that was chosen and the device is still honest, abort. By the random choice of k $← {0, 1}λ, and
the fact that all values were made independent of k, the probability for such a query (and the
resulting abort) is negligible.
However, that behavior is changed as soon as the device gets corrupted, as then the ad-
versary learns k and the above argument no longer holds. With the help of the internal
records, a fresh k is chosen at the moment the device gets corrupted and ensure consistency
with the previously chosen values hp, h′p,i and ti as follows. For a query H(k, pwd) where a
record (setup-rec, sid, k, hp, dS , dD, (N, e)) for k and a record (setup-rec, sid, pwd) for sid, pwd
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exists, set the random oracle response to be hp (taken from the setup-rec record). Similarly,
for a query H(qid i, h∗p) where ((k, pwd′i), h∗p) ∈ TH, i.e., h∗p is the result of a previous query
(k, pwd′i) and records (setup-rec, sid, k, hp, dS , dD, (N, e)) for k, and (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,
mi, ti, ri, {r′i,⊥r′}, {σRSA,i,⊥σ}) and (signreq-rec, sid, qid i, pwd′i) for sid, qid i, pwd′i exists, the re-
sponse is set to H(qid i, h∗p)← h′p,i (taken from sign-rec) and to a random value otherwise. For
queries H("MAC", qid i, k, hm,i) where a setup-rec record for k and a record (sign-rec, sid, qid i,
h′p,i, hm,i,mi, ti, ri, {r′i,⊥r′}, {σRSA,i,⊥σ}) for sid, qid i, hm,i exists, the random oracle response is
set to the stored ti and to a random string otherwise. Overall, this game hop is indistinguishable
by the random choice of k.
Game 7: Now, a similar change to the computation of hp and h′p,i, ti for the setting where a
setup or sign request is done between an honest device and honest server is made. However, here
all values hp and h′p,i, ti are left unassigned at the beginning and only records (setup-rec, sid, pwd)
for setup and (signreq-rec, sid, qid i, pwd′i) for each signing request are created.
When the honest server is supposed to output (SIGNREQ, sid, qid i, ci) where ci indicates
whether the password attempt was successful, it determines ci based on the passwords stored in
the signreq-rec and setup-rec records.
Then, if the server gets the “ok” to proceed and the password attempt was correct, i.e., ci =
pwdok a random tag ti $← {0, 1}λ is chosen and stored in the sign-rec record. The honest server
then proceeds normally. When the honest device receives a message (sid, qid i, hm,i, ti, r′i, σS,i)
from the honest server, it only continues when it receives the same ti that is contained in the
sign-rec record.
The challenger then maintains incomplete records (setup-rec, sid, k,⊥h,pwd, dS , dD, (N, e)) and
(sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥h′,pwd, hm,i,mi, {ti,⊥tag}, ri, {r′i,⊥r′}, {σRSA,i,⊥σ}) where ti is only assigned
when the honest server sends its signature share. This event might not occur though, e.g.,
because the signing request never arrived or the environment did not give the “ok” to proceed.
Similarly, also the list Q only contains incomplete entries (C ′, (⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm , {ti,⊥tag}), (sid,
qid i)). Those tuples are fully completeed and finally assigned values to hp and h′p,i as soon as
the server gets corrupted.
When the server gets corrupted, and the device is still honest, hp and ti are chosen at
random, whereas h′p,i is determined based on ci. That is, if ci = pwdok then h′p,i ← H(qid i, hp)
and h′p,i
$← {0, 1}λ otherwise. The rest of the simulation for this setting is then equivalent to
the previous game with a corrupt from the beginning server. Thus, in the remainder of this
game focuses on the setting where the device gets corrupted first.
If the device gets corrupted (and the server is still honest), the adversary learns k and ri, and
thus is now able to compute the hashes hp, h′p and tag ti himself. However, it has not learned
the choices for those values yet, since the server is still honest. And in fact, still no values are
assigned for hp, h′p or ti (for the open signing requests).
As in the game above, it is aborted if there is a random oracle query of the form H(k, ·) or
H("MAC", ·, k, ·) where k is the secret device key and the device is still honest. Again, as k was
not used in any computation so far, such a query can only occur with negligible probability.
Then, as soon as the device gets corrupted and the adversary learns k, do no longer abort for
those queries. The procedure to answer queries of the form H("MAC", qid i, k, hm,i) is the same
as in the game described above. Whereas for fresh queries of the form H(k, pwd) or H(qid i, h∗p)
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that might be an attempt to (re)-compute hp, h′p simply assign random values.
If the device gets corrupted while the server is still honest, the way the server verifies whether
the provided authentication information for a new signing request is correct is changed. For
each such signing request (sid, qid i, C ′i) coming from a corrupted (but initially honest) device,
the honest server first decrypts (h′p,i, hm,i, ti)
$← SIMNCE(DECRYPT, C ′i, (sid, qid i)) using the
simulator SIMNCE of the non-committing encryption scheme. Then, the challenger checks if the
random oracle table TH contains a preimage (qid i, hp) for h′p,i and a preimage (k, pwd) for the
retrieved hp and having the correct device key k as prefix (k is stored in setup-rec for sid). If
such a preimage exists, a record (signreq-rec, sid, qid i, pwd′i) with pwd′i ← pwd and verify the
correctness of the password based on the signreq-rec and setup-rec records is created. The rest
of the signing protocol is handled as with a device that was corrupt from the beginning. When
eventually also the server gets corrupted, the adversary learns the key skENC to decrypt the
communication towards the server and thus could now check if the “correct” hp, h′p values before
were chosen. Thus, this is the moment those hashes are determined.
To this end, the challenger checks if it already responded to random oracle queries H(k, pwd)
or H(qid i, h∗p) where ((k, pwd′i), h∗p) ∈ TH, for the passwords pwd and pwd′i stored in the setup-rec
and signreq-rec records. If such queries are found, the challenger sets the value for hp, h′p,i to be
the random oracle answers it had given earlier. If no queries of that form were made, it assigns
random hash values. Similarly, the tags ti of incomplete signature requests are either chosen at
random or by reusing the response for a query H("MAC", qid i, k, hm,i) the adversary has made
earlier. The challenger also updates its setup-rec and sign-rec records and the tuples in Q to
contain the determined values for hp, h′p,i, and ti and finally derives and outputs the decryption
key skENC $← SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,Q). Note, at this point Q is fully determined, and thus SIMNCE
has all the input it requires to program the ciphertexts correctly.
Again, by the random choice of k $← {0, 1}λ, the environment can distinguish this game hop
only with negligible probability, due to the birthday paradox.
Game 8: In this game, the signing procedure when done between an honest device and
corrupt server is modified. Roughly, the goal is to make the signature somewhat independent
of mi, in the sense that mi is not used in protocol simulation or in the sign-rec record, but
registered in a signature-rec record at the end. The connection to the real message mi is only
established when the adversary tries to verify the signature and therefore makes a random oracle
query (ri,mi).
To this end, when an honest device wants to sign a message mi, ri, hm,i are chosen at
random from {0, 1}λ, while all values except mi associated with the jointly computed signature
σi ← (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i) are stored, where r′i was provided by the server. That is, the challenger
then has a record (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i, σRSA,i) for the signing process and
another one for the completed signature as (signature-rec, sid, qid i,mi, σi).
If the device did not receive the server’s contribution (σS,i, r′i), the challenger only has a
record (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri,⊥r′ ,⊥σ). However, it will fill in the missing r′i and
the signature itself as soon as the device gets corrupted. More precisely, the challenger chooses a
random r′i and computes σRSA,i ← HRSA(sid, qid i,H(r′i, hm,i))dSdD using the knowledge of dD and
dS as the setup was done by an honest device. It then updates the sign-rec record accordingly
and also creates the corresponding signature-rec record.
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So far, each signature is now independent of mi, as only a random hm,i value was signed and
the random oracle was not programed to map (ri,mi) to hm,i yet. The challenger then “fixes”
this when the corresponding message (ri,mi) is queried to H by the adversary using the sign-rec
and signature-rec records.
That is, whenever the challenger receives a random oracle query of the form (ri,mi) it
first checks whether it has a matching record (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri,⊥r′ ,⊥σ)
containing the same qid i, ri. If it has such a record but r′i = σRSA,i = ⊥, the challenger aborts.
Note, this case only occurs if the server never provided its contribution and the device is still
honest, which in turn means the adversary did not learn ri so far but (at most) the random
value hm,i. Due to the choice of ri $← {0, 1}λ, a query H(ri,mi) for the same ri can only appear
with negligible probability.
If the sign-rec record was completed though (except of mi), and a record (signature-rec, sid,
qid i,mi, σi) for the queried message mi and with σi = (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i) exists, the challenger
responds by programming H(ri,mi) to hm,i using the previously chosen hm,i value from the
sign-rec record. When no matching signature-rec record exists, the challenger simply sets the
random oracle response to a random value.
The “just-in-time” programming of the RO is not possible if a record ((ri,mi), h∗) ∈ TH
with h∗ 6= hm,i already exists, i.e., the adversary had “predicted” the same ri in a random oracle
query before the honest device has randomly chosen ri from {0, 1}λ during a signing request.
However, given that the adversary makes at most qh queries to the random oracle and the honest
device participates in at most qs signing sessions, the adversary has an advantage of at most
qhqs
2λ to hit that event. Thus, the environment can distinguish that game hop with negligible
probability only.
Game 9: Now, a similar change as in the previous game is done, but for the setting where
an honest device runs a signing protocol with an honest server. The difference to the procedure
above is that the device here only draws a random ri, while hm,i gets chosen at the moment
when the honest server creates its signature share. (Recall that since Game 3 the honest device
only sends a simulated ciphertext to the server and Step 2 of the signing protocol is done solely
based on the internal record maintained by the challenger.)
Thus, after completing Step 1 of the signing protocol, the challenger only maintains a
record (sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm ,⊥m,⊥tag, ri,⊥r′ ,⊥σ) (the way h′p,i and ti are computed
was already changed in Game 7). When the server then gets the “ok” to proceed and wants to
create its signature share, it chooses a random hm,i and does the rest according to the protocol.
The challenger also updates its record to (sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥h′,pwd, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i,⊥σ) where ti
is determined as described in Game 7. If the honest device now receives a message (sid, qid i, hm,i,
ti, r
′
i, σS,i) from the honest server, it further completes the sign-rec record to (sign-rec, sid, qid i,
⊥h′,pwd, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i, σRSA,i) and also creates record (signature-rec, sid, qid i,mi, σi).
As in the game above, the completed sign-rec and signature-rec records are used to consistently
answer random oracle queries (ri,mi), but abort if such a query is made but only an incomplete
signing record exists and the device is still honest.
Similar as in the game above, now the behavior when the device gets corrupted and also
complete the records of interrupted or discontinued signing sessions is changed. However, there
is the additional case that the server might still be honest when the device got corrupted. Thus,
the completion and random-oracle handling depend on the status of the adaptive corruption.
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In any case, if the device gets corrupted, ri values of all signing requests must be provided,
including ongoing ones, to the adversary. That is, the adversary now knows the randomness
that was allegedly used to compute the (possibly still unassigned) hm,i value. Thus, the signing
records of interrupted signing sessions are completed such that the “just-in-time” random
oracle programming for queries (ri,mi) is possible, as in the previous game. However, if the
server is still honest only records of the form (sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥h′,pwd, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i,⊥σ)
are completed, i.e., where the honest server had already sent its signature share. For those, the
challenger computes the full signature and creates a record (signature-rec, sid, qid i,mi, σi).
In difference to the previous game that handled the setting of an (initially) honest device and
corrupt server, also to random oracle queries (ri,mi) for which only a record (sign-rec, sid, qid i,
⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm ,⊥m,⊥tag, ri,⊥r′ ,⊥σ) exists is responded. If such a query occurs, the challenger
responds with a random hm,i and adds ((ri,mi), hmi) to TH. Those rather empty sign-rec records
are completed at the moment when both, the device and server, are corrupted.
That is, as soon as the server gets corrupted (too), the challenger completes those signatures,
but by signing a random h′m,i and choosing a random r′i. That is, h′m,i is not a “proper” random
oracle response yet. The challenger also updates its sign-rec record to include h′m,i, r′i, σRSA,i and
creates a full signature record. Thus, while (signature-rec, sid, qid i,mi, σi) is complete now, the
record (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i,⊥hm ,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i, σRSA,i) still misses the hm,i value. (The way h′p,i
is chosen is described in Game 7.)
The challenger then determines the “correct” value for hm,i by going through all answered
random oracle queries that have the form ((ri,mi), hm,i) ∈ TH. For each such entry the
challenger checks if a matching signature record (signature-rec, sid, qid i,mi, σi) exists, i.e., the
record contains the same mi and σi = (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i) contains ri. If that is the case, the
challenger now fully completes the sign-rec record by including hm,i (taken from TH) and mi
(taken from signature-rec). It also sets H(r′i, hm,i)← h′m,i, i.e., it links hm,i to the random hash
value h′m,i it has signed. If there is no such matching random oracle query ((ri,mi), hm,i) ∈ TH,
the challenger chooses a random hm,i $← {0, 1}λ, sets H(r′i, hm,i) ← h′m,i and also updates
its sign-rec record to contain hm,i. Thus, all missing values hm,i get assigned as soon as the
server gets corrupted. The challenger then uses those sign-rec records to complete all tuples
(C ′, (h′p,i, hm,i, ti), (sid, qid i) for Q. All pairs are needed to get skENC $← SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,Q).
From now on, every new query H(ri,mi) is answered as in the previous game, i.e., by
checking if a corresponding sign-rec record exists, in which case the random oracle response is set
to hm,i contained in sign-rec. Again, such programming fails if the adversary queried H(ri, ·) or
H(r′i, ·) and the challenger has subsequently chosen the same ri, r′i values in a signing protocol.
However, all ri, r′i are chosen at random from {0, 1}λ, i.e., such an event can only occur with
negligible probability. Thus, the environment can recognize this game hop only with negligible
probability, i.e., the adversary cannot distinguish between the views.
Game 10: In the final game the transition from letting the challenger run the “real”
protocol (w.r.t. Game 9) to letting him interact with the ideal functionality FPass2Sign and
simulate all messages based solely on the information he can obtain from FPass2Sign is made.
Clearly, each hop changes the view of the environment only negligibly, and thus the given




Now, the the proof is completed by describing how to construct a simulator SIM such that for
any environment Z and adversary A that controls a certain subset of the parties, the view
of the environment in the real world, when running the protocol (according to Game 9 from
Section 4.4.1) with the adversary, is indistinguishable from its view in the ideal world where it
interacts with the ideal functionality and the simulator (which corresponds to the final game
from Section 4.4.1).
“D”, “S” denote the simulated honest party D and S respectively in the real world. The
description of the simulator is given as follows: Section 4.4.2.2 describes the setup procedure for
the different combinations of honest and corrupt parties. Analogously, Section 4.4.2.3 describes
the signing process for those combinations. The simulation of the random oracle is then described
in Section 4.4.2.4 and the handling of adaptive corruptions is given in Section 4.4.2.5. For
simplicity, FPass2Sign is now referred to as F from now on.
4.4.2.1 Simulation of the Initialization Protocol
When the server is initially honest, “S” creates its public key of the non-committing encryption
scheme as pkENC
$← SIMNCE(PUBLICKEY, 1λ) instead of using the real key generation, and
honestly runs the code of FCA. Also, if S has not yet registered a public key and becomes
corrupted, send (INIT, sid) to F , once the adversary decides to register a key. In other words,
all calls are simply passed through.
4.4.2.2 Simulation of the Setup Protocol
Setup – Step 1 (done by honest device “D”): The simulation starts when SIM receives
a message (SETUPREQ, sid, ) from F , and then depends whether the account is created with
an honest or corrupt server. In both cases, though, k, (N, e), dS and dD are generated according
to the real protocol.
Server is honest. When “D” is supposed to send an encryption of the secret key share and its
authentication information, it sends a simulated ciphertext C $← SIMNCE(ENCRYPT, |N |+
λ, (sid, (N, e))) instead. The simulator also internally stores the tuple (C, (dS ,⊥h,pwd), (sid,
(N, e))) in a list Q. It will determine a value for hp as soon as the server gets corrupted.
The simulator then creates an internal request record (signreq-rec, sid, k,⊥h,pwd, dS , dD,
(N, e)). The record will be transformed into an activated setup record when the request
arrives at the server.
Server is corrupt. Here the password hash hp is chosen at random and “D” sends the correct
ciphertext C and not a simulated one. The simulator then maintains a full setup record
(setup-rec, sid, k, hp, dS , dD, (N, e)).
Setup – Step 2 (done by honest server “S”): The simulation of an honest server “S”
starts when “S” receives (sid, (N, e), C) and “S” does not have an account for sid yet. If the
tuple (sid, (N, e), C) was created by an honest device, the simulation continues with the first
case, otherwise with the second case.
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Request from honest device. If “S” receives the same simulated ciphertext C that was sent
by “D”, it does not decrypt the ciphertext but directly responds by sending sid. The
simulator also stores an activated setup record as (setup-rec, sid, k,⊥h,pwd, dS , dD, (N, e)),
using the information from signreq-rec.
Request from corrupt device. Here the server “decrypts” the ciphertext C with label (sid,
(N, e)) using the simulator of the non-committing encryption scheme as (dS , hp) $←
SIMNCE(DECRYPT, C, (sid, (N, e))) and stores the received information in an activated
setup record as (setup-rec, sid,⊥k, hp, dS ,⊥S , (N, e)).
In a very special case the simulator SIM might already have a different request record
(signreq-rec, sid, k′,⊥h,pwd, d ′S , d ′D, (N ′, e′)) for the same sid. This can happen if the request
was initiated by an honest device, but never reached the honest server. If the adversary
then corrupts the device, it can “reuse” the same sid from the honestly started setup
request, but replace all other information. If the simulator notices such a replacement,
it sends (KEYGEN, sid, 1, (N, e)) to F which reflects the intrusion of the adversary and
overwrites the initial password of the honest device in the ideal world by a dummy password
“1”.
If SIM does not have a signreq-rec record for sid yet, it sends (SETUPREQ, sid, 1) to F
and subsequently inputs (KEYGEN, sid,⊥, (N, e)) to F .
Note that SIM uses “1” as the password of the corrupted device when creating, or
overwriting the account in F and not the preimage of hp, as such a preimage does not
necessarily exist yet. For the further simulation this is sufficient though, as SIM only has
to ensure that it invokes F either with the correct password (i.e., again with “1”) or a
wrong one (e.g., with “0”).
Setup – Step 3 (done by honest device “D”): When “D” outputs (SETUP, sid, (N, e)),
the simulator registers the public key in the functionality by sending (KEYGEN, sid,⊥, (N, e))
to F , which will also deliver the message (SETUP, sid, (N, e)) to the honest device in the ideal
world.
4.4.2.3 Simulation of the Signing Protocol
Sign – Step 1 (done by honest device “D”): When SIM receives a message (SIGNREQ,
sid, qid) from F , it starts the simulation of “D” which now has to initiate a signing protocol in
the real world, but without knowing m or pwd′. Again, the simulation branches depending on
whether “D” interacts with an honest or corrupt server.
Server is honest. Here “D”, instead of sending the real ciphertext C ′ to “S”, sends a simulated ci-
phertext C ′ $← SIMNCE(ENCRYPT, 3λ, (sid, qid)) using the simulator of the non-committing
encryption scheme. At this point, the simulator does not know the entire corresponding
plaintext. Namely, it does not know hm, t yet and also does not have enough information
to “correctly” determine h′p. Thus, SIM stores the incomplete ciphertext/plaintext tuple
(C ′, (⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm ,⊥tag), (sid, qid)) in Q.
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The device should also have created an internal signing record. Therefore, “D” chooses
a random r $← {0, 1}λ and stores it as (sign-rec, sid, qid, r) and also initiates a signature
request record (signreq-rec, sid, qid,⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm ,⊥m,⊥tag, r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ) that will be used for
a consistent simulation. Similar as in setup, the request record will become a “real” sign
record as soon as the request arrives at the honest server.
Server is corrupt. In this case, the simulator continues by sending (DELIVER, sid, qid,⊥,
⊥) to F in order to learn whether the submitted password was correct. That is, when
SIM then receives (SIGNREQ, sid, qid, status) from F with status = pwdok it retrieves its
setup record (setup-rec, sid, k, hp, dS , dD, (N, e)) for sid and computes h′p ← H(qid, hp).
If SIM learns that the password did not match, i.e., status = pwdwrong, the simulator
chooses h′p
$← {0, 1}λ at random. Recall that SIM does not know the actual message
that should be signed, but here the device has to send a correctly computed ciphertext
C ′ $← EncENC(pkENC, (h′p, hm, t), (sid, qid)) to S. Thus, in addition to r, “D” also chooses
random hm $← {0, 1}λ and t $← {0, 1}λ. All values r, hm, h′p, t are kept in an internal
record (sign-rec, sid, qid, h′p, hm,⊥m, t, r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ). The simulated device “D” then sends
the message (sid, qid, C ′) to S.
Sign – Step 2 (done by honest server “S”): The simulation of an honest server starts
when “S” receives a message (sid, qid, C ′), and then branches depending on whether the message
was sent by an honest device or not. That is, even if the device got corrupted in the meantime,
but the adversary has not replaced the initially sent message of “D”, the first case applies.
Request from honest device. If (sid, qid, C ′) was sent by an honest device, “S” does not decrypt
C ′ but directly sends (DELIVER, sid, qid,⊥,⊥) to F , triggering the output to S in the ideal
world. The simulator also reflects the arrived request by storing a record (sign-rec, sid, qid,
⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm ,⊥m,⊥tag, r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ) using the information form signreq-rec.
Request from corrupt device. When a request came from a corrupt device, SIM must further
distinguish whether or not it replaces a pending sign request that was initiated from the
device when it was still honest.
If it replaces another request, the simulator already maintains a signreq-rec record for
the same qid. The simulator then first decrypt C ′ with the help of the simulator of the
non-committing encryption scheme and obtains (h′p, hm, t)
$← SIMNCE(DECRYPT, C ′, (sid,
qid)). The simulator must now reflect the replacement of the sign request towards the
ideal functionality too. That is, it must determine pwd∗ and m∗ which should replace
the initial password and message. To determine the message, the simulator uses its
maintained random-oracle table T to look up the preimage (r,m∗) for hm. If no preimage
of the form (r,m∗) exists, SIM sets m∗ ← ⊥, which it will solely use towards the ideal
functionality. Note, that all calls to H are also implicitly prefixed with the sid of the
current session/account. That is, the adversary cannot reuse a dummy hm that was chosen
at random in another sid-session by an honest device to obtain a valid signature on the
unknown message.
The simulator proceeds similarly to obtain the adversaries password attempt: SIM first
checks if the random oracle table T contains a preimage (qid, hp) for h′p and a preimage
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(k, pwd∗) for the retrieved hp and with the device key k as prefix (which is stored in
setup-rec for sid). If such a proper preimage was found, SIM uses the retrieved pwd∗ or
sets pwd∗ $← {0, 1}λ to a random value otherwise, which will mimic a signature request for
a wrong password. Finally, it sends (DELIVER, sid, qid, pwd∗,m∗) to F which triggers the
output of (SIGNREQ, sid, qid, status) to the honest server in the ideal world. The honest
server also maintains a record (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) for the signing request, where
c← pwdwrong if no proper pwd∗ was found in the random oracle, and c← ⊥ otherwise
(as SIM doesn’t know yet whether the password was correct or wrong)
For the case where the request was fully initiated from a corrupt device, the simulator
uses the same strategy as above to decrypt (h′p, hm, t) and determine the message m.
However, the password attempt is derived differently as here the server maintains a
complete setup record (setup-rec, sid, hp, dS , (N, e)) for sid. Thus, “S” can use the stored
value hp to normally verify whether H(qid, hp) = h′p. If that is the case, SIM sets
pwd′ ← 1 and pwd′ ← 0 otherwise, where pwd′ denotes the password that the simulator
will use towards the ideal functionality (recall that SIM sets pwd← 1 in F for an account
generated by the simulator). The simulator then initiates a signing session in F by sending
(SIGNREQ, sid, qid, pwd′,m) followed by (DELIVER, sid, qid,⊥,⊥). Here, the honest server
also maintains a full record (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) for the signing request.
In both cases, the honest server also creates activated sign records now. For values hm
where a proper preimage (r,m) in T existed, SIM stores a sign record (sign-rec, sid, qid, h′p,
hm,m, t, r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ). That is, here SIM knows the message m that it is supposed to sign.
If no preimage of the form (r,m) existed, the simulator only creates a record (sign-rec,
sid, qid, h′p, hm,⊥m, t,⊥r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ).
Sign – Step 3 (done by honest server “S”): When SIM receives a message (PROCEED,
sid, qid) from F it knows that the password pwd′ provided by the device was correct and the
honest server in the ideal world approves the signing request. Thus, “S” acts accordingly and
creates its signature contribution σS . Depending on whether “S” has received the signing request
from an honest or corrupt device, the simulator might not have chosen a value for hm, t yet,
and thus the simulation again branches:
Request from honest device. Here, “S” only received a dummy ciphertext C ′ in the previous
step, and the simulator has not assigned a value to hm, t or h′p yet. Thus, “S” now chooses
hm
$← {0, 1}λ and r′ $← {0, 1}λ and uses the secret key dS stored in the setup-rec record for
sid to compute σS ← HRSA(sid, qid,H(r′, hm))dS . The simulator also draws t $← {0, 1}λ
and updates its sign-rec record to (sign-rec, sid, qid,⊥h′,pwd, hm,⊥m, t, r, r′,⊥σ).
The newly created information is also included in the list Q by updating the tuple with
label (sid, qid) to contain the almost full plaintext (⊥h,pwd, hm, t). Recall that h′p,i is only
assigned as soon as the server gets corrupted, as described in Game 7. The server now also
maintains a full record (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) with c← pwdok for the signing request.
“S” then sends (sid, qid, hm, t, r′, σS) to “D”, if the device is still honest, or to D if it got
corrupted in the meantime.
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Request from corrupt device. Here, “S” looks up its record (sign-rec, sid, qid, h′p, hm, {m,⊥m},
t, {r,⊥r},⊥r′ ,⊥σ) and normally computes its signature share σS for the stored hm. In
that process, “S” chooses a random r′ $← {0, 1}λ which is then included in the sign-rec
record. Finally, “S” sends (sid, qid, hm, t, r′, σS) to D. The honest server also updates its
state record to (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) setting c← pwdok.
Here, SIM now maintains a signature record of the form (sign-rec, sid, qid, h′p, hm, {m,
⊥m}, t, {r,⊥r}, r′,⊥σ) That is, SIM knows (for “well-formed” hm) the message m it has
provided its signature share for, but not the created signature σ. In particular, also the
ideal functionality F has not stored any signature for m yet. However, SIM can provide
the missing signature right on time when the environment tries to verify the signature, as
described in Section 4.4.2.4. Note, for non “well-formed” hashes hm SIM has initiated a
signature request for dummy message m = ⊥ towards the ideal functionality. However,
such a request will never lead to a signature in F due to the collisision-resistance provided
by the random oracle.
Sign – Step 4 (done by honest device “D”): When “D” receives a message (sid, qid,
hm, t, r
′, σS), it only continues if the received value t is the same as stored in (sign-rec, sid, qid,
h′p, hm,⊥m, t, r, r′,⊥σ). It then completes the signature to σRSA using the locally stored dD
value. Eventually, “D” ends with output (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ), upon which SIM sends
(SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ) to F and also stores σRSA in its internal sign-rec record. Thus, the
simulator has then “blindly” generated a signature in F , i.e., SIM has not learned the signed
message m yet, while the ideal functionality now contains a record (signature-rec, (N, e),m, σ,
true).
To summarize, depending on the interference of the adversary and the input of the environ-
ment SIM ends this simulation for an honest device in one of the following states:
Signature completed: The signature process ended correctly and F contains a valid signature
record including the message m (which is unknown to the simulator) and the completed
signature σ. The simulator created a signature record (sign-rec, sid, qid, {h′p,⊥h′,pwd}, hm,
t,⊥m, r, r′, σRSA), that contains hm and the created RSA signature σRSA, and where ⊥m
stands for the unknown message m that the simulator had signed. However, the simulator
can use the fact that the ideal functionality contains a completed signature record including
the message m to ensure consistency when a random oracle query for the message (r,m) is
made. Furthermore, if done with an honest server “S”, “S” also created a signing record
(sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) where c← pwdok.
Proceed, but no completed signature: If SIM ended in the second state when the envi-
ronment gave the ok to proceed, but the adversary in the real world has interrupted
the final message, such the device never received (sid, qid, hm, t, r′, σS) from “S”. Con-
sequently, SIM could not create the signature record in F yet, that SIM later needs to
ensure consistency with the random oracle. Also the simulator only maintains a record
(sign-rec, sid, qid, {h′p,⊥h′,pwd}, hm, t,⊥m, r, r′,⊥σ). (Note that r′, t and hm were added to
the record already when “S” send its message.) However, SIM will finalize the computation
of σ as soon as the device gets corrupted using the already selected r′ and create the
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corresponding ideal world record by sending (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ) to F . If an honest
server was involved, it also stores a full record (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) with c← pwdok.
No proceed: The third state occurs when the sign request arrived at the server, but the
either the environment didn’t gave the ok to proceed. Thus, SIM has neither created
a signature σS , nor allocated r′, t or hm yet. The record of SIM therefore looks as
follows (sign-rec, sid, qid, {h′p,⊥h′,pwd},⊥hm ,⊥m,⊥tag, r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ). An honest server is then
also supposed to have created an intermediate record (sign-rec, sid, qid, hm, t, c) where c
indicates whether the password matched or not. However, in the simulation hm and c are
not known yet, and therefore “S” only has the incomplete record (sign-rec, sid, qid,⊥hm ,
⊥tag,⊥c). The simulator will complete such records when the server gets corrupted.
Signing request never arrived: The last state occurs when the adversary already intercepted
the signature request from “D”. Here, SIM only holds the following record (signreq-rec,
sid, qid, {h′p,⊥h′,pwd},⊥hm ,⊥m,⊥tag, r,⊥r′ ,⊥σ).
4.4.2.4 Verification and Random Oracle Simulation
In the simulation so far, SIM has sometimes “blindly” signed messages for a user, or signed
messages which were known to the simulator, but where SIM did not learn the resulting signature.
However, SIM can use the verification interface and the fact that SIM is in charge of answering
the random oracle queries, to learn the missing values and ensure consistency with the values
maintained by the ideal functionality F .
First is shown how the simulator SIM learns the missing message for records of the type
(sign-rec, sid, qid, {h′p,⊥h′,pwd}, hm,⊥m, t, r, r′, σRSA) or records of the form (signreq-rec, sid, qid,
{h′p,⊥h′,pwd}, hm,⊥m, t, r, r′, σRSA). The simulator uses the procedure as described in Game 8
and Game 9, with the modification that whenever the challenger would look up if a record
(signature-rec, sid, qid,m, σ) exists, SIM sends (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, (N, e)) to F , where (N, e) is
taken from the setup record for sid. When F asks SIM to verify a signature σ, the simulator re-
turns (VERIFIED, sid,m, σ, (N, e), false) and waits for a message (VERIFIED, sid,m, σ, (N, e), f).
If f = true, SIM behaves as if the challenger would have found a matching record (signature-rec,
sid, qid,m, σ). Thereby SIM ensures that whenever a random oracle query (r,m) is made where
r was used in a signing session, it can detect a query containing the “real” m that the simulator
might have blindly signed, and react consistently.
The second type of incomplete records were created when only the server was honest. In
that case the simulator could “extract” the message, but did not learn the signature the corrupt
device had completed. Thus, the simulator maintains a record (sign-rec, sid, qid, h′p, hm,m, t,
r, r′,⊥σ), and more importantly, the ideal functionality did not receive the signature either.
Whenever SIM then receives a message (VERIFY, sid,m, σ, (N, e),P) from F , it checks whether
σ is valid signature on m using the normal verification algorithm. If verification fails, SIM
responds with (VERIFIED, sid,m, σ, (N, e), false) to F . When the verification succeeds, SIM
parses σ as (σRSA, qid, r, r′) and checks if it has a setup-rec record for sid with the same public
key (N, e) and also a record (sign-rec, sid, qid, h′p, hm,m, t, r, r′,⊥σ) for the same sid, qid,m, r, r′.
If such matching records are found, i.e., the signature belongs to a previous signing request, SIM
sends (SIGNATURE, sid, qid, σ) to F , ensuring that the signature is now registered by the ideal
functionality as well, followed by a call (VERIFIED, sid,m, σ, (N, e), true). When the verification
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in the real world succeeded but no matching record was found, SIM aborts, as justified in
Game 5 and Game 6.
The simulator also takes special care of queries that contain the device secret key k as
described in Game 8 and Game 9. Whenever, in those games a record signreq-rec or setupreq-rec
is used, SIM instead invokes the PWDGUESS interface of F . This procedure is recalled in more
detail in the description of full corruption below.
4.4.2.5 Adaptive Corruptions
Device Corruption. When the environment decides to corrupt a previously honest device,
“D” receives the message (CORRUPT, sid) from the environment. This is mimicked by sending
(CORRUPT, sid,D, ∅) to F in the ideal world. The impact of that corruption depends on whether
it happened after the setup was completed, or before, and whether or not the server is honest.
During setup: If the device gets corrupted during setup, i.e., “D” already had sent (sid,
(N, e), C) to the server but never completed the setup, it must provide its setup record
(setup-rec-temp, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) to the adversary. All values were correctly generated in
the setup and thus, “D” simply gives the record (setup-rec-temp, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) to A.
If the setup was done with an honest server which already replied with (sid), but the
adversary never let the message arrive at “D”, the simulator now also sends (SETUP, sid,
(N, e)) to F . This ensures that the account will be activated in the ideal functionality as
well.
After setup: When the device gets corrupted after the setup was done, the adversary expects
to get the setup record (setup-rec, sid, k, dD, (N, e)) as well as all records {(sign-rec, qid i,
ri)} that result from signing requests.
Before the simulator outputs those records, it ensures that incomplete signature requests
that were initiated by the device are now completed towards the ideal functionality. This is
crucial to ensure consistency with a potential random oracle query (ri,mi) as described in
Section 4.4.2.4. The type of discontinued signing request SIM can complete now depends
on whether the server is (still) honest or not.
• Server honest: If the server is still honest, the simulator can only complete signing
requests, where the honest server (in the ideal world) already gave the ok to proceed.
That is, for those requests, where in the simulation “S” had already send its contribution
(r′i, σS,i) to “D” but the adversary intercepted the share. For each such intercepted signing
session the simulator maintains a record (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i,⊥σ) and
now computes (σRSA,i)← HRSA(sid, qid i,H(r′i, hm,i))dSdD using the RSA secret key shares
dS , dD the honest device had generated in setup. It then sets σi ← (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i),
updates its record sign-rec to contain σRSA,i and, most importantly, sends (SIGNATURE,
sid, qid i, σi) to F .
From now on the simulator must also answer to random oracle queries (ri,mi) where ri
belongs to a signing session where the honest server had never sent its signature share.
In those cases the adversary has not learned hm,i though, and in fact, those are not even
chosen by the simulator yet. Thus, SIM will respond with a random value hm,i for each
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such query. The simulator then has to ensure consistency for those queries as soon as
the server gets corrupted as well.
• Server corrupt: If the server was initially honest, the simulator first completes the
records as in the case of the honest server described above. However, given that here the
server is corrupt, the simulator additionally creates signatures in F for those sessions,
where i) either an initially honest server never got the approval to continue or ii) a
corrupt server did not provide a (valid) signature share.For that type of discontinued
signing requests, the simulator maintains records (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri,
⊥r′ ,⊥σ). In case those records stem from a setting where the server was initially honest,
but got then corrupted, h′p,i, hm,i, ti got assigned at the moment of the corruption (see
description of server corruption).
The simulator SIM now completes each such sign-rec record by choosing r′i
$← {0, 1}λ and
computing σRSA,i ← HRSA(sid, qid i,H(r′i, hm,i))dSdD , again using the knowledge of dS , dD,
generated by the honest device. SIM then sends (PROCEED, sid, qid i) to F , followed by
the message (SIGNATURE, sid, qid i, σi) where the signature is composed as σi ← (σRSA,i,
qid i, ri, r′i).
In both cases the simulator has now created full signature records in F that maps the still
unknown message mi to the “blindly” created signature σi. This will allow the simulator
to determine mi whenever a query (ri,mi) is made to the random oracle from now on
(which is exactly the crucial turning point, as the adversary will learn all the ri values of
the incomplete signing records, which thus need to be simulated), using the procedure
described in Section 4.4.2.4.
Server Corruption. When the honest server “S” receives the message (CORRUPT, sid) from
the adversary, the adversary then expects to learn the secret key of the non-committing encryption
scheme skENC, the setup information (setup-rec, sid, hp, dS , (N, e)) and records {(sign-rec, sid,
qid i, hm,i, ti, ci)} for all signing sessions.
However, hp might still be unassigned and the signing records will currently have the form
(sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥hm ,⊥tag,⊥c) though, whenever they were created in a signing protocol with
an honest device and the server did not continue the protocol. However, SIM can assemble
the correct records now using the list L that SIM will obtain from F and the internal signing
records maintained by SIM. How the simulation proceeds again depends on whether the device
is still honest or not.
• Device honest: If the device is still honest, SIM sends (CORRUPT, sid,S, ∅) to F receiving
(CORRUPT, sid,S,L). Then, for every record (sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥hm ,⊥tag,⊥c) stored by “S”,
the simulator takes ci from the tuple (qid i, ci) ∈ L and includes it in the sign-rec record.
Determining the missing values for hp, h′p,i, hm,i and ti is also rather simple here, as the
adversary has not learned the device key k and randomness ri yet that was used to “blind”
the message mi in hm,i. Thus, SIM also had not to react to random oracle queries of the form
(ri,mi) yet. Thus, for each incomplete sign-rec record the simulator simply chooses random
values hm,i $← {0, 1}λ, ti $← {0, 1}λ. The password hash hp is chosen at random now and
whenever ci = pwdok it also sets the password attempt of that session to h′p,i ← H(qid, hp)
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and to h′p,i
$← {0, 1}λ otherwise. The created values of hp, h′p,i, hm,i are then added to the
setup-rec and sign-rec records.
• Device corrupted during setup: When the adversary corrupted the initially honest device
during setup it has learned the device secret k. Thus, the adversary would already have been
able to make a random oracle query to compute the password hash himself that is supposedly
encrypted in C. The simulator has to figure out whether he already committed to hp before
outputting the secret decryption key skENC.
To do so, SIM sends (CORRUPT, sid,S, ∅) to F receiving (CORRUPT, sid,S,L) which will
also enable the password guess interface. The simulator then goes through previously answered
random oracles queries that had the form H(k, pwdj), and for each sends (PWDGUESS, sid,
⊥, pwdj) to F to verify whether pwd was the actual password of the initially honest device. If
F responds with (PWDGUESS, sid,⊥, cj) with cj = pwdok , it sets hp to be the random oracle
answer it had randomly assigned for that query. If no such matching query is found, hp is chosen
at random. To determine the decryption key, simulator invokes skENC $← SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,
Q) with Q ← (C, (dS , hp), (sid, (N, e)) using (N, e), dS from the signreq-rec record. Finally,
“S” outputs skENC as well as all sign records. Note that here all sign records where already
completed during the protocol run as all requests originated from a corrupt device, i.e., nothing
has to be simulated here.
• Device corrupted after setup: When the device is corrupted sometime after setup, SIM has to
take special care of all signing request that were initiated when the device was still honest.
Here the adversary when corrupting the device has not only learned the device secret k
but also all records {(sign-rec, qid i, ri)} of signing requests from “D”. Thus, the adversary
could have made random oracle queries targeted to compute the message hash himself. More
precisely, the adversary would have been able to query (ri,mi) to the random oracle where mi
is the message for which the environment triggered the signing request. As the adversary will
now also learn the decryption key skENC, SIM has to make sure that all ciphertexts C ′i sent
by “D” in the signing requests now open to the correct plaintext. That is, it must hold that
(h′p,i, hm,i, ti)← DecENC(skENC, C ′i, (sid, qid i)) and hm,i ← H(ri,mi).
This requires a more careful simulation using the functionality to determine the blindly
signed messages. The simulator now completes the signature record in F and uses that
record to determine whether it already answered to a random oracle query (ri,mi). To this
end, SIM first retrieves each qid i for which a request record (signreq-rec, sid, qid i,⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm ,
⊥m,⊥tag, ri,⊥r′ ,⊥σ) exists and there is either a matching sign record of the form (sign-rec,
sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) or (sign-rec, sid, qid i,⊥h′,pwd,⊥hm , ∗, ∗, ∗,⊥r′ ,⊥σ). For each such
qid i, SIM chooses r′i
$← {0, 1}λ, a random h′m,i $← {0, 1}λ and computes the full signature
σRSA,i ← HRSA(sid, qid i, h′m,i)dSdD , again using the knowledge of dS , dD, generated by the
initially honest device. SIM then updates it (empty) sign-rec record to contain σRSA,i and
r′i. The simulator also adds σi with σi ← (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i) to a signature list Σ. If the list
is complete, SIM finally sends (CORRUPT, sid,P ,Σ) to F which will generate full signature
records in F for all blindly signed message mi that were incomplete so far. The input also
enables the PWDGUESS interface, which will be crucial for the rest of the simulation.
SIM first leverages the fact that now all blindly signed messages are completed within F
to ensure a consistent decryption for the dummy ciphertexts C ′i of the sign protocols. The
following procedure is done to either complete request records or sign records. In the former
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case, the initial honest sign request was replaced after device corruption, whereas in the latter
one the sign request was received by the server but never completed.
Now, SIM goes through all random oracle queries of the form ((ri,mi), hm,i) ∈ T for which a
signreq-rec record for ri exist and sends (VERIFY, sid,mi, σi, (N, e), SIM) to F , where again
σi ← (σRSA,i, qid i, ri, r′i) and (N, e) is taken from the setup record for the sid specified in
sign-rec. The ideal functionality will then send its ping (VERIFY, sid,mi, σi, (N, e), SIM) to
SIM, upon which it responds with (VERIFIED, sid,mi, σi, (N, e), false). In case mi is indeed
the blindly signed message of signing request qid i, the ideal functionality will respond with
(VERIFIED, sid,mi, σi, (N, e), true). Whenever that happens, SIM now knows that it had signed
a message mi and also assigned already a hash value hm,i ← H(ri,mi) for mi. Thus, SIM
includes that hash value hm,i in its internal record sign-rec or signreq-rec. It also “links” the
signed h′m,i value to hm,i by setting H(r′i, hm,i) ← h′m,i. If for a signing query qid i no such
matching random oracle query (ri,mi) was found, SIM draws a random hash hm,i $← {0, 1}λ
and updates its internal sign-rec or signreq-rec record accordingly. In addition, it adds valid
tags ti ← H("MAC", qid, k, hm,i) to the records using k from the corresponding setup-rec record.
SIM also has to take similar care of the password hashes, as the adversary already knows k and
would have been able to compute the password hashes himself. Thus SIM uses the procedure
from Game 7 to determine hp and all h′p,i such that they are consistent with the adversaries
view. However, in difference to Game 7 SIM does not have internal records for the password
pwd and all password attempts pwd′i. Instead, SIM uses the PWDGUESS interface of F , which is
available now since both parties are corrupt. Thus, for all previously answered random oracles
queries that had the form H(k, pwd), SIM sends (PWDGUESS, sid,⊥, pwd) to F to verify
whether pwd was the actual password of the initially honest device. If such a query is found,
it sets hp to be the random oracle answer it had randomly assigned for that query. Likewise,
for all queries H(qid i, h∗p) where ((k, pwd′i), h∗p) ∈ T , SIM send (PWDGUESS, sid, qid i, pwd′i) to
F and reuses its previous random oracle answers for each h′p,i it had already created.
Note that all internal records will now have the form (sign-rec, sid, qid i, h′p,i, hm,i,⊥m, ti, ri, r′i,
σRSA,i) and a corresponding full signature record in F was created. That is, for all signature
request that were ever started by the honest device, the simulator can now use F to ensure
consistency with random oracle queries (ri,mi) of still unknown messages mi (as described in
Section 4.4.2.4).
In the first and third cases, SIM now uses its sign-rec records to assemble the complete
signing records {(sign-rec, sid, qid i, hm,i, ti, ci)} the server is supposed to give to A. Further,
the simulator adds the newly obtained values to the list Q to contain the full plaintext tuples
(h′p,i, hm,i, ti) for every simulated ciphertext C ′i. It also adds such tuples for all replaces signature
request, i.e., where the simulator just completed the signreq-rec records. Similarly, it adds
C, (dS , hp), (sid, (N, e) to Q to ensure consistency for the dummy ciphertext of the setup
protocol. Finally, the simulator invokes skENC $← SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,Q) to learn the secret
key of the encryption scheme. “S” then outputs skENC, (setup-rec, sid, hp, dS , (N, e)) and the
completed records {(sign-rec, sid, qid i, hm,i, ci)} of all signing sessions.
Simulating Oﬄine Attacks after Full Corruption. When the environment has fully
corrupted both parties, the adversary in the real world learned k, hp, h′p,1, . . . , h′p,q where q
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denotes the number of signing requests initiated by the device. Thus, it can run oﬄine attacks
against the password hashes, trying to determine the underlying password. In fact, as the
passwords of honest devices were provided by the environment, they might even be known to
the adversary. SIM uses F ’s PWDGUESS interface that is available for fully-corrupted instances
from now on for each random oracle query that looks like an attempt of the adversary to verify
the password against a learned hash value.
That is, for each query H(k, pwd∗) where k appears in a record (signreq-rec, sid, k, hp, dS ,
dD, (N, e)), SIM sends (PWDGUESS, sid,⊥, pwd∗) to F . When it receives (PWDGUESS, sid, qid,
c) with c = pwdok from F , the simulator sets H(k, pwd∗) ← hp where hp is taken from the
setup-rec record and to a random value when c = pwdwrong.
For every query H(qid i, h∗p) where h∗p = H(k, pwd∗), i.e., h∗p is the result of a previous random
oracle query (k, pwd∗) and records (setup-rec, sid, k, hp, dS , dD, (N, e)) for k and (signreq-rec, sid,
qid i, h′p,i, hm,i, {mi/⊥m}, ti, ri, r′i, {σRSA,i,⊥σ}) for qid i exist, SIM sends (PWDGUESS, sid, qid i,
pwd∗) to F . When F responds with the message (PWDGUESS, sid, qid i, c) where c = pwdok,
SIM sets H(qid i, h∗p)← h′p,i where h′p,i is taken from the sign-rec record and assigns a random
response otherwise.
All other parties, which only verify signatures, can be simulated honestly w.r.t. to the
execution history, ignoring the programming, which has been explained in detail earlier this
section.
Thus, it was shown how to construct a simulator that provides a view that is indistinguishable
to the one described in Game 10, which concludes the proof.
4.5 Implementation
This section contains a short summary of a prototypical implementation of the Pass2Sign scheme.
A more detailed description is given in Appendix G. The measurements of the protocol were done
with three different RSA-moduli sizes, 1,024, 2,048 and 4,096Bit to account for different security
requirements. The key size is used for both the signing key and the trapdoor permutation in
the non-committing encryption scheme.
To instantiate the random oracles K,G, and H are instantiated as SHA-512, while each
call is prefixed accordingly. The instantiation of the full-domain hash HRSA is based on the
construction given by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], and uses rejection sampling to uniformly
map into Z∗N . All messages are sent using standard TCP-Sockets.
The implementation was done using Java 8 without any optimization. The server is a laptop
with a 2.7GHz processor and 16GiB RAM, while the device is a Nexus 10 tablet with 1.7GHz,
2GB RAM and Android 5.1.1, while FAuth was implemented using standard TLS connections
with the corresponding certificates.
Table 4.1 depicts the average time for the setup and signing protocol, split between the
device and server part, based on measurements of 100 protocol runs. The table does not include
network latencies, as they strongly depend on the actual location setting. However, assuming a
round-trip time takes 100ms, a full signing protocol with 2,048Bit keys then requires roughly
250ms in total.
Summarized, the protocol can be considered practical, even though no optimizations were
implemented.
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Table 4.1: Overview of the measurements. All values are in milliseconds.
Setup Signing
Key Size 1,024Bit 2,048Bit 4,096Bit 1,024Bit 2,048Bit 4,096Bit
Device
Median 648.11 3′335.34 14′343.46 19.08 79.83 482.60
Average 855.58 3′646.27 16′202.58 19.79 83.40 574.41
Server
Median 14.32 63.96 388.11 11.76 64.53 456.38
Average 15.20 65.69 393.27 12.31 65.50 466.73
4.6 Non-Blind Signatures
The Pass2Sign scheme guarantees message blindness towards the server, meaning that the server
does not learn the message the device wishes to be signed. This may not always be required
or wanted though, e.g., if the message is public or jointly determined or if the server should
have control over the messages being signed (for instance because it should also apply throttling
based on the message). Sketched in this section is a variant Pass2Sign∗ of the scheme that does
not include message blindness, and comes with the additional benefit that the signing protocol is
even simpler and verification requires less message pre-processing. Thus, the sketched alterations
lead to an additional efficiency gain, but offer less privacy. Clearly, it depends on the use-case
which protocol should be deployed in what context.
The Ideal Functionality. The ideal functionality FPass2Sign∗ can be obtained from the one
for Pass2Sign by simply including the message m in the output to the server. That is, when
the server learns about a signature request, the output is augmented to contain the message
m provided by the device: in the <5.Sign Delivery> interface, the server S now receives
(SIGNREQ, sid, qid, status,m).
Note that so far the message still remains confidential between D and S, disregarding the
length the message. If the message is supposed to be entirely public, then m must also be
included in the output (SIGNREQ, sid, qid,D,m) to the adversary A in the <4.Sign Request>
interface.
The Protocol. Now is sketched how the Pass2Sign realization can be modified to one that
realizes FPass2Sign∗ with entirely public messages. First note that only the signing protocol needs
to be changed. In a nutshell, one simply drops all its steps that aim at providing message
blindness, such as the hashing of the message including r and r′. More precisely, when requesting
a signature, the device drops the blinding Step 1b) where hm ← H(r,m) is computed for a
random r, and the “MAC” Step 1d) which aims at ensuring message consistency without having
to store m on the device. Instead, the device now simply keeps the message in its sign record.
Depending on whether one aims at the confidential or public message setting, the message is
sent either encrypted or in plain to S. For the latter, one has to ensure that the adversary
cannot tamper with the message during delivery, and thus one would have to include m in the
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label of the ciphertext. That is, for the public message setting, the device sends to S the tuple
(sid, qid, C ′,m) with C ′ becoming C ′ $← EncENC(pkENC, h′p, (sid, qid,m)).
The changes to the server’s computation are similar: in Step 3b) the server drops its
randomness r′ and double-hashing contribution and simply signs the (slightly augmented)
message (sid, qid,m) based on the received message m. The server then returns (sid, qid, σS) to
the device.
Finally, in Step 4c), where the device completes the signature to σRSA, the verification of σRSA
is adapted accordingly and, in Step 4d), the full signature is set to σ = (σRSA, qid). Verification
of a signature σ on message m is simplified to a standard RSA-FDH verification of σRSA for
message m′ ← (sid, qid,m).
It is easy to see that the proof of the simplified non-blind scheme Pass2Sign∗ can be derived
with minor modifications from the proof of the Pass2Sign scheme. Roughly, one has to adapt the
games for the reduction to the RSA assumption, and drop all simulation that stems from the
message blinding, such as the simulation of the tags t or the “late-programming” of the random
oracle upon a signature verification request (as the messages are now known to the simulator).
Clearly, the proofs carry over with only minor adjustments.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduced a protocol for signing messages with the help of a device and a server.
To authenticate towards the server, the user has to enter a password on his device. If the
device gets stolen, an adversary is limited to online password guessing attacks, which can be
throttled by the server. Neither the device nor the server are required to be tamper-resistant
in any form, yet the protocol offers comparable security to trusted hardware, but without
its inconveniences. The UC-formulation guarantees that the protocol remains secure even in
arbitrarily chosen contexts. Moreover, the protocol is secure against adaptive corruptions, which
properly models the main threat where the device gets lost or stolen. The model of corruption
is even stronger than the existing standard: the simulator does not learn any previous inputs.
The ideal functionality also provides a realistic way how password guesses are handled. Namely,
even if both the device and the server are corrupted, the adversary does not immediately learn
the passwords, but can only mount an oﬄine attack. Thus, if strong passwords are used, the
adversary might still not be able to guess them, despite having corrupted both entities. The
protocol is round-optimal and very efficient, as it only requires few random oracle calls and three
full-size modular exponentiations for each signature generation. Furthermore, it is sketched how
to lift the blindness property from the functionality and protocol, yielding an even more efficient
scheme. Possible extensions include achieving full blindness with unlinkability of the resulting





The results of this chapter have already been published [CLNS17].
Abstract. The universal composability (UC) framework enables the modular design of cryp-
tographic protocols by allowing arbitrary compositions of lower-level building blocks. Public-key
encryption is unarguably a very important such building block. However, so far no UC-
functionality exists that offers non-interactive encryption necessary for modular protocol con-
struction. This chapter provides an ideal functionality for non-committing encryption (i.e.,
public-key encryption secure against adaptive corruptions) with locally generated, and therefore
non-interactive, ciphertexts. As a sanity check, a game-based security notion is provided, which
is proven to be equivalent to the UC notion. It is then shown that the encryption scheme given
in the prior chapter, based on trapdoor permutations, securely implements the new notion
in the random-oracle model even without assuming secure erasures. This is the best one can
hope to achieve as standard-model constructions do not exist due to the uninstantiability of
round-optimal non-interactive adaptively secure message transfer in the standard model [Nie02].
The modular reusability of the functionality is illustrated by constructing the first non-interactive
signcryption scheme secure against adaptive corruptions without secure erasures in the UC
framework.
Roadmap. The problem statement is given in Section 5.1, while Section 5.1.3 contains
additional preliminaries. The new game-based definition is given in Section 5.2, which is
compared to existing notions in Section 5.3. The corresponding UC-definition FLNCE, along
with a proof of equivalence, is given in Section 5.4. How to build UC-secure secure message
transfer from FLNCE is presented in Section 5.5, while the primitive of UC-secure sugncryption,
i.e., FLSignCrypt, is given in Section 5.6. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.7.
5.1 Introduction
The universal composability (UC) framework [Can01] enables the modular design of crypto-
graphic protocols by analyzing the security of composed protocols in a so-called “hybrid” model,
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where subprotocols are replaced by their ideal functionalities, thereby eliminating the need for
explicit reductions from the security of the individual building blocks in the overall security
proof. Faithful to its name, the UC framework guarantees that any secure instantiation of the
subprotocols yields a secure instantiation of the composed protocol.
A wide variety of UC-secure cryptographic primitives have appeared in the literature. Public-
key encryption is an important such primitive that may not have received the attention that
it deserves in the UC framework, especially given its widespread use to build cryptographic
protocols. The original UC paper by Canetti [Can01] specifies an ideal functionality FPKE for
public-key encryption and proves it equivalent to the game-based notion of indistinguishability
against chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). However, this result only holds for non-adaptive
adversaries, that is, where the set of corrupted parties is fixed a priori for each protocol instance.
Non-Committing Encryption. Security against adaptive corruptions is obviously the more
realistic notion for practical applications, but is notoriously difficult to achieve for public-key
encryption because of the so-called selective de-commitment problem [DNRS99, Hof11]. In a
nutshell, the problem is the following. As long as both sender and receiver are honest, the
simulator communicates “dummy” ciphertext values without knowing the actual plaintext. When
later the receiver gets corrupted, the simulator must provide the adversary with a decryption
key that makes these dummy ciphertexts decrypt to the correct messages, which are only
handed to the simulator at the moment of corruption. Similarly, when the sender is corrupted,
the simulator must provide encryption randomness that turns the messages into the dummy
ciphertexts. One can easily solve the latter problem by securely erasing the randomness after
encryption. However, secure erasures do not help to provide correct decryption keys when the
receiver gets corrupted, and security cannot be proven. This is an unsatisfactory situation, as
already noted in prior work [BHK12,FHKW10,FHKP16,HRW16,HR14].
Adaptively secure public-key encryption is therefore often referred to as non-committing
encryption (NCE). Nielsen [Nie02] showed that NCE cannot be achieved in the standard model
by non-interactive protocols, i.e., protocols sending only one message per encryption. Canetti,
Halevi, and Katz [CHK05a] circumvent Nielsen’s impossibility result by periodically changing
decryption keys and requiring a small amount of interaction between senders, namely, the
current time period that has to be communicated.
The main concern is that such interactive, i.e., non-local, constructions are not suitable
for all use cases. Examples include scenarios where the sender and receiver are not on-line
simultaneously, as is for instance the case for encrypted email which are typically stored on an
IMAP server and are retrieved by the receiver at any time, possibly when the sender is no longer
available. Indeed, many real-world communications are “fire-and-forget,” where additional
communication is impossible or too expensive, e.g., for UDP, sensor networks, etc.
Security in the random-oracle model [BR93] can be a reasonable price to pay for adaptive
non-interactive encryption, especially when other building blocks in a composed protocol rely
on random oracles already. Nielsen [Nie02] provided a non-interactive construction in the
random-oracle model, but presented it as a secure message transmission (SMT) protocol, which
lets a sender send a secure message to a receiver but does not provide the environment any actual
ciphertexts, which is the same as in the work done by Choi et al. [CDMW09]. This is problematic
when a higher-level protocol needs to perform further operations on ciphertexts, such as signing,
hashing, or re-encrypting ciphertexts. Another problem is that Nielsen’s construction assumes
5.1. INTRODUCTION 135
authenticated channels between the sender and receiver. When the underlying encryption
scheme is used without authenticated channels, the scheme becomes malleable and thus does
not satisfy the security properties that one expects.
5.1.1 Contribution
This chapter presents a new non-committing encryption functionality FLNCE that gives the
encrypting party access to actual ciphertexts, much like Canetti’s FPKE and Canetti-Halevi-Katz’
FAFSE, but unlike Nielsen’s FSMT. It also presents a new game-based notion FULL-SIM that
is proven to be equivalent to the ideal functionality FLNCE, and to be strictly stronger than
most existing notions, e.g., by Hazay et al. [HPW15], but incomparable to Canetti et al.’s
notion [CHK05a]. Apart from acting as a sanity check for the UC functionality, the game-based
notion is also easier to prove schemes secure. It is then shown that an existing encryption
scheme [CLNS16,Nie02,BR93] (See also Chapter 4) based on trapdoor one-way permutations
satisfies FULL-SIM, and hence securely implements FLNCE against adaptive adversaries, in the
random-oracle model. Secure erasures are not required, which is important in practice because
realizing secure erasures is virtually impossible on modern hardware and software, as intermediate
results may be copied or moved across the RAM, swap partitions, and SSD memory blocks.
The efficient and simple scheme presented in the prior chapter is a reminiscent of Bellare-
Rogaway’s IND-CCA-secure encryption scheme [BR93] as well as Nielsen’s SMT scheme. A
public key is a trapdoor permutation f , its corresponding secret key the trapdoor f−1. Slightly
simplified, the scheme encrypts a message m by choosing a random element x from the domain
of f and produces the ciphertext (f(x),H(x)⊕m,H(x,m)) where H is a random oracle. To
decrypt a ciphertext (c(1), c(2), c(3)), one computes x′ ← f−1(c(1)), m′ ← c(2)⊕H(x′), and checks
that c(3) = H(x′,m′).
Because an instantiation of the FLNCE functionality immediately gives rise to a non-interactive
secure message transmission protocol, Nielsen’s impossibility result extends to FLNCE, meaning
that FLNCE cannot be securely instantiated in the standard model. Moreover, Canetti et al. [CJS14]
pointed out that a globally accessible and programmable random oracle (or common reference
string, for that matter) cannot be instantiated with a single hash function.
Recommending a provably uninstantiable scheme for use in cryptographic protocols is, of
course, controversial. Most other examples of uninstantiable random-oracle schemes [CGH04,
GK03] are contrived constructions that would never be considered for real-world use, if only
because there actually exist efficient alternatives that still have a chance of being instantiated
securely. The quite natural construction clearly doesn’t fall in this category. Rather, one can
compare it to highly practical random-oracle schemes, such as RSA-OAEP encryption [BR94]
or Schnorr signatures [Sch91], that are widely used in spite of strong indications that they may
not be instantiable [BF05,PV05]. Moreover, these schemes are used in spite of the fact that
reasonably efficient standard-model alternatives do exist for encryption and signatures. As
Nielsen’s result showed, the same is not true for non-interactive encryption, even if one were
willing to make sacrifices on efficiency.
Security in the random-oracle model, even if uninstantiable, is still meaningful, in the sense
that it does protect against “generic” adversaries that treat the hash function as a black box.
Moreover, a proof in the random-oracle model is still a good “sanity check” to exclude other
design flaws in the protocol and is obviously highly preferable to not having a security proof at
136 CHAPTER 5. UC-SECURE NON-INTERACTIVE PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION
all.
Therefore, in scenarios where interaction is simply not an option, and where security in
the local random-oracle model is acceptable, the functionality FLNCE can very conveniently be
used as a building block in higher-level protocols. This is demonstrated with the example of
signcryption, showing that the generic encrypt-then-sign construction from the game-based
world also works in UC, yielding the first adaptively UC-secure signcryption scheme without
erasures. In other words, the formalization presented allows, for the first time, to analyze
protocols relying on such a building for the first time.
5.1.2 Related Work
The first non-committing encryption schemes [BH92,CFGN96] were only able to encrypt single
bits and require new public keys to be distributed for each encrypted bit. Unsurprisingly, in
the light of Nielsen’s impossibility result [Nie02], most “two-sided” NCE schemes, i.e., where
both sender and receiver can be corrupted at any time, are interactive [Bea97,BH92,CEN15,
CFGN96,CHK05a,CDMW09,DN00,GWZ09,HLP15,HP17,HORR16,HOR15,LCC06,Nie02,
ZB10], meaning that either encryption and decryption cannot be done locally without additional
communication, there is an a-priori upper bound on the number of ciphertexts created before a
new key pair has to be generated, or there is no ciphertext at all.
Nielsen [Nie02] and the prior chapter present non-interactive schemes in the random-oracle
model without this a priori bound. However, as discussed earlier, the former is presented as an
SMT protocol and therefore not easily reusable as a UC building block; also, it implicitly assumes
authenticated channels between parties. The latter scheme is the same as the construction as
in the prior chapter, but is proven secure under a game-based (i.e., non-UC) definition and
assumes secure erasures in the analysis. This chapter provides a UC analysis of the scheme
without assuming secure erasures, and tighter security.
Single-sided definitions of NCE have also been proposed, where only the sender or the receiver
can be corrupted [BDWY12,BHK12,FHKW10,FHKP16,HPW15,HJR16,HRW16,HR14,JL00],
but not both at the same time. On the upside of these definitions is that there are realizations in
the standard, i.e., non-random-oracle model, while some still resort to idealized models [HP16].
More importantly, these constructions are not proven secure if both sides can be corrupted.
5.1.3 Additional Preliminaries
In this section, some additional definitions are presented. For the following definitions, the
following additional conventions are used. A variable v in bold face is a vector. I is an index
set. The notation vI means that the elements in v are indexed by the index set I. Also, the
random oracle is not made explicit in these definitions, as the definitions are geared to be secure
in the standard model.
5.1.3.1 SSIM-SO-Security
The following definition is plainly taken from [HPW15].
Definition 5.1 (SSIM-SO-Security). An encryption scheme ENC is SSIM-SO-secure if for all




m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) $← Dist1,2,...,n
I $← S()
output $← S(mI)




(Dist, state1) $← A(pkENC)
m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) $← Dist1,2,...,n
(c; r) = ((c1; r1), (c2; r2), . . .
(cn; rn)) $← EncENC(pkENC,mi)1,2,...,n
(I, state2) $← A(c, state1)
output $← A(rI ,mI , state2)
return (m,Dist, I, output)
Figure 5.1: Experiments SSIM-SO-ideal and SSIM-SO-real for the SSIM-SO definition
distinguisher D and any n polynomial in λ it holds that:∣∣∣Pr[D(SSIM-SO-idealENCS,n (λ)) = 1]− Pr[D(SSIM-SO-realENCS,n (λ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
for some negligible function  and the experiments of Figure 5.1.
In a nutshell, this definition requires that an adversary cannot decide whether it sees
simulated ciphertexts or real ones, even it sees the randomness used to generate the ciphertexts
at some point.
5.1.3.2 RSIM-SO-Security
The following definition is taken from [HPW15], but adjusted for the used notation. Note, here
the secret key also contains the randomness used to create it.
Definition 5.2 (RSIM-SO-Security). An encryption scheme ENC is said to be RSIM-SO-secure
if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a stateful PPT simulator S such that for every
binary-output distinguisher D and any n polynomial in λ it holds that:∣∣∣Pr[D(RSIM-SO-idealENCS,n (λ)) = 1]− Pr[D(RSIM-SO-realENCS,n (λ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
for some negligible function ν and the experiments of Figure 5.2.
In a nutshell, this definition requires that an adversary cannot decide whether it sees
simulated ciphertexts or real ones, even it sees the secret decryption key (with randomness) at
some point. The adversary does never receive any randomness used for encryptions.
5.1.3.3 IND-NCER-Security
The following definition is taken from [CHK05a,HPW15], but explicit state was added to the
adversary.
Next, let ENC∗ = (KeyGenENC,EncENC,Enc∗ENC,ADecENC,Open∗ENC). Algorithm KeyGenENC,
EncENC, and DecENC are a standard encryption scheme (without labels). The fake encryption
scheme Enc∗ENC outputs a ciphertext c∗ and a trapdoor t. Given the secret key skENC, the public
key pkENC, the fake-ciphertext c∗, the trapdoor t, and a plaintext m, algorithm Open∗ENC outputs
sk∗ENC. Refer to [HPW15] for a formal definition, including correctness.
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Experiment RSIM-SO-idealENCS,n (λ):
Dist $← S(1λ)
m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) $← Dist1,2,...,n
I $← S()
output $← S(mI)
return (m,Dist, I, output)
Experiment RSIM-SO-realENCS,n (λ):
(pk, sk; r) = ((pkENC,1, skENC,1; r1) . . . ,
(pkENC,n, skENC,n; rn))
$← KeyGenENC(1λ)1,2,...,n
(Dist, state1) $← A(pk)
m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) $← Dist1,2,...,n
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) $← EncENC(pkENC,i,mi)1,2,...,n
(I, state2) $← A(c, state1)
output $← A(rI ,mI , state2)
return (m,Dist, I, output)






(m, state) $← A(pkENC)
c0
$← EncENC(pkENC,m)
(c1, t) $← Enc∗ENC(pkENC, 1|m|)
(skENC,1, rkey1)
$← Open∗ENC(skENC,0, pkENC, c1, t,m)
b∗ $← A(state, (skENC,b, rkeyb), cb)
return 1, if b∗ = b
return 0
Figure 5.3: ENC∗ IND-NCER-Security
Definition 5.3 (IND-NCER-Security). An encryption scheme ENC∗ is IND-NCER-secure, if for
all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[IND-NCERENC∗A (λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
for the experiment given in Figure 5.3.
This definition requires that an adversary A cannot decide whether it sees simulated secret
key randomness (and ciphertext), or the real one, even it receives an encryption of a message of
its own choice.
5.2 Game-Based Non-Committing Encryption
Most existing game-based security notions aim at standard-model instantiations and therefore
have to circumvent Nielsen’s impossibility result [Nie02]. They either do so by encrypting
only a single message under each public key (e.g., Canetti, Halevi, and Katz’ IND-NCER, i.e.,
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non- committing encryption for the receiver, notion [CHK05a]) or by considering only sender
corruptions but no receiver corruptions (e.g., the SSIM-SO, i.e., sender-simulatable selective-
opening, notion [HPW15]), or only receiver corruptions but no sender corruptions (e.g., the
RSIM-SO, i.e., receiver-simulatable selective-opening, notion [HPW15], and the RECV-SIM notion
introduced in Chapter 4) allows unlimited ciphertexts and receiver corruptions, but, because it
focuses on a setting with secure erasures, does not give the adversary access to the randomness
used in encryption or key generation.
This section first introduces a new game-based security notion termed FULL-SIM for non-
committing encryption. Unlike existing game-based notions [HPW15], the FULL-SIM adversary
simultaneously has access to the randomness used in previous ciphertexts as well as to the
randomness used to generate the key pair (and hence, the secret decryption key skENC). Then, a
FULL-SIM-secure NCE scheme based on trapdoor one-way permutations in the random-oracle
model is given. Finally, the relationship of FULL-SIM to existing notions is proven, finding
FULL-SIM to be either strictly stronger or incomparable.
5.2.1 Game-Based Definition of Non-Committing Encryption
A labeled non-committing encryption scheme ENC = {KeyGenENC,EncENC,DecENC} consists
of three algorithms. The first algorithm, as for standard encryption schemes, is the key
generation algorithm, i.e., (pkENC, skENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ), which outputs a public and the
corresponding secret key. The public key implicitly specifies a message space MS. The
encryption algorithm c $← EncENC(pkENC,m, `) computes a ciphertext c on input of a public key
pkENC, a message m ∈ MS and a label ` ∈ {0, 1}∗. The deterministic decryption algorithm
m′ ← DecENC(skENC, c, `) takes as input a secret key skENC, a ciphertext c and a label ` and
outputs either a message m′, or ⊥ if decryption failed. Clearly, for definitions and schemes
without labels, one can simply fix all labels to the empty string below.
The scheme must be correct, meaning that for all λ ∈ N, all (pkENC, skENC) $← KeyGenENC(1λ),
all messages m ∈MS, and all labels ` ∈ {0, 1}∗, it holds that m = DecENC(skENC,EncENC(pkENC,
m, `), `) with probability one.
Clearly, this is still the standard definition of an encryption scheme, as defined in Chapter 2.
Now the notion of FULL-SIM-security for labeled non-committing encryption schemes ENC
is defined. While not made explicit in the notation, SIMNCE is allowed to keep state between
invocations. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a random oracle, i.e., a truly random function chosen
fresh at the beginning of the experiment [BR93].
Definition 5.4 (FULL-SIM-Security). An encryption scheme ENC is FULL-SIM-secure if for all
PPT adversaries A with binary output there exists a stateful PPT simulator SIMNCE such that:∣∣∣Pr[FULL-SIM-real(λ) = 1]− Pr[FULL-SIM-ideal(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
for some negligible function ν, and the experiments depicted in Figure 5.4. The input ENCRYPTL
means that the simulator only receives the length of the message in question, while in the case
ENCRYPTM the simulator receives the message itself, i.e., when one of the participants is already
corrupted.
The definition says that an encryption scheme ENC is FULL-SIM-secure, if no PPT adversary
A can distinguish between simulated ciphertexts and real ones. The adversary A receives full






where oracle DecENC on input m and `:
if oracle GetKey() has been called:
let c $← SIMNCE(ENCRYPTM,m, `)
else:
let c $← SIMNCE(ENCRYPTL,L(m), `)
Q ← Q∪ {(c,m, `)}
return c
where oracle DecENC on input c and `:
if (c,m, `) ∈ Q, return m
else, return SIMNCE(DECRYPT, c, `)




where oracle GetRand(·, ·) on input (c, `):
if (c,m, `) /∈ Q for some m, return ⊥






where oracle DecENC on input m and `:
let (c; r) $← EncENC(pkENC,m, `)
Q ← Q∪ {(c,m, `, r)}
return c
where oracle DecENC on input c and `:
return DecENC(skENC, c, `)




where GetRand(·, ·) on input (c, `):
if (c,m, `, r) /∈ Q, for some r and m,
return ⊥
else, return r
Figure 5.4: Experiments FULL-SIM-ideal and FULL-SIM-real for the FULL-SIM definition
adaptive access to oracles for new encryptions, decryptions, the randomness used for encryptions,
as well as the randomness used for generating the secret key. The simulated ciphertexts do not
contain any information about the plaintext other than what is explicitly given to the simulator
by the leakage function L. It is defined that the leakage function L : {0, 1}∗ → N0 returns the
(bit-)length of the message m in question, which is a reasonable leakage definition for the given
use case. Only when the adversary asks for the randomness used to generate a ciphertext or the
secret key, does the simulator obtain the corresponding messages, upon which it must provide a
consistent view to A.
5.2.2 Instantiation
Now a concrete instantiation for an encryption scheme ENC that is FULL-SIM-secure is given.
The construction is identical to the encryption scheme presented in the prior chapter, which, in
turn, borrows ideas from Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] and Nielsen [Nie02]. It is recalled here
and proven secure under the stronger FULL-SIM notion.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a hash function, modeled as a random oracle. Further, it
requires an encoding scheme EC = (ec, dc) which allows to map arbitrary length messages to a
list of blocks with fixed length. More precisely, let ec : {0, 1}∗ → ({0, 1}λ)+ be a deterministic
injective encoding function and dc : ({0, 1}λ)+ → {0, 1}∗ be the corresponding deterministic
decoding function that returns ⊥ if no valid pre-image exists. It is required that both functions
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are computable in polynomial time and that the output length of ec only depends on the length
of its input, while dc and ec need to be perfectly correct, i.e., for all λ ∈ N, and all messages
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ it holds that m = dc(ec(m)) with probability one, just as done in the prior Chapter.
Construction. Here, the construction from Chapter 4 is given again for convenience. It is
practical enough for use in real protocols, which avoids the major obstacle for real-life deployment.
Hence, the complexity is hidden inside the simulator SIMNCE, which is given in the proof.
Construction 5.5 (FULL-SIM-secure ENC). Construct ENC in the following way.
KeyGenENC. Generate the key pair in the following way:
1. Generate a random TDP , i.e., (f, f−1,Σ) $← KeyGenTDP(1λ). The message space MS
is {0, 1}∗.
2. Output the public key pkENC = (f,Σ), and skENC = f−1 as the secret key.
EncENC. To encrypt a message m w.r.t. to pkENC and label ` do:
1. Let (m1,m2, . . . ,mk)← ec(m).
2. Draw x $← SampleTDP(Σ), compute c1 ← f(x), ci2 ← G(i, x) ⊕ mi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
and c3 ← K(x, k,m, `).
3. Output the ciphertext c← (c(1), (c1(2), c2(2) . . . , ck(2)), c(3)).
DecENC. To decrypt a ciphertext c w.r.t. to skENC and label ` do:
1. Parse c as (c(1), (c1(2), c2(2), . . . , ck
′
(2)), c(3)) for some k′ ≥ 1.
2. Compute x′ ← f−1(c(1)) and m′i ← G(i, x′)⊕ ci(2) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k′.
3. Let m′ ← dc(m′1, . . . ,m′k′).
4. If m′ = ⊥ or c(3) 6= K(x′, k′,m′, `), output ⊥. Output m′.
The above construction clearly fulfills perfect correctness, if EC is perfectly correct.
5.2.3 Security of The Construction
Now is proven that the above construction is actually FULL-SIM-secure.
Theorem 5.6. The construction ENC = {KeyGenENC,EncENC,DecENC} above is FULL-SIM-
secure, if KeyGenTDP is a secure trapdoor permutation generator and if H is modeled as a fully
programmable, and observable, random oracle.
Proof. The proof is providing a simulator SIMNCE such that the view created by the simulator
is indistinguishable from the view provided by the real experiment. The general idea is that
the simulator honestly generates the key pair, and honestly samples the first part c(1) of all
ciphertexts c, but draws c(2,i) and c(3) randomly. Once the plaintext corresponding to a simulated
ciphertext becomes known, i.e., when the adversary makes a GetRand or GetKey query, the
simulator programs the random oracle H such that the ciphertext actually decrypts to the
correct message. As all the randomness used by the simulator is drawn honestly, this can
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be simulated as well, so secure erasures are not required. The only thing that can make the
simulation fail, is that the programming of the random oracle fails because entries have already
been assigned. It is shown that such an event gives rise to an algorithm breaking the one-wayness
of the TDP.
Description of the Simulator. The simulator SIMNCE keeps two initially empty lists LH,
and LR. The first list LH contains pairs (s, h), where h is the value returned by the random
oracle on the query H(s). The second list LR stores entries (c,m, `, r, x) to keep track of
the relationship between (simulated and non-simulated) ciphertexts c, messages m, labels `,
sampling randomness r and sampled values x.
Key Generation. On input of (PUBLICKEY, 1λ), SIMNCE honestly generates the key pair, i.e.,
it generates ((f, f−1,Σ); rkey) $← KeyGenTDP(1λ). It stores skENC = f−1, and rkey. SIMNCE
returns (f,Σ) as pkENC.
Random-Oracle Queries. For each query (ROQUERY, s), SIMNCE checks whether there is an
entry (s, h) ∈ LH for some h. If so, SIMNCE returns h. Else, SIMNCE draws h $← {0, 1}λ,
adds (s, h) to LH, and returns h.
Encryption. Depending on the type of input, the simulator needs to branch:
• On input (ENCRYPTM,m, `), the simulator SIMNCE encrypts honestly, i.e., it runs
(c; r) $← EncENC(pkENC,m, `), using SIMNCE(ROQUERY, s) for random-oracle calls H(s),
adds (c,m, `, r,⊥x) to LR, and returns c.
• On input (ENCRYPTL,L(m) = |m|, `), SIMNCE draws (x; r) $← SampleTDP(1λ). Let
k ← |ec(1|m|)|
λ
. It sets c(1) ← f(x) and chooses c(2,i) $← {0, 1}λ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
c(3)
$← {0, 1}λ. It adds (c,⊥m, `, r, x) to LR and returns c.
Decryption. On input of (DECRYPT, c, `), SIMNCE needs to provide a plaintext. It computes
x′ ← f−1(c(1)), lets m′i ← c(2,i) ⊕ SIMNCE(ROQUERY, (i, x′)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and
computes m′ ← dc(m′1,m′2, . . . ,m′k). If m′ = ⊥ or c(3) 6= SIMNCE(ROQUERY, (x′, k,m′, `)),
it returns ⊥, otherwise it returns m′. Note that SIMNCE never receives a request where it
has to decrypt a simulated ciphertext.
Encryption Randomness. On input of (RAND, (c,m, `)), look up a tuple (c,m′, `, r, x) ∈ LR
where m′ ∈ {m,⊥m}. Note that, from the description of experiment FULL-SIM-ideal, such
a tuple always exists. If m′ = m, then SIMNCE simply returns r. If m′ = ⊥m, then SIMNCE
must first program H to ensure consistent encryption, as with the given randomness r
the adversary can re-encrypt m to see whether it obtains c. It does so as follows. Let
(m1,m2, . . . ,mk)← EC.ec(m). If ((x, k,m, `), c′(3)) ∈ LH for some c′(3) or if ((i, x), hi) ∈ LH
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then event BAD happened and SIMNCE aborts. Otherwise, SIMNCE
adds ((i, x),mi ⊕ c(2,i)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k as well as ((x, k,m, `), c(3)) to LH. It then updates
(c,⊥m, `, r, x) to (c,m, `, r, x) in LR and returns r.
Key Leakage. On input (KEYLEAK,Q), SIMNCE first programs the random oracle H to ensure
consistent decryption for all (c,m, `) ∈ Q in the same way as for answering GetRand
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queries above. SIMNCE then returns the random coins rkey used to generate the secret key
skENC.
From the way random oracles are programmed, it is clear that the simulation is perfect
unless the event BAD happens. Using Pr[REAL] and Pr[IDEAL] as shorthand notations for the
probability that the experiment outputs 1 for the real and ideal experiments, respectively, it
holds that ∣∣∣Pr[REAL]− Pr[IDEAL]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(Pr[REAL | BAD]− Pr[IDEAL | BAD]) · Pr[BAD]
+ (Pr[REAL | BAD]− Pr[IDEAL | BAD]) · Pr[BAD]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(Pr[REAL | BAD]− Pr[IDEAL | BAD])∣∣∣ · Pr[BAD] (5.1)
≤ Pr[BAD] , (5.2)
where (5.1) is true because Pr[REAL | BAD]− Pr[IDEAL | BAD] = 0 and (5.2) is true because
the first factor of (5.1) is at most one.
Reduction from Trapdoor Permutations. It remains to prove that the event BAD happens
with negligible probability. This is done by proving that any adversary that causes BAD to
occur gives rise to an algorithm breaking the one-wayness of the trapdoor permutation. The
reduction is similar to the analysis of the prior chapter, but is tighter and explicitly gives out
the randomness used for encryption to the adversary.
Let qe be the number of encryption queries, qd the number of decryption queries, and qh the
number of random-oracle queries to H. Assume towards contradiction that Pr[BAD] > ν(λ).
One can then construct an algorithm B which outputs the preimage of a TDP challenge point y
with non-negligible probability. Algorithm B receives (f, y,Σ) as input from the TDP challenger.
It then interacts with A as follows.
Key Generation. On input of (PUBLICKEY, 1λ), B draws a random index j $← [1, qe], and
returns (f,Σ) as pkENC.
RO Queries. On input (ROQUERY, s), B checks if there is an entry (s, h) ∈ LH for some h.
If so, B returns h. Else, B draws h $← {0, 1}λ.
If s is of the form (x, k,m, `) and there exists a previously rejected ciphertext that,
by assigning h as the output of H(s), should have been considered valid, then it is
said that event BADH happened and B aborts. More precisely, if there exists a tuple
(c, `) ∈ Lc with c = (c(1), c(1,2), . . . , c(k,2), c(3)) such that c(1) = f(x), c(3) = h, and
m = dc(c(1,2)⊕H(1, x), . . . , c(k,2)⊕H(k, x)), then BADH happened and B aborts, whereby
random-oracle queries H(i, x) are simulated as described here.
Otherwise, B adds (s, h) to LH and returns h.
Encryption. On input (ENCRYPTL, |m|, `), it proceeds as follows. If this is the jth encryption
query, then B sets c(1) ← y and x, r ← ⊥. Otherwise, it draws (x; r) $← SampleTDP(1λ),
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sets c(1) ← f(x), and tests whether x ∈ Lx. If so, then it is said that event BADX
happened, and B aborts, otherwise B adds x to Lx. Let k ← |EC.ec(1|m|)λ . Algorithm B
chooses c(2,i) $← {0, 1}λ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and c(3) $← {0, 1}λ, adds (c,⊥m, `, r, x) to LR,
and returns c. Note, (ENCRYPTM,m, `) is never received.
Decryption. On input (DECRYPT, c, `) from A, B proceeds as follows. Look for an entry
((x, k,m, `), c(3)) ∈ LH such that f(x) = c(1) and m = EC.dc(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) for mi ←
c(2,i) ⊕ H(i, x), where calls to H are simulated as above. Note that at most one such
entry can exist because, TDP being a permutation, there exists only one x ∈ Σ such that
f(x) = c(1), which then unique defines m1, . . . ,mk and thereby m. If no such entry exists,
then B adds (c, `) to Lc and returns ⊥, otherwise it returns m.
Encryption Randomness. On input of (RAND, (c,m, `)), look up a tuple (c,m′, `, r, x) ∈ LR
for m′ ∈ {m,⊥m}. If m′ = m then B returns r. If m′ = ⊥m then B must program H
to ensure consistent encryption. If now the conditions of the BAD event in SIMNCE are
satisfied, i.e., if there exists a tuple ((x′, k,m, `), ·) ∈ LH or a tuple ((i, x′), ·) ∈ LH such
that f(x′) = c(1), and if additionally c is the j-th simulated ciphertext, i.e., if x = r = ⊥,
then B outputs x′ as its preimage for y = c(1). If the conditions for BAD are satisfied but c
is not the j-th ciphertext, then B aborts. If the conditions for BAD are not satisfied, then
B programs the random oracle in the same way as SIMNCE, i.e., by adding ((i, x),mi⊕c(2,i))
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k as well as ((x, k,m, `), c(3)) to LH. Algorithm B updates (c,⊥m, `, r, x) to
(c,m, `, r, x) in LR and returns r.
Key Leakage. On input of (KEYLEAK,Q), B checks each entry (i, x) and (x, k,m, `) in LH
whether f(x) = y. If so, then B returns x as the preimage of y to the challenger. Otherwise,
it aborts.
Algorithm B succeeds in inverting y with probability 1
qe
whenever event BAD happens and
neither BADH nor BADX happen, i.e.
Pr[B succeeds] = 1
qe






Note that not being able to respond to a KEYLEAK input does not influence the success
probability of B, because after a KEYLEAK input the BAD event can no longer happen anyway.
The event BADH happens when the response to a new random-oracle query H(x, k,m, `)
turns a ciphertext that was previously rejected during a decryption query into a valid ciphertext.
For each decryption query DecENC(c, `), there is only a single random-oracle query H(x, k,m, `′)
that could cause BADH to happen though, namely the query where f(x) = c(1), k is the number
of blocks in c(2) = (c(1,2), . . . , c(k,2)), m = dc(c(1,2) ⊕ H(1, x), . . . , c(k,2) ⊕ H(k, x)), and `′ = `.
Each of those random-oracle queries H(x, k,m, `′) has probability 12λ to hit c(3), so the overall
probability of BADH is at most:
Pr[BADH] ≤ qd2λ







Figure 5.5: Implications of security definitions. Solid arrows denote strict implications, while
striked out arrows denote separations.
The event BADX happens when during encryption, a randomly chosen value x $← Σ hits one
of the at most qe elements of LR. Since |Σ| ≥ 22λ, the probability of this happening is
Pr[BADX] ≤ q2e22λ
Putting everything together, if ν ′(t) is the maximum advantage of a PPT algorithm to break
the one-wayness of TDP, then one has that
|Pr[REAL]− Pr[IDEAL]| ≤ qeν ′(t) + qd2λ +
q2e
22λ
which proves the theorem.
It is stressed that Nielsen’s underlying construction [Nie02] is not a FULL-SIM-secure
encryption scheme, as it is trivially malleable. Refer to Appendix H for his construction.
The following corollary immediately follows from the construction.
Corollary 5.7. If trapdoor one-way permutations exist, then there also exist FULL-SIM-secure
encryption schemes in the fully programmable, and observable, random-oracle model without
secure erasures.
5.3 Relationships Between Security Notions
As depicted in Figure 5.5, it is now shown that the definition is strictly stronger than the
existing definitions RECV-SIM given in Chapter 4, SSIM-SO [HPW15], and RSIM-SO [HPW15],
while being incomparable to IND-NCER [CHK05a,HPW15]. Now, these statements are proven.
Clearly, the RECV-SIM given in the prior chapter is the basis of the FULL-SIM notion, but
does not give the adversary access to encryption or key generation randomness. As one would
expect, the new notion implies RECV-SIM, and also IND-CCA2-security, it automatically follows
that FULL-SIM security also implies IND-CCA2-security.
Theorem 5.8 (FULL-SIM =⇒ RECV-SIM). Any encryption scheme that is FULL-SIM secure
is also RECV-SIM secure.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A which can guess whether it is run in RECV-SIM-real, or
RECV-SIM-ideal resp., with a probability non-negligibly better than 12 . One can then construct an
adversary B which uses A internally to distinguish between FULL-SIM-real and FULL-SIM-ideal
with the same probability.
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B proceeds as follows. It receives pkENC from its own challenger. It then initializes A with
pkENC. Then, for every query s to H from A, B forwards the query to its own oracle H, and
returns the result unmodified to A. Likewise, for every query (m, `) to EncENC, B asks the
encryption oracle provided by its own challenger. Again, the answer is passed to A unmodified.
Finally, every query (c, `) to the decryption is also honestly answered using the decryption
oracle provided to B. Eventually, A returns stateA. B saves stateA. B then asks its own
oracle GetKey to receive rkey. B then generates the corresponding secret key of pkENC by letting
(pk′ENC, skENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ; rkey). B then continues simulating A with input (skENC, stateA).
The random oracle queries made by A are answered as before. Finally, A will return its guess
b∗. B uses b∗ as its own guess. Clearly, B’s advantage is the same as A’s, as B can perfectly
simulate A’s environment.
Next, the chosen-plaintext definitions given by Hazay, Patra, and Warinschi [HPW15] are
considered. As RSIM-SO and SSIM-SO do not incorporate labels, it is defined that the encryption
and decryption oracles only accept empty labels, as the notions are essentially equivalent [SG02].
First, RSIM-SO security is addressed.
Theorem 5.9 (FULL-SIM =⇒ RSIM-SO). Any public-key encryption scheme that is FULL-SIM
secure, is also RSIM-SO secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary, together with a distinguisher D, which together guess in which
RSIM-SO-experiment it is run in with a probability non-negligibly better than 12 . One can then
construct an adversary B which can distinguish between FULL-SIM-real and FULL-SIM-ideal
with a non-negligible probability.
This statement is proven by a series of hybrids. Let Exp0 be RSIM-SO-ideal, while Expn is
the experiment RSIM-SO-real. Also, define Expi such that the first i public keys are simulated,
while the remaining n− i are honestly generated. Further assume towards contradiction that
there is an adversary A that can distinguish between Expi, and Expi+1 for some index i. One can
then construct an adversary B which can break the FULL-SIM-security definition. In particular,
B proceeds as follows. It receives pkENC from its own challenger. It then embeds pkENC as
pkENCi+1, and leaves the other pkENCs untouched, and gives the complete public key vector to A.
Algorithm B then samples the message vector m according to the received distribution Dist.
It generates each cj, j 6= i according to the current experiment, but asks its own challenger to
receive the ciphertext ci. The ciphertext vector c is then given to A. Eventually, A returns I,
and B then receives all the randomness used to create the corresponding secret keys, and the
messages mI , which it provides to A. Finally, A outputs output, which B, together with m, and
I to D. Whatever D then outputs, is then also output by B. Clearly, the probability that B can
successfully distinguish between FULL-SIM-real, and FULL-SIM-ideal is thus non-negligible.
Theorem 5.10 (FULL-SIM =⇒ SSIM-SO). A public-key encryption scheme that is FULL-SIM
secure, is also SSIM-SO secure.
Proof. Assume there is a distinguisher D with some arbitrary, but fixed adversary A which
together can decide whether they run in SSIM-SO-real or SSIM-SO-ideal with a probability
non-negligibly better than 12 . Then an adversary B can be constructed which distinguishes
between FULL-SIM-real and FULL-SIM-ideal with the same probability.
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In the first step, the random oracle is rewired to B’s own random oracle. B then receives the
challenge public key pkENC. pkENC is simply passed to A to initialize the adversary. B receives
Dist and state1 from A. B then samples the message vector m according to the received Dist.
Each mi is then sent to B’s own encryption oracle to receive each ciphertext ci. Let c denote
the complete vector of the ciphertexts. A is then given state1 and c. Eventually, A outputs
(I, state2). For each i ∈ I, B then queries its own oracle GetRand(·) with ci to receive each ri.
Let the vector of all received ri be r. A is then given (r,mI , state2). Finally, A returns output.
D is given (m,Dist, I, output). Whatever D outputs, is also output by B. Clearly, as one can
perfectly simulate the environment of A and D, B success probability equals the one of A with
D.
Next, some additional results to show the separations in the other direction, i.e., to show
that the FULL-SIM definition is strictly stronger than RECV-SIM, RSIM-SO, and SSIM-SO are
needed.
Theorem 5.11. There is no FULL-SIM-secure NCE in the standard model.
Proof. This follows by construction. In Section 5.5 is shown how to realize the round-optimal
secure message transfer functionality FLSMT using the functionality FLNCE, which is black-box
realized by any FULL-SIM-secure encryption scheme. The theorem follows by plugging in the
impossibility result by Nielsen [Nie02].
The implications above are strict. This follows from the fact that there are standard model
instantiations of RSIM-SO-secure, and SSIM-SO-secure, schemes.
This also means that one cannot avoid the programmability of the random oracle in the
construction, which also follows from the results given by Nielsen [Nie02].
Theorem 5.12. If one-way trapdoor permutations exist, and the Decisional composite residu-
osity [Pai99] (DCR) assumption holds, then IND-NCER security is incomparable to FULL-SIM
security in the random oracle model. Meaning, there exists a scheme that is IND-NCER secure
but not FULL-SIM secure and vice versa.
Proof. For the first direction, note that there are constructions in the standard model, i.e.,
under the DCR-Assumption, for IND-NCER security [CHK05a], but none for FULL-SIM security,
as proven before. Thus, IND-NCER security does not imply FULL-SIM security.
For the other direction, it is shown that there is a FULL-SIM-secure construction, which is
not IND-NCER-secure. Namely, one already knows that the presented construction is FULL-SIM-
secure, if TDPs exist in the random oracle model. Now is shown that the construction is not
IND-NCER-secure.
Let Open∗ENC, and Enc∗ENC be arbitrarily defined, while the remaining algorithms are defined as
in the construction. In particular, A draws a random message m $← {0, 1}λ. Then, the challenger
(Note, Open∗ENC and Enc∗ENC are public and thus no random oracle programming is possible!)
needs to return a ciphertext c, which correctly decrypts to m, i.e., at least c3 = H(x, k,m, `)
must hold. The probability that Enc∗ENC guesses the messages correctly upfront (and therefore
the correct output) is negligible, i.e., at most qh2λ , where qh is the number of random oracle
queries. The other case is similar, i.e., that c3 was drawn randomly, and one hopes that the
unique random oracle query (x, k,m, `) (Note, k, `, and x are fixed), makes the ciphertext valid.
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Clearly, this is negligible as well. Thus, the probability that Open∗ENC returns randomness for
the secret key such that the ciphertext returned decrypts correctly is negligible ( 12λ ), regardless
of the choice of Open∗ENC, and Enc∗ENC. It thus follows that the probability that this happens is
equal/less than qh+12λ , which is negligible.
Moreover, even SSIM-SO-Security and RSIM-SO-Security together do not imply FULL-SIM-
Security, as the adversary cannot proceed adaptively in the RSIM-SO game, i.e., the distribution
is fixed, which is not the case in the FULL-SIM-Security game.
Theorem 5.13 (RECV-SIM 6=⇒ FULL-SIM). If perfectly binding commitments exist, then there
exists a scheme that is RECV-SIM secure but not FULL-SIM secure.
Proof. The idea of the proof is as follows. If there exists is a perfectly-binding (bit) commitment-
scheme, then RECV-SIM-Security does not imply FULL-SIM-Security. With perfectly-binding is
meant that even a computationally unbounded adversary can find only one way to open a given
commitment c w.r.t. to the (even adversarially chosen) public parameters ppCC.
Let ENC be any FULL-SIM-secure encryption, and CommitCC be a perfectly-binding commit-
ment-scheme as defined.
Now construct the counterexample ENC′ = {KeyGen′ENC,Enc′ENC,Dec′ENC} as follows, such
that is only RECV-SIM-secure, but not FULL-SIM-secure.
Construction 5.14 (Counterexample ENC′). A counterexample ENC′ can be constructed as
follows.
KeyGen′ENC. To generate a key pair do:
1. Generate (pkENC, skENC)
$← ENC.KeyGenENC(1λ).
2. Return (pkENC, skENC).
Enc′ENC. To encrypt a message m w.r.t. to pkENC and label ` do:
1. Generate ppCC
$← ParGenCC(1λ).
2. For each bit bi ∈ m, let (ci, ri) $← CommitCC(ppCC, bi).
3. Set `′ ← (`, ppCC, (c1, c2, . . . , c|m|)).
4. Let c $← ENC.EncENC(pkENC,m, `′).
5. Return (c, ppCC, (c1, c2, . . . , c|m|)).
Dec′ENC. To decrypt a ciphertext c w.r.t. to skENC and label ` do:
1. Parse c as (c, ppCC, (c1, c2, . . . , c|m|)).
2. Let `′ ← (`, ppCC, (c1, c2, . . . , c|m|)).
3. Return ENC.DecENC(skENC, c, `′).
It is obvious that the construction is still RECV-SIM-secure by the following argument. If
the commitment scheme used is computationally hiding, the ciphertext c is indistinguishable
from an encryption using any other message m′ of the same length, as the randomnesses used
to generate the commitments are never given to the adversary attacking the scheme. Thus, the
simulator can choose a random message of the same length.
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However, the scheme ENC′ cannot be FULL-SIM-secure, as the probability that any simulator
SIMNCE guesses the correct message is negligible, as the commitment-scheme is perfectly binding,
i.e., no simulator can equivocate the commitments. For any other (meaningful) definition of the
leakage oracle L, similar arguments exist.
5.4 Universally Composable Non-Committing Encryp-
tion
In this section, an ideal functionality in the UC framework for non-committing encryption
FLNCE is introduced. It is shown that FLNCE and FULL-SIM-security are essentially equivalent, in
the sense that any FULL-SIM-secure scheme immediately gives rise to a secure instantiation of
FLNCE and vice versa. It is also shown that FLNCE can be used to instantiate the secure message
transmission functionality FSMT, so that, as an immediate consequence, Nielsen’s impossibility
result [Nie02] excludes any secure instantiations of FLNCE (and therefore, of FULL-SIM-secure
encryption schemes) in the standard model.
5.4.1 Ideal Functionality for Non-Committing Encryption
The ideal functionality FLNCE is depicted in Figure 5.6. In a nutshell, FLNCE encapsulates local
public-key encryption, which is one of the most basic operations in modern cryptography. The
functionality is based on the FAFSE functionality of Canetti et al. [CHK05a], but without the
a-priori bound on the ciphertexts to be generated, while it also supports labels. It therefore
neither needs any update interfaces, nor any special corruption interfaces. Compared to the
definition by Canetti et al. [CKN03], it is also enforced that once a ciphertext is decrypted, the
decryption remains fixed.
Encryption and decryption in the functionality are local operations that generate and decrypt
actual ciphertexts. The ciphertexts are provided by the adversary A which, as long as the
owner of the key pair is honest, only receives the information explicitly provided by the leakage
function L. The notation “send x to A and wait for y from A” is used as a shorthand notation
for requests to responsive environments as defined by Camenisch et al. [CEK+16], so that the
functionality “stalls” until A provides a response y through a dedicated interface, i.e., the
adversary is forced to provide an answer right away. While the functionality waits for a message
from A, the adversary cannot invoke any other interfaces of the ideal functionality, generate
any network traffic, or activate or corrupt parties.
Previous functionalities in the literature require the adversary to provide an encryption
algorithm that the functionality runs to generate ciphertexts for the encrypted messages [Can01,
CH06, KT08, KT09, KT11]. All realizations using this paradigm suffer from the selective de-
commitment problem [Can01,KT09] or inherently require static adversaries. This problem is
avoided by querying the adversary for each ciphertext that needs to be generated and decrypted.
The public key for an instance of FLNCE is also provided by the adversary. To avoid implying
certified keys, the encryption interface also accepts queries for different public keys than the
registered key of this instance. Decryption for simulated ciphertexts works as expected, in the
sense that for every ciphertext generated by the encryption interface, the functionality returns
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1. Key Generation. On input (KEYGEN, sid) from party P:
• If sid 6= (P, sid ′) or a record (key-rec, ·) exists, ignore.
• Send (KEYGEN, sid) to A and wait for (KEYCONF, sid, pk) from A.
• If pk = ⊥, ignore.
• Create record (key-rec, pk) and output (KEYCONF, sid, pk) to P.
2. Encryption. On input (ENCRYPT, sid, pk,m, `) from party Q:
• If pk = ⊥, ignore.
• If no record (key-rec, pk) exists, send (ENCRYPTM, sid, pk,m, `) to A and wait for (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c)
from A.
• Else, if sid = (P, sid ′) and P is corrupt, send (ENCRYPTM, sid, pk,m, `) to A and wait for (CIPHERTEXT,
sid, c) from A.
• Else, send (ENCRYPTL, sid, pk,L(m), `) to A and wait for (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c) from A.
• If there is a record (key-rec, v), let pk′ ← v, else let pk′ ← ⊥.
• If there is a record (enc-rec, sid, pk, ·, `, c) and pk = pk′, ignore.
• If there is a record (dec-rec, sid, ·, `, c) and pk = pk′, ignore.
• Create record (enc-rec, sid, pk,m, `, c).
• Output (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pk) to Q.
3. Decryption. On input (DECRYPT, sid, c, `) from party P:
• If sid 6= (P, sid ′), ignore.
• If no record (key-rec, pk) exists, ignore.
• If a record (enc-rec, sid, pk,m, `, c) exists, output (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m, `) to P.
• If a record (dec-rec, sid,m, `, c) exists, output (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m, `) to P.
• Send (DECRYPT, sid, c, `) to A and wait for (PLAINTEXT, sid,m) from A.
• Create record (dec-rec, sid,m, `, c).
• Output (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m, `) to P.
Figure 5.6: Ideal encryption functionality FLNCE. L is a leakage function.
the original message without any involvement of the adversary. If, however, a ciphertext was
not honestly generated, the functionality asks the adversary to provide the decryption.
The Interfaces. Next, briefly explained, the interfaces of the FLNCE functionality.
• The KEYGEN interface can only be called once and allows the key-pair owner P to generate a
key pair. The public key pkENC is provided by the adversary.
• The ENCRYPT interface allows any party, including the key-pair owner itself, to encrypt a
message of arbitrary length. If the public key that is given as part of the input equals the
public key stored for this instance, then the adversary only receives the information explicitly
given by the leakage function L, as long as P is honest. Otherwise, the functionality does
not give any security guarantees, and gives the adversary the plaintext. Note, the adversary
does not learn which party wants to encrypt, while the provided pk may also be adversarially
chosen. The adversary must provide fresh ciphertexts for the stored public key and cannot
overwrite ciphertexts.
• The DECRYPT interface allows the key-pair owner to decrypt a given ciphertext. For simulated
ciphertexts and ciphertexts that were decrypted before, the corresponding plaintexts are
directly returned by the functionality. All other ciphertexts are sent to the adversary which
needs to provide a decryption. Decryption is consistent, in the sense that once a ciphertext is
mapped to a given plaintext, the result of decrypting that ciphertext will always be the same.
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5.4.2 Instantiation of FLNCE
The construction is a wrapper around any FULL-SIM-secure labeled non-committing encryption
scheme ENC = (KeyGenENC,EncENC,DecENC) to match the input and output behavior of the
ideal functionality FLNCE, using the label to bind a ciphertext to a session sid. Any calls that
ENC makes to a random oracle are relayed to an instance of the random-oracle functionality
FRO with session identifier (sid,FRO). Note, one cannot rely on the more realistic global
random oracles [CJS14], because the instantiation cannot avoid programmability, as proven in
Section 5.3.
Key Generation. On input of (KEYGEN, sid), check that sid = (P , sid ′), and P the identity.
If this is not the case, ignore. If a record (key-rec, sid, pkENC, skENC) exists, ignore. Generate
(pkENC, skENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ), store (key-rec, sid, pkENC, skENC), and output (KEYCONF,
sid, pkENC).
Encryption. On input of (ENCRYPT, sid, pk,m, `), ignore if pk = ⊥, or sid 6= (P , sid ′).
Generate c $← EncENC(pk,m, (`, sid)). Output (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pk).
Decryption. On input of (DECRYPT, sid, c, `), check that sid = (P , sid ′). If this is not the case,
or no record (key-rec, sid, pkENC, skENC) exists, ignore. Otherwise, let m← DecENC(skENC,
c, (`, sid)). Output (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m, `).
Theorem 5.15. If ENC is FULL-SIM secure, then the above protocol securely realizes FLNCE in
the FRO-hybrid model without secure erasures and with adaptive corruptions.
Proof. By the FULL-SIM security of ENC, there must exist a simulator SIMNCE so that no PPT
adversary exists that can distinguish between the real FULL-SIM game and the ideal FULL-SIM
game with SIMNCE with non-negligible probability. Given such a simulator SIMNCE, a UC
simulator SIM for the above instantiation of FLNCE is now described. Subsequently it is shown
that any environment that can distinguish whether it is interacting with the real protocol and a
real-world adversary A or with FLNCE and SIM can be used to build a FULL-SIM distinguisher
for SIMNCE, contradicting the FULL-SIM security of ENC.
Simulator. Given a FULL-SIM simulator SIMNCE and a real-world UC adversary A, consider
the following UC simulator SIM for FLNCE.
Key Generation. On input (KEYGEN, sid), SIM calls the simulator SIMNCE with the
input (PUBLICKEY, 1λ), which returns pkENC. SIM then records (key-rec, sid, pkENC) and sends
(KEYCONF, sid, pkENC) to FLNCE.
Encryption. On input (ENCRYPTM, sid, pk,m, `), the simulator SIM computes (c; r) $←
EncENC(pk,m, (`, sid)), creates record (enc-rec, sid, c,m, `, r, pk, false), and sends (CIPHERTEXT,
sid, c) to FLNCE. On input (ENCRYPTL, sid, pk,L(m), `), SIM calls SIMNCE with (ENCRYPTL,
L(m), (`, sid)) to SIMNCE to receive c. It then creates a record (enc-rec, sid, c,⊥m, `,⊥r, pk, false)
and sends (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c) to FLNCE. Note that this case implies pk = pkENC.
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Decryption. On input (DECRYPT, sid, c, `), SIM calls SIMNCE with (DECRYPT, c, (`, sid))
to obtain m and sends (DECRYPT, sid,m) to FLNCE.
Random oracle. In the FRO-hybrid model, SIM must also provide responses to all parties’
inputs to the FRO functionality. On input (ROQUERY, sid ′, s) from a party P, SIM outputs
SIMNCE(ROQUERY, s) if sid ′ = (sid,FRO), or runs the actual code of FRO otherwise.
Corruptions. The scheme is proven within standard corruption definition [Can01] where,
upon corruption of a party, the simulator receives all previous inputs and outputs of that party
and needs to provide a consistent view of the real-world state for that party to the real-world
adversary A. The simulator needs to consider different cases depending on which party gets
corrupted.
If the holder of the secret key P becomes corrupted, SIM receives six lists corresponding to
the inputs and outputs of the three interfaces of FLNCE to and from P .
The simulator SIM has to provide a realistic snapshot of P’s real-world state to the adver-
sary A that must contain, apart from the list of previous inputs and outputs that SIM just
obtained from FLNCE, the randomness used in key generation and encryption. To obtain the
key generation randomness from SIMNCE, SIM must compile the set Q of all honestly generated
ciphertexts and corresponding plaintexts (c,m, `) that were encrypted under pkENC by any
party (not just P). The list of ciphertexts c and labels ` can be looked up in its own records
(enc-rec, sid, c,⊥m, `,⊥r, pkENC, false). Since P is now corrupt, SIM can obtain the corresponding
plaintexts m by querying the decryption interface on FLNCE with (DECRYPT, sid, c, `). After thus
composing the list Q, SIM calls SIMNCE(KEYLEAK,Q) to obtain the key generation randomness
rkey.
To obtain the randomness used for every encryption under pkENC performed by P, SIM
considers P ’s previous outputs from the encryption interface (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pkENC)
that it received from FLNCE. For each of these outputs, SIM calls SIMNCE with (RAND, (c,m,
(`, sid))) to obtain the encryption randomness r. For ciphertexts generated by P under other
public keys pk 6= pkENC, SIM also has records of the form (enc-rec, sid, c,m, `, r, pk, false), so that
SIM can simply give the stored r and update the record to (enc-rec, sid, c,m, `, r, pk, true).
The latter is important to ensure that randomness will not be given out for another party
later. Namely, when encrypting under an adversarial public key pk, one cannot exclude that
different randomness r, r′ yield the same ciphertext c. If this happens for two encryption calls
made by two different parties, and these parties later get corrupted, then the simulator must
ensure that different randomness r and r′ is given out to each of these parties. (Recall that
the simulator doesn’t learn which party initiated an encryption, so it doesn’t know which
randomness it used for which party.) By flagging a record with true when the randomness was
given out, SIM ensures that the same randomness will not be given out again to a different
party.
If any other party Q becomes corrupted, SIM needs to provide to A all Q’s previous inputs
and outputs, as well as the randomness used to create the ciphertexts that Q generated. For all
previous encryption outputs (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pk) to Q, which SIM now obtains from
FLNCE, SIMNCE is called with (RAND, (c,m, (`, sid))) to return the randomness which SIM simply
passes on to A. It also includes the randomnesses used for other public keys pk 6= pkENC, which
are all stored in the records (enc-rec, sid, c,m, `, r, pk, false).
5.4. UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE NON-COMMITTING ENCRYPTION 153
Reduction From FULL-SIM. Fix an environment and a real-world adversary A that can
distinguish the real protocol with A from the ideal functionality FLNCE with simulator SIM.
One can then construct an adversary B that breaks the FULL-SIM-security of the underlying
encryption scheme with essentially the same probability (ignoring negligible parts).
Essentially, let B’s inputs and oracles handle the key generation, encryption, decryption,
random-oracle, and corruption queries, much like SIM lets these be handled by SIMNCE. First,
B receives the public key pkENC from the challenger in the FULL-SIM experiment.
If the environment, before the KEYGEN interface is called, instructs an honest party to
encrypt a message m by providing it with input (ENCRYPT, sid, pk,m, `), B simply calculates
(c; r) $← EncENC(pk,m, (`, sid)), and outputs (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pk).
It also saves (c,m, `, r, pk). If at any point this party becomes corrupted, the reduction
simply hands over the corresponding rs stored in (c,m, `, r, pk). Decryption queries are simply
ignored before the KEYGEN interface is called. Queries to the random-oracle functionality for
sid ′ = (sid,FRO) are rewired to B’s own random oracle; for other session identifiers, it executes
the real code of FRO.
When at some point the environment instructs the key-pair owner P to generate its keys
by providing input (KEYGEN, sid), then B embeds the key pkENC in the (KEYCONF, sid, pkENC)
output. The encryption queries for a “incorrect” public keys pk 6= pkENC are answered as before.
However, for an encryption query with pk = pkENC, B refers to its own encryption oracle, by
calling EncENC(m, (`, sid)) which returns a ciphertext c.
Store (c,m, `,⊥r, pkENC). Output (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pkENC). Decryption queries are
handled similarly, i.e., on input (DECRYPT, sid, c, `), B calls DecENC(c, (`, sid)) to obtain m and
returns (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m, `).
If at some point a party becomes corrupted, B needs to provide a consistent view of its
state to A. It uses the records (c,m, `,⊥r, pkENC) belonging to the corrupted party to call
GetRand(c, (`, sid)) to obtain the randomness r, which is passed to A. The randomness used for
“incorrect” public keys pk 6= pkENC is obtained from its records of the form (c,m, `, r, pk). If the
key-pair holder becomes corrupted, B
additionally calls GetKey() to receive rkey and passes it to A. At some point, the environment
then outputs its guess b∗ indicating whether it is running in the real world with A or in the ideal
world with SIM. B returns b∗ as its own guess, indicating that it is running in the FULL-SIM-real
experiment with the real encryption scheme, or in FULL-SIM-ideal with SIMNCE.
It is clear that if B is running in FULL-SIM-real, then the environment’s view is exactly as
when interacting with the real protocol. Likewise, if B is running in FULL-SIM-ideal, then all its
oracle queries are handled by SIMNCE, as is also done by the UC simulator SIM. It follows that
B’s advantage is negligibly close to that of A.
Clearly, any FULL-SIM-secure encryption scheme securely realizes FLNCE. To prove the
equivalence, one also need to prove the other direction. In a nutshell, now is shown how one can
build a FULL-SIM-secure scheme from FLSMT, while any adversary against the resulting scheme
can be used to construct an environment which can be used to distinguish between the real
world and the ideal one.
Theorem 5.16 (FLNCE =⇒ FULL-SIM). Any protocol that securely realizes FLNCE gives rise to
a FULL-SIM-secure non-committing encryption scheme.
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Proof. The construction of the FULL-SIM-secure encryption scheme ENC from an instantiation
of FLNCE is quite straightforward. First, a choose random, yet correctly structured, sid. The key
generation algorithm invokes the KEYGEN interface, and returns the resulting public key pkENC
as the public key. Encryption, and decryption resp., invoke the ENCRYPT, and DECRYPT resp.,
interfaces.
For the proof, first construct a simulator SIMNCE for FULL-SIM-ideal given a UC-simulator
SIM. Essentially, one has to implement the five oracles given in the FULL-SIM-experiment,
by translating the answer given by SIM. Namely, for oracle H, the queries received are
simply re-routed to the SIM’s random-oracle interface. pkENC is obtained by calling SIM with
(KEYGEN, sid). SIM answers with (KEYCONF, sid, pk). This pk is the public key pkENC which
is given to the adversary. For encryption (oracle EncENC), SIM is called with (ENCRYPTL,
sid, pkENC,L(m), `) if oracle GetKey has not been queried, or (ENCRYPTM, sid, pkENC,m, `) in
all other cases. Here, (m, `) is the corresponding input. In both cases, SIM responds with
(CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pkENC). This c is given to the adversary. Decryption (oracle DecENC)
is similar, i.e., for each query (c, `) to decrypt, and not seen so far, (DECRYPT, sid, c, `) is
sent to SIM, which answers with (PLAINTEXT, sid,m). If (c, `) has been seen before, SIMNCE
directly returns m as given in the prior corresponding query to SIM. This m is simply given to
the adversary. If the oracle GetRand on input (c, `) is called, and (c, `) has never been queried
before, SIMNCE hands (ENCRYPT, sid, pkENC,m, `), and (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pk) to SIM.
SIM then responds with a complete execution history, where the used randomness r is contained.
If (c, `) has been seen before, SIMNCE looks up the prior corresponding answer from SIM, which
contains r. In any case, the randomness r is then given to the adversary. Finally, the oracle
GetKey is simulated by handing over all lists of the form (KEYGEN, sid), (KEYCONF, sid, pkENC),
(ENCRYPTL, sid, pkENC,L(m), `), and (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pkENC) to SIM, if this oracle
has not been called before. In the execution history given to SIMNCE, there is the randomness
rkey, which can be returned to the adversary by SIMNCE. If oracle GetKey has been called
before, SIMNCE directly hands over rkey to the adversary. Clearly, SIMNCE perfectly translates all
requests.
In the second step, assume that there is an adversary A which wins against the constructed
simulator SIMNCE. One can then construct an environment B, and an adversary Ad which
together can distinguish between the ideal world with SIM, and the real world. Namely, one
proceeds as follows. B requests a public key pkENC from FLNCE by sending (KEYGEN, sid) to
FLNCE (through the dummy party defined by sid). The received pkENC is embedded to initialize
A, which is run inside the adversary Ad. Every query to the random oracle by A is also
rewired. However, as there are local random oracles, one needs a workaround. Namely, B
directs Ad to query the random oracle for each query. The returned value is simply given to
A. On the ith encryption query for message mi, B spawns a new party Pi which it feeds with
(ENCRYPT, sid, pkENC,mi, `i). Upon receiving (CIPHERTEXT, sid, ci,mi, `i, pkENC), B records
(mi, ci, `i, i), and gives ci to A. Decryption queries are delegated through the functionality as
well. The answer is simply given to A. If A wants to see randomness of given ciphertext ci
with label `i, B looks up record (mi, ci, `i, i), and corrupts Pi. The simulator then returns the
randomness ri somewhere in the execution history, which is then given to A. Likewise, if A
wants to see rkey, B B corrupts the holder of the secret key (defined by sid), which presents the
execution history, where rkey is stored. Eventually, whatever A outputs, is also output by B.
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5.5 Secure Message Transfer from FLNCE
The functionality FLSMT (secure message transfer) combines confidentiality and authentication
between two entities. Now is shown how to use FLNCE s.t. it realizes FLSMT with FCA and digital
signatures. Using the modular approach, i.e., by using FLNCE, the proof becomes much more
readable.
It was decided to adjust the functionality given in [Nie02] (See Figure H.1 in Appendix H)
to the version depicted in Figure 5.7. Namely, the functionality requires initialization interfaces,
allows multi-message transmission, and explicitly allows the adversary to overrule “hold-back”
messages, which was implicit in the realization given in [Nie02]. In a nutshell, the simulator
needs to know when it has to generate the keys for the honest parties, which also implies that
these fresh keys have to be registered with FCA, as FLSMT is not using JUC [CR03]. Moreover,
using the given instantiation, one is able to completely simulate the execution history, not only
the random tapes.
Conventions. It is required that sid = (P ,Q, sid ′) for some sid ′. The instantiation neither
uses FSig, FLSignCrypt nor FAuth [Can04], as this section focuses on FLNCE. Of course, they can be
used instead of the direct signature construction. Refer to the work done by Gjøsteen and
Kr˚akmo [GK07] for an instantiation with FLSignCrypt. In a nutshell, the public keys generated by
the functionality are simply authenticated by FCA or the like.
Explanation. Let is give a high-level description what each interface does, i.e., a more informal
explanation is given to make the functionality more readable.
• INIT. This interface allows the environment to setup the keys for the participants. Namely,
the keys have to be created at some point; in prior definitions this was not made explicit.
However, as there are no secure erasures, the simulator needs to know when to generate
randomness.
• SEND. This interface allows a party to send a message m to the other party. The functionality
enforces uniqueness of the message IDs (mid), while only the sending party needs to be
initialized if it honest.
• RETRIEVE. This interface allows the adversary to trigger reception of the messages sent so
far. Clearly, as the adversary can schedule delivery. This is done on a “per message” basis
using mid. If the receiving party is honest, it must be initialized. Note, the decryption is not
required to be valid, i.e., not ⊥.
• CORRUPT. This interface allows the adversary to change hold back messages upon corruption.
This interface is called if a honest party sent messages which have never been received, i.e.,
hold back by the adversary. Thus, the adversary, after corruption, can change those pending
messages to whatever it wants.
5.5.1 Protocol Description
For simplicity, the label input to FLNCE is set to be ⊥, which can be interpreted as the empty
string. For simplicity, it is assumed that FCA is never queried again, if a valid public key was
returned.
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1. Initialize. Upon input (INIT, sid) from a party P ′:
• If sid 6= (P ′, ·, sid ′), or sid 6= (·,P ′, sid ′) ignore.
• If sid = (P ′,P ′, sid ′), ignore.
• If there is a record (INIT, sid,P ′), ignore.
• Send (INIT, sid,P ′) to A.
2. Send. Upon input (SEND, sid,mid,m) from a party P ′:
• If P ′ 6= P or P ′ 6= Q, ignore.
• If P ′ = P, set R ← Q, and R ← P otherwise.
• If there is a record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·,R, ·), ignore.
• If P ′ is honest, and no record (INIT, sid,P ′) exists, ignore.
• Create record (msg-rec, sid,mid,m,R,⊥).
• If P or Q is corrupt, send (SENDM, sid,mid,P ′,m) to A.
• Send (SENDL, sid,mid,P ′,L(m)) to A.
3. Receive. Upon input (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,P ′) from adversary A:
• If there is no record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·,P ′,⊥), ignore.
• If P ′ is honest, and no record (INIT, sid,P ′) exists, ignore.
• Update record (msg-rec, sid,mid,m,P ′,⊥) to (msg-rec, sid,mid,m,P ′).
• Output (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m) to P ′.
4. Corrupt. Upon input (CORRUPT, sid,mid,P ′,m′) from A:
• If P ′ is not corrupt, ignore.
• If P ′ = P, set R ← Q, and R ← P otherwise.
• If there is a record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·,R), ignore.
• Update record (msg-rec, sid,mid,m,R,⊥) to (msg-rec, sid,mid,m′,R).
• Output (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m′) to R.
Figure 5.7: Ideal secure message transfer functionality FLSMT. L is the leakage function.
Step 1a. Initialize Party (P):
a) Upon input (INIT, sid), ignore, if a record (key-rec, sid, ·, ·, ·) exists.
b) If sid 6= (P , ·, sid ′), or sid = (P ,P , sid ′), ignore.
c) Query FLNCE to generate the public key of the encryption scheme, i.e., send (KEYGEN, (P ,
(sid,FLNCE))) to FLNCE.
d) Upon receiving (KEYCONF, (P , (sid,FLNCE)), pkENC,P), generate a key pair of a digital
signature scheme DSIG, i.e., (pkSig,P , skSig,P)
$← KeyGenSig(1λ).
e) Send (REGISTER, (P , (sid,FCA)), (pkENC,P , pkSig,P)) to FCA.
Step 1b. Initialize Party (Q):
a) Upon input (INIT, sid), ignore, if a record (key-rec, sid, ·, ·, ·) exists.
b) If sid 6= (·,Q, sid ′), or sid = (Q,Q, sid ′), ignore.
c) Query FLNCE to generate the public key of the encryption scheme, i.e., send (KEYGEN, (Q,
(sid,FLNCE))) to FLNCE.
d) Upon receiving (KEYCONF, (Q, (sid,FLNCE)), pkENC,Q), generate a key pair of a digital
signature scheme DSIG, i.e., (pkSig,Q, skSig,Q)
$← KeyGenSig(1λ).
e) Send (REGISTER, (Q, (sid,FCA)), (pkENC,Q, pkSig,Q)) to FCA.
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Step 2a. Send Message (P):
a) Upon input (SEND, sid,mid,m), check that a record (key-rec, sid, pkENC,P , pkSig,P , skSig,P)
exists. If not, ignore.
b) If there is a record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·), ignore.
c) Record (msg-rec, sid,mid,m).
d) Query FCA with (RETRIEVE, (Q, (sid,FCA))).
e) Upon receiving (RETRIEVECOMPL, (Q, (sid,FCA)), v), check that v = (pkENC,Q, pkSig,Q) 6=
⊥. If not, ignore.
f) Encrypt m, i.e., send (ENCRYPT, (Q, (sid,FLNCE)), pkENC,Q,m,⊥) to FLNCE.
g) Upon receiving input (CIPHERTEXT, (Q, (sid,FLNCE)), c,m,⊥, pkENC,Q) from FLNCE, com-
pute σ $← SignSig(skSig,P , (sid, c,mid)).
h) Send m′ = (sid,mid, c, σ) to Q.
Step 2b. Send Message (Q):
a) Upon input (SEND, sid,mid,m), check that record (key-rec, sid, pkENC,Q, pkSig,Q, skSig,Q)
exists. If not, ignore.
b) If there is a record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·), ignore.
c) Record (msg-rec, sid,mid,m).
d) Query FCA with (RETRIEVE, (P , (sid,FCA))).
e) Upon receiving (RETRIEVECOMPL, (P , (sid,FCA)), v), check that v = (pkENC,P , pkSig,P) 6=
⊥. If not, ignore.
f) Encrypt m, i.e., send (ENCRYPT, (P , (sid,FLNCE)), pkENC,P ,m,⊥) to FLNCE.
g) Upon receiving (CIPHERTEXT, (P , (sid,FLNCE)), c,m,⊥, pkENC,P) from FLNCE, compute σ $←
SignSig(skSig,Q, (sid, c,mid)).
h) Send m′ = (sid,mid, c, σ) to P .
Step 3a. Receive Message (P):
a) Upon input receiving m′ = (sid,mid, c, σ), check that a record (key-rec, sid, pkENC,P ,
pkSig,P , skSig,P) exists. If not, ignore.
b) If there is a record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·), ignore.
c) Query FCA with (RETRIEVE, (Q, (sid,FCA)).
d) Upon receiving (RETRIEVECOMPL, (Q, (sid,FCA)), v), check that v = (pkENC,Q, pkSig,Q) 6=
⊥. If not, ignore.
e) Check σ, i.e., d← VerifySig(pkSig,Q, (sid, c,mid), σ). If d = false, ignore.
f) Decrypt the ciphertext c, i.e., send (DECRYPT, (P , (sid,FLNCE)), c,⊥) to FLNCE.
g) Upon receiving (PLAINTEXT, (P , (sid,FLNCE)), c,m,⊥) from FLNCE, record (msg-rec, sid,
mid,m).
h) Output (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m,Q).
Step 3b. Receive Message (Q):
a) Upon input receiving m′ = (sid,mid, c, σ), check that a record (key-rec, sid, pkENC,Q,
pkSig,Q, skSig,Q) exists. If not, ignore.
b) If there is a record (msg-rec, sid,mid, ·), ignore.
c) Query FCA with (RETRIEVE, (P , (sid,FCA))).
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Party P Party Q
Input: pkENC,Q, skSig,P , m, mid Input: skENC,Q, pkSig,P
on input (SEND, sid,mid,m):
c
$← EncENC(pkENC,Q,m, sid) (using FLNCE)
σ
$← SignSig(skSig,P , (sid, c,mid))
sid,mid, c, σ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Let d← VerifySig(pkSig,P , (sid, c,mid),
σ)
If d = false, ignore
Let m ← DecENC(skENC,Q, c, sid) (us-
ing FLNCE)
output (msg-rec, sid,mid,m)
Figure 5.8: Main idea of the secure message transfer from P to Q
d) Upon receiving (RETRIEVECOMPL, (P , (sid,FCA)), v), check that v = (pkENC,P , pkSig,P) 6=
⊥. If not, ignore.
e) Check σ, i.e., d← VerifySig(pkSig,P , (sid, c,mid), σ). If d = false, ignore.
f) Decrypt the ciphertext c, i.e., send (DECRYPT, (Q, (sid,FLNCE)), c,⊥) to FLNCE.
g) Upon receiving (PLAINTEXT, (Q, (sid,FLNCE)), c,m,⊥) from FLNCE, record (msg-rec, sid,
mid,m).
h) Output (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m,P).
A simplified overview can be found in Figure 5.8.
5.5.2 Security of the Protocol
Now is proven that the construction actually realizes FLSMT.
Theorem 5.17. The above construction securely realizes FLSMT in the (FCA,FLNCE)-Hybrid Model
with adaptive corruptions without erasures, if DSIG is eUNF-CMA.
To prove the above theorem, a sequence of games is provided. The corresponding simulator is
given afterwards. Namely, a simulator is provided such that the ideal world is indistinguishable
from the real world. The main transition is simulating the ciphertexts.
5.5.2.1 Sequence of Games
Game 0: This is the real world, i.e., the simulator runs the protocol for all honest parties.
Game 1: Abort, if a verifying message/signature pair (m∗, σ∗) from the adversary A is
received in the name of a honest party, where the corresponding message m∗ has never been
signed by a honest party, which visibly changes the behavior. Clearly, a standard reduction
yields an adversary which can break the eUNF-CMA security of the used signature scheme
DSIG, and thus the difference to the prior game is negligible.
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Game 2: Now in the ideal world with simulator SIM is run. This is only an internal change
and thus the views do not change.
5.5.2.2 Simulator
Given a (FLNCE,FCA)-hybrid-model adversary A, construct a simulator SIM so that no environ-
ment can distinguish running with A and the real protocol in the (FLNCE,FCA)-hybrid world
from running with SIM and FLSMT in the ideal world in the following way. Note that, apart from
interacting correctly with FLSMT, the simulator must also play the role of the subfunctionalities
FLNCE and FCA to A when they are called by corrupt parties. Essentially, SIM needs to provide
network traffic to A s.t. the simulated messages are indistinguishable from a real protocol. The
major obstacle in the simulation is to provide a consistent view upon corruption of a party,
which requires heavy book-keeping of the values generated during the simulation. The following
simulator is sketched, as the proof should be obvious. Calls to the interfaces of FCA are ignored,
as they stay untouched, i.e., the code of the functionality is simply run.
High-Level Idea. The simulator proceeds as follows. If both participants are honest, it uses
the corresponding “FLNCE” (played by A) to generate ciphertexts. As long as both parties are
honest, nothing is ever decrypted. The ciphertexts and the corresponding mids are then signed.
Upon a corruption, each “FLNCE” is provided the corresponding lists compiled by SIM, which
then gives out the randomness used for encryptions and secret key generation. The randomness
used for the signatures is simulated honestly. If a request is ignored, the execution history is
implicit, and given to the adversary upon corruption.
Initialization. Upon receiving (INIT, sid,S) from FLSMT, send (KEYGEN, (S, (sid,FLNCE))) to
A. Upon receiving (KEYCONF, (S, (sid,FLNCE))), pkENC) from A, create a signature key
pair (pkSig, skSig; rs). Create a record (key-rec, pkENC, pkSig, skSig; rs), while “FCA” is run as
is.
Key Generation. Upon receiving (KEYGEN, sid ′,S) from A, initialize the party as in the
protocol, i.e., ask A for the public key pkENC, returning (KEYCONF, sid ′, pkENC).
Encryption. Upon receiving (ENCRYPT, sid ′, pkENC′,m, `) from A, SIM executes the real code
of FLNCE, asking A to provide a ciphertext c, creating an encryption record (enc-rec, sid ′,
pkENC′,m, `, c), and returning (CIPHERTEXT, sid ′, c,m, `, pkENC′).
Decryption. Upon receiving (DECRYPT, sid ′, c, `) from A, SIM executes the real code of
FLNCE, asking A for a plaintext m, creating a decryption record (dec-rec, sid ′,m, `, c), and
returning (PLAINTEXT, sid ′, c,m, `).
Sending. Upon receiving (SENDL, sid,mid,P ′,L(m)) from FLSMT, SIM proceeds according to
the protocol, but generates the ciphertext according to Game 3 using A. It then creates a
record (SEND,S,⊥m, rsign,mid, σ, c,⊥), and sends m′ = (sid,mid, c, σ) to the party over
A.
If (SENDM, sid,mid,P ′,m) is received from FLSMT, everything is done honestly, i.e., ac-
cording to the protocol.
Receiving. Now is shown how receiving is handled.
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Both Participants Honest. If both participants are honest, the simulator SIM re-
ceives control if the recipient “R” receives a message m = (sid,mid, c, σ) from A. This
message is ignored, if there is no record (SEND,S,⊥m, rsign,mid, ·, c,⊥), is not correctly
formatted, or σ is not valid. “R” proceeds honestly, with one notable exception: the
ciphertext is never decrypted. If “R” outputs (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m,Q), SIM sends
(RETRIEVE, sid,mid,R) to FLSMT. For now, the execution history for receiving (but
decryption) is implicit.
Sender Dishonest. If the sender S is dishonest, “R” receives a message m directly
from A. If m is not of the form (sid,mid, c, σ), the message is simply ignored. Otherwise,
“R” performs its computations according to the real protocol, i.e., it asks “FCA”, checks the
well-formedness of the public key, and if the signature is valid. If there is an entry (enc-rec,
sid ′, pkENC′,m′, `, c), with sid ′ = (R, sid ′′), let m ← m′, and otherwise m ← ⊥. In other
words, “R” either ignores the input, “hangs”, or outputs (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m′). In the
first case, SIM simply ignores the input as well. In the second case, the execution history
is still implicit if R becomes corrupted at this point. In the third case, check whether
there is a record (SEND,S,m′′, r′enc, r′sign,mid, σ′, c′,⊥) with m′′ 6= m′. If so, SIM updates
the record (SEND,S,m′′, renc, rsign,mid, σ, c,⊥) to (SEND,S,m′′, r′enc, r′sign,mid, σ′, c′, done)
and then sends message (CORRUPT, sid,mid,S,m′) to FLSMT. Else, i.e., there is no record
(SEND,S,m, rsign,mid, σ, c,⊥), SIM sends (SEND, sid,mid,m′) to FLSMT. FLSMT directly
returns control to SIM. Finally, SIM sends (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,R) to FLSMT.
Corruption. Corruption is clearly the most interesting part of the simulation. SIM does
not consider the lists (KEYGEN, sid) and (KEYCONF, sid, pk) for “FLNCE”, as these are
generated honestly and thus are implicit and only blow up decryption. Moreover, if the
holder of a secret key becomes corrupted, SIM does not require the lists (ENCRYPT,
sid, pk,m,⊥), and (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥, pk), as they are never called and are thus
empty. The same is true for the decryption; a party not holding the correct secret key
never calls (DECRYPT, sid, c,⊥), and thus never sees any (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥).
The strategy is simple: for every sent message from that party, SIM needs to construct the
lists (ENCRYPT, sid, pk,m,⊥), (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥, pk). The randomness used for
signature generation and signature key generation is already known by SIM itself. Then,
SIM has to program all ciphertexts which can now be decrypted. For sent messages,
this is easy. For received messages, however, this is not trivial, as SIM needs to consider
hold-back messages well. Then, SIM can construct the lists (DECRYPT, sid, c,⊥), and
(PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥), and can provide them to the corresponding simulator of “FLNCE”,
i.e., the hybrid adversary. Note, SIM no longer needs to consider any “hanging” parties,
as the execution history is implicit.
Both Parties were Honest. Upon corruption of a party P ′, the simulator receives
all prior input, and output of P ′. Thus, the simulator receives the lists (INIT, sid),
(SEND, sid,mid,m), and (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m).
First, SIM needs to provide the randomness for encryptions. SIM is able to generate the
lists (ENCRYPT, sid, pkENC,P ′ ,m,⊥), and also (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥, pkENC,P ′) as it
5.6. UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE SIGNCRYPTION 161
has the list (SEND,S,⊥m, rsign,mid, σ, c,⊥), and (SEND, sid,mid,m). These are simply
given to “FLNCE” with the sid corresponding to the other party. This accounts for the
randomness used for encryptions. The key generation interfaces were honestly used, while
the decryption interfaces were never used.
Second, SIM has to create the lists (DECRYPT, sid, c,⊥), and (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥)
for the other “FLNCE” with the sid corresponding to P ′′ 6= P ′. SIM starts with completing
the execution history for the received messages, which is trivial due to the records of the
form (SEND,S,m′′, r′enc, r′sign,mid, σ′, c′, done). Next, SIM needs to consider the hold-back
messages as well. Namely, SIM has still records of the form (SEND,P ′′,⊥m, rsign,mid, σ, c,
⊥), where P ′′ 6= P ′. For all these entries, SIM sends (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,P ′′) to FLNCE,
receiving (RETRIEVE, sid,mid,m,P ′′) to learn each m. Thus, each record can now be
updated to (SEND,P ′′,m, rsign,mid, σ, true). Hence, SIM now knows all sent messages.
SIM can now derive the records (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥), which in turn, means that SIM
can also complete the records of the form (DECRYPT, sid, c,⊥). These are then given to
“FLNCE” (with the sid corresponding to P ′), which can then present the randomness used
for the secret key. Finally, SIM has to give the randomness used for the signatures and
the signature private key. As these are stored in the records of the form (SEND,P ′,m,
renc, rsign,mid, σ, c, ·) and (key-rec,P ′, pkSig,P ′ , skSig,P ′ , rsig,P ′ , pkENC,P ′), SIM can easily do
so. This step also generates the execution history for decryptions.
Already a Corrupt Party. If the last party P ′ becomes corrupted, SIM needs to con-
struct the lists (ENCRYPT, sid, pkENC,P ′′ ,m,⊥), and (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥, pkENC,P ′′),
where P ′′ is the party already corrupted. As SIM has the records (SEND,P ′′,m, rsign,
mid, σ, c, done), this is straightforward. These are simply given to “FLNCE” with the sid
corresponding to the already corrupt party. Finally, SIM have to construct the lists
(DECRYPT, sid, c,⊥), and (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m,⊥). As SIM has the records (SEND,P ′′,
m, rsign,mid, ·, c, done), this is easy. Finally, SIM hands over the randomness stored in
records (SEND,P ′′, ·, rsign, ·, ·, ·, ·) and rsig stored in record (key-rec,P ′′, pkSig,P ′′ , skSig,P ′′ ,
rsig,P ′′ , pkENC,P ′′). The decryption history is part of “P ′”.
This completes the proof.
5.6 Universally Composable Signcryption
The section illustrates the use of the non-committing encryption functionality FLNCE by showing
that the generic encrypt-then-sign approach that is known to be secure for building sign-
cryption schemes under game-based definitions [Zhe97,ADR02] also works in the UC setting
against adaptive adversaries, if one relies on strongly unforgeable signatures. Gjøsteen and
Kr˚akmo [GK07] already considered UC-secure signcryption, but explicitly left security against
adaptive corruptions as an open problem.
In a nutshell, signcryption is a primitive allowing a sender S to send an encrypted and
authenticated message to a receiver R, where both sender and receiver have their own key pairs.
The goal of signcryption is to obtain better efficiency than a generic composition of encryption
and signatures, but proving the generic construction secure is important to set a benchmark
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1. Key Generation. Upon input (SCKEYGEN, sid) from a party P:
• If sid 6= (P, ·, sid ′) and sid 6= (·,P, sid ′), ignore.
• If there is a record (key-rec, sid,P, ·), ignore.
• Send (SCKEYGEN, sid,P) to A and wait for (SCKEYGENCONF, sid,P, v) from A.
• If v = ⊥, ignore.
• Create record (key-rec, sid,P, v).
• Output (SCKEYGENCONF, sid, v) to P.
2. SignCryption. On input (SIGNCRYPT, sid,m, `, pkr) from party P:
• If sid 6= (P,Q, sid ′), or pkr = ⊥, ignore.
• If there is no record (key-rec, sid,P, pks), ignore.
• If there is a record (key-rec, sid,Q, v), let pk′r ← v.
• If pkr = pk′r, and Q is honest, send (SENDL, sid,L(m), `, pkr) to A and wait for
(SIGNCRYPTRES, sid, `, s) from A.
• Else, send (SENDM, sid,m, `, pkr) to A, and wait for (SIGNCRYPTRES, sid, `, s) from A.
• If there is a record (sc-rec, sid, ·, ·, s, ·, pks, pk′r), pk′r taken from (key-rec, sid,Q, pk′r), where
sid = (P,Q, sid ′), ignore.
• If pk′r = pkr, create record (sc-rec, sid,m, `, s, true, pks, pkr).
• Output (SIGNCRYPTRES, sid,m, `, s) to P.
3. De-signcryption. On input (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s, `, pks) from party P:
• If sid 6= (Q,P, sid ′), or pks = ⊥, ignore.
• If there is no record (key-rec, sid,P, pkr), ignore.
• If there is a record (sc-rec, sid,m, `, s, b, pks, pkr), output (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s,m, `, b) to
P.
• If there is a record (key-rec, sid,Q, pks), and Q is honest, create record (sc-rec, sid,m, `, s,
false, pks, pkr), and output (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s,m, `, false) to P.
• Else, send (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s, `, pks) to A and wait for (DESIGNCRYPTA, sid, s,m, `, φ)
from A.
• If φ /∈ {false, true}, ignore.
• If there is no record (sc-rec, sid,m, `, ·, true, pk′s, pkr), and pk′s = pks, where pk′s is taken from
(key-rec, sid,Q, pk′s), let φ← false.
• If φ = false, let m← ⊥.
• Create record (sc-rec, sid,m, `, s, φ, pks, pkr).
• Output (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s,m, `, φ) to P.
Figure 5.9: Ideal signcryption functionality FLSignCrypt. L is a leakage function
to which direct schemes can be compared. Interactive functionalities such as secure message
transmission (FSMT) are clearly not well suited to build a local primitive such as signcryption,
so it is a good use case for the non-interactive functionality FLNCE. Moreover, as the signcryption
directly gives rise to a protocol implementing FSMT, also this functionality cannot be instantiated
in the standard model.
The signcryption functionality FLSignCrypt is depicted in Figure 5.9. Following Gjøsteen and
Kr˚akmo [GK07], as well as the design choices for FLNCE, the adversary determines the ciphertext
strings. Unlike Gjøsteen and Kr˚akmo, however, the functionality includes labels and lets public
keys be determined by the adversary, modeling the case where the public keys are not necessarily
certified or registered through a PKI, which avoids implying a PKI.
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Explanation. Let us give a high-level description what each interface does, i.e., a more
informal explanation is given to make the functionality more readable.
1. The SCKEYGEN interface allows the sender and receiver to generate their public keys. The
key pair of the receiver is used to encrypt the message, while that of the sender will be used
to authenticate it. For simplicity, the interface was merged for both participants.
2. The SIGNCRYPT interface allows the sender to create the signcryption of a message m to a
receiver’s public key pkr. In case the public key is not the one registered for the receiver, or
the receiver is corrupted, then the adversary learns the message. For the registered receiver’s
public key, the signcryption ciphertexts provided by the adversary must be unique.
3. The DESIGNCRYPT interface allows the receiver to de-signcrypt a ciphertext. If the receiver
was not initialized, this interface ignores requests. In case the signcryption was honestly
generated, the functionality can directly answer the requests. In all other cases, the adversary
has to determine whether the ciphertext is valid and, if so, provide the plaintext. The
adversary is then committed to its decision, in the sense that future de-signcryptions of the
same ciphertext will yield the same result.
Protocol Description. Now, the generic encrypt-then-sign construction for a signcryption
scheme using FLNCE and FSig as sub-functionalities is described.
Step 1a. Key Generation (Sender S):
a) Upon input (SCKEYGEN, sid), ignore, if a record (key-rec, sid, ·) exists.
b) If sid 6= (S,R, sid ′), ignore.
c) Create a signature key pair by inputting (KEYGEN, (S, (sid,FSig))) to FSig.
d) Upon obtaining (KEYCONF, (S, (sid,FSig)), pkSig), create a record (key-rec, sid, pkSig).
e) Output (KEYCONF, sid, pkSig).
Step 1b. Key Generation (Receiver R):
a) Upon input (SCKEYGEN, sid), ignore, if a record (key-rec, sid, ·) exists.
b) If sid 6= (S,R, sid ′), ignore.
c) Create an encryption scheme key pair by inputting (KEYGEN, (R, (sid,FLNCE))) to FLNCE.
d) Upon obtaining (KEYCONF, (R, (sid,FLNCE)), pkENC), create a record (key-rec, sid, pkENC).
e) Output (KEYCONF, sid, pkENC).
Step 2. Create Signcryption (Sender S):
a) Upon input (SIGNCRYPT, sid,m, `, pk), ignore, if no record (key-rec, sid, pkSig) exists.
b) If sid 6= (S,R, sid ′) or pk = ⊥, ignore.
c) Encrypt m under pk with label `′ = (`, pkSig, pk), i.e., input (ENCRYPT, (R, (sid,FLNCE)),
pk,m, (`, pkSig, pk)) to FLNCE.
d) Sign the resulting ciphertext together with label `′, i.e., upon obtaining (CIPHERTEXT,
(R, (sid,FLNCE)), c,m, (`, pkSig, pk), pk) from FLNCE, send (SIGN, (S, sid), (c, (`, pkSig, pk))) to
FSig.
e) Upon receiving (SIGNATURE, (S, sid), (c, (`, pkSig, pk)), σ), output (SIGNCRYPTRES, sid,
m, `, (c, σ)).
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Step 3. De-signcryption (Receiver R):
a) Upon input (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s, `, pk), ignore if there is no record (key-rec, sid, pkENC)
or pk = ⊥.
b) If s 6= (c, σ) or sid 6= (S,R, sid ′), ignore.
c) Verify the signature, i.e., input (VERIFY, (S, sid), (c, (`, pk, pkENC)), σ, pk) to FSig. Upon
receiving (VERIFY, (S, sid), (m, (`, pk, pkENC)), σ, pk, v) from FSig, output (DESIGNCRYPT,
sid, s,⊥, (`, pk, pkENC), false), if v = false. Decrypt the ciphertext, i.e., send (DECRYPT,
(R, sid), c, (`, pk, pkENC)) to FLNCE. Upon receiving input (PLAINTEXT, (R, sid), c,m, (`,
pk, pkENC)), output (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s,m, `, true).
Theorem 5.18. The above construction securely realizes FLSignCrypt in the (FLNCE,FSig)-hybrid
model with adaptive corruptions without secure erasures.
Proof. Given a (FLNCE,FSig)-hybrid-model adversary A, construct a simulator SIM so that no
environment can distinguish running with A and the real protocol in the (FLNCE,FSig)-hybrid
world from running with SIM and FLSignCrypt in the ideal world. Note that, apart from interacting
correctly with FLSignCrypt, the simulator must also play the role of the subfunctionalities FLNCE
and FSig to A when they are called by corrupt parties. The simulator SIM proceeds as follows:
Key Generation (S). Upon input (SCKEYGEN, sid,S) from FLSignCrypt, send (KEYGEN, (S,
(sid,FSig)))) to A and wait for (KEYCONF, (S, (sid,FSig))), pkSig) from A. Create a record
(key-rec, sid,S, pkSig) and send (SCKEYGENCONF, sid,S, pkSig) to FLSignCrypt.
Key Generation (R). Upon receiving (SCKEYGEN, sid,R) from FLSignCrypt, send (KEYGEN,
(R, (sid,FLNCE))) to A and wait for (KEYCONF, (R, (sid,FLNCE))), pkENC) from A. Create a record
(key-rec, sid,R, pkENC) and send (SCKEYGENCONF, sid,R, pkENC) to FLSignCrypt.
Encryption. Upon receiving (ENCRYPT, sid ′, pk′ENC,m, `) from A, SIM executes the real code
of FLNCE, asking A to provide a ciphertext c, creating an encryption record (enc-rec, sid, pk′ENC,
m, `, c). Afterwards, it returns, i.e., outputs (CIPHERTEXT, sid, c,m, `, pk′ENC).
Decryption. Upon receiving (DECRYPT, sid ′, c, `) from A in name of the corrupt receiver
R, SIM executes the real code of FLNCE, asking A for a plaintext m if necessary, creating a
decryption record (dec-rec, sid,m, `, c), and returning (PLAINTEXT, sid, c,m, `).
Signing. Upon receiving (SIGN, sid ′,m) from A in name of the corrupt sender S, SIM executes
the real code of FSig, asking A for a signature σ, creating a signing record (sig-rec, sid,m, σ,
pkSig, true), and returning (SIGNATURE, sid,m, σ).
Verification. Upon receiving (VERIFY, sid ′,m, σ, pk′Sig) from A, SIM executes the real code
of FSig, asking A for a verification outcome φ if necessary, creating signature record (sig-rec,
sid ′,m, ·, pk′Sig, true) or (sig-rec, sid ′,m, σ, pk′Sig, φ), and returning (VERIFY, sid ′,m, σ, pk′Sig, φ).
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Signcryption. When S andR are both honest and pkr = pkENC, SIM is notified by FLSignCrypt by
receiving (SENDL, sid,L(m), `, pkr). The simulator doesn’t know the message m, but obtains a
ciphertext by sending (ENCRYPTL, (sid,FLNCE), pkENC,L(m), (`, pkSig, pkENC)) to A and waiting
for (CIPHERTEXT, (sid,FLNCE), c) from A. It then creates an incomplete encryption record
(enc-rec, sid, pkENC,⊥, (`, pkSig, pkENC), c), indicating that it doesn’t know the corresponding
message m. It then obtains a signature σ for (c, `) using the procedure for signing simulation
above and sends (SIGNCRYPTRES, sid, (`, pkSig, pkENC), s = (c, s)) back to FLSignCrypt.
When S is honest and (R is corrupt or pkr 6= pkENC), then SIM executes the real signcryption
algorithm with the code of FLNCE and FSig.
Designcryption. When a new de-signcryption request occurs, SIM is notified by FLSignCrypt by
a message (DESIGNCRYPT, sid, s = (c, σ), `, pks). First check whether the signature σ should
be deemed valid for message (c, (`, pks, pkENC)) by performing the verification simulation above.
If not, then SIM sends (DESIGNCRYPTA, sid, s,⊥, `, false) back to FLSignCrypt, indicating that the
signcryption is invalid. If so, then it must be the case that pks 6= pkSig, because the strong
unforgeability enforced by FLSignCrypt would have rejected the ciphertext already. If c was part
of a signcryption generated by the honest sender (for which the corresponding plaintext is
not known), then SIM sends (DESIGNCRYPTA, sid, s,⊥, `, false) back to FLSignCrypt, because the
ciphertext label of c includes the wrong sender’s public key pkSig 6= pks. Otherwise, A decrypts
c by performing the decryption simulation above to obtain the plaintext message m. If m = ⊥,
then send (DESIGNCRYPTA, sid, s,⊥, `, false) back to FLSignCrypt, else send (DESIGNCRYPTA,
sid, s,m, `, true) back to FLSignCrypt.
Corruption. When a party is corrupted, then SIM obtains the full input and output history
of that party. Based on this history, SIM can also compile the list of inputs and outputs of that
party to the FLNCE and FSig sub-functionalities, which it could not do earlier because some of
the messages were unknown. It submits this full list of inputs and outputs to A.
It is stressed that defining a functionality for multiple senders, and receivers, is straightfor-
ward.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter defined and gave a secure realization of FLNCE, a UC functionality for local public-key
encryption, in a setting of adaptive corruptions without erasures. It also introduced a new
game-based notion of FULL-SIM security, which was shown to be equivalent to the UC definition.
The non-interactive construction assumes the existence of trapdoor one-way permutations in
the random-oracle model. It is very efficient, as it only has a constant overhead, only requires
one evaluation of a trapdoor permutation, and a handful of hash evaluations. Due to Nielsen’s
impossibility result for round-optimal adaptively secure secure message transmission, a standard
model instantiation of the primitive was also shown to be impossible.
Still, it is reasonable to believe that the functionality FLNCE and its instantiation can be a
very useful building block for other UC-secure protocols, which until now had to provide direct
constructions tailored to one specific application scenario. As an example, it was shown how
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FLNCE can be used to model and realize the signcryption functionality FLSignCrypt in the presence
of adaptive adversaries without erasures.
Chapter 6
Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral
Trapdoors and Their Applications to
Invisible Sanitizable Signatures
The results of this chapter have already been published [CDK+17].
Abstract. A chameleon-hash function is a hash function that involves a trapdoor the knowledge
of which allows one to find arbitrary collisions in the domain of the function. In this chapter,
the notion of chameleon-hash functions with ephemeral trapdoors is introduced. Such hash
functions feature additional, i.e., ephemeral, trapdoors which are chosen by the party computing
a hash value. The holder of the main trapdoor is then unable to find a second pre-image
of a hash value unless also provided with the ephemeral trapdoor used to compute the hash
value. This chapter presents a formal security model for this new primitive as well as provably
secure instantiations. The first instantiation is a generic black-box construction from any secure
chameleon-hash function. This chapter further provides three direct constructions based on
standard assumptions. The new primitive has some appealing use-cases, including a solution to
the long-standing open problem of invisible sanitizable signatures, which is also presented in
this chapter.
Roadmap. The problem statement is presented in Section 6.1. The new definition of chamele-
on-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors is given in Section 6.2, while the corresponding constructions
are presented in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 contains a small note on chameleon-signatures, while
Section 6.5 proposes the new primitive of invisible sanitizable signatures as the application
scenario for the new chameleon-hashes. This chapter is concluded in Section 6.6.
6.1 Introduction
Chameleon-hash functions, also called trapdoor-hash functions, are hash functions that feature
a trapdoor that allows one to find arbitrary collisions in the domain of the functions. However,
chameleon-hash functions are collision resistant as long as the corresponding trapdoor (or secret
key) is not known. More precisely, a party who is privy of the trapdoor is able to find arbitrary
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collisions in the domain of the function. Example instantiations include trapdoor-commitments,
and equivocal commitment schemes.
One prominent application of this primitive are chameleon signatures [KR00b]. Here, the
intended recipient—who knows the trapdoor—of a signature σ for a message m can equivocate
it to another message m′ of his choice. This, in turn, means that a signature σ cannot be
used to convince any other party of the authenticity of m, as the intended recipient could
have “signed” arbitrary messages on its own. Many other applications appear in the literature,
some of which is discussed in the related work section. However, all current constructions are
“all-or-nothing” in that a party who computes a hash with respect to some public key cannot
prevent the trapdoor holder from finding collisions. This can be too limiting for some use-cases.
6.1.1 Contribution
This chapter introduces a new primitive dubbed chameleon-hash functions with ephemeral
trapdoors. In a nutshell, this primitive requires that a collision in the hash function can be
computed only when two secrets are known, i.e., the main trapdoor, and an ephemeral one. The
main trapdoor is the secret key corresponding to the chameleon-hash function public key, while
the second, ephemeral, trapdoor is generated by the party computing the hash value. The latter
party can then decide whether the holder of the long-term secret key shall be able to equivocate
the hash by providing or withholding the second trapdoor information. Also a corresponding
formal security model for this new primitive is presented. This chapter also includes stronger
definitions for existing chameleon-hash functions not considered before. Thus includes the new
notion of uniqueness and fully adaptive security. These new notions may also be useful in other
scenarios.
Moreover, four provably secure constructions for chameleon-hash functions with ephemeral
trapdoors are presented. The first is bootstrapped, while the three direct constructions are
built on RSA-like and the DL assumption. The new primitive has some interesting applications,
including the first provably secure instantiation of invisible sanitizable signatures, which are
also presented. Additional applications of this new primitive may include revocable signa-
tures [HKY15], but also simulatable equivocable commitments [Fis01]. However, in contrast
to equivocable commitments, it is wanted that parties can actually equivocate, not only a
simulator. Therefore, it was chosen to call this primitive a chameleon-hash function rather
than a commitment. Note, the primitive is different from “double-trapdoor chameleon-hash
functions” [BCG07, CRFG08, LZCS16], where knowing one out of two secrets is enough to
produce collisions.
6.1.2 Related Work
Standard chameleon-hashes were introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [KR00b], based on the
work done by Brassard et al. [BCC88]. Later, they have been ported to the identity-based
setting, i.e., ID-based chameleon-hash functions, where the holder of some master secret key
can extract new secret keys for some identity [AdM04,BDD+11,RMS08,ZSS03]. However, most
of the schemes presented suffer from the key-exposure problem [AdM04,KR00b]. Key exposure
means that seeing a single collision in the hash allows to find further collisions by extracting the
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corresponding trapdoor, i.e., the secret key.1 This problem was addressed by the introduction of
“key-exposure free” chameleon-hashes [AdM04,CTZD10,CZK04,GLW09,GWX07,RMS08], which
prohibit extracting the secret key if a collision was seen. This also includes combinations of both
techniques [CZS+10]. This allows re-using the secret, which is also the goal of the presented
primitive. However, the definition of collision-resistance is defined w.r.t. some additional label L.
Moreover, they do not prohibit that once a collision is made public for a label L, an adversary
can produce additional collisions for the given hash w.r.t. that label L. All mentioned approaches
are thus orthogonal to the goal here, as in the discussed case two keys at the same time are
required. Brzuska et al. then proposed a formal framework for tag-based chameleon-hashes
secure under random-tagging attacks, i.e., they add an additional tag to the input to the hashing
algorithm [BFF+09].
Additional related work is discussed when presenting the applications of the new primitive.
6.1.3 Chameleon-Hashes
Now, a “standard” chameleon-hash is defined. The framework is based upon the work done by
Ateniese et al. and Brzuska et al. [AMVA17,BFF+09], but adapted to fit the given notation.
Additionally, some extended security definitions are provided.
Definition 6.1. A chameleon-hash CH consists of five algorithms (PPGenCH,KeyGenCH,HashCH,
CheckCH,AdaptCH), such that:




It is assumed that ppCH is implicit input to all other algorithms.
KeyGenCH. The algorithm KeyGenCH given the public parameters ppCH outputs the private and
public keys of the scheme:
(skCH, pkCH)
$← KeyGenCH(ppCH)
HashCH. The algorithm HashCH gets as input the public key pkCH, and a message m to hash. It
outputs a hash h, and some randomness r:
(h, r) $← HashCH(pkCH,m)
The randomness r is also sometimes called “check value” [AMVA17].
CheckCH. The deterministic algorithm CheckCH gets as input the public key pkCH, a message m,
randomness r, and a hash h. It outputs a decision d ∈ {false, true} indicating whether the
hash h is valid:
d← CheckCH(pkCH,m, r, h)
AdaptCH. The algorithm AdaptCH on input of secret key skCH, the old message m, the old
randomness r, hash h, and a new message m′ outputs new randomness r′:
r′ $← AdaptCH(skCH,m,m′, r, h)
1In the case of identity-based chameleon-hashes w.r.t. to some identity.










where oracle HashOrAdapt on input skCH,m,m′ and b:
(h, r) $← HashCH(pkCH,m′)
(h′, r′) $← HashCH(pkCH,m)
r′′ $← AdaptCH(skCH,m,m′, r′, h′)
If r = ⊥ ∨ r′′ = ⊥, return ⊥
if b = 0:
return (h, r)
if b = 1:
return (h′, r′′)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 6.1: CH Indistinguishability
Correctness. Each CH must have a correctness property. In particular, it is required that for
all λ ∈ N, for all ppCH $← PPGenCH(1λ), for all (skCH, pkCH) $← KeyGenCH(ppCH), for all m ∈MS,
for all (h, r) $← HashCH(pkCH,m), for all m′ ∈MS, it holds for all r′ $← AdaptCH(skCH,m,m′, r, h),
that true = CheckCH(pkCH,m, r, h) = CheckCH(pkCH,m′, r′, h) holds. This definition captures
perfect correctness. The randomness is drawn by HashCH, and not outside. This was done to
capture “private-coin” constructions [AMVA17].
Indistinguishability. Indistinguishability requires that the randomnesses r does not reveal
if it was obtained through HashCH or AdaptCH. The messages are chosen by the adversary. The
perfect indistinguishability definition of Brzuska et al. [BFF+09] is relaxed to a computational
version, which is enough for most use-cases, including the one presented.
Note, the experiments returns ⊥ in some cases in the HashOrAdapt oracle, as the adversary
may try to enter a message m /∈MS, even ifMS = {0, 1}∗, which makes the algorithm output
⊥. If one would not do this, the adversary could trivially decide indistinguishability. For similar
reasons these checks are also included in other definitions.
Definition 6.2 (Indistinguishability). A chameleon-hash CH is indistinguishable, if for any
efficient adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣Pr[IndistinguishabilityCHA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)








(m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) $← AAdapt′CH(skCH,·,·,·,·)(pkCH)
where oracle Adapt′CH on input skCH,m,m′, r, h:
Return ⊥, if CheckCH(pkCH,m, r, h) 6= true
r′ $← AdaptCH(skCH,m,m′, r, h)
If r′ = ⊥, return ⊥
Q ← Q∪ {m,m′}
return r′
return 1, if CheckCH(pkCH,m∗, r∗, h∗) = CheckCH(pkCH,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) = true ∧
m′∗ /∈ Q ∧ m∗ 6= m′∗
return 0
Figure 6.2: CH Collision Resistance
Collision Resistance. Collision resistance says, that even if an adversary has access to an
adapt oracle, it cannot find any collisions for messages other than the ones queried to the
adapt oracle. Note, this is an even stronger definition than key-exposure freeness [AdM04]:
key-exposure freeness only requires that one cannot find a collision for some new “tag”, i.e., for
some auxiliary value for which the adversary has never seen a collision.
Definition 6.3 (Collision-Resistance). A chameleon-hash CH is collision-resistant, if for any
efficient adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that
Pr[CollResCHA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 6.2.
Uniqueness. Uniqueness requires that it is hard to come up with two different randomness
values for the same message m∗ such that the hashes are equal, for the same adversarially chosen
pk∗.
Definition 6.4 (Uniqueness). A chameleon-hash CH is unique, if for any efficient adversary A
there exists a negligible function ν such that
Pr[UniquenessCHA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 6.3.
Definition 6.5 (Secure Chameleon-Hashes). A chameleon-hash CH is said to be secure, if it is
correct, indistinguishable, and collision-resistant.




(pk∗,m∗, r∗, r′∗, h∗) $← A(ppCH)
return 1, if CheckCH(pk∗,m∗, r∗, h∗) = CheckCH(pk∗,m∗, r′∗, h∗) = true
∧ r∗ 6= r′∗
return 0
Figure 6.3: CH Uniqueness
Uniqueness is not considered as a fundamental security property, as it depends on the
concrete use-case whether this notion is required.
Subsequently is shown how to construct such a chameleon-hash, which is essentially a
modified construction of the one given by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09].
The Modified Construction. Now the modified construction is presented, inspired by the
ideas given by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09]. It should be clear that indistinguishability still holds in
this setting, except that the modified construction achieves stronger collision-resistance under a
different assumption, and is unique, which is proven on its own.
Construction 6.6 (Modified Chameleon-Hash). Let HN : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N , N ∈ N, denote a
random oracle. Now, let CH := (PPGenCH,KeyGenCH,HashCH,CheckCH,AdaptCH) such that:
PPGenCH. The algorithm PPGenCH generates the public parameters in the following way:
1. Call RSAGen with the restriction e > N , and e prime. Return e.
KeyGenCH. The algorithm KeyGenCH generates the key pair in the following way:
1. Generate p, q using RSAGen(1λ).
2. Let N = pq.
3. Compute d such that ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N).
4. Return (pkCH, skCH) = (N, d).
HashCH. To hash a message m w.r.t. pkCH do:
1. Draw r $← Z∗N .
2. Let h← HN(m)re mod N .
3. Return (h, r).
CheckCH. To check a hash h′ w.r.t. a message m, randomness r, and pkCH do:
1. If r /∈ Z∗N , return false.
2. Let h← HN(m)re mod N .
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3. Return true, if h = h′, and false otherwise.
AdaptCH. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, randomness r, hash h, and skCH do:
1. If CheckCH(pkCH,m, r, h) = false, return ⊥.
2. If m = m′, return r.
3. Let g ← HN(m), and y ← gre mod N .
4. Let g′ ← HN(m′).
5. Return r′ ← (y(g′−1))d mod N .
Theorem 6.7. If the one-more RSA-inversion assumption holds, then the above construction
is secure in the random oracle model.
For the proofs of the given constructions, two auxiliary lemmas which are proven subsequently
are needed. The first one is well-known, while the second one allows an approximation for one
of the reductions to succeed.
Lemma 6.8. Let N ≥ 2 be any arbitrary integer, and e > N be any prime. Then, re ≡
r′e mod N implies r = r′, if r ∈ Z∗N and r′ ∈ Z∗N .
Proof. Because of e > N ≥ ϕ(N) and e prime it holds that gcd(e, ϕ(N)) = 1. Therefore, there
exists d such that de ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N). It holds now that red ≡ r′ed mod N , and the claim follows
as xϕ(N) ≡ 1 mod N for all x ∈ Z∗N .
Lemma 6.9. There exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every adversary A that on input N
outputs N ′ of the same bit-length, it holds that:
Pr
[





Thus, the given probability is non-negligible.
Before proving the lemma, recap the following fact:




eγ log logN + 3log logN
,
where γ = 0.57721 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
Now note that this ratio is noticeable in λ for every number N output by an efficient
algorithm on input 1λ, as the bit-length of such an n is polynomially bounded in λ, say by p(·),
and thus N ≤ 2p(λ). Thus, the denominator of the above ratio is bounded by O(log(p(λ))) and
thus by O(λ).
Proof. First note that y ∈ Z∗NN ′ if and only if y ∈ Z∗N and y ∈ Z∗N ′ . The former holds true by
definition; one can thus replace Z∗NN ′ by Z∗N ′ in the definition.
If N = N ′ the sought probability is 1. Otherwise, note that replacing Z∗N by ZN only changes
the probability by a negligible amount, as for an RSA modulus ϕ(N)/N is overwhelming. In
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the following the probability space (i.e., (N, p, q, e, d)← RSAGen(1λ), N ′ $← A(N), y $← ZN) is
denoted by Ω. Furthermore, ΩJN ′K denotes the same probability space except that y ← ZN is
replaced by y ← ZN ′ .
Let N > N ′. Then follows:
Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ : Ω] = Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ ∧ 0 ≤ y < N ′ : Ω] + Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ ∧N ′ ≤ y < N : Ω]
≥ Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ ∧ 0 ≤ y < N ′ : Ω]
= Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ |0 ≤ y < N ′ : Ω] · Pr[0 ≤ y < N ′ : Ω]







For N < N ′ it holds that:
Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ : Ω] = Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ |0 ≤ y < N : ΩJn′K]
= Pr[y ∈ Z∗N ′ ∧ 0 ≤ y < N : ΩJN ′K] · Pr[0 ≤ y < N : ΩJN ′K]







The claim of the lemma follows.
Now, the proof of the first construction is given.
Proof. Each property is proven separately.
Indistinguishability. Indistinguishability is straightforward to see; the randomness r is
freshly drawn in the challenge oracle and RSA defines a permutation. The proof is therefore
omitted.
Collision-Resistance. Now is proven that the above construction is collision-resistant.
Game 0: This is the original collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but instead of using the e from the system parameters, e received
from a one-more RSA challenger is embedded as PPGenCH. Note, one can still determine d—and
therefore honestly simulate all oracles—as the n from the challenger is not used at this point
and can thus freely choose it. This does not change the view of the adversary, as the received e
is distributed identically to the prior game.
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Game 2: As Game 1, but abort, if the adversary was able to generate a collision (m∗, r∗,
m′∗, r′∗, h∗). Let this event be denoted E2. Assume that event E2 does happen with non-negligible
probability. One can then build an adversary B which breaks the one-more RSA-inversion
assumption. Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary makes all the random oracle
queries before outputting the messages (otherwise, B does them). The adversary B proceeds as
follows. In the first step, the challenge Nc is embedded in pkCH. Clearly, as the distributions
are the same, this is only a conceptual change so far. In the second step, for each new random
oracle query mi, B asks its challenge oracle C to provide a challenge ci ∈ Z∗N . This challenge
is embedded as the response to mi. It stores (mi, ci,⊥) in an internal table. This does not
change the view of the adversary either. However, it remains open how to simulate the adaption
oracle. Assume, for now, that m0 is supposed to be adapted to m1. If m0 = m1, proceed
as in the algorithm. If there is no tuple (m0, c0, z0), with z0 6= ⊥, query the inversion oracle
with c0 to receive z0. Update record (m0, c0,⊥) to (m0, c0, z0). If there is no tuple (m1, c1, z1),
with z1 6= ⊥, query the inversion oracle with c1 to receive z1. Update record (m1, c1,⊥) to
(m1, c1, z1). Return r′ ← rz0(z1)−1 mod N . Then, at some point in time, the adversary returns
(m, r,m′, r′, h). One then knows (by construction) that HN (m)re ≡ HN (m′)r′e mod N . If there
is no record for m and no record for m′, query the inversion oracle for the root z of HN (m), and
update record (m, c,⊥) to (m, c, z). Then, by definition of the security game, one knows that m′
is fresh, and there exists a record (m′, c′,⊥). One can then extract HN (m′)d = z′ by calculating
HN (m′)d ≡ r′−1zr mod N . As therefore the adversary A has inverted more challenges than the
inversion oracle was queried, B can return the list {(ci, zi)} for each entry where (mi, ci, zi),
zi 6= ⊥ exists, along with (c′,HN (m′)d). As now the adversary has no other way to win its game,
collision-resistance is proven, as each hop only changes the view of the adversary negligibly.
Uniqueness. Now is proven that the above construction is unique using a sequence of games:
Game 0: The original uniqueness game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but the challenger aborts, if the adversary finds randomness
r∗ 6= r′∗, a public key pk∗ = N , a message m∗, and a hash h∗ such that CheckCH(pk∗,m∗, r∗,
h∗) = CheckCH(pk∗,m∗, r′∗, h∗) = true. Let this abort event be denoted E1. This cannot happen,
as RSA (with the given restrictions on e and r) defines a permutation, and random oracles
behave as functions, regardless of the choice of N . See also Lemma 6.8. This proves that the
construction is unique.
As now collision-resistance and uniqueness is proven, security of the construction is finally
proven.
6.2 Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors
As already mentioned, a chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoor (CHET) allows to prevent
the holder of the trapdoor skCHET from finding collisions, as long as no additional ephemeral
trapdoor sktd is known. This additional ephemeral trapdoor is chosen freshly for each new hash,
and providing, or withholding, this trapdoor thus allows to decide upon each hash computation
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if finding a collision is possible for the holder of the long-term trapdoor. Hence, one needs to
introduce a new framework given next, which is also accompanied by suitable security definitions.
Definition 6.11 (Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors). A chameleon-hash with
ephemeral trapdoors CHET is a tuple of five algorithms (PPGenCHET,KeyGenCHET,HashCHET,
CheckHashCHET,AdaptCHET), such that:
PPGenCHET. The algorithm PPGenCHET outputs the public parameters:
ppCHET
$← PPGenCHET(1λ)
For simplicity, it is assumed that ppCHET is an implicit input to all other algorithms.
KeyGenCHET. The algorithm KeyGenCHET given the public parameters PPGenCHET outputs the
long-term private and public keys of the scheme:
(skCHET, pkCHET)
$← KeyGenCHET(ppCHET)
HashCHET. The algorithm HashCHET gets as input the public key of the scheme pkCHET, and
a message m to hash. It outputs a hash h, randomness r, and the ephemeral trapdoor
information sktd:
(h, r, sktd) $← HashCHET(pkCHET,m)
CheckHashCHET. The deterministic algorithm CheckHashCHET gets as input the public key of the
scheme pkCHET, a message m, a hash h, and randomness r. It outputs a decision bit
d ∈ {false, true}, indicating whether the given hash is correct w.r.t. to the input values:
d← CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m, r, h)
AdaptCHET. The algorithm AdaptCHET gets as input skCHET, the old message m, the old random-
ness r, the new message m′, the hash h, and the trapdoor information sktd and outputs
new randomness r′:
r′ $← AdaptCHET(skCHET,m,m′, r, h, sktd)
Correctness. For each CHET the usual correctness properties must hold. In particular, it is
required that for all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all ppCHET $← PPGenCHET(1λ), for all (skCHET,
pkCHET)
$← KeyGenCHET(ppCHET), for all m ∈ MS, for all (h, r, sktd) $← HashCHET(pkCHET,
m), CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m, r, h) = true holds, and additionally for all m′ ∈ MS, for all
r′ $← AdaptCHET(skCHET,m,m′, r, h, sktd), it holds that CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m′, r′, h) = true.
This definition captures perfect correctness. Also, some security guarantees are required, which
are introduced next.










where oracle HashOrAdapt on input skCHET,m,m′ and b:
let (h, r, sktd) $← HashCHET(pkCHET,m′)
let (h′, r′, sktd′) $← HashCHET(pkCHET,m)
let r′′ $← AdaptCHET(skCHET,m,m′, r′, h′, sktd′)
if r′′ = ⊥ ∨ r′ = ⊥, return ⊥
if b = 0:
return (h, r, sktd)
if b = 1:
return (h′, r′′, sktd′)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 6.4: CHET Indistinguishability
Indistinguishability. Indistinguishability requires that the randomnesses r does not reveal
if it was obtained through HashCHET or AdaptCHET. In other words, an outsider cannot decide
whether a message is the original one or not.
Definition 6.12 (Indistinguishability). A chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoor CHET is
indistinguishable, if for any efficient adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣Pr[IndistinguishabilityCHETA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 6.4.
Public Collision Resistance. Public collision resistance requires that, even if an adversary
has access to an AdaptCHET oracle, it cannot find any collisions by itself. Clearly, the collision
must be fresh, i.e., must not be produced using the AdaptCHET oracle to avoid trivial wins of the
adversary.
Definition 6.13 (Public Collision-Resistance). A chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoor
CHET is publicly collision-resistant, if for any efficient adversary A there exists a negligible
function ν such that:
Pr[PublicCollResCHETA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 6.5.







(m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) $← AAdapt′CHET(skCHET,·,·,·,·,·)(pkCHET)
where oracle Adapt′CHET on input skCHET,m,m′, r, sktd and h:
return ⊥, if CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m, r, h) = false
r′ $← AdaptCHET(skCHET,m,m′, r, h, sktd)
If r′ = ⊥, return ⊥
Q ← Q∪ {m,m′}
return r′
return 1, if CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m∗, r∗, h∗) = true ∧
CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) = true ∧
m′∗ /∈ Q ∧ m∗ 6= m′∗
return 0





(pk∗, state) $← A(ppCHET)
(m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗)← AHash′CHET(pk∗,·)(state)
where oracle Hash′CHET on input pk∗ and m:
(h, r, sktd) $← HashCHET(pk∗,m)
If h = ⊥, return ⊥
Q ← Q∪ {(h,m)}
return (h, r)
return 1, if CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r∗, h∗) = true ∧
CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) = true ∧
(h∗,m∗) /∈ Q ∧ (h∗, ·) ∈ Q
return 0
Figure 6.6: CHET Private Collision-Resistance
Private Collision-Resistance. Private collision resistance requires that even the holder of
the secret key skCHET cannot find collisions as long as sktd is unknown. This is formalized by a
honest hashing oracle which does not return sktd. Hence, A’s goal is to return an actual collision






(pk∗,m∗, r∗, r′∗, h∗) $← A(ppCHET)
return 1, if CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r∗, h∗) = CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r′∗, h∗) = true ∧
r∗ 6= r′∗
return 0
Figure 6.7: CHET Uniqueness
Definition 6.14 (Private Collision-Resistance). A chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoor
CHET is privately collision-resistant, if for any efficient adversary A there exists a negligible
function ν such that:
Pr[PrivateCollResCHETA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 6.6.
Uniqueness. Uniqueness requires that it is hard to come up with two different randomness
values for the same message m∗ and hash value h∗, where pk∗ is adversarially chosen, i.e., only
the public parameters ppCHET are fixed.
Definition 6.15 (Uniqueness). A chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoor CHET is unique, if
for any efficient adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[UniquenessCHETA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 6.7.
Definition 6.16 (Secure Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors). A chameleon-hash
with ephemeral trapdoor CHET is said to be secure, if it is correct, indistinguishable, publicly
collision-resistant and privately collision-resistant.
Note, is it not required that a secure CHET is unique, as it depends on the use-case whether
this strong security notion is required.
6.3 Constructions
Regarding constructions of CHET schemes, it is natural to ask the question whether CHETs
can be built from existing primitives in a black-box way. Interestingly, it is now shown how
to elegantly “bootstrap” a CHET scheme in a black-box fashion from any existing secure (and
unique) chameleon-hash, e.g., the one introduced before. If one does not require uniqueness,
one can, e.g., resort to the recent scheme given by Ateniese et al. [AMVA17].
Then, direct constructions are given, two based on the DL assumption, and one based on an
RSA-like assumption. While the DL-based constructions are not unique, the construction from
RSA-like assumptions even achieves uniqueness. Note, however, that this strong security notion
is not required in all use-cases. For example, in the application scenario given in Section 6.5,
the CHETs do not need to be unique.
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6.3.1 Black-Box Construction: Bootstrapping
Now a black-box construction from any existing chameleon-hash is presented. Namely, it is shown
how one can achieve the desired goals by combining two instances of a secure chameleon-hash
CH.
Construction 6.17 (Bootstrapped Construction). Obvious checks are omitted for brevity. Let
CHET be defined as:
PPGenCHET. The algorithm PPGenCHET generate the public parameters in the following way:
1. Return ppCHET
$← PPGenCH(1λ).
KeyGenCHET. The algorithm KeyGenCHET generates the key pair in the following way:
1. Return (sk1CH, pk1CH)
$← KeyGenCH(ppCHET).
HashCHET. To hash a message m, w.r.t. public key pk1CH do:
1. Let (sk2CH, pk2CH)
$← KeyGenCH(ppCHET).
2. Let (h1, r1) $← HashCH(pk1CH,m).
3. Let (h2, r2) $← HashCH(pk2CH,m).
4. Return ((h1, h2, pk2CH), (r1, r2), sk2CH).
CheckHashCHET. To check whether a given hash h = (h1, h2, pk2CH) is valid on input pkCH = pk1CH,
m, r = (r1, r2), do:
1. Let b1 ← CheckCH(pk1CH,m, r1, h1).
2. Let b2 ← CheckCH(pk2CH,m, r2, h2).
3. If b1 = false ∨ b2 = false, return false.
4. Return true.
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, randomness r = (r1, r2), hash h = (h1, h2, pk2CH),
sktd = sk2CH, and skCH = sk1CH do:
1. If false = CheckHashCHET(pkCH,m, r, h), return ⊥.
2. Compute r′1
$← AdaptCH(sk1CH,m,m′, r1, h1).
3. Compute r′2
$← AdaptCH(sk2CH,m,m′, r2, h2).
4. Return (r′1, r′2).
This construction is easy to understand, and only uses standard primitives. However, it
remains to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.18. If CH is secure and unique, then the chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors
CHET in Construction 6.17 is secure, and unique.
Proof. Correctness follows from inspection; the remaining properties are proven below.
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Indistinguishability. This follows by a simple argument. In particular, consider the following
sequence of games.
Game 0: The original indistinguishability game, where b = 0.
Game 1: As Game 0, but instead of calculating the hash h1 as in the game, directly hash.
Due to the indistinguishability of the chameleon hashes, this hop only changes the view of the
adversary negligibly due to the the indistinguishability of the chameleon hashes. More formally,
assume that the adversary can distinguish this hop. One can then construct an adversary B
which breaks the indistinguishability of the chameleon hashes. In particular, the reduction
works as follows. B receives pkc as its own challenge, B embeds pkc as pk1CH, and proceeds as
in the prior hop, with the exception that it uses the HashOrAdapt oracle to generate h1. Then,
whatever A outputs, is also output by B.
Game 2: As Game 1, but instead of calculating the hash h2 as in the game, directly hash.
Due to the indistinguishability of the chameleon hashes, this hop only changes the view of the
adversary negligibly due to the the indistinguishability of the chameleon hashes. More formally,
assume that the adversary can distinguish this hop. One can then construct an adversary B
which breaks the indistinguishability of the chameleon hashes. In particular, the reduction
works as follows. B receives pk′c as its own challenge, B embeds pk′c as pk2CH, and proceeds as
in the prior hop, with the exception that it uses the HashOrAdapt oracle to generate h2. Then,
whatever A outputs, is also output by B. Clearly, this now case b = 1.
As each hop changes the view only negligibly, indistinguishability is proven. As each hop only
changes the view of the adversary negligibly, this proves that the construction is indistinguishable.
Public Collision-Resistance. Let A be an adversary which breaks the public-collision
resistance of the construction. One can then construct an adversary B which uses A internally
to break the collision-resistance of the underlying chameleon hash. This proven by a sequence
of games:
Game 0: The original public collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the adversary A outputs a forgery (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗).
Refer to E1 as the abort event. A distinguisherA for this hop can be turned into a forger B against
the collision-resistance of the underlying chameleon-hash. B proceeds as follows. It receives pk1CH
as the challenge public key. It uses this key to initialize A. As the only oracle B has to simulate
is the AdaptCHET-oracle, it proceeds as follows. On input m∗,m′∗, r∗, sktd∗, h∗, B first checks, if




Adversary B then queries its own adaption oracle to receive r′1, and gives (r′1, r′2) to A. At
some point, A returns (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗). Via assumption, it is known that m∗, r∗ w.r.t.
m′∗, r′∗ is “fresh”, i.e., has never been returned by the adaption oracle. Thus, B can return
(m∗, r∗1,m′∗, r′∗1 , h∗1) as its own forgery attempt.
As each game hop only changes the view of the adversary negligibly, and the adversary has
no way to forge a collision in Game 1, this proves that the construction is unique.
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Private Collision-Resistance. The following sequence of games is used to prove the private
collision-resistance of the construction.
Game 0: The original private collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but the challenger aborts, if the adversary A outputs a valid forgery
(m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗). Use E1 to refer to the abort event. This can be reduced the security to the
collision-resistance of the underlying chameleon-hash. Moreover, let qh be the number of queries
to the hashing oracle. One can now construct an adversary B which uses A internally to break
the collision-resistance of the underlying chameleon hash. First, B receives pk2CH from its own
challenger, and pk∗ from A. Then proceed as follows. Draw a random index i $← [1, qh]. For each
query j 6= i, let (pk2,iCH, sk2,iCH) $← KeyGenCH(1λ). On input m, compute (h, r)← HashCH(pk2,iCH,m).
Otherwise, i.e., i = j, on input m, compute (h, r)← HashCH(pk2CH,m). Next, let pk2,jCH ← pk2CH.
In both cases, B gives ((r′, r), (h, pk2,iCH)) to A. At some point, A returns (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗).
One now knows that h∗2 = h′∗2 (i.e, the hash must have been returned by the oracle by definition)
and m∗ must be fresh by assumption, B can return (m∗, r∗2,m′∗, r′∗2 , h∗2) as its own forgery
attempt, if the hash returned is the one the challenge was embedded in. Thus, the probability
that B wins is the same as A, divided by qh, as B has to guess on which query the adversary A
finds the collision.
As each game hop only changes the view of the adversary negligibly and the adversary has
no other way to forge a collision, this proves that the construction is privately collision-resistant.
Uniqueness. Let A be an adversary which breaks the uniqueness of the construction. One
can then construct an adversary B which uses A internally to break the uniqueness of the
underlying chameleon-hash. In particular, consider the following sequence of games:
Game 0: The original uniqueness game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the adversary outputs a randomness r∗ 6= r′∗, a public
key pk∗, along with a message m, and some hash h∗ such that CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r∗, h∗) =
CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r′∗, h∗) = true. Let us use E1 to refer to the abort event. This case
can be reduced to the case of the uniqueness of the underlying chameleon-hash. B proceeds as
follows. It initializes A with 1λ. At some point, A returns (pk∗,m∗, r∗, r′∗, h∗). By construction,
one knows that r∗ is of the form (r∗1, r∗2), and that h∗ of the form (h∗1, h∗2, pk′∗), and r′∗ is of
the form (r′∗1 , r′∗2 ), respectively. Moreover, by assumption, it is known that CheckHashCHET(pk∗,
m∗, r∗1, h
∗
1) = CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r′∗1 , h∗1) = true, but also that CheckHashCHET(pk′∗,m∗, r∗2,
h∗2) = CheckHashCHET(pk′∗,m∗, r′∗2 , h∗2) = true. However, one also knows that r′∗1 6= r∗1 or r′∗2 6= r∗2.
Thus, B can return (pk∗,m∗, r∗1, r′∗1 ), if r∗1 6= r′∗1 , or (pk′∗,m∗, r∗2, r′∗2 ), if r′∗2 6= r∗2.
As each game hop only changes the view of the adversary negligibly, this proves that the
construction is unique.
The question is now, if one can also directly construct CHET, which is answered to the
affirmative subsequently.
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6.3.2 A First Direct Construction
Now, a direct construction in groups where the DLP is hard using some ideas related to Pedersen
commitments [Ped91] is presented. In a nutshell, the long-term secret is the discrete logarithm
x between two elements g and h (i.e., gx = h) of the long-term public key, while the ephemeral
trapdoor is the randomness of the “commitment”. To prohibit that a seen collision allows to
extract the long-term secret key x, both trapdoors are hidden in a NIZKPoK. To make the
“commitment” equivocable, it is then again randomized. To avoid that the holder of skCH needs
to store state, the randomness is encrypted to a public key of a IND-CCA2 secure encryption
scheme contained in pkCH. Security then directly follows from the DL assumption, IND-CCA2,
the collision-resistance of the used hash function, and the extractability property of the NIZKPoK
system. For brevity it is assumed that the NP-languages involved in the NIZKPoK are implicitly
defined by the scheme. Note, this construction is not unique.
Construction 6.19 (CHET in Known-Order Groups). Let the set {HkZ∗q}k∈K denote a family
of collision-resistant hash functions HkZ∗q : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q indexed by a key k ∈ K and let CHET be
as follows:
PPGenCHET. The algorithm PPGenCHET generates the public parameters in the following way:
1. Let (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ).
2. Let k $← K for the hash function.
3. Let crsNIZKPoK $← PPGenNIZKPoK(1λ, L).2
4. Return ((G, g, q), k, crsNIZKPoK).
KeyGenCHET. The algorithm KeyGenCHET generates the key pair in the following way:
1. Draw random x $← Z∗q. Set h← gx.
2. Generate pipk $← ProveNIZKPoK{(x) : h = gx}.
3. Let (skENC, pkENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ).
4. Return ((x, skENC), (h, pipk, pkENC)).
HashCHET. To hash m w.r.t. pkCH = (h, pipk, pkENC) do:
1. Return ⊥, if h /∈ G×.
2. If pipk is not valid, return ⊥.
3. Draw random r $← Z∗q.
4. Draw random sktd $← Z∗q.
5. Let h′ ← gsktd.
6. Generate pit $← ProveNIZKPoK{(sktd) : h′ = gsktd)}.
7. Encrypt r, i.e., let C $← EncENC(pkENC, r).
8. Let a← HkZ∗q (m).
9. Let p← hr.
2Actually one crsNIZKPoK is needed per language, but this is not made explicit here.
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10. Generate pip $← ProveNIZKPoK{(r) : p = hr}.
11. Let b← ph′a.
12. Return ((b, h′, pit), (p, C, pip), sktd).
CheckHashCHET. To check whether a given hash (b, h′, pit) is valid on input pkCH = (h, pipk, pkENC),
m, r = (p, C, pip), do:
1. Return false, if p /∈ G× ∨ h′ /∈ G×.
2. If either pip, pit, or pipk are not valid, return ⊥.
3. Let a← HkZ∗q (m).
4. Return true, if b = ph′a.
5. Return false.
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCH = (x, skENC) do:
1. If false = CheckHashCHET(pkCH,m, (p, C, pip), (b, h′, pit)), return ⊥.
2. Decrypt C, i.e., r ← DecENC(skENC, C). If r = ⊥, return ⊥.
3. If h′ 6= gsktd, return ⊥.
4. Let a← HkZ∗q (m).
5. Let a′ ← HkZ∗q (m′).
6. If p 6= gxr, return ⊥.
7. If a = a′, return (p, C, pip).
8. Let r′ ← rx+a·sktd−a′·sktd
x
.
9. Let p′ ← hr′.
10. Encrypt r′, i.e., let C ′ $← EncENC(pkENC, r′).
11. Generate pi′p
$← ProveNIZKPoK{(r′) : p′ = hr′}.
12. Return (p′, C ′, pi′p).
Some of the checks can already be done in advance, e.g., at a PKI, which only generates
certificates, if the restrictions on each public key are fulfilled.
Theorem 6.20. If the DL assumption in G holds, HkZ∗|G| is collision-resistant, ENC is IND-CCA2
secure, and NIZKPoK is secure, then the chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors CHET in
Construction 6.19 is secure.
For the following proof it is assumed that the reduction sets up the NIZKPoK-parameters,
but also the groups used in the protocol and the hashing-key k. This is not made explicit.
Proof. As before, it is only required to prove that the construction is indistinguishable, publicly
collision-resistant, and privately collision-resistant. Again, each property is proven on its own.
Indistinguishability. Indistinguishability is trivial: as adversary never sees both the hash
and the adapted hash at the same time the distributions are equivalent.
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Public Collision-Resistance. Public collision-resistance is proven by a sequence of games.
Game 0: The original public collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ) $← SIM1(1λ) upon setup, store τ and
henceforth simulate all proofs using SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, ·). A distinguisher between Game 0 and
Game 1 is a zero-knowledge distinguisher. A fully-fledged reduction is trivial and therefore
omitted.
Game 2: As Game 1, but upon setup obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ, ξ) $← E1(1λ), and additionally
store ξ. Under simulation sound extractability, this change is conceptual. Note, the values from
the proofs are not extracted yet.
Game 3: As Game 2, but additionally change the simulation of the AdaptCHET oracle as
follows:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCHET = (x, skENC) do:
1. If (p, C, ·) corresponds to a previous query, set AD = >, and AD = ⊥ otherwise
2. If only C corresponds to a previous query, return ⊥.
3. If false = CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m, (p, C, pip), (b, h′, pit)), return ⊥.
...
This change is purely conceptual and thus does not change the view of the adversary at
all. Observe that C is unconditionally binding, and, thus, modifying p implies that the check
p = gxr which is performed within AdaptCHET fails and the oracle would abort anyway in this
case.
Game 4: Behave exactly as in Game 3, but further change the simulation of the AdaptCHET
oracle as follows:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCHET = (x, skENC) do:
1. If (p, C, ·) corresponds to a previous AdaptCHET query, set AD = > and AD = ⊥
otherwise. If only C corresponds to a previous query, return ⊥.
...
3. If AD = ⊥, decrypt C, i.e., r ← DecENC(skENC, C). If the resulting decryption is
invalid, i.e., r = ⊥, return ⊥.
...
7. If AD = ⊥, check if p 6= gxr, and return ⊥ if so.
...
This change is conceptual (the checks are only omitted if one knows that they would not
yield to an abort).
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Game 5: Behave exactly as in Game 4, but further change the simulation of the AdaptCHET
oracle as follows:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCHET = (x, skENC) do:
1. If (p, C, ·) corresponds to a previous AdaptCHET query, set AD = > and AD = ⊥
otherwise. If only C corresponds to a previous query, return ⊥.
...
8. If a = a′, return (p, C, pip).
9. NOP //NOP means NO Operation
10. Let p′ ← b
ga′sktd .
11. C ′ ← DecENC(pkENC, 0) .
12. Generate pi′p
$← SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, (p′, h)).
...
A distinguisher between Game 3 and Game 4 is an IND-CCA2 distinguisher for ENC, using
a standard hybrid argument.
Game 5: As Game 4, but further modify AdaptCHET so that it runs on an skch where x is
replaced by gx:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCHET = (gx , skENC) do:
...
7. If AD = ⊥, check if p 6= (gx )r, and return ⊥ if so.
...
This change is conceptual.
Game 6: As Game 5, but for every query to AdaptCHET, store (p, C, pip), if pip was not
previously simulated within AdaptCHET in R[(b, h′, pit)]← (p, C, pip). Now, for every forgery either
both r∗ or r′∗ are fresh, or one of them contains a proof pip (resp. pi′p) which was previously
simulated in the AdaptCHET oracle. If one of them contains such a proof, replace the respective
randomness tuple (p, C, pip) by R[h∗]. This change is conceptual. Observe that the fact that
a proof stems from a tuple returned by AdaptCHET implies that a query with a tuple (p, C, pip)
where pip was not simulated must once have happened. Further, the modified forgery is still a
valid public collision freeness forgery.
Game 7: As Game 6, but for the modified forgery extract both r and r′ from pip and pi′p
contained in r∗ = (p, C, pip) and r′∗ = (p′, C ′, pi′p). If the extraction fails, abort. Both games
proceed identically, unless the abort event happens. Due to the extractability property of the
proof system, this only happens with negligible probability. For simplicity, both extractions are
collapsed in a single game change. It is easy to unroll them into two separate game changes, i.e.,
changing them in a hybrid game.
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Game 8: As Game 7, but for pit contained in h∗ extract sktd and abort if the extraction
fails. Both games proceed identically, unless the abort event happens, which, due to the
extractability property of the proof-system is negligible.
Game 9: As Game 8, but obtain a DL-challenge (G, g, q, gx), perform the setup with
respect to (G, g, q) and embed gx into skch. This change is conceptual.
In Game 9, for every forgery (modified according to Game 6) it holds that h∗ = (b, h′, pit)
contains b = grx+asktd = gr′x+a′sktd. Thus, it holds that rx+ asktd = r′x+ a′sktd. Hence, x can
easily be calculated, which is the solution to the DL-challenge. This extraction is only possible,
if a 6= a′. However, if this is not the case there is a collision in the hash-function, which can
easily be extracted. As the view between all intermediate games only changes negligibly, the
proof is concluded.
Private Collision-Resistance. Below private collision resistance is proven using a sequence
of games.
Game 0: The original private collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ) $← SIM1(1λ) upon setup, store τ and
henceforth simulate all proofs using SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, ·). A distinguisher between Game 0 and
Game 1 is a zero-knowledge distinguisher.
Game 2: As Game 1, but upon setup obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ, ξ) $← E1(1λ), and additionally
store ξ. Under simulation sound extractability, this change is conceptual.
Game 3: As Game 2, but modify the HashCHET oracle so that it no longer draws sktd
uniformly at random, but directly draws h′ uniformly at random from G×.
HashCHET. To hash m w.r.t. pkCHET = (h, pipk, pkENC) do:
...
5. Let h′ $← G× .
...
Game 4: As Game 3, but for every pip returned by HashCHET record the value r so that
p = hr in R[p]← r. This change is conceptual.
Game 5: As Game 4, but for pk∗ output by the adversary extract x so that gx = h. If the
extraction fails, abort. Both games proceed identically, unless there is the abort event, which
only happens with negligible probability due to the extractability property.
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Game 6: As Game 5, but obtain a DL instance (G, g, q, gt), perform the setup with
respect to (G, g, q) and further modify HashCHET as follows:
HashCHET. To hash m w.r.t. pkCHET = (h, pipk, pkENC) do:
...
5. Let s $← Z∗q, h′ ← (gt)s .
...
Furthermore, record S[h′]← s. This change is conceptual.
Game 7: As Game 6, but if pip or pi′p contained in r∗ = (p, C, pip) and r′∗ = (p′, C ′, pi′p) do
not correspond to a HashCHET answer, obtain r and r′ using the extractor and set R[p]← r or
R[p′]← r′. If the extraction fails, abort. Both games proceed identical unless the abort event
happens.3
Now, if the adversary A outputs (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) such that h∗ = gxrh′a = gxr′h′a′ in
Game 7, B proceeds as follows. By definition, it holds that grx+ats = gr′x+a′ts (Note, gts = h′ in
both cases, which, by definition, needs to be returned by the HashCHET oracle, and thus s = S[h′]
is known). It follows that rx+ ats = r′x+ a′ts holds. As all variables but t are now known (the
values for r and r′ can be obtained from R), it also holds that t can be calculated and returned
as DL solution unless a = a′, which would however imply a collision for the hash function. Thus,
as the views of the adversary changes only changes negligibly, security of the construction is
finally proven.
6.3.3 A Direct Construction From RSA-Like Assumptions
Now, an extension to the RSA-based chameleon-hash given in Section 6.1.3 (which is itself based
on the construction given by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09], see Appendix I for their construction)
using the technique used for accumulators by Po¨hls et al. [PPS+13]. In the construction, the
trapdoor is an additional RSA-modulus N ′. Only if the factorization of N ′ = p′q′, contained in
sktd, and N = pq, which is the secret key skCHET, is known, a collision can be produced. It is
assumed that the bit-length of N and N ′ is the same, which is implicitly given by the security
parameter λ. Note, the condition e > N3 implies that e > NN ′, and thus gcd(ϕ(NN ′), e) = 1,
which makes the analysis simpler (cf. Lemma 6.8).
This is not explicitly checked in the algorithms.
Construction 6.21 (CHET from RSA-like Assumptions). Let HN : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N , N ∈ N,
denote a random oracle. Let CHET be defined as:
PPGenCHET. The algorithm PPGenCHET generates the public parameters in the following way:
1. Call RSAGen with the restriction e > N3, and e prime. Return e.
KeyGenCHET. The algorithm KeyGenCHET generates the key pair in the following way:
3For simplicity both extractions are collapsed in a single game change. It is easy to unroll them into two
separate game changes.
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1. Generate two primes p and q using RSAGen(1λ). Set skCH ← (p, q). Let N ← pq. Set
pkCH ← N .
2. Return (skCH, pkCH).
CheckHashCHET. To hash a message m w.r.t. pkCH = N do:
1. Generate two primes p′ and q′ using RSAGen(1λ). Set sktd← (p′, q′), and N ′ ← p′q′.
2. If gcd(N,N ′) 6= 1, go to 1.
3. Draw r ← Z∗NN ′.
4. Let g ← HNN ′(m), and h← gre mod NN ′.
5. Return ((h,N ′), r, sktd).
CheckHashCHET. To check whether a given hash h is valid on input pkCH = N , m, and r, do:
1. Return ⊥, if r /∈ Z∗NN ′.
2. Let g ← HNN ′(m), and h′ ← gre mod NN ′.
3. Return true, if h = (h′, N ′).
4. Return false.
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, randomness r, hash h, trapdoor information sktd,
and skCH do:
1. Check that N ′ = p′q′, where p′ and q′ is taken from sktd. If this is not the case, return
⊥.
2. If CheckHashCHET(pkCH,m, r, h) = false, return ⊥.
3. Compute d s.t. de ≡ 1 mod ϕ(NN ′).
4. Let g ← HNN ′(m), and h← gre mod NN ′.
5. Let g′ ← HNN ′(m′) and r′ ← (h(g′−1))d mod NN ′.
6. Return r′.
Theorem 6.22. If the one-more RSA-inversion assumption holds, then the above construction
is secure in the random-oracle model.
Proof. Again, one needs to prove that the construction is indistinguishable, unique, publicly
collision-resistant, and privately collision-resistant.
Indistinguishability. It is easy to see that the above construction is indistinguishable; all
values are chosen uniformly at random and RSA defines a permutation. See also Lemma 6.8.
Public Collision-Resistance. Now is proven, via a sequence of games, that the above
construction is collision-resistant.
Game 0: This is the original public collision-resistance game.
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Game 1: As Game 0, but instead of using the e from the system parameters (here,
e > N3), Embed the e received from a one-more RSA challenger as ppCHET. Note, one can still
determine d—and therefore honestly simulate all oracles—as the N chosen by the challenger at
this point is not used, and one can thus freely choose it. This does not change the view of the
adversary, as the received e is distributed identically to the real game.
Game 2: As Game 1, but abort, if the adversary was able to generate a collision (m∗, r∗,
m′∗, r′∗, h∗). Let this event be denoted E2. Assume that event E2 does happen with non-negligible
probability. One can then build an adversary B which breaks the one-more RSA-inversion
assumption. Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary makes all the random oracle
queries before outputting the messages (otherwise, B does them). The adversary B proceeds
as follows. In the first step, the challenge Nc is embedded in pkCH as N . Clearly, as the
distributions are the same, this is only a conceptual change so far. In the second step, for
each new random-oracle query mi to HNN ′ , B asks its challenge oracle C to provide a challenge
ci ∈ Z∗N . However, it may happen that ci /∈ Z∗NN ′ (note, that one has a family of random-
oracles!). In this case, request a new ci from the challenge oracle till the condition holds.4 Draw
ui ← Z∗NN ′ and record (mi, N ′, ci, ui,⊥). Embed ciuei mod NN ′ as the random-oracle response
for mi. Note, this value is distributed perfectly uniformly in Z∗NN ′ . However, it remains open
how to simulate the adaption oracle. Assume, for now, that m0 is supposed to be adapted to
m1, while the second modulus is N ′. If m0 = m1, or n = N ′, proceed as in the algorithm. If
there is no tuple (m0, N ′, c0, u0, z0), with z0 6= ⊥, query the inversion oracle with c0 to receive z0.
Update record (m0, N ′, c0, u0,⊥) to (m0, N ′, c0, u0, z0). If there is no tuple (m1, N ′, c1, u1, z1),
with z1 6= ⊥, query the inversion oracle with c1 to receive z1. Update record (m1, N ′, c1, u1,⊥)
to (m1, N ′, c1, u1, z1). Calculate the collision modN as rz0(z1)−1. The collision modN ′ can be
calculated honestly, as the factors are known. Combine the result modNN ′ using the Chinese
remainder theorem, and return it. Eventually, the adversary returns (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗). Then,
one knows (by construction) that HNN ′(m∗)r∗e ≡ HNN ′(m′∗)r′∗e mod NN ′. If there is no record
for m∗ and no record for m′∗, query the inversion for oracle for the root z∗ for HNN ′(m∗), and
update record (m∗, N ′, c∗, r∗,⊥) to (m∗, N ′, c∗, u∗, z∗). Then, by definition of the security game,
one knows that m′∗ is fresh, and there exists a record (m′∗, N ′, c′∗, u′∗,⊥). One can then extract
HNN ′(m′∗)d by calculating HNN ′(m′∗)d ≡ r′∗−1z∗r∗ mod NN ′, and extract the root of c′∗ by
multiplying it with u′∗−1 mod NN ′, resulting in z′∗. As therefore the adversary A has inverted
more challenges than the inversion oracle was queried, B can return the list {(ci, zi)} for each
entry where (mi, N ′i , ci, ri, zi), zi 6= ⊥ exists, along with (c′∗, z′∗ mod n).
As now the adversary has no other way to win its game, public collision-resistance is proven,
as each hop only changes the view of the adversary negligibly.
Private Collision-Resistance. Now, via a sequence of games, is proven that the above
construction is collision-resistant.
Game 0: This is the original private collision-resistance game.
4Lemma 6.9 directly provides a polynomial bound on the expected number of needed samples. To have a
strictly polynomial-time B, abort if one needs p(λ) times more samples than expected, for some fixed polynomial
p. Clearly, this only happens with at most negligible probability, and therefore does not significantly change the
winning probability in the following.
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Game 1: As Game 0, but instead of using the e from the system parameters (here,
e > N3), Embed the e received from a RSA challenger as ppCHET. As before, one can still
determine d—and therefore honestly simulate all oracles—as the N ′ from the challenger is not
embedded at this point, and one can thus freely choose it. This does not change the view of the
adversary, as the received e is distributed identically to the real game.
Game 2: As Game 1, but now abort, if there are random-oracle collisions in any random
oracle. Let this event be E2. Event E2 cannot happen with non-negligible probability due to
the birthday-bound.
Game 3: Now abort, if the adversary was able to output a tuple (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) which
breaks the private collision-resistance of the construction. Let this event be E3. First, note that
without loss of generality one only needs to consider such adversaries A that only make a single
call to the CheckHash′CHET oracle, as it can simulate all other calls (except for the h∗) internally.5
Assume now that the abort event happens with non-negligible probability. One can then
construct an adversary B which breaks the one-more RSA assumption with non-negligible
probability. B simulates the CheckHash′CHET oracle by embedding the modulus it received
from its own RSA challenger as N ′.6 For computing HNN ′(m), it asks its own challenger for
challenges in Z∗N ′ until it receives a challenge c that also lies in Z∗NN ′ (as before, this happens
after a polynomial number of steps by Lemma 6.9). It then chooses a random u ← Z∗NN ′ ,
sets HNN ′(m) = cue mod NN ′, and computes its response as in the original algorithm, i.e.,
it outputs ((HNN ′(m)re mod NN ′, N ′), r) for a random r. All other queries to the HNN ′(mj)
oracle are replied by vej for a fresh vj ← Z∗NN ′ , and the pairs (mj, vj) are stored internally.
As before, assume that A did all the random oracle queries before it outputs its messages
(otherwise, B makes the necessary queries). Eventually, A outputs (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) with
CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r∗, h∗) = CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) = true with h∗ as returned by
B and m′∗ 6= m∗. B then looks up v∗ such that HNN ′(m∗) = v∗e. By assumption it then holds
that HNN ′(m∗)r∗e = HNN ′(m′∗)r′∗e, i.e., that v∗er∗e = cuere mod NN ′, or equivalently that
c = (v∗r∗u−1r−1)e mod NN ′. B now outputs (c, x = v∗r∗u−1r−1 mod N ′) and returns it to its
one-more RSA challenger. It is easy to see that c = xe mod N ′ holds: c = (v∗r∗u−1r−1)e mod
NN ′ means that c = (v∗r∗u−1r−1)e + kNN ′ for some integer k. Reducing by N ′ yields
c = (v∗r∗u−1r−1)e mod N ′. As B did not query the inversion oracle at all, it thus wins with
a probability only polynomially smaller than E3, contradicting the assumption that E3 is not
negligible. The private collision-resistance follows. Note that the private collision resistance
property actually already holds under the standard RSA assumption (not the one-more RSA
assumption), as B never queries the inversion oracle. Formally, in the proof, it would abort
when receiving a c 6∈ Z∗NN ′ , which—by Lemma 6.9—imposes a polynomial loss.
Uniqueness. Now is proven that the above construction is unique using a sequence of games:
5Formally, in the following B honestly simulates all calls to CheckHash′CHET, except for a random query where
it embeds the challenge; this causes a loss of 1/qh in the success probability, where qh is the number of oracle
queries made by A.
6Note that the adversary already has access to the random oracles in its first phase, i.e., before outputting
pk∗. In the following, assume that it never queried the oracle for HNN ′(·) during this phase. Given the
super-polynomial number of possible values for N ′, this only introduces a negligible loss in the following.
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Game 0: The original uniqueness game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but the challenger aborts, if the adversary finds randomness r∗ 6= r′∗,
a public key pk∗ = N , a message m∗, and a hash h∗ such that CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r∗, h∗) =
CheckHashCHET(pk∗,m∗, r′∗, h∗) = true. Let this abort event be denoted E1. This cannot happen,
as RSA (with the given restrictions on e and r) defines a permutation, and random-oracles
behave as functions, regardless of the choice of N . See also Lemma 6.8. This proves that the
construction is unique.
6.3.4 A Construction in Gap-Groups
Next, a a second direct construction in prime order groups equipped with a bilinear map is
given. This construction is derived from the first construction. Essentially, the main idea is to
use a DDH oracle to check the correctness of the commitment. Subsequently, the construction
is presented, where it is assumed that the NP-languages involved in the proofs of knowledge are
implicitly defined by the scheme.
Construction 6.23 (CHET in Gap-Groups). Let {HkZ∗q}k∈K denote a family of collision-re-
sistant hash functions HkZ∗q : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q indexed by a key k ∈ K and let CHET be defined
as:
PPGenCHET. The algorithm PPGenCHET generates the public parameters in the following way:
1. Let (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) $← BLGen(1λ).
2. Let k $← K for the hash function.
3. Let crsNIZKPoK $← PPGenNIZKPoK(1λ).7
4. Return ((G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q), k, crsNIZKPoK)
KeyGenCHET. The algorithm KeyGenCHET generates the key pair in the following way:
1. Draw random x $← Z∗q. Set h← gx2 .
2. Generate pipk $← ProveNIZKPoK{(x) : h = gx2}.
3. Let (skENC, pkENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ).
4. Return ((x, skENC), (h, pipk, pkENC)).
HashCHET. To hash m w.r.t. pkCH = (h, pipk, pkENC) do:
1. If pipk is not valid, return ⊥.
2. Draw random r $← Z∗q.
3. Draw random sktd $← Z∗q.
4. Let h′ ← gsktd2 .
5. Generate pit $← ProveNIZKPoK{(sktd) : h′ = gsktd2 )}.
7Actually one crsNIZKPoK is needed per language, but this is not make explicit here.
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6. Encrypt r, i.e., let C $← EncENC(pkENC, r).
7. Let p← e(gr1, h).
8. Generate pip $← ProveNIZKPoK{(r) : p = e(gr1, h)}.
9. Let a← HkZ∗q (m).
10. Let b← p · e(ga1 , h′).
11. Return ((b, h′, pit), (p, C, pip), sktd).
CheckHashCHET. To check whether a given hash (b, h′, pit) is valid on input pkCH = (h, pipk, pkENC),
m, (p, C, pip) do:
1. Return false, if p /∈ G×T ∨ h′ /∈ G×2 .
2. If either pip, pit, or pipk are not valid, return ⊥.
3. Let a← HkZ∗q (m, τ).
4. Return true, if b = p · e(ga1 , h′).
5. Return false.
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor information
sktd, and skCH = (x, skENC) do:
1. If false = HashCHET(pkCH,m, (p, C, pip), (b, h′, pit)), return ⊥.
2. Return ⊥, if h′ 6= gsktd2 .
3. Decrypt C, i.e., r ← DecENC(skENC, C). If r = ⊥, return ⊥.
4. If m = m′, return (p, C, pip).
5. Let a← HkZ∗q (m).
6. Let a′ ← HkZ∗q (m′).
7. If p 6= e(gr1, gx2 ), return ⊥.
8. If a = a′, return r = (p, C, pip).
9. Let r′ ← rx+a·sktd−a′·sktd
x
.
10. Let p′ ← e(gr′1 , gx2 ).
11. Encrypt r′, i.e., let C ′ $← EncENC(pkENC, r′).
12. Generate pi′p
$← NIZKPoK{(r′) : p′ = e(gr′1 , gx2 )}.
13. Return (p′, C ′, pi′p).
Most of the checks can already be done in advance, e.g., at a PKI, which only generates
certificates, if the restrictions on each public key are fulfilled. Moreover, it is not required that
the correctness of the ciphertext is proven.
Theorem 6.24. If the DL assumption in G2 holds, HkZ∗|G2| is collision-resistant, ENC is
IND-CCA2 secure, and NIZKPoK is secure, then the chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors
CHET in Construction 6.23 is secure.
Proof. One needs to prove that the construction is indistinguishable, publicly collision-resistant,
and privately collision-resistant.
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Indistinguishability. Indistinguishability is trivial: as the adversary never sees both the
hash and the adapted hash at the same time, the distributions are identical. The proof is
therefore omitted.
Public Collision-Resistance. Public collision-resistance is proven by a sequence of games.
Game 0: The original public collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but upon setup obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ) $← SIM1(1λ) upon setup,
store τ and henceforth simulate all proofs using SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, ·). A distinguisher between
Game 0 and Game 1 is a zero-knowledge distinguisher.
Game 2: As Game 1, but upon setup obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ, ξ) $← E1(1λ), and additionally
store ξ. Under simulation sound extractability, this change is conceptual.
Game 3: As Game 2, but simulate the AdaptCHET oracle as follows:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCHET = (x, skENC) do:
1. If (p, C, ·) corresponds to a previous query, set AD = >, and AD = ⊥ otherwise
2. If only C corresponds to a previous query, return ⊥.
3. If false = CheckHashCHET(pkCHET,m, (p, C, pip), (b, h′, pit)), return ⊥.
...
This change is conceptual. Observe that C is unconditionally binding, and, thus, modifying
p implies that the check p = e(gx1 , gr2) which is performed within AdaptCHET fails, and the oracle
would abort anyway).
Game 4: As Game 3, but further change the AdaptCHET oracle as follows:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor information
sktd, and skCH = (x, skENC) do:
1. If (p, C, ·) corresponds to a previous AdaptCHET query, set AD = > and AD = ⊥
otherwise. If only C corresponds to a previous query, return ⊥.
...
3. If AD = ⊥, decrypt C, i.e., r ← DecENC(skENC, C). If r = ⊥, return ⊥.
...
7. If AD = ⊥, check if p 6= e(gr1, gx2 ), and return ⊥ if so.
...
This change is conceptual, as the checks are only omitted if they would not yield to an abort.
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Game 4: As Game 3, but further change the AdaptCHET oracle as follows:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCH = (x, skENC) do:
1. If (p, C, ·) corresponds to a previous AdaptCHET query, set AD = > and AD = ⊥
otherwise. If only C corresponds to a previous query, return ⊥.
...
8. If a = a′, return (p, C, pip).
9. NOP
10. Let p′ ← b
e(ga′ ,h′) .
11. C ′ $← EncENC(pkENC, 0) .
12. Generate pi′p ← SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, (p′, gx2 )).
...
A distinguisher between Game 3 and Game 4 is an IND-CCA2 distinguisher for ENC, using
a standard hybrid argument.
Game 5: As Game 4, but further modify AdaptCHET so that it runs on an skCHET where x
is replaced by gx:
AdaptCHET. To find a collision w.r.t. m, m′, (b, h′, pit), randomness (p, C, pip), and trapdoor
information sktd, and skCHET = (gx2 , skENC) do:
...
This change is conceptual.
Game 6: As Game 5, but for every query to AdaptCHET, store (p, C, pip) if pip was not
previously simulated within AdaptCHET in R[(b, h′, pit)]← (p, C, pip). Now, for every forgery either
both r∗ or r′∗ are fresh, or one of them contains a proof pip (resp. pi′p) which was previously
simulated in the AdaptCHET oracle. If one of them contains such a proof, replace the respective
randomness tuple (p, C, pip) by R[h∗]. This change is conceptual. Observe that the fact that
a proof stems from a tuple returned by AdaptCHET implies that a query with a tuple (p, C, pip)
where pip was not simulated must once have happened. Further, the modified forgery is still a
valid public collision freeness forgery.
Game 7: As Game 6, but for the modified forgery extract both r and r′ from pip and pi′p
contained in r∗ = (p, C, pip) and r′∗ = (p′, C ′, pi′p). If the extraction fails, abort. Both games
proceed identically, unless the abort event happens. This event only happens with negligible
probability due to the extractability property of the proof system. For simplicity both extractions
were collapsed in a single game change. It is easy to unroll them into two separate game changes.
Game 8: As Game 7, but for pit contained in h∗ extract sktd, and abort if the extraction
fails. Both games proceed identically, unless the abort event happens.
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Game 9: As Game 8, but obtain a DL-challenge (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, gx2 ), perform
the setup with respect to G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) and embed gx2 into pkCHET. This change is
conceptual.
In Game 9, for every forgery (modified according to Game 6) it holds that h∗ = (b, h′, pit)
contains b = grx+asktdT = gr
′x+a′sktd
T . Thus, rx+ asktd = r′x+ a′sktd follows. Hence, x can easily
be calculated, which is the solution to the DL-challenge. This extraction is only possible, if
a 6= a′. However, if this is not the case, there is a collision in the hash-function. Taking the
union bound yields that Pr[S9] = νDL(λ) + νCR(λ); all intermediate game changes are negligible,
which concludes the proof.
Private Collision-Resistance. Below private collision resistance is proven, using a sequence
of games.
Game 0: The original private collision-resistance game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but upon setup obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ) ← SIM1(1λ) upon setup,
store τ and henceforth simulate all proofs using SIM2(crsNIZKPoK, τ, ·). A distinguisher between
Game 0 and Game 1 is a zero-knowledge distinguisher.
Game 2: As Game 1, but upon setup obtain (crsNIZKPoK, τ, ξ)← E1(1λ), and additionally
store ξ. Under simulation sound extractability, this change is conceptual, and thus does not
change the distribution.
Game 3: As Game 2, but modify the HashCHET oracle so that it no longer draws sktd
uniformly at random but directly draws h′ uniformly at random from G∗2.
HashCHET. To hash m w.r.t. pkCH = (h, pipk, pkENC) do:
...
5. Let h′ $← G×2 .
...
Game 4: As Game 3, but for every pip returned by HashCHET, also record the value r so
that p = e(gr1, h) in R[p]← r. This change is conceptual.
Game 5: As Game 4, but for pk∗ output by the adversary one can extract x so that
gx2 = h. If the extraction fails, abort. Both games proceed identically, unless the abort event
happens. This can only happen with negligible probability due to the extractability property of
the proof system.
Game 6: As Game 5, but obtain a DL instance (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, gt2), perform
the setup with respect to (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) and further modify HashCHET as follows:
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HashCHET. To hash m w.r.t. pkCH = (h, pipk, pkENC) do:
...
5. Let s← Z∗q, h′ ← (gt2)s .
...
Furthermore, keep the record S[h′]← s. This change is conceptual.
Game 7: As Game 6, but if pip or pi′p contained in r∗ = (p, C, pip) and r′∗ = (p′, C ′, pi′p) do
not correspond to a HashCHET answer obtain r and r′ using the extractor and set R[p]← r or
R[p′]← r′. If the extraction fails, abort. Both games proceed identical unless the abort event
happens. This only happens with negligible probability due to extractability property of the
proof system. For simplicity both extractions are collapsed in a single game change. It is easy
to unroll them into two separate game changes.
Now, if the adversary A outputs (m∗, r∗,m′∗, r′∗, h∗) such that h∗ = p ·e(ga1 , h′) = p′ ·e(ga′1 , h′)
in Game 7, B proceeds as follows. By definition, it holds that grx+atsT = gr
′x+a′ts
T (Note, gts = h′
in both cases, which, by definition, needs to be returned by the HashCHET oracle, and thus
s = S[h′] is known). It follows that rx + ats = r′x + a′ts is true. As all variables but t are
now known (the values for r and r′ can be obtained from R), it holds that t can be calculated
and returned as DL solution unless a = a′, which would however imply a collision for the hash
function. All intermediate game changes are negligible, which concludes the proof.
Note, IND-CCA2-security is required in the construction, as the adaption algorithm acts as
a decryption oracle. Moreover, the construction does not achieve uniqueness, as the holder of
skCH can always derive new randomness, e.g., by re-encrypting r1. This also true for the first
construction in known-order groups.
6.4 A Small Note on Chameleon-Signatures
Chameleon-Signatures have been introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin at NDSS ’00 [KR00b].
In a nutshell, the sender hashes the message m to be signed using the public key pkCH of a
chameleon-hash with fresh randomness r. The resulting hash is then signed using a standard
digital signature scheme. The randomness r, the signature σ, and the message m is then
transferred to the receiver using a secure channel. As the receiver has the corresponding secret
key skCH of the chameleon-hash, it can create arbitrary collisions. Thus, following the reasoning
of Krawczyk and Rabin [KR00b], the signature becomes “non-transferable” in the sense that
the intended recipient cannot present the received signature to another third party, as the third
party cannot decide whether the recipient used its secret key skCH to create a collision, i.e.,
created a new signature on a new message m′. Hence, their construction inherently requires
that a PKI vouches for the fact that the recipient actually knows skCH (which they state), and
thus does not choose it in way that it can prove to a third party that it does not know skCH,
e.g., by letting pkCH be defined as the output of a random oracle. This represents, to a certain
point, a “rogue key”-attack [RY07].
From a practical perspective, this can be solved very easily. In particular, the owner of the
public key needs to attach a proof pi, e.g., a NIZKPoK, that is knows the corresponding secret
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key. This also removes, depending on the NIZKPoK, the need for a trusted third party, ignoring
some potential setup assumptions, e.g., a common reference string or the like. How these proofs
can be exactly be realized depends on the instantiation of the chameleon-hash in question and
is not part of this note.
6.5 Application: Invisible Sanitizable Signatures
Informally, security of digital signatures requires that a signature σ on a message m becomes
invalid as soon as a single bit of m is altered [GMR88]. However, there are many real-life use-
cases in which a subsequent change to signed data by a semi-trusted party without invalidating
the signature is desired. As a simplified example, consider a patient record which is signed by a
medical doctor. The accountant, which charges the insurance company, only requires knowledge
of the treatments and the patient’s insurance number. This protects the patient’s privacy. In
this constellation, having the data re-signed by the M.D. whenever subsets of the record need to
be forwarded to some party induces too much overhead to be practical in real scenarios or may
even be impossible due to availability constraints.
Sanitizable signature schemes (SSS) [ACdMT05] address these shortcomings. They allow the
signer to determine which blocks m[i] of a given message m = (m[1],m[2], . . . ,m[i], . . . ,m[`])
are admissible. Any such admissible block can be changed to a different bitstring m[i]′ ∈
{0, 1}∗, where i ∈ [1, `], by a semi-trusted party named the sanitizer. This party is iden-
tified by a private/public key pair and the sanitization process described before requires
the private key. In a nutshell, sanitization of a message m results in an altered message
m′ = (m[1]′,m[2]′, . . . ,m[i]′, . . . ,m[`]′), where m[i] = m[i]′ for every non-admissible block, and
also a signature σ′, which verifies under the original public key. Thus, authenticity of the message
is still ensured. In the prior example, for the server storing the data it is possible to already
black-out the sensitive parts of a signed document without any additional communication with
the M.D. and in particular without access to the signing key of the M.D.
Real-world applications of SSSs include the already mentioned privacy-preserving handling
of patient data, secure routing, privacy-preserving document disclosure, credentials, and blank
signatures [ACdMT05,BFLS10,BPS12,BPS13,CL13,DHS14,DHS14].
6.5.1 Contribution
This section introduces the notion of invisible SSSs. This strong privacy notion requires that a
third party not holding any secret keys cannot decide whether a specific block is admissible,
i.e., can be sanitized. This has already been discussed by Ateniese et al. [ACdMT05] in the
first work on sanitizable signatures, but they neither provide a formal framework nor a provably
secure construction. However, some use-cases are identified where such a notion is important,
and this gap is closed by introducing a new framework for SSSs, along with an extended security
model. Moreover, a construction is proposed, which is provably secure in the new framework.
The construction paradigm is based on IND-CPA secure encryption schemes, standard, yet
unique, chameleon-hashes and strongly unforgeable signature schemes. These can be considered
standard tools nowadays. Those are paired with a chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors.
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6.5.2 Motivation
At PKC ’09, Brzuska et al. formalized the most common security model of SSSs [BFF+09]. For
this work, the most important property they are addressing is “weak transparency”. It means
that although a third party sees which blocks of a message are admissible, it cannot decide
whether some block has already been sanitized by a sanitizer. More precisely, their formalization
explicitly requires that the third party is always able to decide whether a given block in a
message is admissible. However, as this may invade privacy, having a construction which hides
this additional information is useful as well. To address this problem the notion of “strong
transparency” has been informally proposed in the original work by Ateniese et al. [ACdMT05].
Examples. To make the usefulness of such a stronger privacy property more visible, consider
the following two application scenarios.
In the first scenario, consider that a document is the output of a workflow that requires
several—potentially heavy—computations to become ready. It is assumed that the output
of each workflow step could be produced by one party alone, but could also be outsourced.
However, if the party decides to outsource the production of certain parts of the document it
wants the potential involvement of other parties to stay hidden, e.g., the potential and actual
outsourcing might be considered a trade secret. In order to regain some control that all tasks are
done only by authorized subordinates, the document—containing template parts—is signed with
a sanitizable signature. Such an approach, i.e., to use SSS for workflow control, was proposed
by Derler et al. [DHPS15].
The second one is motivated by an ongoing legal debate in Germany.8 Consider a school
class where a pupil suffers from dyslexia9 and thus can apply for additional help to compensate
the illness. One way to compensate this is to consider spelling mistakes less when giving grades.
Assume that only the school’s principal shall decide to what extent a certain grade shall be
improved. Of course, this shall only be possible for pupils who are actually handicapped. For
the pupil with dyslexia, e.g., known to the teacher of the class in question, the grade is marked
as sanitizable by the principal. The legal debate in Germany is about an outsider, e.g., future
employer, who should not be able to decide that grades had the potential to be altered and
of course also not see for which pupils the grades have been altered to preserve their privacy.
To achieve this, standard sanitizable signature schemes are clearly not enough, as they do not
guarantee that an outsider cannot derive which blocks are potentially sanitizable, i.e., which
pupil is actually handicapped. The presented primitive offers a solution to this challenge, where
an outsider cannot decide which block is admissible, i.e., can be altered.
6.5.3 State-of-the-Art
SSSs have been introduced by Ateniese et al. [ACdMT05]. Brzuska et al. formalized most
of the current security properties [BFF+09]. These have been later extended for (strong)
unlinkability [BFLS10, BPS13, FKM+16] and non-interactive public accountability [BPS12,
BPS13]. Some properties discussed by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09] have then been refined by Gong
8See for example the ruling from the German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) 29.07.2015, Az.: 6 C
33.14, 6 C 35.14.
9A disorder involving difficulty in learning to read or interpret words, letters and other symbols.
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et al. [GQZ10]. Namely, they also consider the admissible blocks in the security games, while
still requiring that these are visible to everyone. Recently, Krenn et al. further refined the
security properties to also account for the signatures, not only the message [KSS15].10 The
aforementioned results are used as the starting point for the extended definitions introduced in
this chapter, as they cover most use-cases.
Also, several extensions such as limiting the sanitizer to signer-chosen values [CJ10,DS15,
KL06, PSP11], trapdoor SSSs (which allow to add new sanitizers after signature generation
by the signer) [CLM08, YSL10], multi-sanitizer and -signer environments for SSSs [BFLS09,
BPS13, CJL12], and sanitization of signed and encrypted data [FF15] have been considered.
SSSs have also been used as a tool to make other primitives accountable [PS15], and to build
other primitives [BHPS16,dMPPS14]. Also, SSSs and data-structures being more complex than
lists have been considered [PSP11]. Our results carry over to the aforementioned extended
settings with only minor additional adjustments. Implementations of SSSs have also been
presented [BPS12,BPS13,dMPPS13,PPS+13].
Of course, computing on signed messages is a broad field. This introduction can therefore only
give a small overview. Decent and comprehensive overviews of other related primitives, however,
have already been published [ABC+15,BPS17,BBD+10,DDH+15,GGOT16,GOT15,TDB16]. It
is stressed, howeverm that this list is, by far, not exhaustive.
6.5.4 The Framework for Sanitizable Signature Schemes
Subsequently, the framework for SSSs is introduced. The definitions are based on existing
work [BFF+09, BPS12, BPS13, GQZ10, KSS15]. However, due to the new goals, they were
modifed to account for the fact that the admissible blocks are only visible to the sanitizer.
Moreover, the property of “non-interactive public accountability” [BPS12,BPS13,HPS12] is not
considered, which allows a third party to decide which party is accountable, as transparency is
mutually exclusive to this property, but is elegantly to achieve, e.g., by signing the sanitizable
signature again [BPS12]. For the sake of completeness, the definitions which are omitted in the
following are provided in Appendix J.
Before the formal definition are presented, some additional notation is required. The variable
ADM contains the set of indices of the modifiable blocks, as well as the number ` of blocks
in a message m. Moreover, ADM(m) = true, if ADM is valid w.r.t. m, i.e., ADM contains
the correct ` and all indices are in m. For example, let ADM = ({1, 2, 4}, 4). Then, m must
contain four blocks, while all but the third will be admissible. The notation mi ∈ ADM means
that mi is admissible. MOD is a set containing pairs (i,m[i]′) for those blocks that shall be
modified, meaning that m[i] is replaced with m[i]′. Likewise, the notation MOD(ADM) = true
means that MOD is valid w.r.t. ADM, meaning that the indices to be modified are contained in
ADM. To allow a compact presentation of the construction, let X˜n,m with n ≤ m be the vector
(Xn, Xn+1, Xn+2, . . . , Xm−1, Xm).
Definition 6.25 (Sanitizable Signatures). A sanitizable signature scheme SSS consists of
the following eight PPT algorithms (PPGenSSS,KeyGenSigSSS,KeyGenSanSSS, SignSSS, SanitSSS,VerifySSS,
ProofSSS, JudgeSSS) such that
10Note, Krenn et al. [KSS15] also introduce “strong transparency”, which is not related to the definition given
by Ateniese et al. [ACdMT05].
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PPGenSSS. The algorithm PPGenSSS, on input security parameter λ, generates the public param-
eters:
ppSSS ← PPGenSSS(1λ)
It is assumed that ppSSS is implicitly input to all other algorithms.
KeyGenSigSSS. The algorithm KeyGenSigSSS takes the public parameters ppSSS and returns the signer’s
private key and the corresponding public key:
(pkSigSSS, skSigSSS)
$← KeyGenSigSSS(ppSSS)
KeyGenSanSSS. The algorithm KeyGenSanSSS takes the public parameters ppSSS and returns the sani-
tizer’s private key and the corresponding public key:
(pkSanSSS, skSanSSS)
$← KeyGenSanSSS(ppSSS)
SignSSS. The algorithm SignSSS takes as input a message m, skSigSSS, pkSanSSS, as well as a description
ADM of the admissible blocks. If ADM(m) = false, this algorithm returns ⊥. It outputs a
signature
σ
$← SignSSS(m, skSigSSS, pkSanSSS,ADM)
SanitSSS. The algorithm SanitSSS takes a message m, modification instruction MOD, a signature
σ, pkSigSSS and skSanSSS. It outputs m′ together with σ′:
(m′, σ′)← SanitSSS(m,MOD, σ, pkSigSSS, skSanSSS)
Here, m′ ← MOD(m) is message m modified according to the modification instruction
MOD.
VerifySSS. The algorithm VerifySSS takes as input the signature σ for a message m w.r.t. the
public keys pkSigSSS and pkSanSSS. It outputs a decision d ∈ {true, false}:
d← VerifySSS(m,σ, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS)
ProofSSS. The algorithm ProofSSS takes as input skSigSSS, a message m, a signature σ, a set of
polynomially many additional message/signature pairs {(mi, σi)}, and pkSanSSS. It outputs a
string pi ∈ {0, 1}∗ which can be used by the JudgeSSS to decide which party is accountable
given a message/signature pair (m,σ):
pi ← ProofSSS(skSigSSS,m, σ, {(mi, σi) | i ∈ N}, pkSanSSS)
JudgeSSS. The algorithm JudgeSSS takes as input a message m, a signature σ, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS, as
well as a proof pi. Note, this means that once a proof pi is generated, the accountable party
can be derived by anyone for that message/signature pair (m,σ). It outputs a decision
d ∈ {Signer, Sanitizer}, indicating whether the message/signature pair has been created by
the signer, or the sanitizer:
d← JudgeSSS(m,σ, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS, pi)













for i = 1, 2, . . . , q let (mi, pkSanSSS,i,ADMi) and σi
index the queries/answers to/from SignSSS
for j = 1, 2, . . . , q′ let (mj, σj, pkSigSSS,j,MODj) and (m′j, σ′j)
index the queries/answers to/from SanitSSS
return 1, if Verify(m∗, σ∗, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS) = true ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} : (pkSanSSS,m∗, σ∗) 6= (pkSanSSS,i,mi, σi) ∧
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q′} : (pkSigSSS,m∗, σ∗) 6= (pkSigSSS,j,m′j, σ′j)
return 0
Figure 6.8: SSS Unforgeability
Correctness of Sanitizable Signature Schemes. The usual correctness requirements must
hold. In a nutshell, every signed and sanitized message/signature pair should verify, while a
honestly generated proof on a honestly generated message/signature pair should point to the
correct accountable party. A formal definition was given by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09], which
straightforwardly extends to this framework.
6.5.5 Security of Sanitizable Signature Schemes
Next, the formal security model is introduced, where our definitions already incorporate newer
insights [BFF+09, BPS13, GQZ10, KSS15]. In particular, mostly the “strong” definitions by
Krenn et al. [KSS15] are considered as the new state-of-the-art, as they also capture malleability
of the signatures. Moreover, also the data-structure corresponding to the admissible blocks, i.e.,
ADM, is an asset which needs protection, which addresses the work done by Gong et al. [GQZ10].
6.5.5.1 Unforgeability
The first notion introduced is unforgeability. This definition requires that an adversary A not
having any secret keys is not able to produce any validating signature σ∗ which it has not seen,
even if A has full oracle access.
Definition 6.26 (Unforgeability). An SSS is unforgeable, if for any PPT adversary A there
exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[UnforgeabilitySSSA (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure 6.8.











for i = 1, 2, . . . , q let (mi, pkSanSSS,i,ADMi) index the queries to SignSSS
return 1, if VerifySSS(m∗, σ∗, pkSigSSS, pk∗) = true ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} : (pk∗ 6= pkSanSSS,i ∨
m∗ /∈ {MOD(mi) | MOD with ADMi(MOD) = 1})
return 0
Figure 6.9: SSS Immutability
6.5.5.2 Immutability
Clearly, a sanitizer should only be able to sanitize the admissible blocks defined by ADM. This
therefore also prohibits deleting or appending blocks from a given message. Moreover, the
adversary is given full oracle access, while it is also allowed to generate the sanitizer key pair
itself. Note, it is not required that the adversary cannot find any new signatures, as finding new
signatures is clearly required due to the correctness of any SSS.
Definition 6.27 (Immutability). An SSS is immutable, if for any PPT adversary A there exists
a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[ImmutabilitySSSA (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure 6.9.
6.5.5.3 Privacy
The notion of privacy is related to the indistinguishability of ciphertexts. The adversary is
allowed to input two messages with the same ADM which are sanitized to the exact same
message. Afterwards, the adversary has to decide which message (left or right) was used to
generate the sanitized one. The adversary receives full adaptive oracle access.
Definition 6.28 (Privacy). An SSS is private, if for any PPT adversary A there exists a
negligible function ν such that∣∣∣∣Pr[PrivacySSSA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure 6.10.
6.5.5.4 Transparency
Transparency guarantees that the accountable party of a message m remains anonymous. This
is important if discrimination may follow [ACdMT05,BFF+09]. In a nutshell, the adversary




















where oracle LoRSanit on input of m0,MOD0,m1,MOD1,ADM, skSigSSS, skSanSSS and b
return ⊥, if MOD0(m0) 6= MOD1(m1) ∨ ADM(m0) 6= ADM(m1)
let σ $← SignSSS(mb, skSigSSS, pkSanSSS,ADM)
return (m′, σ′) $← SanitSSS(mb,MODb, σ, pkSigSSS, skSanSSS)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 6.10: SSS Privacy
has to decide whether it sees a freshly signed signature, or a sanitized one. The adversary has
full (but proof-restricted) adaptive oracle access. The proof-restriction is necessary to avoid
trivial attacks. Moreover, the definition was adjusted to account for some subtleties regarding
the restrictions of the proof oracle, in the sense of Bellare et al. for IND-CCA2 security [BHK15].
This has also been mentioned in a non-formal way by Derler and Slamanig [DS15].
Definition 6.29 ((Proof-Restricted) Transparency). An SSS is proof-restricted transparent, if
for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣∣Pr[TransparencySSSA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure 6.11.
For the rest of the paper, “transparency” is written, even if proof-restricted transparency is
meant. Moreover, our construction actually achieves the stronger notion of transparency, with
the same arguments given by Brzuska et al. [BFLS10]. However, the proof-restricted version
seems to be more natural.
6.5.5.5 Signer-Accountability
For signer-accountability, a signer should not be able to blame a sanitizer if the sanitizer is
actually not responsible for a given message/signature pair never issued by the sanitizer. Hence,
the adversary A has to generate a proof pi∗ which makes JudgeSSS to decide that the sanitizer is
accountable, if it is not for a message m∗ output by A. Here, the adversary gains access to all
oracles related to sanitizing. Note, this definition does not take the signature into account.
Definition 6.30 (Signer-Accountability). An SSS is signer-accountable, if for any PPT adver-
sary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[Sig-AccountabilitySSSA (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)























where oracle ProofSSS′ on input of skSigSSS,m, σ, {(mi, σi) | i ∈ N} and pkSanSSS′:
return ⊥, if pkSanSSS′ = pkSanSSS ∧ ((m,σ) ∈ Q ∨ Q ∩ {(mi, σi)} 6= ∅)
return ProofSSS(skSigSSS,m, σ, {(mi, σi)}, pkSanSSS′)
where oracle SigOrSan on input of m,MOD,ADM, skSigSSS, skSanSSS and b:
σ
$← SignSSS(m, skSigSSS, pkSanSSS,ADM)
(m′, σ′) $← SanitSSS(m,MOD, σ, pkSigSSS, skSanSSS)
if b = 1:
σ′ $← SignSSS(m′, skSigSSS, pkSanSSS,ADM)
If σ′ 6= ⊥, set Q ← Q∪ {(m′, σ′)}
return (m′, σ′)
return 1, if a = b
return 0






(pk∗, pi∗,m∗, σ∗) $← AOSanitSSS(·,·,·,·,sk
San
SSS)(pkSanSSS)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , q let (m′i, σ′i) and (mi,MODi, σi, pkSigSSS,i)
index the answers/queries from/to SanitSSS
return 1, if VerifySSS(m∗, σ∗, pk∗, pkSanSSS) = true ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} : (pk∗,m∗) 6= (pkSigSSS,i,m′i) ∧
JudgeSSS(m∗, σ∗, pk∗, pkSanSSS, pi∗) = Sanitizer
return 0
Figure 6.12: SSS Signer Accountability
where the experiment is defined in Figure 6.12.
Note, the adversary generates the signer public-key by itself and thus only receives access to
the oracle related to sanitizing, but needs to return the generated public key and the forged
proof.











for i = 1, 2, . . . , q let (mi,ADMi, pkSanSSS,i) and σi
index the queries/answers to/from SignSSS
pi
$← ProofSSS(skSigSSS,m∗, σ∗, {(mi, σi) | 0 < i ≤ q}, pk∗)
return 1, if VerifySSS(m∗, σ∗, pkSigSSS, pk∗) = true ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} : (pk∗,m∗, σ∗) 6= (pkSanSSS,i,mi, σi) ∧
JudgeSSS(m∗, σ∗, pkSigSSS, pk∗, pi) = Signer
return 0
Figure 6.13: SSS Sanitizer Accountability
6.5.5.6 Sanitizer-Accountability
Sanitizer-accountability requires that the sanitizer cannot blame the signer for a particular
message/signature pair not created by the signer. In particular, the adversary has to make
ProofSSS generate a proof pi which makes JudgeSSS decide that for a given (m∗, σ∗) generated
by A the signer is accountable, while it is not. Thus, the adversary A gains access to all
signer-related oracles.
Definition 6.31 (Sanitizer-Accountability). An SSS is sanitizer-accountable, if for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that
Pr[San-AccountabilitySSSA (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
where the experiment is defined in Figure 6.13. Note, the adversary generates the sanitizer
public-key by itself and receives full adaptive access to all signing-related oracles.
The notion of “non-interactive public accountability” [BPS12,BPS13,HPS12], which allows a
third party to decide which party is accountable, is not considered, as transparency is mutually
exclusive to this property, but is very easy to achieve, e.g., by signing the sanitizable signature
again [BPS12]. The notion of unlinkability [BFLS10,BPS13,FKM+16,LZCS16], is not considered,
as it seems to be hard to achieve with the underlying construction paradigm.
For completeness, these notions are given in Appendix J.
6.5.6 Invisibility of SSSs
Next, the new property of invisibility is introduced. Basically, invisibility requires that an outsider
cannot decide which blocks of a given message are admissible. The notation ADM0 ∩ ADM1
means the intersection of the admissible blocks, ignoring the length of the messages.
In a nutshell, the adversary can query an LoRADM oracle which either makes ADM0 or ADM1
admissible in the final signature. Of course, the adversary has to be restricted to ADM0 ∩ADM1




















where oracle LoRADM on input of m,ADM0,ADM1, pkSanSSS, skSigSSS and b:
return ⊥, if ADM0(m) 6= ADM1(m)
let σ ← SignSSS(m, skSigSSS, pkSanSSS′,ADMb)
let Q ← Q∪ {(m,σ,ADM0 ∩ ADM1)}
return σ
where oracle Sanit′SSS on input of m,MOD, σ, pkSigSSS and skSanSSS:
return ⊥, if @(m,σ,ADM) ∈ Q : MOD(ADM) = true
let (m′, σ′)← SanitSSS(m,MOD, σ, pkSigSSS, skSanSSS)
if ∃(m,σ,ADM′) ∈ Q : MOD(ADM′) = true,
let Q ← Q∪ {(m′, σ′,ADM′)}
return (m′, σ′)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 6.14: SSS Invisibility
for sanitization requests for signatures originating from those created by LoRADM and their
derivatives to avoid trivial attacks. The sign oracle can be simulated by querying the LoRADM
oracle with ADM0 = ADM1. It is stressed that the invisibility definition is very strong, as it also
takes the signatures into account, much like the definitions given by Krenn et al. [KSS15]. One
can easily alter the definition to only account for the messages in question, e.g., if one wants to
avoid strongly unforgeable signatures, or even allow re-randomizable signatures. An adjustment
is straightforward.
Definition 6.32 (Invisibility). An SSS is invisible, if for any efficient adversary A there exists
a negligible function ν such that∣∣∣∣Pr[InvisibilitySSSA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure 6.14.
It is obvious that invisibility is not implied by any other property. In a nutshell, taking
any secure SSS, it is sufficient to non-malleable append ADM to each block m[i] to prevent
invisibility. Clearly, all other properties of such a construction are still preserved.
Definition 6.33 (Secure SSS). An SSS is called secure, if it is correct, private, unforgeable,
immutable, sanitizer-accountable, signer-accountable, and invisible.
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Note, neither non-interactive public accountability nor unlinkability nor transparency are
considered as essential security requirements, as it depends on the concrete use-case whether
these properties are required.
6.5.7 Construction
Now the construction, based on the paradigm of Ateniese et al. [ACdMT05], is introduced.
It is enriched with several ideas of prior work [BFF+09, GQZ10, dMPPS13]. The main idea
is to hash each block using a chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors, and then sign the
hashes. The main trick introduced to limit the sanitizer is that only those sktdi are given to
the sanitizer, for which the respective block m[i] should be sanitizable. To hide whether a
given block is sanitizable, each sktdi is encrypted; a sanitizable block contains the real sktdi,
while a non-admissible block encrypts a 0, where 0 is assumed to be an invalid sktd. For
simplicity, it is required that the IND-CPA secure encryption scheme ENC allows that each
possible sktd, as well as 0, is in the message space MS of ENC, which can be achieved using
standard embedding and padding techniques, or using KEM/DEM combinations [AGK08].
To achieve accountability, additional “tags” for a “standard” chameleon-hash (which binds
everything together) are generated in a special way, namely PRFs and PRGs, which borrows
ideas from the construction given by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09].
Construction 6.34 (Secure and Transparent SSS). The secure and transparent SSS construction
is as follows:





3. Return ppSSS = (ppCHET, ppCH).
KeyGenSigSSS. To generate the key pair for the signer, do the following steps:
1. Let (pkSig, skSig)
$← KeyGenSig(1λ).
2. Pick a key for a PRF, i.e., κ $← KeyGenPRF(1λ).
3. Return ((κ, skSig), pkSig).
KeyGenSanSSS. To generate the key pair for the sanitizer, do the following steps:
1. Let (skCHET, pkCHET)
$← KeyGenCHET(ppCHET).
2. Let (skCH, pkCH)
$← KeyGenCH(ppCH).
3. Let (skENC, pkENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ).
4. Return ((skCH, skCH, skENC), (pkCHET, pkCH, pkENC)).
SignSSS. To generate a signature σ, on input of m = (m[1],m[2], . . . ,m[`]), skSigSSS = (κ, skSig),
pkSanSSS = (pkCH, pkCH, pkENC), and ADM do the following steps:
1. If ADM(m) 6= true, return ⊥.
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2. Draw x0 $← {0, 1}λ.
3. Let x′0 ← EvalPRF(κ, x0).
4. Let τ ← EvalPRG(x′0).
5. For each i ∈ [1, `] do:
(a) Set (hi, ri, sktdi) $← HashCHET(pkCH, (i,m[i], pkSigSSS)).
(b) If block i is not admissible, let sktdi ← 0.
(c) Compute ci ← EncENC(pkENC, sktdi).
6. Set (h0, r0) $← HashCH(pkCHET, (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS)).
7. Set σ′ $← SignSig(skSig, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, `)).
8. Return σ = (σ′, x0, r˜0,`, τ, c˜1,`, h˜0,`).
VerifySSS. To verify a signature σ = (σ′, x0, r˜0,`, τ, c˜1,`, h˜0,`), on input of m = (m[1],m[2], . . . ,
m[`]), w.r.t. to pkSigSSS = pkSigSSS and pkSanSSS = (pkCH, pkCH, pkENC), do:
1. For each i ∈ [1, `] do:
(a) Set bi ← CheckHashCHET(pkCHET, (i,m[i], pkSigSSS), ri, hi). If any bi = false, return
false.
2. Let b0 ← CheckCH(pkCH, (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS), r0, h0).
3. If b0 = false, return false.
4. Return d← VerifySig(pkSigSSS, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, `), σ′).
SanitSSS. To sanitize a signature σ = (σ′, x0, r˜0,`, τ, c˜1,`, h˜0,`), on input of m = (m[1],m[2], . . . ,
m[`]), w.r.t. to pkSigSSS = pkSigSSSs, skSanSSS = (skCH, skCH, skENC), and MOD do:
1. Verify the signature, i.e., run d← VerifySSS(m,σ, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS). If d = false, return ⊥.
2. Decrypt each ci for i ∈ [1, `], i.e., let sktdi ← DecENC(skENC, ci). If any decryption fails,
return ⊥.
3. For each index i ∈ MOD check that sktdi 6= 0. If not, return ⊥.
4. For each block m[i]′ ∈ MOD do:
(a) Let r′i
$← AdaptCHET(skCHET, (i,m[i], pkSigSSS), (i,m[i]′, pkSigSSS), ri, hi, sktdi).
(b) If r′i = ⊥, return ⊥.
5. For each block m[i]′ /∈ MOD do:
(a) Let r′i ← ri.
6. Let m′ ← MOD(m).
7. Draw τ ′ ← {0, 1}2λ.
8. Let r′0 ← AdaptCH(skCH, (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS), (0,m′, τ ′, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜′1,`, pkSigSSS),
r0, h0).
9. Return (m′, (σ′, x0, r˜′0,`, τ ′, c˜1,`, h˜0,`)).
ProofSSS. To create a proof pi, on input of m = (m[1],m[2], . . . ,m[`]), a signature σ, w.r.t. to
pkSanSSS and skSigSSS, and {(mi, σi) | i ∈ N} do:
1. Return ⊥, if false = VerifySSS(m,σ, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS).
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2. Verify each signature in the list, i.e., run di ← VerifySSS(mi, σi, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS). If for any
di = false, return ⊥.
3. Go through the list of (mi, σi) and find a (non-trivial) colliding tuple of the chameleon-
hash with (m,σ), i.e., h0 = h′0, where also true = CheckCH(pkCH, (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`,
pkSigSSS), r0, h0), and true = CheckCH(pkCH, (0,m′, τ ′, `, h˜′1,`, c˜′1,`, r˜′1,`, pkSigSSS), r′0, h′0) for
some different tag τ ′ or message m′. Let this signature/message pair be (σ′,m′) ∈
{(mi, σi) | i ∈ N}.
4. Return pi = ((σ′,m′),EvalPRF(κ, x0)), where x0 is contained in (σ,m).
JudgeSSS. To find the accountable party on input of m = (m[1],m[2], . . . ,m[`]), a valid signature
σ, w.r.t. to pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, and a proof pi do:
1. Check if pi is of the form ((σ′,m′), v) with v ∈ {0, 1}λ. If not, return Signer.
2. Also return ⊥, if false = VerifySSS(m′, σ′, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS), or false = VerifySSS(m,σ, pkSigSSS,
pkSanSSS).
3. Let τ ′′ ← EvalPRG(v).
4. If τ ′ 6= τ ′′, return Signer.
5. If we have a (non-trivial) collision h0 = h′0, true = CheckCH(pkCH, (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`,
c˜1,`, pkSigSSS), r0, h0) = CheckCH(pkCH, (0,m′, τ ′, `′, h˜′1,`′ , c˜′1,`′ , pkSigSSS), r′0, h′0), c˜1,` = c˜′1,`′,
x0 = x′0, ` = `′, and h˜0,` = h˜′0,`′, return Sanitizer.
6. Return Signer.
Theorem 6.35. If ENC is IND-CPA secure, DSIG, PRF, PRG, CHET are secure, CH is secure
and unique, Construction 6.34 is a secure and transparent SSS.
Note, CHET is not required to be unique.
Each property is proven on its own.
Proof. Correctness follows by inspection.
Unforgeability. To prove that the scheme is unforgeable, a sequence of games is used:
Game 0: The original unforgeability game




∗, c˜∗1,`∗ , h˜
∗
0,`∗), where (σ′∗, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, `)) was never obtained from the sign
or sanitizing oracle. Let this event be E1. Clearly, if (σ′∗, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, `)) was
never obtained by the challenger, this tuple breaks the strong unforgeability of the underlying
signature scheme. The reduction works as follows. We obtain a challenge public key pkc from a
strong unforgeability challenger and embed it as pkSigSSS. For every required “inner” signature
σ′, use the signing oracle provided by the challenger. Now, whenever E1 happens, output σ′∗
together with the message protected by σ′∗ as a forgery to the challenger. That is, E1 happens
with exactly the same probability as a forgery. Further, both games proceed identically, unless
E1 happens.
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Game 2: Among others, it is now established that the adversary can no longer win by
modifying pkSigSSS and pkSanSSS. Now proceed as in Game 1, but abort if the adversary outputs a
forgery (m∗, σ∗), where message m∗ or any of the other values protected by the outer chameleon-
hash were never returned by the signer or the sanitizer oracle. Let this event be E2. The
probability of the abort event E2 to happen is exactly the probability of the adversary breaking
collision freeness for the outer chameleon-hash. Namely, it is already established that the
adversary cannot tamper with the inner signature and therefore the hash value h∗0 must be from
a previous oracle query. Now, assume that one obtains pk′ch from a collision freeness challenger.
If E2 happens, there must be a previous oracle query with associated values (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`,
r˜1,`, pkSigSSS) and r0 so that h∗0 is a valid hash with respect to some those values and r0. Further,
it also holds that (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS) 6= (0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ , pkSigSSS), and can
thus output ((0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ , pkSigSSS), r∗0, (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS), r0, h∗0) as the
collision. Thus, the probability that E2 happens is exactly the probability of a collision for the
chameleon-hash. Both games proceed identically, unless E2 happens.
Game 3: As Game 2, but abort if the adversary outputs a forgery where only the
randomness r0 changed, i.e., there is previously generated signature with respect to r0 so that
r0 6= r∗0. Let this be event be E3. If the abort event E3 happens, the adversary breaks uniqueness
of the chameleon-hash. In particular, one receives values (0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ , pkSigSSS) in
the forgery which also correspond to some previous query, but r0 from the previous query is
different from r∗0. Obtaining ppCH from a uniqueness challenger thus shows that E3 happens
with exactly the same probability as the adversary breaks uniqueness of the chameleon hash.
In the last Game, the adversary can no longer win the unforgeability Game; this Game is
computationally indistinguishable from the original Game, which concludes the proof.
Immutability. Now is proven that the above construction is immutable using a sequence of
games.
Game 0: The immutability game.




∗, c˜∗1,`∗ , h˜
∗
0,`∗) where (σ′∗, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, `)) was never obtained from the sign
oracle. Let E1 be the abort event. Clearly, if (σ′∗, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pkSanSSS, pkSigSSS, `)) was never obtained
by the challenger, this tuple breaks the strong unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme.
The reduction works as follows. We obtain a challenge public key pkc from a strong unforgeability
challenger and embed it as pkSigSSS. For every required “inner” signature σ′, use the signing oracle
provided by the challenger. Now, whenever E1 happens, one can output σ′∗ together with the
message protected by σ′∗ as a forgery to the challenger. That is, E1 happens with exactly the
same probability as a forgery of the underlying signature scheme. Further, both games proceed
identically, unless E1 happens.
Game 2: As Game 1, but the challenger aborts, if the message m∗ is not derivable from any
returned signature. Note, it is already known that tampering with the signatures is not possible,
and thus pkSigSSS, and pkSanSSS, are fixed. The same is true for deleting or appending blocks, as ` is
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signed in every case. Let this event be denoted E2. Now assume that E2 is non-negligible. One
can then construct an adversary B which breaks the private collision-resistance of the underlying
chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors. Let the signature returned be σ∗ = (σ′∗, x∗0, r˜∗0,`∗ , τ˜ ∗,
c˜∗1,`∗ , h˜
∗
0,`∗), while A’s public key is pk∗. Due to prior game hops, it is known that A cannot tamper




h˜∗0,`∗) returned by the signing oracle. This, however, also implies that there must exists an index
i ∈ [1, `∗], for which one has CheckHashCHET(pkCH, (i,m∗[i], pkSigSSS), r∗i , h∗i ) = CheckHashCHET(
pkCH, (i,m′∗[i], pkSigSSS), r′∗i , h∗i ) = true, where m∗[i] 6= m′∗[i] by assumption. B proceeds as follows.
Let qh be the number of “inner hashes” created. Draw an index i $← [1, qh]. For a query i 6= j,
proceed as in the algorithms. If i = j, however, B returns the current public key pkc for the
chameleon-hash with ephemeral trapdoors. This key is contained in pkSanSSS∗. B then receives
back control, and queries its HashCHET oracle with (i,m[i], pkSigSSS), where i is the current index of
the message m to be signed. Then, if ((i,m∗[i], pkSigSSS), r∗i , (i,m′∗[i], pkSigSSS), r′∗i , h∗i ) is the collision
w.r.t. pkc, it can directly return it.
As each hop changes the view of the adversary only negligibly, immutability is proven, as
the adversary has no other way to break immutability in Game 2.
Privacy. Now privacy is proven, again using a sequence of games.
Game 0: The original privacy game.
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the adversary queries a verifying message-signature
pair (m∗, σ∗) which was never returned by the signer or the sanitizer oracle, and queries it to
the sanitization or proof generation oracle. Let E1 be the abort event. Clearly, whenever the
adversary queries such a new pair, one can output it to break the unforgeability of the scheme,
as this tuple is fresh. However, it was already proven that this can only happen with negligible
probability.
Game 2: As Game 1, but instead of hashing the blocks (i,mb[i], pkSigSSS) for the inner
chameleon-hashes using HashCHET, and then AdaptCH to (i,m[i], pkSigSSS), directly apply HashCHET
to (i,m[i], pkSigSSS). Assume that the adversary can distinguish this hop. One can then construct
an adversary B which wins the indistinguishability game B receives pkc as it’s own challenge, B
embeds pkc as pkCH, and proceeds honestly with the exception that it uses the HashOrAdapt
oracle to generate the inner hashes. Then, whatever A outputs, is also output by B.
Game 3: As Game 2, but instead of adapting (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS) to the new
values, directly use HashCHET. Assume that the adversary can distinguish this hop. One can then
construct an B which wins the indistinguishability game B receives pkc as it’s own challenge, B
embeds pkc as pkCH, and proceeds honestly with the exception that it uses the HashOrAdapt
oracle to generate the outer hashes. Then, whatever A outputs, is also output by B.
Clearly, the game is now independent of the bit b. As each hop changes the view of the
adversary only negligibly, privacy is proven.
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Transparency. Now transparency is proven by showing that the distributions of sanitized
and fresh signatures are indistinguishable. Note, the adversary is not allowed to query ProofSSS
for values generated by SigOrSan.
Game 0: The original transparency Game, where b = 0.
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the adversary queries a valid message-signature pair
(m∗, σ∗) which was never returned by any of the calls to the sanitization or signature generation
oracle. Let us use E1 to refer to the abort event. Clearly, whenever the adversary queries such
a new pair, one can output it to break the unforgeability of the scheme, as this tuple is fresh. A
reduction is straightforward.
Game 2: As Game 1, but instead of computing x′0 ← EvalPRF(λ, x0), set x′0 ← {0, 1}λ
within every call to SignSSS in the SigOrSan oracle. A distinguisher between these two games
straightfowardly yields a distinguisher for the PRF.
Game 3: As Game 2, but instead of computing τ ← EvalPRG(x′0) , set τ $← {0, 1}2λ for
every call to SignSSS within the SigOrSan oracle. A distinguisher between these two games yields
a distinguisher for the PRG using a standard hybrid argument.
Game 4: As Game 3, but abort if a tag τ was drawn twice. Let this event be E4. As the
tags τ are drawn completely random, event E4 only happens with probability q
2
t
22λ , where qt is
the number of drawn tags.
Game 5: As Game 4, but instead of hash and then adapting the inner chameleon-hashes,
directly hash (i,m[i], pkSigSSS). Assume that the adversary can distinguish this hop. One can
then construct an B which wins the indistinguishability game In particular, the reduction works
as follows. B receives pkc as it’s own challenge, B embeds pkc as pkCH, and proceeds honestly
except that it uses the HashOrAdapt oracle to generate the inner hashes. Then, whatever A
outputs, is also output by B.
Game 6: As Game 5, but instead of hashing and then adapting the outer hash, directly
hash the message, i.e., (0,m, τ, `, h˜1,`, c˜1,`, r˜1,`, pkSigSSS). Assume that the adversary can distinguish
this hop. We can then construct an B which wins the indistinguishability game In particular,
the reduction works as follows. B receives pkc as it’s own challenge, embeds pkc as pkCH, and
proceeds honestly with the exception that it uses the HashOrAdapt oracle to generate the outer
hashes. Then, whatever A outputs, is also output by B.
Clearly, now b = 1 holds, while each hop changes the view of the adversary only negligibly.
This concludes the proof.
Signer-Accountability. Now is proven that the construction is signer-accountable using a
sequence of games.
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Game 0: The original signer-accountability game
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the sanitization oracle draws a tag τ ′ which is in the
range of the PRG. Let this event be E1. This hop is indistinguishable by a standard statistical
argument: at most 2λ values lie in the range of the PRG. Note, this also means, that there
exists no valid pre-image x0.
Game 2: As Game 1, but now abort, if the adversary was able to find (pk∗, pi∗,m∗, σ∗) for
some message m∗ with a τ ∗ which was never returned by the sanitization oracle. Let this event
be E2. The previous games have already established that the sanitizer oracle will never return a
signature with respect to a tag τ in the range of the PRG. Thus, if event E2 happens, one knows
by the condition checked in step 4 of JudgeSSS that at least one of the tags (either τ ∗ in σ∗, or
τpi in pi∗) was chosen by the adversary, which, in further consequence, implies a collision for CH.
Namely, assume that E3 happens with non-negligible probability. Then embed the challenge
public key pkc in pk′CH, and use the provided adaption oracle to simulate the sanitizer oracle. If
E3 happens one can output ((0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ , pk∗), r∗0, (0,m′∗, τ ′∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜1,`, r˜∗1,`∗ ,
pk∗), r′∗0 , h∗0), as a valid collision. These values can simply be compiled using pi∗, m∗, and σ∗.
Game 3: As Game 2, but now abort, if the adversary was able to find (pk∗, pi∗,m∗, σ∗)
for a new message m∗ which was never returned by the sanitization oracle. Let this event be
E3. Assume that E3 happens with non-negligible probability. In the previous games it was
already established that the only remaining possibility for the adversary is to re-use tags τ ∗, τpi
corresponding to some query/response to the sanitizer oracle. Then, m∗ must be fresh, as it was
never returned by the sanitization oracle by assumption. Thus, ((0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ ,
pk∗), r∗0, (0,m′∗, τ ′∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜1,`, r˜∗1,`∗ , pk∗), r′∗0 , h∗0), is a valid collision. These values can simply
be compiled using pi∗, m∗, and σ∗.
In the last Game the adversary can no longer win; each hop only changes the view negligibly.
This concludes the proof.
Sanitizer-Accountability. That the construction is sanitizer-accountable is proven by a
sequence of games.
Game 0: The original sanitizer-accountability definition.
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the adversary outputs a forgery (m∗, σ∗, pk∗) with
σ∗ = (σ′∗, x∗0, r˜∗0,`∗ , τ˜ ∗, c˜∗1,`∗ , h˜∗0,`∗) where (σ′∗, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pk∗, pkSigSSS, `)) was never obtained from
the signing oracle. Let the abort event be E1. Clearly, if (σ′∗, (x0, h˜0,`, c˜1,`, pk∗, pkSigSSS, `)) was
never obtained by the challenger, this tuple breaks the strong unforgeability of the underlying
signature scheme. The reduction works as follows. We obtain a challenge public key pkc from a
strong unforgeability challenger and embed it as pkSigSSS. For every required “inner” signature
σ′, use the signing oracle provided by the challenger. Now, whenever E1 happens, one can
output σ′∗ together with the message protected by σ′∗ as a forgery to the challenger. That is, E1
happens with exactly the same probability as a forgery. Further, both games proceed identically,
unless E1 happens.
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Game 2: As Game 1, but abort if the adversary outputs a forgery where only the
randomness r0 changed, i.e., there is previously generated signature with respect to r0 so that
r0 6= r∗0. Let this event be E2. If the abort event E2 happens, the adversary breaks uniqueness
of the chameleon-hash. In particular, one has values (0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ , pkSigSSS) in the
forgery which also correspond to some previous query, but r0 from the previous query is different
from r∗0. Obtaining ppCH from a uniqueness challenger thus shows that E2 happens with exactly
the same probability as the adversary breaks uniqueness of the chameleon hash.
In Game 2 the forgery is different from any query/answer tuple obtained using SignSSS
by definition. Due to the previous hops, the only remaining possibility is a collision in the
outer chameleon-hash, i.e., for h∗0 = h′∗0 one has HashCH(pk′∗, (0,m∗, τ ∗, `∗, h˜∗1,`∗ , c˜∗1,`∗ , r˜∗1,`∗ , pkSigSSS),
r∗0, h
∗
0) = HashCH(pk′∗, (0,m′∗, τ ′∗, `′∗, h˜′∗1,`′∗ , c˜′∗1,`′∗ , r˜′∗1,`′∗ , pkSigSSS), r′∗0 , h′∗0 ) = true. In this case the
JudgeSSS algorithm returns Sanitizer and Pr[S2] = 0 which concludes the proof.
Invisibility. Now is proven that the construction is invisible by a sequence of games. The
idea is to show that one can simulate the view of the adversary without giving out any useful
information at all.
Game 0: The original invisibility Game, i.e., the challenger runs the experiment as defined.
Game 1: As Game 0, but abort if the adversary queries a valid message-signature pair
(m∗, σ∗) which was never returned by the signer or the sanitizer oracle to the sanitization or
proof generation oracle. Let this abort event be E1. Clearly, whenever the adversary outputs
such a new pair, one can output it to break unforgeability of the scheme, as this tuple is fresh.
However, it was already proven that this can only happen with negligible probability. Note, this
also means that only those signatures can be input to the sanitization oracle which have both of
the challenge keys signed.
Game 2: As Game 1, but internally keep all sktdi. This is only a conceptual change.
Game 3: As Game 2, but encrypt only zeroes instead of the real sktdi in LoRADM
independent of whether block are admissible or not. Note, the LoRADM oracle enforces that
pkSanSSS = pkSanSSS′. Note, the challenger still knows all sktdi, and can thus still sanitize correctly.
A standard reduction, using hybrids, shows that this hop is indistinguishable by the IND-CPA
security of the encryption scheme used. Note, IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme ENC
is sufficient, as the abort in Game 1 ensures that the adversary can only submit queries with
respect to ciphertexts which were previously generated in the reduction, i.e., where one can
simply look up the respective values sktdi instead of decryption.
At this point, the distribution is independent of the LoRADM oracle. Note, the sanitization,
and proof oracles, can be still be simulated without any restrictions, as each sktdi is known to
the challenger. Thus, the view the adversary receives is now completely independent of the bit b
used in the invisibility definition. As each hop only changes the view of the adversary negligibly,
the construction is thus proven to be invisible.
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6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the notion of chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors. This
primitive allows to prevent the holder of the trapdoor corresponding to the long-term public
key from finding collisions. Along with a comprehensive security model we have presented four
provably secure constructions. The first one is bootstrapped from any chameleon-hash in a
black-box fashion, while the second direct scheme is based on RSA-like assumptions, and the
other two on the DL assumption. Applications of this new primitive include, but are not limited
to, the first provably secure construction of invisible sanitizable signatures. An interesting open




The results of this chapter have already been published [BKPS16].
Abstract. One of the key features that must be supported by every modern PKI is an efficient
way to determine (at verification) whether the signing key had been revoked. In most solutions,
the verifier periodically contacts the certificate authority (CA) to obtain a list of blacklisted, or
whitelisted, certificates. In the worst case this has to be done for every signature verification.
Besides the computational costs of verification, after revocation all signatures under the revoked
key become invalid. In the solution by Boneh et al. [BDTW01], the CA holds a share of the
private signing key and contributes to the signature generation. After revocation, the CA simply
denies its participation in the interactive signing protocol. Thus, the revoked user can no longer
generate valid signatures. This solution is extended to also cover privacy, non-trusted setups, and
time-stamps. This is accompanied by a formal definitional framework, and elegantly simple, yet
provably secure, instantiations from efficient standard building blocks such as digital signatures,
commitments, and partially blind signatures, which can co-exist with already deployed solutions.
Finally, several extensions to the basic scheme are provided.
Roadmap. Section 7.1 presents the problem statement. The framework for CA-assisted
signatures is presented in Section 7.2. The corresponding constructions are given in Section 7.3,
including some extensions. The chapter is concluded in Section 7.4.
7.1 Introduction
Digital signatures [GMR88] provide meaningful security as long as the signing key stays secret.
However, in the real-world, signing keys can be compromised very easily, e.g., through hacker
attacks, lost hardware tokens, or simply by accident. Furthermore, it is often required to revoke
signing rights, e.g., when an employee leaves a company. Consequently, deployed solutions such
as X.509, and related standards, always allow for revocation of certificates [CDE+14,CSF+08].
Here, two main approaches (and potentially combinations thereof) are deployed. First, in a
white-list approach, the certificate authority (CA) vouches for the fact that a given certificate is
not revoked. Alternatively, the CA can publish a black-list containing all revoked certificates.
Now, a verifier directly rejects a signature if the used key has been black-listed. Thus, if one
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requires up-to-date information, this means that the lists must be retrieved for every signature
verification, causing a high — and sometimes too high — computational and communicational
overhead. Thus, in either case, the verifiers contact the CA to determine whether a given
certificate is still valid. Hence, every verifier must periodically update the published lists in
both approaches to have meaningful security guarantees.
Moreover, as noted by Boneh et al. [BDTW01], these total revocation mechanisms have
several drawbacks. For example, as mentioned previously, to check the revocation status of
a given certificate, the verifier must have access to an up-to-date certificate revocation list
(CRL), or the CA has to be queried for each signature verification. The latter may not be
possible, however, as the verifier may not have a network connection, or communication is too
costly. Furthermore, if a certificate is revoked, all signatures corresponding to the contained
public key pk, including the ones that were generated honestly, become invalid after revocation.
However, it is desirable that all signatures under a secret key sk that were generated prior to the
corruption of sk (or prior to the revocation of the corresponding certificate) remain valid, while
the generation of new signatures under sk is not possible. For example, consider Spider-Man
sending the message m=“I admit that you, Iron Man, are more powerful than me.”1 Clearly, if
m is signed with Spider-Man’s secret key sk, Iron Man can publish the signature to prove to the
public that he is more powerful than Spider-Man. However, if Spider-Man revokes his certificate,
the signature becomes invalid, and there is no way for Iron Man to prove that the statement is
valid. This is because if the secret key sk is corrupted, it cannot be proven that Iron Man is not
the adversarial party generating new bogus signatures on behalf of Spider-Man. The problem is
that signatures are not associated with their generation time, i.e., a new signature is as good as
an old one, if no further means such as time-stamping services are involved. Thus, all signatures
have to be revoked in this setting. Refer to Gutmann for additional problems of PKIs in their
current form [Gut02].
7.1.1 Contribution
The aforementioned unsatisfactory situation is addressed by introducing the notion of CA-
assisted signature generation with time-stamping, message privacy and non-trusted setup. In
a nutshell, the scheme requires that a partially trusted CA blindly signs the message m in
question plus potentially a time-stamp (and some other technical values such as keys, etc.),
while a trusted setup is not required. In particular, the CA checks whether the corresponding
user’s pk is revoked and signs m only if pk not revoked. The signature generated by the CA is
then additionally signed with a standard digital signature scheme by the user. Both signatures
are subsequently sent to, and verified, by the verifier. Signatures can be generated as long as
the corresponding public key is not revoked. Therefore, all generated signatures remain valid
after revocation as the CA simply stops assisting the signer after the key gets revoked.
While technically being relatively simple, the construction solves most of the mentioned
problems, and, interestingly enough, is even more efficient than most deployed solutions, as the
CAs are no longer queried for each verification.
Moreover, it is required that the solution can be added “on-top” of the existing PKI, i.e.,
the users do not require new keys, while the existing method can co-exist. If a time-stamping








Signature Generation Denial of Generation
Figure 7.1: Revocation of certificates
authority and traditional revocation lists are na¨ıvely used to solve the problem, the signing
process needs to be interactive similar to the constructions given (because the time-stamp needs
to be bound to the signed message). However, the solution does not require any interactivity
upon verification, which is needed in the na¨ıve solution in order to update revocation information.
Moreover, the construction paradigm is elegantly simple, yet very versatile and black-box. It is
shown how it can easily be extended to cover additional application scenarios. Interestingly, when
one tries to close the remaining gap between corruption and revocation (refer to Figure 7.1), the
resulting construction becomes very similar to the na¨ıve solution again (Refer to Section 7.3.3).
However, in this case it is easy to see that interactivity is needed for signing (because of the
time-stamp), as well as for verification (to check whether a signature key has been revoked “into
the past”).
Even though the CA is only partially trusted, nothing is lost, as some kind of trust anchor
is always required for a PKI anyway. The proposed approach actually requires less trust: for
white-lists, the CA learns if signatures for a specific public key are verified, while in a black-list
approach everyone sees which certificates are revoked. In the proposed solution, the CA only
learns when a signature is generated, which happens less frequently. Moreover, the presented
constructions offer a fall-back mode, which allows to revert to standard signatures.
A Word of Caution. Even though the algorithms involve a CA, a meaningful definition in
practice requires that any certificates issued are generated by another entity. Otherwise, the
security are meaningless in a practical sense, as the “CA” can always produce new certificates
and bind a public key to a name. In other words, the CA in the protocols proposed here must
be considered as “revocation authorities”, and not CAs in the usual sense.
7.1.2 Related Work
The idea to let a (semi-)trusted entity such as a CA also contribute to signature generation
has been introduced by Boneh et al. [BDTW01] and Rivest [Riv98], but neither present a
full formalization. The approach by Boneh et al. is based on standard 2-out-of-2 threshold
signatures [Bol03,DF89]. In particular, the secret key sk is split between the CA and the signer.
The server denies its contribution to signature generation, if the presented certificate is marked
as revoked. However, their approach requires trusted setup (the suggested mitigation strategy
of using a distributed key generation algorithm here is too inefficient in practice), new keys for
each participant and cannot add time-stamps to generated signatures. Moreover, an adversarial
server may also learn the message to be signed, i.e., in contrast to the solution presented in
this chapter, no privacy guarantees are given to the user. A similar approach is deployed in
220 CHAPTER 7. PRACTICAL SIGNING-RIGHT REVOCATION
anonymous credentials such as Idemix [CDE+14,CL02a], where the credential holder proves that
it is not revoked at presentation of the credential, e.g., using accumulators [BdM93,BCD+17,
CH02,DHS15,PS14]. Here, the prover has to prove knowledge of a witness (in zero-knowledge)
such that its revocation handle is contained in the accumulator, which resembles a white-list
approach. Clearly, the witnesses have to be updated for each revocation, while credentials are,
compared to digital signatures, only valid once at presentation or, to be more precise, only valid
for a certain amount of time to avoid re-usage.
There also exists the notion of certificate-less cryptography [AP03,HSMZ05]. Compared to
the proposed construction, they also require a certificate, there are ephemeral keys and identity
management. However, the ideas are very similar and can thus be seen as related. Likewise,
the concept of virtual smart-cards (See Chapter 4) is related and actually serves as the basis
for this chapter. However, in contrast to the proposed approach, the additional server is not
trusted by outsiders and the signer has to provide an additional password. Moreover, for an
outsider (i.e., verifier), a signature generated in such a scheme may be indistinguishable from a
traditional signature. This is not what the proposed construction achieves, i.e., a verifier must
be able to decide whether a signature was generated using the method presented.
The idea of using an additional entity to revoke public-keys has also been proposed in the set-
ting of encryptions, e.g., for identity-based encryption [BGK08,DT03], for access-control [BDT04],
but for also general encryption [CBN06]. In general, those schemes prohibit that a ciphertext
can be decrypted. However, for every decryption (or key-update), the server has to be contacted,
while in the constructions presented in this chapter, for each signature the server has to be asked
once. Thus, the constructions presented compliment existing ideas for signatures, extending
them for additional use-cases and add additional privacy features. If, and how, the ideas
presented in this chapter can be extended to encryption is left as open work.
There are also other primitives which may be used to achieve similar goals, e.g., threshold
signatures [DF89], proxy signatures [MUO96], server-assisted signatures [BB04], multi signa-
tures [BN06], but also aggregate signatures [BGLS03], or sanitizable signatures [ACdMT05,
BFF+09, KSS15].2 However, all these approaches do not offer privacy (i.e., they potentially
reveal the message to the server or signatures become linkable to a protocol execution) without
further modifications. It was therefore chosen to use primitives which directly give the required
security and privacy guarantees.
Blind signatures have been introduced by Chaum [Cha82]. In a nutshell, blind signatures
allow an external entity to receive a signature σ on a message m (of its own choice) such
that the signer learns nothing about the message m, and cannot link a signing transcript to
the final signature. Chaum’s work was later formalized and proven secure [BNPS03,JLO97].
Later, constructions in the standard model [CKW04], based on different assumptions other than
RSA [Bol03], additional security guarantees [FS09], but also some impossibility results [FS10]
were published.
The initial idea was also extended to cover some form of partial blindness, where the
signature is issued on the blinded message m, but also some public information info known
to both parties [AO00,CHYC05]. These partially blind signatures are mostly used to prevent
misuse of blind signatures. This possibility is used in the proposed construction to bind a
signature to a public key, but also to add time-stamps.
2See also Chapter 6.
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7.1.3 Additional Preliminaries
For this chapter, the only additional building block required are partially blind signatures.
7.1.3.1 Partially Blind Signatures
Blind signatures [Cha82, JLO97] allow the holder of a secret key to sign a message m for a
second entity. The signer does not learn what message it signs, and also cannot link a signature
generation transcript against the final signature. Partially blind signatures [AO00] also allow
to bind some piece of public information, known to both parties, to the final signature. Note,
for the following definition, the case where some “public parameters” are generated is omitted,
as it depends on the underlying scheme whether this algorithm is required. An extension is
straightforward. In particular, one simply defines a new algorithm which outputs the public
parameters, but one is also required to adjust the definitions to account for the new algorithm
and the new values. However, for the use-case presented in this thesis, it is only of minor
relevance.
Definition 7.1 (Partially Blind Signatures). A partially blind signature scheme BSIG consists
of two algorithms {KeyGenBSIG,VerifyBSIG}, and an interactive protocol 〈B,U〉, such that:
KeyGenBSIG. The algorithm KeyGenBSIG outputs the public and private key of the signer, where
λ is the security parameter:
(skBSIG, pkBSIG)
$← KeyGenBSIG(1λ)
〈B,U〉. The algorithm 〈B,U〉 is interactive. The user U receives input m, public information
info, and pkBSIG. The signer B inputs the secret key skBSIG, and some string info, while
the user U inputs a public key pkBSIG, a message m, and the string info. At the end of the
protocol, only the user U receives a signature σ, while B receives nothing:
(⊥, σ) $← 〈B(skBSIG, info),U(pkBSIG,m, info)〉
Here, 〈·,U(·, ·, ·)〉∞ means that if the adversary plays the role of the signer B, it can start
a new signing session with U as often as it wants to, and can arbitrarily schedule the
interactions. Likewise, the notation 〈B(·, ·), ·〉1 means, that the adversary acts as the user,
and can interact with the signer only once. For simplicity it is also required that every entity
is able to decide to what step of which “session” a given protocol message corresponds, and
also when a given “signing session” is finished, and whether was successful. In particular,
it is required that a signing session is finished once B sends its last message to U , and U
can actually extract a valid signature. This in particular means, that the B does not send
any other message after U can extract a signature.
VerifyBSIG. The deterministic algorithm VerifyBSIG outputs a decision bit d ∈ {false, true}, indi-
cating the validness of the signature σ, w.r.t. pkBSIG, info, and m:
d← VerifyBSIG(pkBSIG,m, info, σ)




((m1, σ1, info1), . . . , (m`, σ`, info`)) $← AO〈B(skBSIG,·,·),·〉
∞
(pkBSIG)
return 1, if ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} : VerifyBSIG(pkBSIG,mi, infoi, σi) = true
and oracle 〈B(sk, ·), ·〉 finished less than ` times, and
all (mi, infoi) are pairwise distinct
return 0
Figure 7.2: BSIG Unforgeability
Correctness. For each BSIG it is required that the correctness properties hold. In particular,
it is required that for all λ ∈ N, for all (skBSIG, pkBSIG) $← KeyGenBSIG(1λ), for all m ∈ MS,
for all info ∈ {0, 1}∗, VerifyBSIG(pkBSIG,m, info, σ) = true, where σ is taken from (⊥, σ) $←
〈B(skBSIG, info),U(pkBSIG,m, info)〉. This captures perfect correctness.
Security. Two different security notions are needed. These are presented next.
Unforgeability. The following unforgeability definition of partially blind signature schemes
is based on the definition given by Abe and Okamoto [AO00, Oka06], but adjusted for the
notation used in this thesis. In a nutshell, it is required that an adversary A cannot (except
with negligible probability) come up with more signatures for different message/information
pair (m, info) than successful, i.e., completed, signing queries. Note, the adversary can interleave
signing queries.
Definition 7.2 (Unforgeability). A signature scheme BSIG is unforgeable, if for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[omUNF-CMABSIGA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 7.2.
Note, this definition imposes “weak” unforgeability, i.e., once a signature for a given mes-
sage/information pair (m, info) becomes known, the adversary may be able to derive new
signatures for this tuple.
Blindness. Finally, blindness of partially blind signature schemes is defined, derived from the
work by Okamoto [Oka06]. In a nutshell, it is required that an adversary A cannot (except
with negligible probability) decide what message is signed, and cannot link a signing transcript
against the final signature. This must even be true, if it can generate the public key, chose the
messages to be signed, and also the public string info.
Definition 7.3 (Blindness). A partially blind signature scheme BSIG is blind, if for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[BlindnessBSIGA (1λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
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Experiment BlindnessBSIGA (λ)





let σ0, and σ1 denote the output of U0, and U1
If σ0 = ⊥ ∨ σ1 = ⊥, let σ ← ⊥
Else, set σ ← (σb, σ1−b)
a
$← A(stateA,2, σ)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 7.3: BSIG Blindness
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 7.3.
Definition 7.4 (Secure BSIGs). A partially blind signature scheme BSIG is said to be secure, if
it is correct, unforgeable, and blind.
A concrete construction was given by Fuchsbauer et al. [FHKS16].
7.2 CA-Assisted Signatures
Now, CA-Assisted Signatures are introduced. As already discussed in the introduction, the
main idea is that a CA helps generating a signature.
7.2.1 Framework for CA-Assisted Signatures
In the following a formal specification of the algorithms and their interfaces in such schemes
are given. We require that each party has access to a common clock which is synchronized
across all parties. In practice, this can be realized, e.g., by using the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) [MMBK10], and checking that the time-stamp is in an acceptable range, say, e.g., 30
seconds.
Definition 7.5 (CA-Assisted Signatures). A CA-assisted digital signature scheme CASIG con-
sists of four algorithms {KeyGenU,KeyGenCA,RevokeCA,VerifyA} and one interactive protocol
〈CA,U〉 such that:
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〈CA,U〉. The protocol 〈CA,U〉 is interactive. The user U receives input m, pks, time, and skUser.
The CA inputs the secret key skCA, time, and pkUser. At the end of the protocol, only the
user U receives a signature σ (which may be ⊥ for a revoked user), while CA receives
nothing:
(⊥, σ) $← 〈CA(sks, pkUser, time)),U(skUser, pkUser,m, time)〉
As for partially blind signatures, it is assumed that each party knows to which signing
session, and which protocol step a received message belongs to, and is also successful.
RevokeCA. The algorithm RevokeCA allows to revoke a given public key pkUser. In a nutshell, the
CA no longer agrees to start a signing protocol for revoked pkUser. Thus, revocation of
a pkUser does not affect already ongoing signing sessions for this pkUser. This algorithm
outputs nothing:
⊥ ← RevokeCA(pkUser)
VerifyA. The algorithm VerifyA outputs a decision bit d ∈ {false, true}, indicating the validness
of the signature σ, with respect to pkCA, pks, time, and m:
d
$← VerifyA(pkCA, pkUser,m, time, σ)
7.2.2 Security of CA-Assisted Signatures
We now define the formal requirements for CA-assisted signatures. In a nutshell, those are
correctness, unforgeability against malicious users and CAs, and blindness/privacy against CAs
and outsiders.
Correctness. As usual, correctness of any CASIG is required. In particular, it is required that
for all security parameters λ ∈ N VerifyA(pkCA, pkUser,m, time, σ) = true, for all (skUser, pkUser) $←
KeyGenU(1λ), for all (skCA, pkCA)
$← KeyGenCA(1λ), for all m ∈ MS, for all time ∈ N, and for
all (⊥, σ) $← 〈CA(skCA, pks, time),U(sks, pkUser,m, time)〉, while pkUser was not revoked before the
signature generation request. The probability space is here given by all random coins in all
involved algorithms.
Unforgeability. Unforgeability of CA-assisted signatures covers two aspects. On the one
hand, a malicious user must not be able to fake signatures of the CA. On the other hand, a
malicious CA must not be able to impersonate a user. Together, those two definitions clearly
also imply that an outsider is not able to forge any valid signatures.
For signer unforgeability, the adversary is allowed to obtain arbitrarily many signatures
on arbitrary messages, and public keys, of its choice. Furthermore, for every signature, the
adversary may define the current time (except that it may not turn back the time). Also, it can
generate and revoke user keys at convenience. Similarly to Definition 7.2, the adversary now
wins if it can output more message/signature pairs than it queried from the oracle; furthermore,
each of those pairs must only verify for a public key and time that have been used in a signing
query. Finally, signatures may only verify if the corresponding user public key has not been
revoked before starting the respective signing session. For simplicity, it is defined that if a





((m1, σ1, time1, pk∗1), . . . , (m`, σ`, time`, pk∗`))
$← AO〈CA(skCA,·,time),·〉∞ ,OTimestamp(·),ORevokeCA(·)(pkCA)
where oracle Timestamp on input time′:
if time′ ≤ time, ignore
let time← time′
return 1, if ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} : VerifyA(pkCA, pk∗i ,mi, timei, σi) = true
and oracle 〈CA(sk, ·, ·), ·〉 finished less than ` times, and
all (mi, timei, pki) are pairwise distinct
return 1, if VerifyA(pkCA, pk∗1,m1, time1, σ1) = true,
and pk∗1 was revoked before time1
return 0
Figure 7.4: CASIG Signer Unforgeability
signing oracle is tagged as “non-called”, if the corresponding public key was revoked before the
current time. In the case that revocation and signing were done at the very same point in time,
the resulting signature is not considered a forgery even if the revocation request was submitted
first in the experiment; one the one hand, this is a purely academic issue anyways, and on the
other hand “before” and “after” do not have any semantics within a fixed point in time. Of
course, one could define that every call to same oracle increments the current time, as done
for credential definitions [CKL+15]. However, it seems to be more natural to let the adversary
decide.
Definition 7.6 (Signer Unforgeability). A CA-assisted signature scheme CASIG is signer un-
forgeable, if for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[seUNF-CMACASIGA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 7.4.
Complementary to signer unforgeability, it is also required that the CA cannot generate
valid signatures for a specific user without its contribution. Therefore, the adversary (controlling
the CA) can obtain arbitrarily many signatures for a user public key pkUser, where again A has
full control over time. The adversary now wins if it can output a signature on a message that
was not asked for that specific define point in time. This definition is similar to the standard
definition of unforgeability, refer to Definition 2.17.
Note that as before, the adversary is allowed to interleave signing queries. Further note
that the given definition is only presented in its weak formulation, i.e., the adversary is allowed
to output fresh signatures for message/time pairs for which it obtained honest signatures.
Extending the definition to strong unforgeability is straightforward.
Definition 7.7 (CA Unforgeability). A CA-assisted signature scheme CASIG is CA unforgeable,





(m∗, σ∗, time∗, pk∗) $← AO〈·,U(skUser,·,·,time)〉∞ ,OTimestamp(·)(pkUser)
where oracle Timestamp on input time′:
if time′ ≤ time, ignore
let time← time′
return 1, if VerifyA(pk∗, pkUser,m∗, time∗, σ∗) = true,
and oracle 〈·,U(skUser, ·, ·, ·)〉 was never queried for (pk∗,m∗, time∗).
return 0
Figure 7.5: CASIG CA Unforgeability
if for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[ceUNF-CMACASIGA (1λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 7.5.
Blindness. Blindness is concerned with the privacy of the user towards the CA. While a
secure CA-assisted signature scheme must satisfy both aspects of unforgeability, blindness comes
in two flavors giving different privacy guarantees.
The first flavor, called CA blindness, is similar in spirit to Definition 7.3. There, the CA
(controlled by the adversary) may trigger signing protocols on two messages of its choice in
a random order, gets the resulting signatures, and then needs to link the transcripts to the
messages.
In the second flavor, called CA weak-blindness, it is only required that the adversary does
not learn which message it signed. In particular, the adversary does not gain access to the
signatures, and may only trigger a single signing query. It is easy to see that CA blindness
implies CA weak-blindness, but not vice versa. The decision which level of blindness/privacy is
required must be made on a case-to-case basis, depending on the concrete use case.
Similar to Definition 7.3, the adversary is restricted to a single interaction with each oracle
in the blindness definitions. However, blindness against multiple protocol runs directly follows
from a simple hybrid argument.
Definition 7.8 (CA Blindness). A CA-assisted signature scheme CASIG is CA blind, if for any
PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that∣∣∣Pr[CA-BlindnessCASIGA (1λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)









let σ0, and σ1 denote the output of U0, and U1.
If σ0 = ⊥ ∨ σ1 = ⊥, let σ ← ⊥.
Else, set σ ← (σb, σb−1)
a
$← A(state2, σ)
return 1, if a = b
return 0









return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure 7.7: CASIG Weak CA Blindness
Definition 7.9 (CA Weak-Blindness). A CA-assisted signature scheme CASIG is weakly CA-
blind, if for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[CA-WBlindnessCASIGA (1λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure 7.7.
A CA-assisted signature scheme CASIG is secure and (weakly) blind, if it is correct, signer
unforgeable, CA unforgeable, and CA (weakly) blind.
7.3 Constructions
It is now shown how to come up with constructions achieving what is defined. First, a generic
construction is presented, which, depending on the used building blocks, achieves weaker, or
stronger resp., privacy notions. The reductions are tight, i.e., there are no reduction losses, and
a probability analysis in the proofs is omitted.
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7.3.1 Generic Construction Idea
The generic idea of the construction is introduced first. Then, two different derivations of the
generic constructions are given, which are instantiated with different building blocks. Both
constructions offer the same unforgeability guarantees, but offer a different level of privacy.
In a nutshell, the scheme lets a CA contribute to signature generation, but only if the public
key of the requester is not revoked at the time time of the signature request. The CA can then
also add some additional information to the final signature such as certificates, and the like.
However, from a privacy point of view, it is also required that the CA does not learn which
messages m are signed, which reflects (weak-)blindness.
On the one hand, the signer commits to a message. The CA then signs this commitment
(and the signer’s public key), if, and only if, the given public key is not revoked. The user, on
the other hand, creates an additional signature around the received signature from the CA to
protect against bogus CAs. Clearly, there is no joint setup, and thus key generation can be
done oﬄine, which is not possible in current schemes. It is stressed that revoking a public key is
simply sending the CA a message “My pk has been revoked”, possibly containing a proof of
knowledge, which is not necessarily zero-knowledge.
Note, the parties do not need to communicate using a secure channel.
7.3.2 The Constructions
Now, two constructions are presented. The first one is very efficient, while the second one is a
bit more complex, but gives better privacy guarantees.
Construction 7.10 (Weakly-Blind Construction). Let CASIG such that:
KeyGenU. Generate a key-pair of a digital signature scheme, i.e., return (skUser, pkUser)
$←
KeyGenSig(1λ).
KeyGenCA. Generate a key-pair of a digital signature scheme (skCA, pkCA)
$← KeyGenSig(1λ),
and the public parameters ppCC
$← ParGenCC(1λ) of a commitment scheme. Return
(skCA, (pkCA, ppCC)).
〈CA,U〉. See Figure 7.8.
VerifyA. To verify a signature σ = (σ′, σc, C,O, time) w.r.t. m, pkCA, and pkUser, check that m =
OpenCC(ppCC, C,O), and VerifySig(pkCA, (C, time, pkUser), σc) = true, and VerifySig(pkUser,
(σc, time,m,C,O, pkCA, pkUser), σ′) = true. If all checks pass, output true, and false other-
wise.
Theorem 7.11. If DSIG and CC are secure, then the given construction is secure and weakly
blind.
Proof. Correctness follows by inspection. Thus, only consider signer unforgeability, CA unforge-
ability, weak blindness need to be considered. Each property is proven on their own.
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User CA
skUser, pkCA,m, time skCA, time
(C,O) $← CommitCC(ppCC,m)
σu
$← SignSig(skUser, (C, pkUser, pkCA, time))
C, σu, pkUser−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If pkUser is revoked, ignore.
If VerifyA(pkUser, (C, pkUser, pkCA, time), σu) 6= true, ignore.
σc
$← SignSig(skCA, (C, time, pkUser))
σc←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If VerifyBSIG(pkCA, (C, time, pkUser), σc) 6= true, abort.
σ′ $← SignSig(skUser, (σc, time,m,C,O, pkCA, pkUser))
Output σ = (σ′, σc, C,O, time)
Figure 7.8: CA-Assisted signing with Weak Blindness
Signer Unforgeability. Let A be an adversary which can break the signer unforgeability of
the construction. We can then construct an adversary B which either breaks the binding property
of CC, or the unforgeability of the signature scheme DSIG used by the CA. Assume towards
contradiction that there is a signature σ on the message (σc, time,m,C,O, pkCA, pk∗), where σc
is a signature on the message (C, time), but also a signature σ′ for (σc, time′,m′, C,O, pkCA, pk′∗),
where (m, time, pk∗) 6= (m′, time′, pk′∗). Hence, there are two different messages which “are in”
the same commitment C. Clearly, this breaks the binding property of the commitment scheme
used. In the second case, i.e., there is a new commitment C ′ for (m, time) 6= (m′, time′) never
signed by the CA, the adversary must have been able to forge a signature σ′c. This also accounts
for a revoked public key. In both cases building a reduction is trivial and therefore omitted.
CA Unforgeability. This case is trivial as well. If the adversary A can come up with a
signature on a message (σc, time,m,C,O, pk∗, pkUser), where (m, time, pk∗) was never signed,
then it can break the unforgeability of the used signature scheme. Again, a reduction is
straightforward.
CA Weak-Blindness. Trivial, as CC is perfectly hiding, and therefore σu is independent of
m, which is the only information sent to the CA, i.e., A, which is the only value computed from
m.
Construction 7.12 (Blind Construction). Let CASIG′ such that:
KeyGenU. Generate a key-pair of a digital signature scheme, i.e., return (skUser, pkUser)
$←
KeyGenSig(1λ).
KeyGenCA. Generate a key-pair of a partially blind signature scheme, i.e., return (skCA, pkCA)
$←
KeyGenBSIG(1λ).
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User CA
skUser, pkCA,m, time skCA, time
σu
$← SignSig(skUser, (pkUser, pkCA, time))
σu, pkUser−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If pkUser is revoked, ignore.
If VerifySig(pkUser, (pkUser, pkCA, time), σu) 6= true, ignore.
Set info← (pkUser, time)
proceed←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(⊥, σc) $← 〈CA(skCA, info),U(pkCA,m, info)〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If VerifySig(pkCA,m, info, σc) 6= true, abort.
σ′ ← SignSig(skUser, (σc, time,m, pkCA, pkUser))
Output σ = (σ′, σc, time)
Figure 7.9: CA-Assisted signing with Blindness
〈CA,U〉. See Figure 7.9.
VerifyA. To verify a signature σ = (σ′, σc, time) with respect to m, pkCA, and pkUser, check that
VerifySig(pkUser, (σc, time,m, pkCA, pkUser), σ′) = true, and VerifyBSIG(pkCA,m, (pkUser, time),
σc) = true. If all checks pass, output true, and false otherwise.
Theorem 7.13. If DSIG and BSIG are secure, then the construction is secure and blind.
Proof. Again, correctness follows by inspection. It remains to prove CA unforgeability, signer
unforgeability, and blindness.
Signer Unforgeability. Let A be an adversary which can break the signer unforgeability of
the construction. We can then construct an adversary B which breaks the unforgeability of
the partially blind signature scheme. B receives pk from the BSIG to forge, and embeds the
received pk into the public key pkCA. It simply follows the protocol, and uses its own oracle to
get signatures. If a given pki is revoked, B no longer accepts new signing sessions. Eventually, A
outputs ((m1, σ1, info1, pk1), . . . , (m`, σ`, time`, pk`)). Clearly, if pk1 was revoked, B never asked
its own oracle to generate a signature for (m1, (pk1, time1)), and can thus return all successful
runs, and (m1, σ1, time1, pk1), as for (m1, time1) is fresh by assumption, as B never queries its
own oracle any longer for fresher time.
CA Unforgeability. Essentially the same reduction as for the weakly blind scheme.
CA Blindness. Let A be an adversary which breaks the CA blindness of the scheme. We can
then construct an adversary which breaks the blindness of the used BSIG. B proceeds as follows.
It generates pkUser honestly, which it also gives to A, receiving (pk∗, {m0,m1}, time, state1). It
then gives state1 to A, and interacts with its own oracles like A does with his using m0 and
m1, but uses (pkUser, time) as info. If A is finished it returns state2, and B subsequently receives
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(σ1, σ2) from its own challenger. Then, B gives A state2, and (σ1, σ2) to A. Whatever A then
outputs, is also output by B.
7.3.2.1 Efficiency
In the first protocol message the user essentially proves knowledge of the secret key. If the
signature on time is not valid, the protocol can directly be aborted. This prohibits that outsiders
use the CA to check whether a given certificate is revoked. If this is not wanted for performance
reasons, leaving this step out is also possible.
Clearly, both constructions require that a verifier needs to verify two signatures, while
the CA has to generate a signature. However, considering that the CA has to vouch that
a given certificate was not revoked, it has to generate a signature anyway, if the revocation
information needs to be up-to-date, which clearly needs to be verified as well. In other words, the
construction is already more efficient after the first signature verification. Moreover, compared
to the approach by Boneh et al. [BDTW01], an outsider can trivially derive whether the given
protocol was used to generate the signature, which in turn increases trust in the signature itself,
as the verifier can also decide whether it accepts a given pkCA as trustworthy.
7.3.3 Extensions
Next is discussed informally how the basic constructions can be extended to account for additional
use-cases.
Signer-Anonymity. Both constructions give message-privacy guarantees to the user, they
reveal the identity of the signing party to the CA. If this poses a potential privacy problem, it can
be mitigated as follows, for instance for the weakly-blind construction, refer to Figure 7.8. The
commitment is extended to also commit to pkUser. Then, instead of signing the tuple in Figure 7.8
in the first step, one computes a signature proof of knowledge proving in zero-knowledge that one
knows the secret key corresponding to the public key in the commitment, and that this public
key is not on the blacklist. This can be done using similar techniques as used in Idemix [CL02a].
Revocation into the Past. Both constructions are well-suited for situations where signing
keys should simply be deactivated, e.g., when an employee leaves a company. However, in
certain situations, it is also necessary to revoke “into the past” in order to also invalidate
signatures issued between key leakage and revocation, refer to Figure 7.1. In this case, the CA
has to publish a list of revoked keys together with time-stamps of their revocation moment;
upon verification, only signatures issued before this point in time would be accepted. From a
complexity point of view this solution is similar to the combination of black-list based PKIs and
time-stamping authorities, i.e., interaction is needed upon signing and verification.
Message Policies. One could also require that the signer proves (in zero-knowledge) that
the message to be signed follows certain restrictions, e.g., that a company policy is followed.
Only if the proof is valid, and the public key is not revoked, the server contributes to signature-
generation. For example, a policy may be that a normal employee can only sign contracts below
$1,000. This can even be done on a per-public-key basis. The size of signatures does not grow by
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this extension, and also the verification costs do not increase. Furthermore, the policy trivially
remains hidden from the verifier.
Further extending the scheme efficiently such that also the CA does not learn any information
about the policy remains a challenging open problem.
Robustness. Even though the security model is fixed for one signer and one CA, one can of
course switch to a different CA on-the-fly. This protects against oﬄine CAs, as one can simply
use another one. In particular, a user can use a single signing key with different CAs, who act
as revocation authorities for different domains (e.g., across different companies). Revocation by
one CA does not affect other CAs, if no synchronization for revocation between CAs is used.
Security follows by a simple hybrid-argument.
Threshold Scheme. Related to the prior idea is an extension to threshold-cryptography.
Namely, one could require that at least n-out-of-m servers need to participate in order to achieve
robustness against oﬄine or corrupted servers.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the notion of CA-Assisted Signatures. These signatures enable the
revocation of signing-rights if a secret is corrupted. This is achieved by letting a CA contribute
to signature generation, vouching that the used public key was not revoked. Thus, signatures
remain valid even after revocation of the certificate. Moreover, the CA can add timestamps,
while neither the verifier nor the CA need to be online for verification. This has the additional
benefit that verification requires less effort to check the validity of the signature. Furthermore,
various extensions were proposed, increasing the privacy guarantees of our basic constructions.
The constructions do not pose any non-standard requirements to the signature scheme used
by the user. In particular, existing signing infrastructures could thus easily be adapted to the
design, while the users can continue using their favorite signature scheme. However, it remains
an open question whether the idea can be extended for a chain of authorities or even generalized
for other access structures.
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
This thesis proposed a number of protocols which solve some real-life challenges, intended for
direct personal use. The proposed protocols address secure handling of passwords used for
authentication and digital signature schemes with additional features, while being efficient and
also directly deployable in today’s infrastructure.
In particular, the first contributions of this thesis are two UC-secure distributed password-
based single sign-on protocols, where the password check is distributed among multiple servers
to avoid that servers can impersonate users or that servers can mount attacks on the password
(attempts). However, it remains a challenging task to make the protocol secure against adaptive
adversaries.
The second contribution are virtual smart-cards, where a user can use its personal device,
such as a smart-phone, to sign arbitrary messages, but additionally needs to enter a password.
The password is checked at an additional server which also contributes to signature generation,
if the password entered was correct. The server does not learn the messages being signed, while
neither entity alone has enough information to mount oﬄine attacks on the password (attempts).
Moreover, to account for the case of a lost device, the proposed protocol is secure against
adaptive corruptions in a new corruption model, where not all prior input and output is given
to the simulator. This is necessary to model that neither the used passwords nor the signed
messages are not given to the adversary. However, it remains an open challenge to generalize
the protocol to more than one server and to add unlinkability.
The third contribution is a new non-interactive UC-secure definition of non-committing
encryption for adaptive adversaries which does not require secure erasures. Such a non-interactive
definition is necessary, if the environment needs explicit access to ciphertexts or secure erasures
are not a realistic assumption. This is demonstrated by providing the first definition of UC-secure
signcryption secure against adaptive adversaries without secure erasures. As a sanity check,
the new definition is proven to be equivalent to a game-based definition which is compared
to a number of existing definitions addressing adaptive adversaries. It is also shown that this
definition is only realizable in idealized models. However, the proposed definition does not
account for key-dependent messages, which may allow for additional application scenarios.
The fourth contributions are chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors. These chameleon-
hashes only allow to find collisions, if two trapdoors at the same time are known. One trapdoor
is long-term, while the second one is generated at generation of the hash. Such a hash allows to
prohibit that the holder of the long-term trapdoor can find collisions by keeping the ephemeral
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trapdoor secret. The main application scenario is invisible sanitizable signature schemes. In
these signature schemes, a semi-trusted third party, named the sanitizer, can alter signer-chosen
blocks to arbitrary bit-strings, while also hiding which parts are actually admissible from
outsiders. However, it is still an open problem how to construct sanitizable signature schemes
which are invisible and unlinkable simultaneously.
The fifth contributions are efficient protocols for signing-right revocation. In these protocols,
a revocation authority helps generating a signature and vouches that, at the time of signature
generation, the public key was not revoked. This allows verifiers to skip checking the revocation
status of a signature at signature verification, thus no longer requiring network access. Moreover,
in the proposed protocols, the revocation authority neither learns the message signed nor requires
to store any account information besides the revocation status, while the revocation authority
can also add additional information, e.g., a time-stamp. An additional extension also prohibits
that the revocation authority can link signatures with signature generation protocol transcripts.
From a more general point of view, none of the proposed protocols consider leakage, which is
also not considered in UC. Moreover, it is also cumbersome to manually write and check proofs
of protocols. Thus, having an easy to use theorem prover would be very beneficial.
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Now is presented how suitable TEncs can be constructed. First is shown how a general t-out-of-n
version can be realized, while a more efficient n-out-of-n is given afterwards.
A.1 A Generalized t-out-of-n TEnc
This is essentially the construction given by Camenisch et al. [CLLN14], based on existing
work [DF89], but altered for the used notation, while the decryption also takes a label used for
the underlying proof system.
Let (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ) be a group generator for a prime-order, and multiplicatively
written, group G1, along with a generator g of order q of that group, such that 〈g〉 = G, and
that the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Construction A.1 (TEnc). A suitable construction is given as follows, where the message
space MS is thus a group G.
PPGenTEnc. To generate the public parameters, do:
1. Generate (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ), where DDH holds in G.
2. Generate crsNIZKPoK $← PPGenNIZKPoK(1λ, L).
3. Return ppTEnc = (crsNIZKPoK,G, g, q).
KeyGenTEnc. To generate the public key, and the corresponding partial key pairs, do:
1. Pick t+ 1 coefficients, i.e., (a0, a1, . . . , at) $← (Z∗q)t. Let p(x) :=
∑t
k=0 akx
k (mod q) be
the polynomial defined by these coefficients.
2. For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let skiPTEnc ← p(i), pkiPTEnc ← gskiPTEnc, and pkTEnc ← ga0 = gp(0).
3. Return (pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)1≤i≤n).
EncTEnc. To encrypt a message m ∈ G, do:
1. Pick a random r $← Z∗q.
1Clearly, DLGen only returns a description of G.
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2. Return (gr, pkrTEncm).
PDecTEnc. To partially decrypt a ciphertext c = (u, v) w.r.t. to label `, do:
1. Let di ← uskiPTEnc
2. Let pii $← ProveNIZKPoK{(skiPTEnc) : di = uskiPTEnc ∧ pkiPTEnc = gskiPTEnc}(pkTEnc, c, pkiPTEnc, `)
3. Return (di, pii).
VfDecTEnc. To verify a decryption share (di, pii) w.r.t. ` and (u, v), do:
1. Return true, if pii is valid, and false otherwise.
DecTEnc. To complete the decryption of c = (u, v), on input of (di)0<i≤t+1 do:
1. Let I = {i1, i2, . . . , it+1} be the index set corresponding to where the polynomial was
evaluated at key generation w.r.t. (di, pii)0<i≤t+1.
2. Express p(0) as a linear combination of p(i1), p(i2), . . . , p(it+1) using standard polynomial
interpolation techniques using Lagrange, i.e., p(0) = ∑t+1k=1 ukp(ik).
3. Let w ← ∏t+1k=1 dukik .
4. Return vw−1.
That the above construction is secure was already proven by Camenisch et al. [CLLN14],
with the exception of the additional label, which can be ignored in the proof of security.
Note, checking whether a pkiPTEnc belongs to a skiPTEnc is trivial, i.e., by performing a simple
exponentiation, while pii only proves the equivalence of discrete logarithms.
A.2 A Simplified n-out-of-n TEnc
The above construction is for the general t-out-of-n case. If, as required for the single sign-on
protocols, resorts to the special n-out-of-n case, a conceptually simpler construction exists,
which shares the exponents in an additive manner. This saves reconstructing the polynomial
and is thus faster.
The given construction is derived from Romero-Tris et al. [RCV14], but adjusted for the
used notation.
Construction A.2 (TEnc). Consider the following construction, where MS is as before.
PPGenTEnc. To generate the public parameters, do:
1. As before.
KeyGenTEnc. To generate the public key, and the corresponding partial key pairs, do:
1. Choose n random exponents skiPTEnc
$← Z∗q.
2. For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let pkiPTEnc ← gskiPTEnc, and pkTEnc ← g
∑
skiPTEnc.
3. Return (pkTEnc, (skiPTEnc, pkiPTEnc)1≤i≤n).
A.2. A SIMPLIFIED N -OUT-OF-N TENC A-3
EncTEnc. To encrypt a message m ∈ G, do:
1. As before.
PDecTEnc. To partially decrypt a ciphertext c = (u, v) w.r.t. to label `, do:
1. As before.
VfDecTEnc. To verify a decryption share (di, pii) w.r.t. ` and (u, v), do:
1. As before.
DecTEnc. To complete the decryption of c = (u, v), on input of (di)0<i≤n do:




Groth’s Structure Preserving Signature
Scheme
In the second construction of SSO, a signature to issue tokens to user that allows for efficient
proofs of knowledge of a signature as well as efficient verifiable encryption of the signature and
the messages signed is required. To be able to use ElGamal encryption for the latter, i.e., to
avoid the more expensive encryption of exponents, one can use a recent signature scheme by
Groth [Gro15], where signatures and messages are all group elements. This scheme is recalled
in the following, which is secure in the generic-group model.
B.1 Construction
Groth defines the scheme to sign a matrix of group elements. In this case, one can consider the
special case where only a vector of n group elements is signed. The signature scheme assumes the
availability of system parameters (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, x), where (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q)
define a bilinear maps setting and x $← G1 is an additional random group element.
Construction B.1 (DSIG). The signature scheme can now be constructed as follows.
PPGenDSIG. To generate the public parameters with input n, do:
1. Generate (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) $← BLGen(1λ)
2. Choose x $← G1.
3. Return ppDSIG = (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, x).
KeyGenSig. To generate a key pair, do:
1. Choose v $← Z∗q.
2. For each i ∈ [1, n− 1], draw wi $← Z∗q.
3. Let zi ← gwi2 .
4. Compute y ← gv2 .
5. Return (((wi)i∈[1,n−1], v), ((zi)i∈[1,n−1], y)).
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SignSig. On input a message (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Gn1 and secret key skSig = ((wi)i∈[1,n−1], v), do:
1. Choose a random u $← Z∗q.
2. Let r ← gu2 .
3. Let s← (xgv1)1/u.
4. Let t← (∏n−1i=1 mwii (mnxv))1/u.
5. Return σ = (r, s, t).
VerifySig. To verify a signature, do:
1. Parse input as σ = (r, s, t) and pkSig = ((zi)i∈[1,n−1], y).
2. If mi, s, t /∈ G1, return false.
3. If r /∈ G2, return false.
4. If e(s, r) = e(g1, y) · e(x, g2) ∧ e(t, r) = e(mn, g2)∏n−1i=1 e(mi, zi) · e(x, y), return true.
5. Return false.
B.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
As pointed out by Groth, a signature σ = (r, s, t) can be randomized to obtain a signature
σ′ = (r′, s′, t′) by picking a random u′ $← Z∗q and computing: r′ ← ru′ , s′ ← s1/u′ , and t′ ← t1/u′ .
Then, a proof of knowledge of a signature on messages mi that is online extractable w.r.t. a
n+ 2 ElGamal public keys (y˜s, y˜1, . . . , y˜n, y˜t), where the base for these keys is g1, contained in
the CRS is done as follows.
• Encrypt the witnesses by selecting r¯ $← Z∗q and computing g¯ = gr¯ and:
s¯ = s′y˜r¯s , m¯i = miy˜r¯i , t¯ = t′y˜tr¯




(r¯) : e(g1, y) · e(x, g2)/e(s¯, r′) = e(y˜s, r′)−r¯ ∧ g¯ = gr¯ ∧
e(t¯, r′)
e(x, y) · e(m¯n, g2) ·∏n−1i=1 e(m¯i, zi) =
( e(y˜t, r′)
e(y˜n, g2) ·∏n−1i=1 e(y˜i, zi)
)r¯]
(r′, s¯, t¯, m¯1, . . . , m¯n)
The overall on-line extractable proof of knowledge of a signature consists of (r′, s¯, t¯, m¯1, m¯2,
. . . , m¯n, piσ).
From the first term one can derive e(s¯y˜−r¯s , r′) = e(g1, y) · e(x, g2) and from the third
term e(t¯y˜−r¯t , r′) = e(x, y) · e(m¯ny˜−r¯n , g2) ·
∏n−1
i=1 e(m¯iy˜−r¯i , zi). In other words, this means that
(r′, s¯y˜−r¯s , t¯y˜−r¯t ) is a signature on messages m¯1y˜−r¯1 , . . ., m¯ny˜−r¯n . While r¯ is only known to the
prover, it is ensured by the second term g¯ = gr¯ in piσ that the signature and messages can be
computed if one is privy to the discrete logs of the ElGamal public keys (y˜s, y˜1, . . . , y˜n, y˜t) w.r.t.
base g1.
In the generalized case, i.e., where some elements are public knowledge and encryptions are
used across multiple terms, the corresponding proofs can be implemented as follows.
B.2. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS B-3
A proof of knowledge of a signature on messages mi that is online extractable w.r.t. a n+ 2
ElGamal public keys (y˜s, y˜1, . . . , y˜n, y˜t), where the base for these keys is g1, contained in the
CRS is done as follows.
• Encrypt the witnesses by selecting r¯ $← Z∗q, and r¯i $← Z∗q, where mi is not to be made public.
• Compute g¯ = gr¯. For simplicity, it is assumed that mn is always hidden, while I is the index
set of the non-hidden elements. Finally compute:
s¯ = s′y˜r¯s , m¯i = miy˜r¯i (for each hidden mi), t¯ = t′y˜tr¯




(r¯) : e(g1, y) · e(x, g2)/e(s¯, r′) = e(y˜s, r′)−r¯ ∧ g¯ = gr¯ ∧
e(t¯, r′)
e(x, y) · e(m¯n, g2) ·∏i/∈I,i 6=n e(m¯i, zi) ·∏i∈I e(mi, zi) =( e(y˜t, r′)
e(y˜n, g2) ·∏i/∈I,i 6=n e(y˜i, zi)
)r¯]
(r′, s¯, t¯, (m¯i)i/∈I)
It is noted that when the computations of piσ are implemented, there are a number of
optimizations possible in terms of performing exponentiations in G1 and then compute pairing
instead of doing the exponentiations in GT . Also, the number of pairing computations can be
reduced by suitably combining pairings that have the same value as second argument.

Appendix C
Camenisch et al.’s Pseudonym System
This chapter shows how one can construct a scope-exclusive pseudonym-system.
C.1 Pseudonym Systems
Users can be known under different pseudonyms to service providers in the second protocol
presented. This protocol uses a - less strict - version of the definitions given by Camenisch et
al. [CKL+15], i.e., only collision-resistance and unlinkability [LRSW99] are defined, but not
key-extractability [CKL+15].
Definition C.1 (Pseudonym Systems). A pseudonym system NYM consists of the algorithms
{PPGenNYM,KeyGenNYM,GenNYM} such that:
PPGenNYM. This algorithm outputs parameters:
ppNYM
$← PPGenNYM(1λ)
The public parameters are assumed to be input to all following algorithms.
KeyGenNYM. A user generates his secret key:
(usk, upk) $← KeyGenNYM(ppNYM)
PresentNYM. A pseudonym nym is deterministically generated as follows:
nym← GenNYM(usk, scope)
Correctness. For each pseudonym system NYM, the usual correctness properties are required
to hold. In particular, it is required that for all λ ∈ N, for all ppNYM $← PPGenNYM(1λ), for
all (usk, upk) $← KeyGenNYM(ppNYM), for all scope ∈ {0, 1}∗, for all nym ← GenNYM(usk, scope),
nym 6= ⊥. This definition captures perfect correctness.
C.2 Security
Additionally, some security requirements are necessary, presented next.
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(scope∗, stateA) $← AO0(usk0,·),O1(usk1,·)1 (ppNYM, upk0, upk1)
where oracle Oi, for i = 0, 1, on input scope:
L← L ∪ {scope}
return nym $← GenNYM(uski, scope)
nym∗ $← GenNYM(uskb, scope∗)
b′ $← AO0(usk0,·),O1(usk1,·)2 (stateA, nym∗)
return b′ $← {0, 1}, if scope∗ ∈ L
return 1, if b = b′
return 0
Figure C.1: NYM Unlinkability
Collision Resistance. Collision resistance guarantees that for each scope string, any two
users will have different pseudonyms with overwhelming probability.
Definition C.2 (Collision Resistance). A pseudonym system is collision resistant, if for every
PPT algorithm A there is a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[nym0 = nym1 ∧ nym0 6= ⊥ ∧ usk0 6= usk1 : nym0 ← GenNYM(usk0, scope),
nym1 ← GenNYM(usk1, scope), (usk0, usk1, scope) $← A(PPGenNYM(1λ))] ≤ ν(λ)
Unlinkability. To be useable in a broader setting, a NYM also needs to be unlinkable.
Unlinkability guarantees that users cannot be traced across different scopes [CKL+15].
Definition C.3 (Unlinkability). A pseudonym system NYM is unlinkable, if for every PPT
adversary A there is a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[UnlinkabilityNYMA (1λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
The corresponding experiment is depicted in Figure C.1.
C.3 Construction
Construction C.4 (NYM). A suitable pseudonym-system can be constructed as follows, as
presented by Camenisch et al. [CKL+15], which also provide a security proof.
PPGenNYM. To generate the public parameters, do:
C.3. CONSTRUCTION C-3
1. Generate (G, g, q) $← DLGen(1λ), where DDH holds in G.
2. Return ppNYM = (G, g, q).
KeyGenNYM. To generate key pair, do:
1. Choose usk $← Z∗q.
2. Let upk← gusk.
3. Return (usk, upk).
GenNYM. To generate a pseudonym, do:
1. Return nym← (H(scope))usk, where H : {0, 1}∗ → G denotes a random oracle.
Note, however, that in the original construction gusk is not given away as upk. However, as g
is a random generator and the probability that the adversary finds an input which maps an




A Pseudonym-System from Bilinear
Maps
In the following, a pseudonym-system where the secret key is group-element and not a exponent
is presented. It is based on the ideas given by Camenisch et al. [CKL+15]. See also Appendix C.
D.1 Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) $← BLGen(1λ) be defined as usual. The Decisional Co-Bilinear
DH-Assumption now states that given gx1 , g
y
2 and gz2, no PPT adversary A can distinguish
whether z = xy or z $← Zq [BLS01].
More formally, there is the following definition:
Definition D.1 (Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman Assumption). The Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman
Assumption holds, if for every PPT adversary A there is a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr[a = b : x $← Zq, y $← Zq, z0 ← xy, z1 $← Zq,
b
$← {0, 1}, (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) $← BLGen(1λ)
a
$← A(G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, gx1 , gy2 , gzb2 )]− 12
∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
D.2 Construction
Now is shown how to construct such a scheme in a setting of bilinear maps. The scheme is
derived from the one presented by Camenisch et al. [CKL+15] (See also Appendix C). However,
their secret key is some exponent, which requires an expensive encryption scheme to be online-
extractable. In the bilinear setting, this can be avoided by using a group element as the
secret key, and using standard ElGamal encryption [Gam84], which is by far less demanding
than Paillier [Pai99] or Camenisch-Shoup [CS03]. The resulting scheme in then also trivially
key-extractable [CKL+15].
One may ask why there is still a random-oracles and no (fully) structure-preserving primitive
is presented. However, as shown by Abe et al. [ACDD14], this cannot be achieved, as - by their
very definition - pseudonyms are deterministic.
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Construction D.2 (NYM). A suitable pseudonym-system can be constructed as follows:
PPGenNYM. To generate the public parameters, do:
1. Return ppNYM = (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q)
$← BLGen(1λ).
KeyGenNYM. To generate key pair, do:
1. Choose usk $← G1.
2. Let upk← e(usk, g2).
3. Return (usk, upk).
GenNYM. To generate a pseudonym, do:
1. Return e(usk,H(scope)), where H : {0, 1}∗ → G×2 denotes a random oracle.
Theorem D.3. If the DCo-DH Assumption holds, then the above construction is secure and
unlinkable.
Proof. Correctness follows by inspection, as H and the pairing e are both deterministic. The
other two properties are proven on its own. First of all note that giving out upk does not matter:
g2 is a randomly chosen generator of G2 and can thus be seen as a special scope.
Collision-Resistance. Collision-resistance is proven by a sequence of games.
Game 0: The original collision-resistance game.
Game 1: Now abort, if the adversary was able to find a collision w.r.t. to the definition.
Let gx = H(scope) ∈ G×2 , by definition of H. That means that exactly one such x exists,
even though potentially unknown, as G2 is cyclic. Further, nym = gxyT for some y, where
usk = gy1 for some (also potentially unknown y) by definition. Now, as the system works in
prime-order groups, collisions cannot happen, i.e., if gxy = gxy′ , then y = y′. This proves that
the construction is perfectly collision-resistant.
Unlinkability. Now, unlinkability is proven by a sequence of games. Essentially, a distin-
guisher can be turned into a distinguisher of a Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman challenge.
Game 0: The original unlinkability game.
Game 1: Simulate (lazy) the random-oracle H honestly, but keep the queries and the
answers in an internal table T . This is only an internal change.
Game 2: Now abort, if usk0 = usk1. This can only happen with negligible probability due
to the super-polynomial key-space.
D.2. CONSTRUCTION D-3
Game 3: Abort, if the adversary makes a query h to H such that H(h) = g2. This only
happens with negligible probability, i.e., qs|G2|−1 due to the random choice of the responses, where
qs is the number of queries made.
Game 4: No longer compute nym∗ honestly, but with a fresh usk′ ∈ G1. This only changes
the view of the adversary negligibly. To show this, consider the following reduction. First, the
reduction B receives the challenge parameters (G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q, gx1 , gy2 , gz2). It embeds
(G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT , q) in the public parameters. So far, this does not change the view of
the adversary at all. However, abort if usk′ = usk0 or usk′ = usk1. This only happens with
negligible probability due to the super-polynomial key-space, i.e., 2/|G1 − 1|. The reduction B
then starts simulating the random-oracle H in the following way. It is assumed that every query
to the oracles for some scope, scope was already queried to the random oracle H. Otherwise, the
reduction B does that query. Namely, for each (fresh) query q to H, it draws rq $← Z∗q, and sets
the response to grq2 , and stores (q, rq) in an internal table Tq. So far, the distributions are equal.
Draw r $← Z∗q and a random bit d $← {0, 1}. Then, for every query scope to O1−d, it returns
e(gx1 , g
yrq
2 ) (rq taken from record (scope, rq)) and for every query to Od, it returns e(grx1 , gyrq2 ).
So far, the distributions are still equal. Finally, return e(g1, gzrq2 ) for scope∗. If the adversary
guesses d correctly, return 0. Otherwise, return 1. Clearly, if z = xy, the simulation is perfect.
If, however, z 6= xy, then the exponent rq is irrelevant, and the claim follows.
Clearly, nym∗ is now completely decoupled from the bit b, from which unlinkability follows.

Appendix E
Single Sign-On: Detailed Experimental
Results
Here, the detailed measurements are presented.
E.1 The First Protocol
This section presents the detailed measurements for the first protocol. Each measurement is
presented on its own page to increment readability.
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E.1.1 Parameter Generation
Table E.1 contains the bare numbers for the parameter-generation for the first protocol. The




























Figure E.1: Box-Plots of the parameter generation measurements in ms for the first protocol
Table E.1: Percentiles in milliseconds for parameter generation of the first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2
25%: 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
Med.: 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
75%: 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
90%: 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
95%: 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2
Max.: 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 2
Avg.: 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
This shows that parameter generation is constant, regardless how many ticket-granting
servers or services are in the system.
E.1. THE FIRST PROTOCOL E-3
E.1.2 Key-Generation Ticket-Granting Servers
Table E.2 contains the bare numbers for the key-generation measurements for the ticket-granting
servers for the first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.2. Note, the




























Figure E.2: Box-Plots of the key-generation measurements for the ticket-granting servers in ms
for the first protocol
Table E.2: Percentiles for key-generation in milliseconds for the ticket-granting servers of the
first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 23 23 23 39 39 38 79 80 78
25%: 23 23 23 40 41 39 81 82 79
Med.: 24 24 24 40 42 39 82 84 80
75%: 25 24 25 42 44 40 84 86 81
90%: 26 26 27 46 47 41 85 96 83
95%: 28 26 27 51 49 42 85 105 85
Max.: 31 32 30 55 55 43 86 117 87
Avg.: 34 24 24 42 43 40 82 87 81
This shows that key-generation for the ticket-granting servers only depend on the numbers
of ticket-granting servers in the system.
E-4 APPENDIX E. SINGLE SIGN-ON: DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
E.1.3 Key-Generation Ticket-Granting Service
Table E.3 contains the bare numbers for the key-generation measurements for the services for
the first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.3. Note, the numbers are






































Figure E.3: Box-Plots of the key-generation measurements for the services in ms for the first
protocol
Table E.3: Percentiles for key-generation in milliseconds for the services of the first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 611 3′074 6′234 621 3′164 6′184 621 3′175 6′215
25%: 620 3′095 6′321 626 3′229 6′205 636 3′266 6′294
Med.: 628 3′134 6′364 636 3′293 6′223 640 3′336 6′344
75%: 640 3′170 6′508 666 3′357 6′267 646 3′405 6′408
90%: 663 3′299 6′814 703 3′444 6′309 651 3′481 6′467
95%: 674 3′461 6′877 771 3′477 6′349 653 3′555 6′555
Max.: 776 3′764 7′025 834 3′561 6′538 655 3′590 6′700
Avg.: 636 3′171 6′450 656 3′310 6′245 641 3′346 6′362
This shows that key-generation for the services only depend on the numbers of services in
the system.
E.1. THE FIRST PROTOCOL E-5
E.1.4 Registration User
Table E.4 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the user for the
first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.4. Note, the numbers are





























Figure E.4: Box-Plots of the user registration measurements in ms for the first protocol
Table E.4: Percentiles for registration in milliseconds for the user of the first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 56 55 56 91 90 92 168 172 178
25%: 57 56 57 92 95 93 172 179 181
Med.: 59 57 58 95 98 93 174 182 183
75%: 60 59 59 99 99 95 176 185 186
90%: 62 60 62 104 104 96 178 196 189
95%: 67 63 63 108 106 97 178 199 191
Max.: 76 69 65 120 109 97 180 209 207
Avg.: 60 58 58 97 98 94 174 183 184
This shows that the registration phase of the user only depends on how many ticket-granting
servers are in the system.
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E.1.5 Registration Ticket-Granting Servers
Table E.5 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the user for the
first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.5. Note, the numbers are
































Figure E.5: Box-Plots of the ticket-granting server registration measurements in ms for the first
protocol
Table E.5: Percentiles for registration in milliseconds for the ticket-granting servers of the first
protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 135 131 134 449 494 519 3′168 3′302 3′700
25%: 140 132 136 507 529 525 3′258 3′420 3′733
Med.: 143 134 138 518 545 527 3′278 3′478 3′765
75%: 146 137 140 531 557 531 3′292 3′571 3′790
90%: 150 142 146 561 565 538 3′314 3′678 3′821
95%: 153 144 149 579 574 542 3′328 3′755 3′833
Max.: 160 150 158 693 589 555 3′342 4′037 3′876
Avg.: 144 135 140 526 542 529 3′276 3′509 3′767
This shows that the registration phase, as for the user, only depends on how many ticket-
granting servers are in the system.
E.1. THE FIRST PROTOCOL E-7
E.1.6 Token-Generation User
Table E.6 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the user for the
first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.6. Note, the numbers are



























Figure E.6: Box-Plots of the user token-generation measurements in ms for the first protocol
Table E.6: Percentiles for token-generation in milliseconds for the user of the first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 100 97 99 159 159 163 279 286 308
25%: 104 98 101 161 169 164 286 297 312
Med.: 106 100 102 164 172 165 288 303 315
75%: 108 103 105 169 178 166 290 312 318
90%: 112 105 107 183 182 168 292 329 321
95%: 116 107 109 195 186 170 293 342 322
Max.: 121 117 115 216 216 172 296 350 328
Avg.: 107 101 103 169 173 165 288 307 315
This shows that the token-generation phase mainly depends on how many ticket-granting
servers are in the system.
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E.1.7 Token-Generation Ticket-Granting Servers
Table E.7 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the ticket-granting
servers for the first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.7. Note, the
numbers are accumulated, i.e., all computation done during the token-generation phase by the































Figure E.7: Box-Plots of the ticket-granting servers token-generation measurements in ms for
the first protocol
Table E.7: Percentiles for token-generation in milliseconds for the ticket-granting server of the
first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 619 617 631 1′629 1′660 1′640 5′984 6′173 6′225
25%: 627 622 638 1′643 1′712 1′649 6′126 6′354 6′306
Med.: 634 634 649 1′674 1′742 1′657 6′159 6′517 6′350
75%: 653 642 659 1′732 1′778 1′668 6′235 6′672 6′407
90%: 689 668 671 1′845 1′836 1′688 6′260 6′860 6′494
95%: 713 680 703 2′003 1′909 1′704 6′269 6′961 6′537
Max.: 779 743 785 2′176 1′994 1′732 6′289 7′519 6′646
Avg.: 647 639 654 1′716 1′758 1′663 6′168 6′550 6′369
This shows that the token-generation phase, as for the user, mainly depends on how many
ticket-granting servers are in the system.
E.1. THE FIRST PROTOCOL E-9
E.1.8 Communication User
Table E.8 contains the bare numbers for the communication measurements of the user for the



























Figure E.8: Box-Plots of the user communication measurements in ms for the first protocol
Table E.8: Percentiles for communication in milliseconds for the user of the first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 10 10 11 10 10 11 10 11 12
25%: 10 10 11 10 11 11 10 11 12
Med.: 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12
75%: 11 11 11 11 12 11 11 13 12
90%: 12 12 12 12 13 12 11 13 13
95%: 12 12 12 13 14 12 11 14 13
Max.: 12 13 15 14 16 12 12 16 14
Avg.: 11 11 11 11 12 11 11 12 12
This shows that the communication phase is essentially constant for the user.
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E.1.9 Communication Service
Table E.9 contains the bare numbers for the communication measurements of the user for the





























Figure E.9: Box-Plots of the service communication measurements in ms for the first protocol
Table E.9: Percentiles for communication in milliseconds for the service of the first protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 20 19 20 27 27 28 40 42 46
25%: 21 20 20 28 29 29 41 43 47
Med.: 21 20 20 28 30 29 42 44 48
75%: 22 20 21 29 31 29 42 45 48
90%: 23 21 22 31 33 30 43 48 49
95%: 25 22 23 35 34 30 44 51 50
Max.: 29 24 24 43 37 31 44 59 52
Avg.: 22 20 21 29 30 29 42 45 48
This shows that the communication phase essentially only depends on how many ticket-
granting servers are in the system.
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E.2 The Second Protocol
This section presents the detailed measurements for the second, i.e., privacy-enhanced protocol.
As for the first protocol, each measurement is presented on its own page to increment readability.
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E.2.1 Parameter Generation
Table E.10 contains the bare numbers for the parameter-generation for the first protocol. The





























Figure E.10: Box-Plots of the parameter generation measurements in ms for the second protocol
Table E.10: Percentiles milliseconds for parameter generation of the second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 17′413 16′468 16′795 16′544 16′750 18′324 19′171 16′928 16′942
25%: 22′553 22′088 22′015 22′195 22′599 24′055 25′075 21′362 21′750
Med.: 26′958 26′234 28′131 25′552 28′001 28′593 31′683 29′085 26′718
75%: 33′405 32′183 35′083 31′990 34′829 34′784 38′131 37′757 34′644
90%: 39′660 39′001 41′352 38′576 40′678 40′825 45′648 43′033 38′967
95%: 42′337 42′998 47′289 42′078 43′017 44′946 50′762 45′750 43′345
Max.: 45′714 51′123 51′221 43′651 47′197 47′653 56′802 49′422 49′851
Avg.: 28′705 28′066 29′630 27′433 28′965 29′854 32′719 30′057 28′727
This shows that parameter generation is constant, regardless how many ticket-granting
servers or services are in the system. The lion’s share, however, is finding safe prime for the
encryption scheme.
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E.2.2 Key-Generation Ticket-Granting Servers
Table E.11 contains the bare numbers for the key-generation measurements for the ticket-granting
servers for the first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.11. Note, the































Figure E.11: Box-Plots of the key-generation measurements for the ticket-granting servers in ms
for the second protocol
Table E.11: Percentiles for key-generation in milliseconds for the ticket-granting servers of the
second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 81 81 81 136 136 135 278 270 272
25%: 81 82 82 138 137 138 292 274 276
Med.: 82 83 84 139 139 139 318 277 279
75%: 84 84 86 141 140 141 325 281 282
90%: 85 85 89 142 144 143 334 291 289
95%: 86 85 90 144 146 145 342 296 291
Max.: 87 88 97 150 153 150 358 316 308
Avg.: 83 83 85 140 139 140 313 280 280
This shows that key-generation for the ticket-granting servers only depend on the numbers
of ticket-granting servers in the system.
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E.2.3 Key-Generation Ticket-Granting Service
Table E.12 contains the bare numbers for the key-generation measurements for the services for
the first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.12. Note, the numbers are






































Figure E.12: Box-Plots of the key-generation measurements for the services in ms for the second
protocol
Table E.12: Percentiles for key-generation in milliseconds for the services of the second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 614 3′099 6′152 615 3′036 6′159 621 3′056 6′126
25%: 616 3′107 6′241 634 3′099 6′218 653 3′110 6′170
Med.: 619 3′127 6′360 638 3′113 6′292 713 3′127 6′237
75%: 622 3′174 6′505 643 3′172 6′376 724 3′180 6′352
90%: 634 3′212 6′657 650 3′230 6′453 738 3′303 6′427
95%: 642 3′242 6′775 653 3′240 6′529 750 3′374 6′513
Max.: 651 3′307 7′169 684 3′299 6′681 758 3′566 6′766
Avg.: 622 3′146 6′403 639 3′140 6′310 697 3′164 6′271
This shows that key-generation for the services only depend on the numbers of services in
the system.
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E.2.4 Registration User
Table E.13 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the user for the
first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.13. Note, the numbers are





























Figure E.13: Box-Plots of the user registration measurements in ms for the second protocol
Table E.13: Percentiles for registration in milliseconds for the user of the second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 56 57 58 88 88 90 173 169 172
25%: 56 57 59 89 89 91 183 173 176
Med.: 56 58 60 91 92 93 196 176 179
75%: 57 59 62 94 94 95 203 180 182
90%: 59 61 64 96 95 97 211 186 185
95%: 60 62 66 97 97 99 214 195 188
Max.: 64 64 73 99 99 101 220 244 195
Avg.: 57 58 61 92 92 94 195 179 180
This shows that the registration phase of the user only depends on how many ticket-granting
servers are in the system.
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E.2.5 Registration Ticket-Granting Servers
Table E.14 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the user for the
first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.14. Note, the numbers are
































Figure E.14: Box-Plots of the ticket-granting server registration measurements in ms for the
second protocol
Table E.14: Percentiles for registration in milliseconds for the ticket-granting servers of the
second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 129 130 134 452 465 473 3′157 3′199 3′302
25%: 132 133 138 457 472 477 3′540 3′221 3′372
Med.: 135 135 140 465 476 481 3′568 3′236 3′420
75%: 140 138 145 493 487 485 3′593 3′259 3′502
90%: 148 145 155 506 498 491 3′609 3′274 3′588
95%: 154 149 162 508 502 496 3′637 3′281 3′655
Max.: 172 155 172 529 506 502 3′653 3′339 3′762
Avg.: 138 137 143 474 480 482 3′495 3′242 3′449
This shows that the registration phase, as for the user, only depends on how many ticket-
granting servers are in the system.
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E.2.6 Token-Generation User
Table E.15 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the user for the
first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.15. Note, the numbers are































Figure E.15: Box-Plots of the user token-generation measurements in ms for the second protocol
Table E.15: Percentiles for token-generation in milliseconds for the user of the second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 5′284 25′890 51′826 8′745 43′200 86′762 17′693 85′669 172′481
25%: 5′301 25′982 52′144 8′772 43′318 87′117 18′661 87′211 174′953
Med.: 5′319 26′210 53′392 8′802 43′437 88′400 20′279 87′714 176′417
75%: 5′350 26′649 54′535 8′953 44′885 89′686 20′565 90′742 180′667
90%: 5′481 26′913 55′686 9′083 46′225 91′543 20′987 93′881 184′230
95%: 5′516 27′207 56′173 9′151 46′540 92′366 21′248 94′999 185′263
Max.: 5′566 28′088 5′7443 9′373 47′948 94′149 21′877 98′233 189′553
Avg.: 5′349 26′338 53′578 8′879 44′162 88′709 19′784 89′023 177′998
In contrast to the first protocol, the token-generation now depends on the number of
ticket-granting servers and services in the system.
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E.2.7 Token-Generation Ticket-Granting Servers
Table E.16 contains the bare numbers for the registration measurements of the ticket-granting
servers for the first protocol. The corresponding boxplots are given in Figure E.16. Note, the
numbers are accumulated, i.e., all computation done during the token-generation phase by the





























Figure E.16: Box-Plots of the ticket-granting servers token-generation measurements in ms for
the second protocol
Table E.16: Percentiles for token-generation in milliseconds for the ticket-granting server of the
second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 1′178 3′389 6′144 2′567 6′221 10′826 8′058 15′092 24′520
25%: 1′183 3′407 6′217 2′576 6′244 10′899 8′430 15′348 24′673
Med.: 1′187 3′423 6′342 2′592 6′272 11′063 9′068 15′445 24′851
75%: 1′199 3′483 6′475 2′652 6′435 11′302 9′198 15′895 25′369
90%: 1′224 3′533 6′654 2′681 6′547 11′484 9′333 16′436 25′739
95%: 1′247 3′561 6′780 2′707 6′599 11′568 9′555 16′857 26′085
Max.: 1′304 3′627 7′485 2′780 6′726 11′932 9′719 17′265 26′541
Avg.: 1′197 3′450 6′396 2′616 6′342 11′124 8′894 15′677 25′054
In contrast to the first protocol, the token-generation now depends on the number of
ticket-granting servers and services in the system.
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E.2.8 Communication User
Table E.17 contains the bare numbers for the communication measurements of the user for the





























Figure E.17: Box-Plots of the user communication measurements in ms for the second protocol
Table E.17: Percentiles for communication in milliseconds for the user of the second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 772 768 770 1′173 1′179 1′181 2′242 2′185 2′230
25%: 778 778 783 1′192 1′198 1′206 2′328 2′244 2′266
Med.: 782 785 794 1′200 1′206 1′221 2′580 2′264 2′289
75%: 789 793 813 1′212 1′228 1′238 2′616 2′306 2′335
90%: 801 802 826 1′225 1′246 1′259 2′651 2′415 2′378
95%: 812 806 832 1′231 1′258 1′287 2′662 2′488 2′396
Max.: 827 811 870 1′271 1′345 1′319 2′677 2′603 2′462
Avg.: 786 786 799 1′204 1′215 1′226 2′505 2′294 2′305
This shows that the communication phase, in contrast to the first protocol, now also depends
on how many ticket-granting servers are in the system.
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E.2.9 Communication Service
Table E.18 contains the bare numbers for the communication measurements of the user for the






























Figure E.18: Box-Plots of the service communication measurements in ms for the second protocol
Table E.18: Percentiles for communication in milliseconds for the service of the second protocol
|T| 3 5 10
|S| 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000 100 500 1′000
Min.: 1′626 1′636 1′638 2′660 2′673 2′685 5′327 5′254 5′287
25%: 1′652 1′649 1′665 2′685 2′699 2′724 5′556 5′338 5′379
Med.: 1′660 1′658 1′695 2′697 2′720 2′759 6′122 5′388 5′426
75%: 1′677 1′677 1′719 2′733 2′771 2′797 6′214 5′456 5′541
90%: 1′701 1′701 1′771 2′784 2′816 2′819 6′266 5′621 5′628
95%: 1′712 1′722 1′801 2′805 2′858 2′898 6′300 5′764 5′716
Max.: 1′723 1′738 1′863 2′907 3′008 2′961 6′491 6′093 5′902
Avg.: 1′667 1′667 1′702 2′716 2′744 2′767 5′957 5′431 5′466
This shows that the communication phase, in contrast to the first protocol, now also depends
on how many ticket-granting servers are in the system.
Appendix F
Proof of Theorem 4.4
This section is devoted to prove Theorem 4.4, i.e., showing that the modified Bellare-Rogaway
encryption as described in Section 4.1.3 achieves the notion of RECV-SIM security in the
random-oracle model.
Proof. The proof is related to the one given by Nielsen [Nie02] for his construction. The proof
also reduces the security of our construction to the one-wayness of the underlying trapdoor
permutation. For the sake of readability, the simulator SIMNCE is described first. Afterwards, is
proven, via a sequence of games, that the scheme with the given simulator is RECV-SIM-secure,
as required by definition. The simulator processes its tasks as follows.
Key Generation. On input of (PUBLICKEY, 1λ), the simulator SIMNCE generates (f, f−1,Σ)
$← KeyGenTDP(1λ). It stores skENC = f−1, and returns (f,Σ) as pkENC.
Encryption. On input of (ENCRYPT, k, `), SIMNCE draws r $← Σ. It also saves the randomness
r for further usage. Namely, if the same r was drawn before, the simulator aborts. Let
l ← |ec(1k)|/λ.1 Set c(1) ← f(r), ci(2) $← {0, 1}λ, for all 0 < i ≤ l, and c(3) $← {0, 1}λ.
SIMNCE returns c← (c(1), (c1(2), c2(2), . . . , c2(l)), c(3)).
RO Queries. With the input of (ROQUERY, q) both random oracles G and K are addressed,
i.e., it is assumed that q is prefixed accordingly (e.g., q = (G, q′)). If the input does not
satisfy this format, SIMNCE ignores the inputs (in the real world, the same behavior is
enforced by definition). LG and LK is used as a short-hand notation to refer to the lists of
queries and answers to G and K, respectively. If for any of the random-oracle queries the
simulator draws a response twice, it aborts.
Decryption. On input (DECRYPT, (c(1), (c1(2), c2(2), . . . , ck(2)), c(3)), `), SIMNCE checks if a preim-
age (r′, k,m′, `) of c(3) for K and images of (i, r′) for G and all 1 < i ≤ k have been
defined. Let (m′1,m′2, . . . ,m′k′) ← ec(m′). If k 6= k′, the simulator returns ⊥. It then
checks whether ci(2) = G(i, r′)⊕m′i for all 1 < i ≤ k, and c(1) = f(r′) holds. If so SIMNCE
returns m′. Otherwise, the simulator makes the missing oracle calls. If these make the
ciphertext valid, the simulator aborts, otherwise it returns ⊥.
1Note, this is always an integer.
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Key Leakage. On input of (KEYLEAK,Q), SIMNCE must program the random oracles to ensure
consistent decryption of ciphertexts as the adversary will receive the secret key skENC.
That is, for all cj = (c1,j, (c1(2,j), c2(2,j), . . . , c
kj
(2,j)), c(3,j)), and mj ∈ Q, it programs G and K
as follows: Let (m1,j, . . .mkj ,j)← ec(mj). SIMNCE adds ((i, (f−1(c(1,j)))),mi,j ⊕ ci(2,j)) for
0 < i ≤ kj to LG and adds ((f−1(c(1,j)), kj,mj, `j), c(3,j)) to LK. Finally, SIMNCE returns
the secret key skENC, i.e., f−1. If the programming fails at some point, i.e., a preimage
already exists, the simulator aborts.
Now is shown that the simulator is such that the adversary will output 1 in both experiments
with essentially the same probability. By Pi the probability that A outputs 1 in Game i is
denoted.
Game 0: In the first game, the real protocol is run with the adversary, i.e., RECV-SIM-real.
Hence, it holds that:
Pr[ExpRECV-SIM-realENC,A (1λ) = 1] = P0
Game 1: Next, each query (mi, `i) to OEncENC and the corresponding answer ci is stored in
a list LEncENC . In particular, it is encrypted honestly, but ((mi, `i), ci) is stored in a list LEncENC .
Whenever the adversary queries the decryption oracle with (ci, `i), mi is returned, if an entry
((mi, `i), c(i)) ∈ LEncENC for some mi exists. In other words, such ciphertexts are not decrypted
anymore. This is only an internal change, due to the perfect correctness of the scheme it holds
that: ∣∣∣P0 − P1∣∣∣ = 0
Game 2: Now, start gradually building the simulator SIMNCE. In the first step, the
simulator SIMNCE receives control of the random oracles G and K. Abort, if the simulator draws
a response twice. This only happens with probability q
2
h
2λ due to the birthday paradox, where qh
is the number of random oracle queries made. Thus, it holds that:∣∣∣P1 − P2∣∣∣ ≤ q2h2λ
Game 3: Next, the simulator SIMNCE generates the key pair. In particular, on input
of (PUBLICKEY, 1λ), it generates (pkENC, skENC)
$← KeyGenENC(1λ), and returns (pkENC, skENC).
This step is purely conceptional, so it holds that:∣∣∣P2 − P3∣∣∣ = 0
Game 4: Now, the encryption oracle OEncENC is simulated by SIMNCE, i.e., on input of
(ENCRYPT,m, `) (the simulator at this point still receives the full message m), the simulator
draws r $← Σ, calculates c $← EncENC(skENC,m, `; r), and returns (r, c). Note, Σ is exponential in
size. However, the simulator aborts, if it draws a randomness ri a twice. This only happens
with probability at most q2|Σ| due to the birthday paradox, where q is the number of queries made
to EncENC. Hence, it holds that: ∣∣∣P3 − P4∣∣∣ ≤ q2|Σ|
F-3
Game 5: Next, the simulator SIMNCE takes over the decryption of cipher-texts. On input
of (DECRYPT, c, `), SIMNCE runs the decryption algorithms and returns the results. This is only
a conceptual change, so it holds that: ∣∣∣P4 − P5∣∣∣ = 0
Game 6: The simulator SIMNCE now no longer returns skENC directly after creation, but
only when it is queried with (KEYLEAK, ·), which is sent once the adversary is finished with its
query phase. As skENC is not required in the meantime, this is a conceptional change only, thus
the following is true: ∣∣∣P5 − P6∣∣∣ = 0
Game 7: The simulator now always returns ⊥ whenever the adversary queries the de-
cryption oracle with a ciphertext c for which not all random oracle calls have been made. In
particular, the simulator checks whether a preimage (r′, k,m, `) of c(3) for K, and images of (i, r′)
for G and all 1 < i ≤ k have been defined and whether ci(2) = G(i, r′)⊕mi for all 1 < i ≤ k and
c(1) = f(r′) holds, while k = |ec(1
k)|
λ
must hold. If any of these checks fail, the simulator outputs
⊥. Note, the preimages are unique if they exist. Also, the simulator makes the missing random
oracle calls. If these turn the ciphertext into a valid one, the simulator aborts. The adversary
will only notice a difference to the Game 6 if the latter happens, which is with probability at
most qhqd2λ , where qh is the number of random oracle queries made and qd denotes the number of
calls to the decryption oracle. Hence, it holds that:∣∣∣P6 − P7∣∣∣ ≤ qhqd2λ
Game 8: Now gradually change the simulator’s input; instead of giving SIMNCE the message
m before it has to come up with an encryption c, the challenger provides m after the adversary
is done with its query phase, i.e., when the simulator receives (KEYLEAK,Q). In particular,
the simulator SIMNCE only receives (ENCRYPT, |m|, `) instead of (ENCRYPT,m, `). Eventually,
(KEYLEAK,Q) (containing the messages the cipher-texts should contain) is sent to SIMNCE,
which allows SIMNCE to program the random oracles accordingly. It is now proven that this only
affects the view of the adversary negligibly by a series of hybrids. Let q be an upper bound of
queries to the encryption oracle.
Hybrid 8.j: Up to encryption query j, where 0 ≤ j ≤ q, the simulator SIMNCE is given
(ENCRYPT, |m|, `) instead of (ENCRYPT,m, `). So, Game 8.0 is identical to Game 7. On input
(ENCRYPT,m, `), the simulator behaves as before. Now is described how the simulator SIMNCE
proceeds on inputs (ENCRYPT, |m|, `). It draws r $← Σ as in EncENC and sets c(1) ← f(r). Let
l ← |ec(1|m|)|
λ
. For each 0 < i ≤ l, SIMNCE draws ci(2) $← {0, 1}λ. Finally, it draws c(3) $← {0, 1}λ
and returns c ← (c(1), c(2), c(3)). Note, the distributions of c are exactly the same as honest
encryptions for the same message length |m|.
Eventually, SIMNCE is queried (KEYLEAK,Q) and thus receives the message m corresponding
to each (ENCRYPT, |m|, `) call made earlier. To achieve consistent decryption, the simulator
now programs the random oracles K and G, such that a decryption of each generated c (with
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the correct label `) returns the corresponding m. Let (m1,m2, . . . ,mk)← ec(m). SIMNCE adds
((i, r),mi ⊕ ci(2)) for each block mi, 0 < i ≤ k in m to LG . Additionally, it adds ((r, k,m, `), c(3))
to LK. This programming may fail if one of these preimages already exists in LG or LK. This is
only possible if the adversary had already queried (r, k,m, `) to K or (i, r) for some i, 0 < i ≤ k
to G, as SIMNCE always draws fresh random coins.
Reduction: Assuming that the adversary can distinguish between Hybrid 8.j and Hybrid
8.j + 1, One can turn the adversary A into an adversary B which inverts a given element c,
i.e., outputs f−1(c) with non-negligible probability. To do so, adversary B receives c and the
corresponding parameters Σ and f from the trapdoor game. It embeds the challenge c for
A as follows. It draws a random index j $← {1, 2, . . . , l} and then on the jth query to the
encryption oracle, c(1) is not calculated from a honestly drawn r, but is set to the provided
challenge c, i.e., c(1) ← c. Every other query is processed as in the prior game. In particular,
one can extract r = f−1(c(1)) from LG or LK resp., and can therefore simulate the decryption
oracle, if queried with a correctly computed ciphertext. Note that other ciphertexts are already
excluded. Hence, the embedding does not change the view of the adversary. Assuming that
one cannot program the random oracles accordingly, i.e., the adversary notices a difference
to the prior game, then the adversary must have made a query (r′, k′,m′, `′) to the random
oracle K, such that c = c(1) = f(r′), or a query (i, r′) for some i, 0 < i ≤ k, to G for some
c = (c(1), c(2), c(3)) returned by SIMNCE. Let the probability of this event be l. One can now
derive that B can invert f with probability l
l
, which is non-negligible, if l is non-negligible.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that the element c cannot be inverted with noticeable




Clearly, q is at most polynomial, and therefore the given sum is also negligible.
Game 9: Finally, RECV-SIM-ideal is run with the simulator given in Game 8. This is only
an internal change: the adversary does not note any difference:∣∣∣P8 − P9∣∣∣ = 0
As an upper bound, one can therefore derive:
∣∣∣P0 − P9∣∣∣ ≤ 9∑
i=1
∣∣∣Pi−1 − Pi∣∣∣
which is negligible. Clearly this also means that:∣∣∣Pr[ExpRECV-SIM-realENC,A (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExpRECV-SIM-idealENC,A,SIMNCE (λ) = 1]∣∣∣




The Pass2Sign scheme (i.e., the one with message blindness) was implemented to have per-
formance figures demonstrating its practicality. Summarized, setup with a decent security
parameter (4,096 Bit Moduli for both the non-committing encryption and the signatures) takes
roughly 20 seconds, while for each signature generation the non-optimized implementation takes
far less than two seconds. In a real-life deployment, this performance is more than sufficient for
most use-cases.
Setting. Measured were the setup and sign protocol with three different RSA-moduli sizes,
1,024, 2,048, and 4,096 Bit to account for different security requirements. The key size is used
for both the signing key and the RSA trapdoor permutation in the non-committing encryption
scheme. To instantiate the random oracles K,G, and H SHA-512 is used. Each call was prefixed
accordingly. The instantiation of the full-domain hash HRSA is based on the construction given
in [BR93], and uses rejection sampling to uniformly map into Z∗N . The pseudo-code is depicted
in Figure 1, based on the ideas given by Fra¨drich et al. [FPP+16].
Data: Modulus N , a hash-function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗
Result: A hash h uniformly distributed in Z∗N
c← 0;
h← ⊥;
s← b((|N | − 1)/λ)c+ 1; //|N | is the bit-length of N
while true do
h← H(N,m, c)||H(N,m, c+ 1)|| . . . ||H(N,m, c+ s− 1);
h← h (s · λ− |N |); //shift out excessive bits





Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of the FDH-Implementation
The implementation uses Java 8. The server was run on a Intel i7-3740QM with 2.7GHz
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and 16GB RAM, while the device was a Nexus 10 with 1.7GHz, 2GB RAM and Android
5.1.1. Not implemented were any optimizations such as multi-threading, RSA-CRT, connection
pooling, or keep-alive of connections. The communication partners send messages using standard
TCP-Sockets, and open a new connection for each new sub-protocol. This time is included in
the measurements. FAuth has been implemented using digital signatures with pre-shared keys.
Calls to FCA are included in the measurements. However, the measurements do not contain
network round-trip times (typically between 20ms and 400ms), as these clearly depend on the
current locations of the server and the user, and only add an additional constant to the bare
run-time measurements. For example, assuming a round-trip time of 100ms, one can roughly
add these 100ms to the combined run-time.
As the timings should focus on the protocol, they do not include the generation of the setup
parameters such as the keys for the non-comitting encryption scheme, or the generation of the
session and query identifiers sid, qid.
For all the following confidence intervals and tables 100 runs were measured.
Setup Protocol. For measuring the setup protocol, the password that is an input to the
protocol is a fixed string. The runtime box-plots are in Figure G.2 for the device and Figure G.1







Figure G.1: Box-Plots of the setup protocol measurements in ms for the server
As it can be seen, the time for the setup on the device varies a lot, which results from the
randomized RSA-key generation algorithm. Compared with the key generation on smart-cards,
the protocol (including communication time) is still significantly faster though. For a 2,048
Bit modulus, even rather powerful smart-cards take more than one minute for an RSA key
pair generation1, whereas the full setup protocol would take around four seconds on average
including network delay.
Signing Protocol. For each signing request, the correct password was used, i.e., no “failed”
signing attempts were measured. Additionally to the sid now also a query identifier qid is
1http://www.pronew.com.tw/download/doc/400SmartCard080907.pdf (last visit: April 19, 2018)
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Table G.1: Percentiles for setup in milliseconds for the device and server
Device Server
1,024Bit 2,048Bit 4,096Bit 1,024Bit 2,048Bit 4,096Bit
Min.: 180.82 398.27 8′238.22 11.80 55.50 363.10
25%: 443.77 2′063.02 10′760.03 13.22 61.07 376.53
Median: 648.11 3′335.34 14′343.46 14.33 63.96 388.10
75%: 1′130.72 4′700.18 20′913.41 16.14 68.22 396.01
90%: 1′527.36 6′629.75 37′721.16 17.23 74.40 428.47
95%: 2′272.43 7′876.96 40′008.34 19.85 83.44 444.75
Max.: 3′927.65 14′649.61 57′822.42 48.92 99.93 478.49








Figure G.2: Box-Plots of the setup protocol measurements in ms for the device
Table G.2: Percentiles for signing in milliseconds for the device and the server
Device Server
1,024Bit 2,048Bit 4,096Bit 1,024Bit 2,048Bit 4,096Bit
Min.: 16.49 73.47 470.30 10.90 62.43 452.01
25%: 18.06 78.44 478.84 11.32 63.56 454.08
Median: 19.08 79.83 482.61 11.76 64.53 456.38
75%: 20.64 82.38 487.69 12.60 66.58 470.95
90%: 22.25 92.19 671.13 14.41 68.39 501.75
95%: 23.91 113.66 883.83 14.96 72.06 521.64
Max.: 42.80 138.18 4′994.40 27.77 78.98 578.58
Average: 19.79 83.40 574.41 12.31 65.50 466.73
given as input, which is assumed to be generated by an external protocol. The box-plots are in
Figure G.3 and Figure G.4. The corresponding percentiles are depicted in Table G.2.
The figures show that the time required for signing is — from a practical perspective —















Figure G.4: Box-Plots of the signing protocol measurements in ms for the server
nearly constant for each security parameter. Including the communication overhead, the protocol




The construction of the underlying encryption scheme by Nielsen looks very similar to the one
given in Chapter 5. However, it comes without labels and without the “MAC” c(3). The message
and party IDs are omitted to focus on the construction itself, which essentially the well-known
IND-CPA-secure Bellare-Rogaway encryption-scheme [BR93].
Construction H.1 (ENC). Their encryption scheme is given as follows.
KeyGenENC(1λ) : Generate a TDP key pair, i.e., (f, f−1,Σ)
$← KeyGenTDP(1λ). Set MS =
{0, 1}λ. Output the public key pkENC = (f,Σ), and skENC = f−1 as the secret key.
EncENC(pkENC,m) : Draw x
$← SampleTDP(1λ), and compute c(1) ← f(x), and c2 ← H(x)⊕m.
Output the ciphertext c← (c(1), c(2)).
DecENC(skENC, c) : Parse c as (c(1), c(2)). Compute x′ ← f−1(c(1)), and m′ ← H(x′) ⊕ c(2).
Output m′.
Nielsen’s Secure Message Transfer FSMT. As usual, L returns the length of a message m.
Depicted in Figure H.1 is the plain definition given by Nielsen [Nie02]. Note, this definition
does not give away any ciphertext to the environment.
1. Send. Upon input (SEND,mid, j,m) of party Pi do:
• Deliver (RECEIVE,mid, i,m) to Pj , and send (RECEIVE,mid, i,L(m)) to A.




The TAG-Based Chameleon-Hash by
Brzuska et al.
Here, the construction by Brzuska et al. [BFF+09] is restated, in their model. A reformulation
in the given framework is straightforward.
Construction I.1 (CH). Let Hx : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗x, x ∈ N, denote a random oracle. Now, their
chameleon-hash is defined as follows:
PPGenCH. The algorithm PPGenCH generates the public parameters in the following way:
1. Return ∅.
KeyGenCH. The algorithm KeyGenCH generates the key pair in the following way:
1. Generate two primes p and q using RSAGen(1λ), which also outputs e coprime to ϕ(N).
Set skCH = (p, q). Let N = pq. Set pkCH = (N, e).
2. Return (pkCH, skCH).
HashCH. To hash a message m with a tag τ , randomness r w.r.t. pkCH = (N, e) do:
1. Let g ← HN(τ,m).
2. Let h← gre mod N .
3. Return h.
AdaptCH. To find a collision w.r.t. m with tags τ , τ ′, m′, randomness r, and skCH do:
1. Compute g ← HN(τ,m), and h← gre mod N .
2. Compute g′ ← HN(τ ′,m′) and r′ ← (h(g′−1))d mod N .
3. Return r′.





Additional Security Properties for SSS
Here, some additional definitions for SSS are given, which are not needed for the main part of
this thesis. Namely, these are unlinkability and non-interactive public accountability.
Unlinkability. Unlinkability prohibits an adversary to decide how a signature was generated,
i.e., from which signature a sanitized signature was derived. This is the stronger definition by
Brzuska et al. [BPS13], where even the signer can be malicious. This game is similar to privacy
with the same constraints. Namely, compared to the privacy game, the adversary can also input
the signatures to be used. It receives full oracle access, while the signing, and the proof oracles,











where oracle LoRSanit on input of m0,MOD0, σ0,m1,MOD1, σ1, pkSigSSS, b:
return ⊥, if ADM0 6= ADM1 ∨ MOD0(m0) 6= MOD1(m1) ∨
ADM0(MOD0) 6= ADM1(MOD1) ∨
VerifySSS(m0, σ0, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS) 6= VerifySSS(m1, σ1, pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS)
return (m′, σ′)← SanitSSS(mb,MODb, σb, pkSigSSS, skSanSSS)
return 1, if a = b
return 0
Figure J.1: SSS Unlinkability
Definition J.1 (Unlinkability). An SSS is unlinkable, if for any efficient adversary A there
exists a negligible function ν such that∣∣∣∣Pr[UnlinkabilitySSSA (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
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where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure J.1.
Non-Interactive Public Accountability. Non-interactive public accountability allows ev-
eryone to decide whether a sanitizer was involved. This is modeled by requiring that JudgeSSS









(pk∗,m∗, σ∗) $← AOSignSSS(·,sk
Sig
SSS,·,·),OSanitSSS(·,·,·,·,skSanSSS)(pkSigSSS, pkSanSSS)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , q let (mi,ADMi, pkSanSSS,i) and σi
index the queries/answers to/from SignSSS
for j = 1, 2, . . . , q′ let (mj,MODj, σj, pkSigSSS,j) and (m′j, σ′j)
index the queries/answers to/from SanitSSS
return 1, if VerifySSS(m∗, σ∗, pkSigSSS, pk∗) = true ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} : (pk∗,m∗, σ∗) 6= (pkSanSSS,i,mi, σi) ∧
JudgeSSS(m∗, σ∗, pkSigSSS, pk∗,⊥) = Signer
return 1, if VerifySSS(m∗, σ∗, pk∗, pkSanSSS) = true ∧
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q′} : (pk∗,m∗, σ∗) 6= (pkSigSSS,j,m′j, σ′j) ∧
JudgeSSS(m∗, σ∗, pk∗, pkSanSSS,⊥) = Sanitizer
return 0
Figure J.2: SSS Public Accountability
Definition J.2 (Non-Interactive Public Accountability). An SSS is non-interactive publicly
accountable, if for any efficient adversary A there exists a negligible function ν such that:
Pr[Pub-AccountabilitySSSA (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ)
where the corresponding experiment is defined in Figure J.2.
